Jose Luis Muniz-Larios v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE LUIS MUNIZ-LARIOS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-72344
Agency No. A200-149-185
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 16, 2022**
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: KLEINFELD, D.M. FISHER,*** and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Jose Luis Muniz-Larios, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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judge’s (“IJ”) denial of cancellation of removal and withholding of removal.1 We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. The BIA upheld the denial of cancellation of removal because it
determined that Muniz-Larios’s 2011 voluntary departure was a presence-breaking
event that prevented him from establishing the required ten years of continuous
presence in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). We review the
BIA’s determination for substantial evidence. See Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439
F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2006).
A voluntary departure is a presence-breaking event “when the alien has been
informed of, and has knowingly and voluntarily consented to, the terms” of the
voluntary departure. Id. at 620. There is substantial evidence supporting the
BIA’s determination that Muniz-Larios had been informed of his rights and
knowingly and voluntarily accepted voluntary departure. Indeed, Muniz-Larios
testified that he was given a choice to depart voluntarily or proceed before an
immigration judge, and that he chose to depart voluntarily to avoid further
detention. The record also includes the Form I-213, which states that Muniz-
1 Muniz-Larios does not challenge the BIA’s denial of asylum based on
untimeliness. And he has forfeited any challenge to the BIA’s denial of relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) because he merely mentions CAT
relief standards with no argument as to why we should grant the petition as to the
denial of CAT relief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir.
1996).

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Larios had elected voluntary departure after reading the Form I-826 and telling the
deportation officer that he understood the Form I-826. The Form I-826 informed
Muniz-Larios of his right to choose between having a hearing before an
immigration judge or voluntarily returning to his country without a hearing.
Muniz-Larios’s arguments challenging the BIA’s finding that he knowingly
and voluntarily accepted voluntary departure are unavailing. Contrary to Muniz-
Larios’s assertion, he unambiguously testified that he had been informed of his
options. That the Form I-826 is not part of the record is irrelevant because the IJ
took judicial notice of the form, and Muniz-Larios makes no argument that it was
improper for the IJ to do so. And significantly, he does not contest that the officer
had provided him with the form and that he had read it. His argument that there is
no signed statement showing that he waived his right to appear before an
immigration judge also fails, as he cites no authority to support that a signed
waiver is required to show that he knowingly and voluntarily accepted voluntary
departure.
In sum, because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Muniz-Larios failed to establish the required ten years of continuous presence, it
properly denied cancellation of removal.
2. The BIA denied withholding of removal because Muniz-Larios had
failed to show the required nexus between the alleged harm and his claimed

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particular social group of family members. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Zetino v.
Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010). We review the BIA’s
determination for substantial evidence. See Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1012. The
evidence shows that Muniz-Larios’s uncle had been killed and that other family
members had been threatened. But no evidence supports that the killing or threats
occurred because of their family membership. Thus, substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s lack-of-nexus determination, and it properly denied withholding of
removal.
PETITION DENIED.

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