United States of America v. Douglas Allen Jones

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DOUGLAS ALLEN JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10021
D.C. No. 3:18-cr-08040-SMB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2023**
Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Douglas Allen Jones appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 180-month sentence imposed following his jury-trial conviction for
distribution and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252
and 2256. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-10021
Jones contends that the district court procedurally erred and imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence when it failed to grant him a greater
downward variance to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. We review
Jones’s procedural claim for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan,
608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and his substantive unreasonableness claim
for abuse of discretion, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
The record shows that the district court considered all of Jones’s mitigating
arguments—including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities—and
adequately explained that the nature of Jones’s offense and his individual
circumstances justified the sentence imposed. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d
984, 991-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The court’s comment that the content of the
pornography possessed by Jones was “worse than others” was in reference to child
pornography offenses generally and not, as Jones contends, relative to the specific
defendant Jones identified as similarly situated. Finally, the below-Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances and the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and seriousness of the offense,
and Jones’s criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Gutierrez-
Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various
factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”).
AFFIRMED.

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