Martin Gonzalez-Garcia v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARTIN GONZALEZ-GARCIA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-70047
Agency No. A205-648-285
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 8, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, McKEOWN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 12 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Martin Gonzalez-Garcia petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) dismissal of his appeal from the decisions of the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation of removal and his request for
administrative closure. As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as
necessary to explain our decision.
I
Gonzalez-Garcia argues that the agency violated his due process rights by
ignoring relevant evidence of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” which
would result to qualifying relatives if he were removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). But
this court lacks jurisdiction to review denials of cancellation of removal except for
questions of law and colorable constitutional claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2);
Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009). While Gonzalez-
Garcia’s claim is constitutional, it is not colorable. He makes only the conclusory
allegation that the IJ failed to consider the hardship his children would face if he
were to relocate to Mexico, when the record shows that the IJ considered that
hardship and found it not to rise to the level of being exceptional and extremely
unusual. Gonzalez-Garcia might disagree with the IJ’s finding, but this court lacks
jurisdiction over “traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due
process violations.” Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005).

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II
Gonzalez-Garcia also argues that the agency erred by denying administrative
closure based solely on the government’s opposition to closure. This court reviews
denials of administrative closure for abuse of discretion. Marquez-Reyes v. Garland,
36 F.4th 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2022). When the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision and
adds additional reasons, we review both decisions. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207,
1215 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the BIA endorsed the IJ’s application of the multifactor
test laid out in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 696 (BIA 2012). The IJ found
two factors dispositive: (2) the government’s basis for opposing closure, and (4) the
anticipated duration of the closure. The IJ’s application of Avetisyan was not
unreasonable, and it did not undermine the IJ’s neutrality for him to consider the
government’s opposition. The BIA’s endorsement of the IJ’s application of
Avetisyan was therefore not an abuse of discretion. Although the BIA also cited a
since-overruled agency precedent stating that the IJ had no authority to grant
administrative closure absent government consent, see Matter of Castro-Tum, 27
I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), overruled by Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326
(A.G. 2021), this citation did not affect the outcome, since the Avetisyan analysis on
its own was sufficient to affirm the IJ.
* * *
The petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

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