Christine D. Hauck v. Phillip D. Walker, individually and in his capacity as a Clark County Deputy Sheriff;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTINE D. HAUCK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PHILLIP D. WALKER, individually and
in his capacity as a Clark County Deputy
Sheriff; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-35299
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05729-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Christine D. Hauck appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations in
connection with her arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
JUN 02 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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review de novo. Case v. Kitsap Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir.
2001). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hauck’s wrongful
arrest claim on the ground that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
because at the time of the arrest it would not have been clear to every reasonable
officer that an arrest pursuant to an out-of-state warrant violated plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 741 (2011)
(explaining two-part test for qualified immunity); see also Case, 249 F.3d at 926-
30 (Washington law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity
because a reasonable officer could have believed that it was legal to arrest plaintiff
pursuant to an Oregon warrant).
However, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Hauck’s
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Hauck provided evidence that
Walker slammed her head into the ground using the full weight of his body when
she turned toward him while being escorted to the patrol car and that she was not
attempting to spit on him. Accordingly, Hauck raised a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether Walker’s actions were objectively unreasonable. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a) (summary judgment requires the moving party to show that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d
14-35299 2

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646, 651-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (framework for analyzing an excessive force claim
under the Fourth Amendment). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings on this claim.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
14-35299 3

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