Thomas Finn v. City of Boulder City;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS FINN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF BOULDER CITY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-15185
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01835-JAD-GWF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, FARRIS, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Finn appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
Finn’s action alleging claims under Title VII, the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Finn’s Title VII
retaliation claims because Finn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he engaged in protected activity or whether there was a causal link
between protected activity and any adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–3(a) (describing protected activity under Title VII); Cornwell v. Electra
Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth elements
of a prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star
Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (decision maker’s
knowledge of protected activity necessary for causation).
Assuming without deciding that Finn raised a cognizable claim under Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 289.010-.120, the district court properly granted summary judgment
because Finn failed to present evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether defendants violated or engaged in activity giving rise
to procedural protections provided by the statute. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen.
Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive
summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific
facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Finn’s FMLA
claim because Finn failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his

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“taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to
terminate [him].” Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th
Cir. 2001).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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