SANDRA RESTREPO-PEREZ, AKA Patricia Colon v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA RESTREPO-PEREZ, AKA
Patricia Colon,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71091
Agency No. A077-999-746
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted March 15, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,** District Judge.
Sandra Restrepo-Perez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying her untimely
motion to reopen removal proceedings in light of Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) (recognizing “married women in Guatemala who are unable
to leave their relationship” as a particular social group for asylum and withholding
purposes).
The Board concluded that its decision in A-R-C-G- was not a fundamental
change in the law justifying an exercise of its sua sponte authority to reopen
proceedings. The Board further concluded that even if A-R-C-G- had been a
fundamental change, reopening was unwarranted because it would be futile.
Specifically, the Board noted that Restrepo-Perez had failed to show that she
would be able to overcome an independent obstacle to her eligibility for relief upon
reopening by establishing that Colombian authorities were unwilling or unable to
control her persecutor. See Respreto-Perez v. Holder, 553 F. App’x 687 (9th Cir.
2014) (mem.) (concluding, on consideration of a prior petition for review in these
proceedings, that substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision to deny
Restrepo-Perez’s asylum and withholding claims).
Setting aside the question of whether we have jurisdiction to review the
Board’s conclusion that A-R-C-G- was not a fundamental change in the law, we
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s determination, based on its
assessment of the factual record, that reopening would be futile. See Bonilla v.
Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that “this court has
jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the limited

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purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional
error”). That discretionary determination provides independent and unreviewable
grounds for the Board’s order.
Therefore, the petition for review is DISMISSED.

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