United States v. 2020-10-09 | 19-71008 | ALI CHALES V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALI CHALES,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 19-71008

Agency No. A215-617-325

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review From an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 6, 2020
**

Seattle, Washington

Before: CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,
***
District
Judge.

Ali Chales, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in which the BIA affirmed the

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED

OCT 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and denied Chales’ applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on
an adverse credibility determination. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review an Immigration Judge’s credibility determinations under the
substantial evidence standard. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.
2010). Where the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and adds no reasoning of its own,
“we treat the incorporated parts as the BIA’s.” Aguilar–Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d
701, 704 (9th Cir. 2010). “[W]e do not review those parts of the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding that the BIA did not identify as ‘most significant’ and did not
otherwise mention.” Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008).
Petitioner fled Cameroon after military or police officers allegedly detained
and beat him because of his affiliation with the Southern Cameroons National
Council (“SCNC”), a political group opposed to the governing party. Petitioner
claims that because of his activities in connection with the SCNC, he was thrice
arrested, detained, and beaten by police or military officers. After his second arrest,
Chales asserts police beat him until he lost consciousness; he was found and rescued,
and he received monthlong treatment for his injuries.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Petitioner’s
testimony about who rescued him from the bush, how long the Cameroonian police
detained him, how frequently the police beat him during detention, and where he

3
was arrested for the second time were plainly inconsistent with statements Chales
made during his asylum officer interview. For example, when asked to explain
inconsistencies about the identity of his rescuer, Chales stated that “when he
regained consciousness in the woman’s house, he saw her husband and thought that
he had rescued him.” The IJ discounted this explanation, not only because an
affidavit on the record contradicted the explanation, but also because Chales never
mentioned a woman rescuer to the asylum officer, nor did he mention the woman’s
husband during in-court testimony. When asked to explain inconsistencies about the
length of his detention, the frequency with which he was beaten in detention, and the
town of his second arrest, Chales stated that he did not make or did not remember
making the inconsistent statements. The IJ found these explanations unreasonable
because Chales never alleged any interpretation issues and his responses failed to
reconcile the inconsistent statements. Because the IJ specifically and cogently
identified reasons for finding Chales’ testimony not credible and drew on record
evidence to support that reasoning, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
determination.
Further, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that country
conditions evidence did not independently corroborate Chales’ non-credible

4
testimony.
1
“Evidence of background country conditions alone cannot establish that
specific acts of persecution did or did not occur.” Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458
F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). Because country conditions evidence cannot
corroborate Chales’ account of government persecution targeting him specifically,
the BIA did not err by determining that country conditions evidence has little
corroborative weight.
Finally, substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioner
failed to establish “it is more likely than not he [ ] would be tortured if removed” to
Cameroon. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “[W]hen a petitioner’s ‘claims under the
[CAT] are based on the same statements . . . that the BIA determined to be not
credible’ in the asylum context, the agency may rely upon the same credibility
determination in denying both the asylum and CAT claims.” Singh v. Lynch, 802
F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Farah v. Ashcroft,
348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003)). Because Petitioner’s CAT claim is based on
the same testimony and corroborative evidence about his arrests, detainments, and

1
The corroborative weight of the affidavits submitted by Chales’ family members,
friends, and nurse is not properly before this Court. “[E]xhaustion of administrative
remedies is a prerequisite to our jurisdiction.” Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677
(9th Cir. 2004). Chales “d[id] not meaningfully challenge the Immigration Judge’s
finding that the affidavits submitted by members of [his] family and community in
support of his claim should be accorded little evidentiary weight” before the BIA.
Thus, the claim is unexhausted and therefore falls outside our jurisdiction. See
Barron, 358 F.3d at 677.

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injuries in Cameroon as Petitioner’s asylum claim, substantial evidence supports the
denial of protection under CAT.
PETITION DENIED.