United States of America v. Jobeth Lester Dejesus

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOBETH LESTER DEJESUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50024
D.C. No. 3:16-cr-01790-JLS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 16, 2018**
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Jobeth Lester DeJesus appeals from the sentence imposed following his
guilty-plea conviction for possession of images of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
JAN 29 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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DeJesus contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
acknowledge its discretion to reject the child pornography guidelines on policy
grounds under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and by providing
an insufficient explanation for the sentence. The record reflects that the district
court recognized its Kimbrough discretion, considered DeJesus’s arguments
regarding his mental health, and adequately explained the below-Guidelines
sentence. See United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 752-53 (9th Cir.
2011).
DeJesus next argues that the 51-month term of imprisonment is
substantively unreasonable because the district court gave too much weight to the
Guidelines. The district court properly considered the Guidelines as a starting
point and initial benchmark, as required by Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016), and then gave due consideration to the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing DeJesus’s sentence, which is substantively reasonable in light of the
3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2017).
Finally, DeJesus contends that the 10-year term of supervised release is
substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
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imposing this term of supervised release in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) factors
and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to rehabilitate DeJesus.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 923-24 (9th Cir.
2008).
AFFIRMED.
17-50024 3

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