Audie Israel Meza Aguilar v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUDIE ISRAEL MEZA AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-71068
Agency No. A205-317-423
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 8, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: R. NELSON, BADE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Audie Israel Meza Aguilar (Meza Aguilar) challenges the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his claims for withholding of removal and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 13 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction over
the appeal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
To the extent the BIA adopts part of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision,
we review both. See Jie Cui v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 2013).
Otherwise, our review is “limited to the BIA’s decision.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988
F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Legal conclusions are reviewed
de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v.
Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under substantial evidence
review, the BIA’s determination may be reversed only “where the evidence compels
a contrary conclusion.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
1. Withholding of Removal. An applicant is entitled to withholding of
removal if his “life or freedom would be threatened because of [his] race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. at 1146
1Meza Aguilar does not provide any argument to support a challenge to the
BIA’s denial of asylum in his opening brief. Accordingly, we decline to reach the
BIA’s asylum determination. See Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hosp., 840
F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed
abandoned.”). To the extent that the opening brief can be construed as challenging
the denial of asylum, we deny relief for the same reasons we deny the petition as to
Meza Aguilar’s claim for withholding of removal.

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(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An applicant has the burden of
“show[ing] a ‘clear probability’ of persecution because of a protected ground.” Id.
Meza Aguilar’s family has long owned land—including a coffee plantation—
in Honduras. Shortly before Meza Aguilar made his withholding claim, he contends
a prominent gang placed a “tax” on his family in Honduras. Meza Aguilar’s family
lapsed on their payment to the gang. Later, Meza Aguilar’s brother was assaulted at
gunpoint and robbed, allegedly by that same gang.
In assessing Meza Aguilar’s claim for withholding of removal, the BIA
adopted the IJ’s finding that Meza Aguilar asserted a cognizable particular social
group (PSG): “Honduran families that own land and are perceived to have money.”
See Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). Substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s determination that there is no nexus between Meza Aguilar’s
feared persecution and this PSG. Other than conclusory assertions, Meza Aguilar
fails to explain whether and how the gang was aware of the family’s land ownership
or the relationship between the tax and the robbery of his brother. None of Meza
Aguilar’s family in Honduras worked on the plantation when the extortion began.
And, as the BIA observed, there is no evidence as to where the extortion demands
took place, whether the family’s home was near the plantation, or whether the gang
made any reference to the family or their wealth or land ownership during any
encounters.

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To the extent Meza Aguilar argues that he belongs to a PSG consisting simply
of his family and asserts a nexus between his membership in that group and any
alleged harm, we decline to consider this claim because Meza Aguilar did not
exhaust this argument in the proceedings before the agency. See Barron v. Ashcroft,
358 F.3d 674, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1252(d)(1) mandates
exhaustion and, thus, this court generally lacks jurisdiction over “the merits of a legal
claim not presented in the administrative proceedings below”).2
2. CAT claim. Meza Aguilar also challenges the BIA’s finding that he
failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he faced torture “by, or at the
instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). Substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s CAT denial because there is no evidence in the record
compelling the conclusion that the Honduran government would participate in or
acquiesce to torture at the hands of the gang. Indeed, the country conditions evidence
introduced by Meza Aguilar and the testimony of Meza Aguilar’s expert witness
demonstrate that the Honduran government has made attempts to control gang
violence.
2Meza Aguilar’s argument that the Honduran government will not be able to
protect him if he were removed was properly not addressed by the BIA as to Meza
Aguilar’s withholding claim. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per
curiam) (“[A]gencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of
which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

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PETITION DENIED.

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