Lucille Beck v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company

16-35816Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit15 giu 2018

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUCILLE BECK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-35816
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00879-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
John V. Acosta, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2018
Portland, Oregon
Before: RAWLINSON and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,** District
Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance
FILED
JUN 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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Company (Metropolitan) appeals the district court’s order awarding attorney fees
in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Lucille Beck (Beck). Metropolitan acknowledges
that Or. Rev. Stat. § 742.061 entitled Beck to fees, but contends that the district
court improperly applied a 2.0 multiplier to determine the final fee award. Because
the district court exercised diversity jurisdiction, state law governed the award of
attorney fees. See PSM Holding Corp. v. Nat’l Farm Fin. Corp., 884 F.3d 812,
828 (9th Cir. 2018). We review the award amount for abuse of discretion, and
affirm. See id.
In a fifty-six page order, the district court thoughtfully, carefully, and
thoroughly considered each of the factors set forth in Oregon Revised Statutes §§
20.075(1), (2) in light of the record as a whole. See McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze
Dry, Inc., 957 P.2d 1200, 1208 (Or. 1998). The court adequately explained the
nexus between these statutory factors and the multiplier. See Migis v. Autozone,
Inc., 387 P.3d 381, 404 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). Having overseen the proceedings for
a number of years, the court had ample opportunity to observe the litigation
posture of both parties and evaluate the fee request in light of those observations.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the court did not abuse its “substantial
discretion” in applying the multiplier. See Beaverton Sch. Dist. 48j v. Ward, 384
P.3d 158, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2016); see also Migis, 387 P.3d at 404.
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AFFIRMED.
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