FANG YANG, AKA Yang Fang v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FANG YANG, AKA Yang Fang,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-71351
Agency No. A200-272-604
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 16, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: NGUYEN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District
Judge.
Fang Yang petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying asylum
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 13 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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and withholding of removal because Yang was not credible. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the agency’s adverse credibility determination
for substantial evidence, see Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1142 (9th Cir.
2022), we deny the petition for review.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding of “inconsistencies in
and between [Yang’s] testimony and her written statement regarding who was
looking for her in China after she departed the country.” In a supplemental written
statement supporting her asylum application, Yang asserted that “staff from [the]
family planning office came to [her family’s] home and looked for [her]” because
they wanted her to “have a ligation operation.” Yang testified that it was
“somebody from [her] work unit” who “was looking for [her]” because she was
“qualified to receive unemployment compensation.”
The IJ provided Yang “with an opportunity to explain [this] inconsistency”
and “reasonably reject[ed] [her] proffered explanation.” Id. at 1143. Yang
testified that “[w]hen [she] first came to the United States [she] was still frightened
and . . . had to do a lot of adjustment[,] so when [her] parents . . . told [her] that
somebody was looking for [her],” she “assum[ed] that it was Family Planning.”
But Yang made the supplemental written statement at least six months after
arriving in the United States, and despite having the opportunity to correct it at the
hearing, she affirmed under oath that it was all true.

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Moreover, as the BIA observed, “[Yang’s] explanation does not account for
the rapid devolution of her testimony.” She first testified that a person from work
came about unemployment compensation but later testified that the person did not
say why they were looking for her. And when asked why her written statement
identified the person as staff from the family planning office, Yang responded,
“No, I don’t think so.” The BIA reasonably interpreted this response as a “lack of
awareness or denial of what she had written in her supplemental statement.”
Nor was the discrepancy between Yang’s testimony and written statement a
“trivial inconsistenc[y] that under the total circumstances ha[d] no bearing on
[Yang’s] veracity.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010).
Whether the family planning office was still attempting to force her to have a
ligation was integral to whether she feared future persecution. See id. at 1039.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Yang “provided
the Chinese government and the American government false information.” Yang
admitted that she falsely reported living at her mother-in-law’s home for her
household registration so that she could send her son to a “far better” school. She
repeated this false information when applying for a U.S. visa.
While “the fact that an asylum seeker has lied to immigration officers or
used false passports to enter this or another country, without more, is not a proper
basis for finding her not credible,” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.

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2004), here the agency relied on more than a false statement in Yang’s visa
application. The BIA correctly observed that her testimony and asylum application
were also “inconsistent with regard to when and where she lived in China.” Yang
testified that she grew up at a different house number than that listed on her
household registration. She testified that she moved into her mother-in-law’s
home in 1991, but her household registration card states that this occurred in 1995.
And she testified that she moved out of her mother-in-law’s home in 2005 but
stated on her asylum application that she did so in 1995.
3. The BIA did not rely on the timing of Yang’s passport procurement in
upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Therefore, we do not consider
whether the BIA accurately characterized the timing as “dubious.” See Myers v.
Sessions, 904 F.3d 1101, 1113 (9th Cir. 2018).
PETITION DENIED.

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