Steven Peck; v. Margaret Hinchey, individually

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN PECK; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MARGARET HINCHEY, individually and
in her official capacity as a peace officer
with the Arizona Attorney General's Office,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-16397
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01371-JAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 4, 2019**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, IKUTA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Steven Peck, Benjamin Sywarungsymun, Aaron Lentz,
and Shannon Lentz (“Plaintiffs”) brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General Special Agent Margaret Hinchey. In that
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 7 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
action, Plaintiffs alleged that Hinchey violated their due process rights and
maliciously caused their prosecution by fabricating evidence in several reports to
the Arizona Attorney General to show that they worked fewer hours in an off-duty
job than they had reported working, constituting theft. The district court granted
summary judgment to Hinchey on both the deliberate fabrication and malicious
prosecution claims on the basis of qualified immunity.1 We review de novo the
district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Longoria v. Pinal Cty., 873 F.3d
699, 703-04 (9th Cir. 2017).
We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the deliberate fabrication
claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
see Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015), Plaintiffs have failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact that Hinchey deliberately made a false
statement or fabricated evidence, as opposed to making reasonable mistakes in
methodology or in interpreting data. See Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798-99
(9th Cir. 2017). Nor have Plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact that
Hinchey knew or should have known that Plaintiffs were innocent or that Hinchey
used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that she knew or
should have known that those techniques would yield false information. See
1 We had previously determined that Hinchey was not entitled to absolute
immunity in an earlier appeal. See Peck v. Hinchey, 655 F. App’x 534, 536 (9th
Cir. 2016).

-- 2 of 3 --

3
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). And because
Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal that Hinchey acted with malice is entirely dependent
on the premise that Hinchey deliberately fabricated evidence, we affirm on the
malicious prosecution claim as well.
AFFIRMED.2
2 We grant Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an annotated version of their
controverting statement of facts and bookmarked PDF copy of the excerpts of
record.
We also remind Plaintiffs, however, that “it is not our task, or that of the
district court, to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of material fact. We
rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence
that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.
1996) (quotations and brackets omitted). Factual citations in parties’ briefs should
identify that evidence. Many citations in Plaintiffs’ briefs do not. In many
instances, an individual citation directs the court to several different parts of the
record, the vast majority of which provide little or no support for the cited
proposition. In that respect, these briefs “obfuscate[] rather than promote[] an
understanding of the facts.” See id. That is not of assistance to this court and does
not support an argument that there are genuine issues of fact.

-- 3 of 3 --