Elizabeth Isham v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIZABETH ISHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-36076
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05245-MLP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: RAWLINSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,*** Senior
District Judge.
FILED
MAR 18 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., Senior United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.

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Elizabeth Isham (Isham) appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Isham’s application for disability
insurance benefits.
1. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) considered the medical opinion
of Isham’s treating physician, who opined that Isham had severe limitations in
sitting, standing, handling, fingering, and reaching. Although the ALJ agreed that
Isham could only perform sedentary work, the ALJ did not give the treating
physician’s opinion on Isham’s physical limitations controlling weight because his
opinion was unsupported by the record. See Coleman v. Saul, 979 F.3d 751, 757
(9th Cir. 2020) (holding that ALJ did not err in discounting opinions of treating
physicians that were not supported by the record).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s discounting of Isham’s
subjective complaints of pain. See Coleman, 979 F.3d at 755 (applying substantial
evidence standard). The ALJ considered Isham’s allegations regarding the
limitations caused by pain from her severe impairments, which center around
degenerative disc disease. The ALJ found that although the impairments could
cause Isham’s symptoms, the objective medical evidence—MRIs and an x-ray,
treatment notes, and conservative course of treatment—did not support the asserted
limitations. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming
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discounting of pain testimony from degenerative disc disease in light of objective
medical evidence); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
2008) (deeming permissible ALJ’s inference that “pain was not as all-disabling as
[the petitioner] reported” given his conservative treatment). Nonetheless, the ALJ
limited Isham to sedentary work.
3. Finally, the ALJ took into account the testimony from Isham’s
husband, who outlined Isham’s daily limitations. The ALJ gave the testimony
little weight because it was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. See
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that an “ALJ
need only give germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses”
and “[i]nconsistency with medical evidence is one such reason”) (citation omitted).
4. Isham has not established good cause for a sentence six remand. See
Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 463 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (“A claimant
does not meet the good cause requirement [for a sentence six remand] by merely
obtaining a more favorable report once his or her claim has been denied.”). Nor is
a sentence four remand warranted, because the agency did not err in denying
benefits. See Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED.
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