Blanca Rubidia Rojas-Guillen v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BLANCA RUBIDIA ROJAS-GUILLEN,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-71372
Agency No. A078-930-377
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Immigration Judge
Submitted April 20, 2021**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Blanca Rojas-Guillen, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se
for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.31(a) that she did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in El
Salvador and thus is not entitled to relief from her reinstated removal order. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 30 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review an IJ’s negative reasonable
fear determination for substantial evidence. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d
829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Rojas-Guillen
failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in El Salvador on account
of a protected ground. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011)
(even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must
still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such
group”); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s
“desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random
violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Rojas-Guillen
failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or
acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See Andrade-Garcia,
828 F.3d at 836-37 (no reasonable possibility of torture with government
acquiescence).
We reject as unsupported by the record Rojas-Guillen’s contentions that the
IJ and asylum officer ignored her testimony after finding her not credible, violated
her right to due process, or otherwise erred in the analysis of her claims.

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The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (Docket Entry No. 1) is otherwise
denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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