Mario Guadalupe Morales- Gonzalez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIO GUADALUPE MORALES-
GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-70464
Agency No. A202-011-126
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Immigration Judge
April 17, 2023**
Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Mario Guadalupe Morales-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under
8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or
torture in Guatemala and is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 21-70464
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social distinction.
Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de
novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except
to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations. Id. We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Morales-Gonzalez
failed to establish his resistance-based particular social group is socially distinct.
See id. at 1243 (absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus,
the IJ did not err in concluding that Morales-Gonzalez did not establish
membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular
social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))).
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Morales-
Gonzalez failed to show a reasonable possibility of persecution in Guatemala on
account of a protected ground. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 814 (9th
Cir. 2018) (no basis for withholding of removal where petitioner did not show a

-- 2 of 3 --

3 21-70464
nexus to a protected ground). In light of this disposition, we need not reach
Morales-Gonzalez’s remaining contention regarding whether the government was
unable or unwilling to protect him. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538
(9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary
to the results they reach).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Morales-
Gonzalez failed to show a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent
or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See Andrade-Garcia
v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836-37 (petitioner failed to demonstrate government
acquiescence sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --