Robert R. Soto v. LHM CORPORATION, DBA TVW Larry H Miller Volkswagon of Tucson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT R. SOTO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LHM CORPORATION, DBA TVW Larry
H Miller Volkswagon of Tucson,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-16993
D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00597-DTF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
D. Thomas Ferraro, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 12, 2019***
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Robert R. Soto appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of his employment. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Soto’s request for oral
argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
FILED
SEP 16 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Eclectic
Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Soto’s Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
claims because Soto failed to allege facts sufficient to set forth a prima facie case
of discrimination, retaliation or hostile work environment. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 340-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief); Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105-08 (9th Cir.
2008) (discussing McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework applicable to
Title VII and § 1981 claims; setting forth prima facie cases of discrimination,
retaliation and hostile work environment).
The district court properly dismissed Soto’s contract claims because Soto
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim under Arizona law. See
Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 83 P.3d 1103, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (setting forth
elements of a breach of contract claim); see also FL Receivables Tr. 2002–A v.
Ariz. Mills, L.L.C., 281 P.3d 1028, 1037 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (a contracting party
breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by denying the other
party the reasonably expected benefits of the contract).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of
Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend
when amendment would be futile”).
AFFIRMED.

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