United States of America v. Joshua Stephen Doty

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA STEPHEN DOTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10194
D.C. No.
2:15-cr-00133-LRH-PAL-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, N.R. SMITH, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Joshua Doty appeals from his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), arguing that his previous state court conviction for battery
constituting domestic violence under Nevada law does not qualify as a predicate
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 29 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Doty’s entire argument on appeal is premised on the proposition that he was
convicted under section 33.018 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, which is in a civil
portion of that code. We disagree. Both Nevada statutes and Nevada case law
make clear that section 200.485 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, which is in a
criminal portion of that code and which is titled “Battery which constitutes
domestic violence,” is the statute under which Doty was previously convicted.
See, e.g., English v. State, 9 P.3d 60, 64 (Nev. 2000) (“The definition and penalties
for battery constituting domestic violence is [sic] codified at [Nevada Revised
Statute §] 200.485 which took effect on January 1, 1998.”).
Doty has waived any argument as to whether section 200.485 is a categorical
match to the federal definition of misdemeanor domestic violence contained in
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency,
261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]ssues which are not specifically and
distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.”). We therefore
do not reach that issue.
AFFIRMED.

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