Kendel Skinner v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENDEL SKINNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-35819
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05800-MAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 8, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and MOSKOWITZ,***
District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 12 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
Kendel Skinner appeals the district court’s order affirming an Administrative
Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of his application for Child Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income Benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review the district court’s order de novo and the ALJ’s denial of benefits
for substantial evidence. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2020). We
affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Skinner’s
account of debilitating anxiety. After noting that Skinner’s impairments could cause
the alleged symptoms and there was no evidence of malingering, the ALJ cited
several “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” for the conclusion that Skinner’s
anxiety was not as limiting as he alleged. See Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1116
(9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Contrary to Skinner’s claims that he struggled to be around people and had lost
interest in activities, the ALJ noted that he was able to grocery shop, work on cars,
visit Disneyworld with family, and socialize with friends—including playing pool
and cards, going to the beach, visiting Seattle, and attending a car show. See Molina
v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ may consider
inconsistencies between alleged symptoms and claimant’s daily activities),
superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). The ALJ further noted
that consistent treatment with medication and therapy had improved Skinner’s

-- 2 of 4 --

3
mental health symptoms. Finally, the ALJ cited inconsistencies in Skinner’s account
of his alcohol consumption and his explanation for gaps in treatment. See id. at 1112
(noting the ALJ may use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Skinner’s account were clear and specific,
not mere summaries as Skinner argues. Where substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s finding, “we may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278
F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of the medical
evidence. As an initial matter, Skinner waived his challenge to the ALJ’s treatment
of Dr. Katrina Higgins’s opinions by failing to raise it before the district court. See
Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ provided “specific
and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence for giving only partial
weight to the opinion of Dr. Dan Neims. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154. Dr. Neims
assessed Skinner as having marked or severe limitations that would impact his ability
to communicate, maintain appropriate behavior, and complete a normal work day or
work week. The ALJ concluded that these aspects of Dr. Neims’s opinion were
inconsistent with the overall record, including (i) medical notes indicating that
Skinner presented with strong memory, attention, concentration, insight, and
judgment, (ii) evidence that Skinner’s symptoms improved with treatment, and (iii)

-- 3 of 4 --

4
evidence that Skinner was able to work on cars, socialize with friends, and visit
Disneyworld. By contrast, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of non-
examining clinical psychologist Dr. Nancy Winfrey because her conclusion that
Skinner’s limitations were more moderate was consistent with the record.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Skinner’s limitations were
not as severe as Dr. Neims opined and instead were more moderate, as reflected in
Dr. Winfrey’s opinion.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --