United States v. 2020-12-08 | 19-55420 | CLEMENTE HUERTA-JIMENEZ V. CHAD WOLF | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CLEMENTE HUERTA-JIMENEZ;
ERMELINDA PEREZ,

Petitioners-Appellants,

v.

CHAD F. WOLF, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security;
RONALD D. VITIELLO; WILLIAM P.
BARR, Attorney General; UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 19-55420

D.C. No.
3:19-cv-00150-MMA-BLM

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020
**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

DEC 8 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-55420
Clemente Huerta-Jimenez and Ermelinda Perez appeal from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo, Zavala
v. Ives, 785 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.
The district court did not err in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over
petitioners’ 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. See Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (habeas jurisdiction over
expedited removal orders is limited to “to an inquiry over whether: ‘(A) the
petitioner is an alien, (B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such
section, and (C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence’”
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2))); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (courts generally lack
jurisdiction to hear claims arising from the Attorney General’s decision to
commence proceedings); J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032-33 (9th Cir.
2016) (no matter how a claim is framed, if it “challenges the procedure and
substance of an agency determination that is inextricably linked to the order of
removal, it is prohibited by section 1252(a)(5)” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
In light of this disposition, we need not reach petitioners’ contentions
regarding constructive custody. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th

3 19-55420
Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the
results they reach).
Petitioners’ contentions concerning the Suspension Clause are foreclosed by
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969-71 (2020) (where
petitioner “does not want simple release but, ultimately, the opportunity to remain
lawfully in the United States” the relief requested falls outside the scope of the writ
and the Suspension Clause argument fails).
AFFIRMED.