Rooter Hero Phoenix, Inc.; Call Pro's, Inc. v. Jordan Beebe; Brittany Beebe

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROOTER HERO PHOENIX, INC.; CALL
PRO'S, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JORDAN BEEBE; BRITTANY BEEBE,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ROOTER RANGER TUCSON, LLC;
ROOTER RANGER, LLC,
Defendants.
No. 23-15228
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00220-JJT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, BRESS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 11 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Plaintiffs Rooter Hero Phoenix, Inc. and Call Pro’s, Inc. appeal the district
court’s order imposing monetary sanctions on their counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and the court’s inherent authority. We review a district court’s imposition of
sanctions for abuse of discretion. See Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d
1075, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021); In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435
(9th Cir. 1996). We “give ‘great deference’ to a district court’s factual findings
underlying a sanctions order,” which “may not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous.” Am. Unites for Kids, 985 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Evon v. Law Offices of
Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012)). We review legal questions de
novo, including whether the district court afforded adequate process before granting
a motion for sanctions. Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir.
2005). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.1
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.” In addition, the district court has the inherent power to
sanction counsel for “(1) a willful violation of a court order; or (2) bad faith.” Am.
1 We previously affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the First Amended
Complaint. See Rooter Hero Phoenix, Inc. v. Beebe, 2023 WL 2523618 (9th Cir.
Mar. 15, 2023). We also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by striking the plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint as a sanction for plaintiffs’
failure to meet and confer with the defendants. Id. at *1.

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Unites for Kids, 985 F.3d at 1090. “A sanction may be awarded either for willful
disobedience of a court order or when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id.
The district court’s award of $34,715.00 in attorneys’ fees and $2,029.78 in
non-taxable costs was not an abuse of discretion, nor were the court’s factual
findings clearly erroneous. The district court acted within its inherent powers in
concluding that plaintiffs’ counsel should be sanctioned because counsel “persisted
in attempting to bring” claims and allegations that “were frivolous on their face” and
harassing. These included claims that defendants were violating the Arizona
criminal code (which does not provide a private right of action) and allegations that
a defendant had sexually assaulted a family member. “A finding of bad faith is
warranted where an attorney ‘knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument,
or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.’” Primus
Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re
Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d at 436).
The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs’
counsel “willfully disobeyed the Court’s order” to meet and confer “in bad faith or
for oppressive reasons.” See Am. Unites for Kids, 985 F.3d at 1090 (explaining that
“a willful violation of a court order” can support the imposition of sanctions). The
record supports the district court’s determination that plaintiffs’ counsel

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unreasonably failed to meet and confer and willfully failed to address defendants’
meritorious grounds for dismissing plaintiffs’ claims before filing amended
pleadings, contrary to the court’s order and the local rules. Indeed, in the previous
appeal we upheld the district court’s striking of the Second Amended Complaint as
a sanction for plaintiffs’ failure to meet and confer. Rooter Hero, 2023 WL 2523618,
at *1. Considering the record as a whole, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering payment of attorneys’ fees and costs as a sanction.
Finally, plaintiffs were not deprived of due process because the district court
did not hold oral argument before granting the defendants’ motion for fees and costs.
Plaintiffs were entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be heard” before the district
court imposed the sanctions at issue here. See Lasar, 399 F.3d at 1112. The district
court satisfied this requirement by allowing briefing on the fee motion, in which
plaintiffs did not request oral argument.2
AFFIRMED.
2 To the extent plaintiffs challenge the amount of fees and costs awarded, the
challenge is forfeited because plaintiffs did not raise this objection in the district
court. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). As the district court
found, “Plaintiffs do not challenge the reasonableness of Defendants’ requested fees
and non-taxable costs.”

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