Samarjeet Gill v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAMARJEET GILL,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-73656
Agency No. A200-944-658
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Samarjeet Gill, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the
agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility
determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738
(9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on the inconsistency between Gill’s statement at his credible fear interview
and his later statements regarding his residence in England, the omission of his
most severe incident of harm at his credible fear interview, the inconsistency as to
why Gill supported his political party in India, and the inconsistency as to the
alleged threatening telephone calls. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048
(9th Cir. 2010) (agency’s adverse credibility determination was reasonable under
the “totality of circumstances”); see also Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Material alterations in the applicant’s account of persecution are
sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding.”). The record does not support
Gill’s contention that the agency relied on speculation and conjecture. We reject
Gill’s contentions that the agency erred by relying on his credible fear interview,
see Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2004), and his contentions that
the agency did not analyze his claim properly, see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d
983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency need not “write an exegesis on every

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contention”). In the absence of credible testimony in this case, Gill’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims fail. See Jiang, 754 F.3d at 740.
Gill’s CAT claim also fails because it is based on the same testimony the
agency found not credible, and Gill does not point to any other evidence that
compels the finding it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to
India. See id. at 740-41. We reject his contention that the BIA failed to analyze
his CAT claim properly. See Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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