Claudia J. Rohr v. Crime Victims Compensation Commission, of the State of Hawaiʻi

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLAUDIA J. ROHR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, of the State of Hawaiʻi,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-15051
D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00162-LEK-RT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Claudia J. Rohr appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay Christian Fellowship v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
because, assuming without deciding that 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) applies, Rohr failed
to file her action within the applicable limitations period or establish any basis for
equitable estoppel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a); Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Rsch. Found.
Inc., 188 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that under the discovery rule,
the statute begins to run once a plaintiff has knowledge that she has been hurt and
knowledge of who has inflicted the injury); see also Johnson v. Henderson, 314
F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that application of equitable estoppel
under federal law requires active conduct by a defendant to prevent plaintiff from
suing in time, above and beyond the alleged wrongdoing underlying the claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rohr’s motions for
reconsideration and for relief from judgment because Rohr failed to demonstrate
any basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).
We reject as without merit Rohr’s contention that the district court violated
due process.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

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in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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