Arquimedes Mendoza v. Matthew Cate

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARQUIMEDES MENDOZA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW CATE,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 21-16018
D.C. No.
2:09-cv-01710-MCE-DB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 14, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: RAWLINSON and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,**
District Judge.
Arquimedes Mendoza (Mendoza) appeals the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel
FILED
NOV 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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(IAC). Reviewing “the denial of a Section 2254 habeas corpus petition de novo
and any underlying factual findings for clear error,” we affirm.1 Patsalis v. Shinn,
47 F.4th 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
Relief on a § 2254 habeas claim is not warranted unless
adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the
correctness of the state court’s decision. . . .” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
101 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To succeed on an IAC claim, a petitioner must establish that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When a petitioner alleges that his counsel
was deficient in advising the petitioner of the consequences of accepting a plea
bargain, “to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the [petitioner] must show that
1 We elect to decide Mendoza’s IAC claim on the merits. See Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (“[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations defense is not
jurisdictional.”) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
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there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (footnote reference omitted).
The California Superior Court’s order was the last reasoned state-court
decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). The Superior Court
concluded that although Mendoza established deficient performance, he failed to
establish prejudice. Because we assume that summary denials of habeas relief
adopt the rationale of the last reasoned decision, we must assume that the
California Supreme Court’s decision was also based on the absence of prejudice.
See id.
This conclusion was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Strickland. Notwithstanding Mendoza’s wariness regarding another conviction for
a strike offense, a fairminded jurist could conclude that Mendoza would not have
proceeded to trial had he been properly advised that he was pleading guilty to a
strike offense because he did not have a viable defense theory. See United States v.
Rodriguez, 49 F.4th 1205, 1214 (9th Cir. 2022). It is highly unlikely that a jury
would be persuaded that Mendoza’s semen was found in the victim’s vagina
because Mendoza ejaculated on the carpet in the room where the victim was
assaulted, another man came into contact with Mendoza’s semen, and that man
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transferred Mendoza’s semen into the victim’s vagina when he sexually assaulted
the victim.
Neither did the Superior Court base its decision on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Given the record before it, the Superior Court did not
rest its decision on an “objectively unreasonable” finding of fact. Hibbler v.
Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). And the lack of an evidentiary
hearing did not render its factfinding procedure unreasonable. See id. at 1146-49.
AFFIRMED.
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