Testo completo
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID CURTIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WEINGARTEN NOSTAT
INCORPORATED, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-17054
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02584-SRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 10, 2018**
Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
David Curtis appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his diversity action alleging breach of an agreement under state law. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Lukovsky v. City &
County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 12 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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2 17-17054
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Curtis’s breach of
contract claim premised on an oral agreement because it is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-550 (four-year general statute of
limitations for any action other than for recovery of real property for which no
limitation is otherwise prescribed); Hawkinson Tire Co. v. Paul E. Hawkinson Co.,
476 P.2d 864, 865 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (the statute of limitations begins to run on
the date of the alleged breach). Contrary to Curtis’s contention, the district court
properly concluded that the breach alleged by Curtis did not arise from the parties’
written lease agreement. See Long v. Buckley, 629 P.2d 557, 562 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981) (“For the purpose of application of the six year period of limitations,
the act which is alleged to give rise to the breach must bear some connection to the
writing itself.”).
AFFIRMED.
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