International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Consol Energy Inc., and Its Wholly Owned Subsidiaries

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 9, 2023 Decided August 9, 2024
No. 22-7110
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA,
APPELLANT
JAMES ASBURY, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
v.
CONSOL ENERGY INC., AND ITS WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES,
ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Consolidated with 22-7115
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cv-01475)
Kevin Fagan argued the cause for appellant/cross-
appellee. With him on the briefs was Deborah Stern.

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John R. Woodrum argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellees/cross-appellants.
Before: MILLETT and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and
GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.
WALKER, Circuit Judge: A member of the United Mine
Workers of America arbitrated a dispute against Consol
Energy, Inc. He won. Afterwards, the Union sued to confirm
that arbitration award. In a counterclaim, Consol and its
subsidiaries sought to vacate the award.
Neither claim belongs in federal court. The Union has
identified no valid source of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
As for the counterclaim, Consol has ceased to exist, and its
subsidiaries lack standing.
I. Background
The United Mine Workers of America signed a collective-
bargaining agreement with several coal-mining subsidiaries
(the “Subsidiaries”) of a company called Consol Energy,
Inc. — though not with Consol itself. For our purposes, two
parts of the agreement matter. First, the parties agreed to
arbitrate grievances. And second, the Subsidiaries promised
health benefits to certain miners for life. According to the
Union, the Subsidiaries cannot unilaterally reduce those
benefits even if they no longer mine coal.
Consol served as the Subsidiaries’ health-plan
administrator. When the agreement’s expiration date
approached, Consol sent a letter to miners formerly employed

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by the Subsidiaries. The letter said Consol was considering
changes to their benefits after the agreement expired.
Consol’s letter wasn’t warmly received. A retired miner
filed an arbitration grievance against Consol, and with the
Union’s support, he won. The arbitrators concluded that they
had jurisdiction (even though unlike its subsidiaries Consol
never signed the now-expired collective-bargaining
agreement) and that Consol’s proposed benefit changes would
violate the agreement. So the arbitrators issued an award that
said Consol cannot make those unilateral changes.
The dispute did not end there. Instead, the Union sued
Consol and its Subsidiaries in district court to confirm the
arbitration award. Consol and its Subsidiaries counterclaimed
against the Union, seeking to vacate the award. The two suits
were eventually consolidated.
Before the district court reached a decision, Consol split in
half and ceased to exist. One of Consol’s two successors was
joined to the suit; that successor was later dismissed because it
had no connection to coal mining.1 The other Consol
successor, which is the new parent of the Subsidiaries, was
never joined to the suit. For their part, the Subsidiaries
continued to exist, continued to sue the Union, and continued
to be sued by the Union.
In the end, the district court gave each side a partial
victory. It dismissed the Union’s confirmation claim for lack
of standing. It reasoned that the Union wasn’t injured because
the collective-bargaining agreement wasn’t violated: Though
Consol proposed to modify benefit levels, Consol never
actually did so. As for the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim, the
1 That dismissal was not appealed.

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district court declined to vacate the arbitration award after
reaching the merits.
Both parties appealed.
II. The Union’s Claim
We start with the Union’s appeal. Whether or not the
district court’s dismissal for lack of standing was correct, the
court lacked jurisdiction for a different reason. The Union
identified § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), as the sole source of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction — but § 301(a) does not apply to
the Union’s claim.2 See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
Section 301(a) authorizes certain federal suits “for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization.” Id. (emphasis added). But in Textron Lycoming
Reciprocating Engine Division, AVCO Corp. v. Automobile
Workers, the Supreme Court held § 301(a) does not authorize
suits contemplating a future contract violation. 523 U.S. 653,
656-57 (1998).
In Textron, a union sued Textron in federal court under
§ 301(a), alleging that Textron fraudulently induced that union
to sign a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 655. Textron
held that federal courts lack jurisdiction under § 301(a) to hear
suits when “the Union’s complaint alleges no violation of the
collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 661; see also id. at
658 (“Indeed, as far as the Union’s complaint discloses, both
2 See Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“Where both standing and subject matter jurisdiction are at
issue . . . a court may inquire into either and, finding it lacking,
dismiss the matter without reaching the other.”).

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parties are in absolute compliance with the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Section 301(a) jurisdiction
does not lie over such a case.”); id. at 657 (“In this context, the
word ‘for’ has an unmistakably backward-looking
connotation . . . .”).
In our case, the Union’s complaint is materially
indistinguishable from the complaint in Textron. The Union
here concedes that it has not alleged a contract violation — just
as the Textron plaintiffs did not allege a violation.3 Rather, the
Union anticipated that Consol would violate the collective-
bargaining agreement in the future, and the Union sought to
confirm an arbitration award prohibiting that future conduct.4
3 See International Union, United Mine Workers of America v.
Consol Energy Inc., 2022 WL 2643531, at *3 (D.D.C. July 8, 2022)
(“In fact, the Union concedes that it does not assert a pre-Award
contract violation or a post-Award violation of the award itself.”)
(cleaned up); see also JA 352-68 (Third Amended Complaint) (not
alleging a contract violation).
On appeal, the Union tries to recharacterize several letters that
Consol sent (after the miner’s grievance was filed) as contract
violations. See Union Br. at 22-24, 36. We will not entertain that
argument. The Union previously “concede[d]” that there was no
contract violation, even though it had previously discussed these
same letters in its complaint. Consol Energy Inc., 2022 WL
2643531, at *3; JA at 362-63. In any event, the arbitration award
exclusively discussed Consol’s pre-grievance conduct and never
mentioned these letters. JA 369-79.
4 One distinction between our case and Textron is that Textron did
not involve an underlying arbitration award. But since the award in
our case never refers to a contract violation, it is of no help to the
Union. JA 369-79. Instead, the award further confirms that, like
Textron, the Union’s suit is not one “for violation of contracts.” 29
U.S.C. § 185(a).

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Because § 301(a) does not authorize suits “filed with a
view to a future contract violation,” § 301(a) does not authorize
the Union’s claim. Id. at 657 (cleaned up). And because the
Union has identified no other source of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the district court properly dismissed the claim.
III. The Subsidiaries’ Counterclaim
We turn next to the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim, which
sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court
reached the merits, but “we bear an independent obligation to
assure ourselves that jurisdiction is proper.” Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324
(2008); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“Cases” and
“Controversies”). Because the Subsidiaries have not shown
how they are injured by an arbitration award to which they are
not a party, they lack standing to challenge it.
Like any plaintiff, counterclaimants “must demonstrate
standing for each claim.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates,
Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (cleaned up). That means the
Subsidiaries must show “(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) causation,
and (3) redressability.” Kapur v. FCC, 991 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C.
Cir. 2021).
As for the first requirement, not every alleged injury
creates standing. The Subsidiaries’ injury must be “an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992) (cleaned up).
The Subsidiaries have not shown any of that. Far from
concretely injuring the Subsidiaries, the award does not even
name them. See JA 369-79; Oral Arg. Tr. at 8 (the Union

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conceding that the Subsidiaries “are not named in the award”).
And as the Subsidiaries often point out, the award requires
nothing of them. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 41, 42, 43, 47, 49, 50, 53,
55 (Subsidiaries asserting that the award does not bind them).
True, the arbitration award might have injured Consol, the
Subsidiaries’ former parent and health-plan administrator. But
Consol no longer exists — and the Subsidiaries cannot
maintain the claim in its place.
To see why they can’t, recall that Consol dissolved into
two successors. One was dismissed. The other — the new
parent of the Subsidiaries, which may also be their health plan
administrator — was never joined to this suit. See id. at 10-12,
40-41.5
In addition, the Subsidiaries’ injury is speculative. Their
concern is that the award’s legal conclusions may be used
against them if they arbitrate in the future. Id. at 49-51, 54. But
that theory requires quite a chain of “maybes.” Maybe the
Subsidiaries will someday become their own plan
administrators; maybe they will unilaterally reduce benefits;
maybe the Union will file another arbitration grievance; and
maybe the arbitrator will apply the Consol award’s legal
conclusions against the Subsidiaries. Or maybe not. After all,
the Subsidiaries weren’t parties to the award; it doesn’t name
them; and they say the collective-bargaining agreement allows
arbitrators to reconsider past awards.6 Regardless, “the mere
5 We express no opinion on whether the Subsidiaries’ new parent or
health plan administrator would have had standing to challenge the
arbitration award.
6 See Oral Arg. Tr. at 51 (Subsidiaries stating that “an arbitrator is
not bound to follow a . . . prior arbitration decision in the way that

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fact that an adjudication creates a precedent that could harm a
non-party does not create the injury-in-fact required for Article
III standing.” Conference Group, LLC v. FCC, 720 F.3d 957,
959 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Because the Subsidiaries have not shown an injury that is
both concrete and imminent, they lack standing to raise their
counterclaim.
* * *
No party in this appeal has shown that federal courts have
jurisdiction over its claim. So we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the Union’s claim. We also vacate the district
court’s orders to the extent they decided the Subsidiaries’
counterclaim on the merits, and we remand the Subsidiaries’
counterclaim with instructions to dismiss it for lack of standing.
So ordered.
judges would be by other decisions of panels in this Court”); cf.
Union Br. at 4 (“Each [collective-bargaining agreement] has
included language stating that the ‘decisions of the Trustees shall be
final and binding on the parties.’”) (cleaned up and emphasis added).

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