Jilsca Oppier v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JILSCA OPPIER,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 14-70632
Agency No. A096-362-881
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 10, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Jilsca Oppier (“Oppier”), a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying her motion
to reopen her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
FILED
JUL 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition for review and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this disposition.
Oppier failed to file her motion to reopen within ninety days of the date the
final administrative decision was rendered. Therefore, the motion is time-barred
unless it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.”
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). To show
changed country conditions, Oppier must produce evidence of changed conditions
that are material and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous
proceeding. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition,
she must show prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief requested: asylum,
withholding of removal, or protection under CAT. Id. at 947–48.
1. The BIA abused its discretion in concluding that Oppier failed to show
changed circumstances for Christians in Indonesia between December 15, 2006,
the date of her original hearing, and October 10, 2013, the date she filed her motion
to reopen. “The comparison to be made is not between the motion to reopen and
the previous application, but between the country conditions at the time of the
. . . motion [to reopen], and those at the time of the prior hearing.” Salim v. Lynch,
831 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2016). In Salim v. Lynch, we held that the
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conditions for Christians in Indonesia qualitatively changed between 2006 and
2013. See id. at 1139. That holding controls here because Oppier’s motion to
reopen is based on a change in conditions between 2006 and 2013. Furthermore,
Oppier submitted evidence similar to that of the petitioner in Salim, including
Department of State and United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom country reports, which showed increased threats and attacks against
Christians and their places of worship. In addition, she submitted a declaration,
letter, and medical evidence detailing attacks that her family suffered after 2006 on
account of its religion. Specifically, the evidence describes a 2012 incident in
which extremists broke into Oppier’s brother’s home during a prayer group and
attacked her brother and father, causing her father to break his hand. Accordingly,
Oppier has established changed country conditions in Indonesia sufficient to
excuse the untimeliness of her motion.
2. Oppier has also established prima facie eligibility for asylum. Oppier
established her subjective fear of persecution through her credible testimony in
front of the Immigration Judge. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.
1998). She also established an objectively reasonable fear of persecution based on
her membership in a disfavored group and her individualized risk of persecution.
We have held that Christians in Indonesia are a disfavored group. Tampubolon v.
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Holder, 610 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). Additionally, Oppier submitted
evidence detailing threats and physical attacks against family members on account
of their Christianity that sufficiently demonstrates Oppier’s individualized risk of
persecution. See Salim, 831 F.3d at 1140 (holding that letters from family
members showing that they were subject to threats, intimidation, and limitations on
their religious freedom were sufficient to show an individualized threat of
persecution).
Accordingly, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Oppier’s motion to
reopen based on changed country conditions. The Attorney General, Jefferson B.
Sessions III, shall bear the costs on appeal.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.
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