Christopher Michael Larsen v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL LARSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-55398
D.C. No.
3:16-cv-02847-JM-AGS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 12, 2022 **
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and DANIELS, *** District Judge.
Christopher Michael Larsen appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable George B. Daniels, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 16 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v.
Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.1
1. Larsen fails to establish he was prejudiced by the Agency’s use of
incorrect letterhead for supplemental social security income instead of disability
insurance benefits as his untimely request for reconsideration was accepted and he
successfully obtained review before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and the
district court. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Reversal
on account of error is not automatic, but requires a determination of prejudice.”).
Larsen has similarly not shown how the delay in his receiving a report from
consultative psychiatric examiner Dr. Clark affected the ALJ’s ultimate
nondisability determination, particularly as Larsen’s attorney had access to the
report and urged the ALJ to disregard it, which the ALJ largely did. See Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (error is harmless when
“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” (citations omitted)).
2. To the extent Larsen alleges that the ALJ was biased, he does not show
that the ALJ’s behavior reflected a clear inability to render fair judgment and thus
does not rebut the presumption of impartiality. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d
1 Larsen’s motion for summary disposition (Docket Entry No. 25) is denied.

-- 2 of 4 --

3
853, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2001) (claimant must “show that the ALJ’s behavior, in the
context of the whole case, was so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment”).
3. Larsen contends that the ALJ erred in discounting his testimony as to his
disabling pelvic pain. We disagree. The ALJ provided specific, clear, and
convincing reasons to discount Larsen’s testimony because there was a lack of
objective medical evidence corroborating the degree of pain alleged, his symptoms
improved with treatment, there was an unexplained absence of treatment for a
portion of the closed period, and his daily activities cut against his allegation of
disabling pain. These are valid reasons to discredit a claimant’s testimony. See
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2005) (the ALJ may consider a
lack of objective medical evidence as one factor in the credibility determination
and may also consider the effectiveness of pain medication or other treatment);
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112–13 (in assessing credibility, the ALJ may consider the
claimant’s “unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to
follow a prescribed course of treatment” and participation in activities that
“contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment” “[e]ven where those
activities suggest some difficulty functioning” (citation omitted)). Any error in the
ALJ’s additional reasons for discounting Larsen’s symptom testimony was
harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.

-- 3 of 4 --

4
4. Larsen fails to identify any prejudicial error in the ALJ’s assessment of
the medical opinion evidence. The ALJ did not err by relying on the opinions of
state agency consultants G. Taylor-Holmes, M.D., H. Amado, M.D., K. Ragsdale,
Ph.D., and L. Naiman, M.D. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.
2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve
as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical
findings or other evidence in the record.”). Nor did the ALJ err by failing to order
a physical consultative examination prior to rendering his decision. Larsen does
not identify any ambiguity or inadequacy in the medical record requiring such
further development. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011).
5. We reject Larsen’s argument with respect to the vocational expert’s
qualifications. The expert was qualified to “translate[] factual scenarios into
realistic job market probabilities.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 643 (9th
Cir. 1982).
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --