Henry Searcy, Jr. v. Demaurice Fitzgerald Smith

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued May 1, 2024 Decided August 6, 2024
No. 23-7033
HENRY SEARCY, JR.,
APPELLANT
v.
DEMAURICE FITZGERALD SMITH, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:19-cv-00921)
Henry Searcy Jr., pro se, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for appellant.
Alexandra M. Li, Student Counsel, argued the cause for
amicus curiae to assist the court. With her on the brief were
Erica Hashimoto, appointed by the court, Salvatore Mancina,
Supervising Attorney, and Emily N. Janikowski, Student
Counsel.
Jeffrey L. Kessler argued the cause for appellees. With
him on the briefs were Lauren Gailey, Jonathan J. Amoona,
and Angela A. Smedley.

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Before: WILKINS, RAO, and PAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM: The National Football League Players
Association (“NFLPA”) delegates its authority to negotiate
player contracts to agents. Per the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations
Governing Contract Advisors (“Agent Regulations”), in order
to become an agent, a prospective agent must apply for
certification and pass a written exam. Agent Regulations at 4.
After failing the exam twice, Plaintiff-Appellant Henry Searcy,
Jr. appealed the denial of certification and the dispute went to
arbitration. The arbitrator sided with the NFLPA. Searcy v.
Smith, No. 19-cv-921, 2020 WL 2198086, at *3 (D.D.C. May
6, 2020); Appellees’ Appendix (“A.”) 127 (Arbitration
Award). Searcy subsequently sued the NFLPA and its
Executive Director, DeMaurice Fitzgerald Smith (“NFLPA
Defendants”), along with Prometric LLC, which developed and
administers the written exam, and Prometric’s Vice President
and General Counsel, Michael P. Sawicki (“Prometric
Defendants”).
The District Court granted the Prometric Defendants’
motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and the NFLPA
Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Searcy, 2020
WL 2198086, at *1. Because the District Court granted the
NFLPA Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
rather than Rule 12(b)(1), it implicitly ruled that it had subject-
matter jurisdiction. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (holding that federal courts must
resolve jurisdictional issues before reaching the merits). While
the District Court explained that it could exercise diversity
jurisdiction over claims against the NFLPA, see Searcy, 2020

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WL 2198086, at *3 n.3, it did not provide any basis for
exercising jurisdiction over claims against Smith.
After Searcy appealed the District Court’s dismissal of his
claims, we affirmed the dismissal of his claims against the
Prometric Defendants due to the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Searcy v. Smith, No. 20-7048, 2021 WL 2453044,
at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2021). We went on to explain that the
District Court did not have diversity jurisdiction over his
claims against the NFLPA Defendants and instructed the
District Court to reconsider its decision to dismiss the claims
under Rule 12(b)(6), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(1). See id. More
specifically, we said the District Court should examine whether
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, completely preempts Searcy’s
state law claims, which would require the District Court to
consider those claims as if Searcy were seeking relief under the
LMRA. Id. If so, the District Court would have federal
question jurisdiction over these claims and supplemental
jurisdiction over a related claim. That would allow the District
Court to exercise jurisdiction and consider the NFLPA
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6). The District Court subsequently concluded it
had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). See Searcy v. Smith, No. 19-cv-921, 2023 WL
2213249, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2023). Searcy appeals again.
On this further review, we hold that the District Court
erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
against the NFLPA Defendants, as Section 301 of the LMRA
does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims. We
therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of claims against
the NFLPA Defendants on different grounds, and remand this
case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), instead of
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

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I.
Searcy brought breach of contract, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims against the NFLPA. He brought a claim for
tortious interference with a contractual relationship against
Prometric. He also sought vacatur of the arbitration award
under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). While Searcy
named Smith and Sawicki in the complaint, he did not specify
claims against them. In short, Searcy alleged that NFLPA
wrongfully changed its exam scoring methodology without
amending the Agent Regulations and failed to follow the
mandatory procedures for arbitration, as set forth in the Agent
Regulations.
Having dismissed claims against the Prometric Defendants
due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction earlier, the District
Court’s February 2023 Opinion focused on the state law and
FAA claims against the NFLPA Defendants. Searcy, 2023 WL
2213249, at *3–6. The District Court reasoned that Section 301
of the LMRA preempts Searcy’s state law claims against the
NFLPA Defendants because the resolution of these claims was
“substantially dependent” upon or “inextricably intertwined”
with the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”), which is a labor contract covered by Section 301. Id.
at *4–5 (citation omitted). The District Court accordingly
treated these allegedly preempted state claims as arising under
Section 301; as a result, the District Court held that it had
federal question jurisdiction over these claims. Id. at *5. The
District Court further held that it had supplemental jurisdiction
over Searcy’s FAA claim because it was closely connected to
his state law claims. Id. at *5–6.
On this second appeal, both Searcy and the NFLPA
Defendants contend that the District Court had subject matter
jurisdiction over Searcy’s claims against the NFLPA

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Defendants, though they differ in their reasoning. Searcy
contends that the District Court had diversity jurisdiction over
his claims, and argues against Section 301 preemption.
Meanwhile, the NFLPA Defendants argue the District Court
had federal question jurisdiction over state law claims through
Section 301 preemption and supplemental jurisdiction over the
FAA claim. In addition to Section 301 preemption, the NFLPA
Defendants raise a new argument before us that Searcy’s state
law claims are also preempted by a second statute, Section 9(a)
of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a).
We appointed an amicus curiae to examine whether
Section 301 of the LMRA provides a basis for federal
jurisdiction in this case, where the appellant has alleged
violations of the Agent Regulations. Searcy v. Smith, No. 23-
7033 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (Per Curiam Order). According
to the amicus curiae, neither Section 301 of the LMRA nor
Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides a basis for federal
jurisdiction here and so the District Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Searcy’s claims against the NFLPA
Defendants. We agree.
II.
This Court reviews a district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Trump, 929
F.3d 748, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
A.
Complete preemption only applies in cases involving
federal statutes that are intended by Congress to wholly
displace state law, and, to date, the Supreme Court has found
such complete preemption with respect to only three statutes.
District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F.4th 144, 150
(D.C. Cir. 2023). If a state law claim is completely preempted

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by federal law, that claim is treated as a federal claim, and the
district court accordingly has federal question jurisdiction over
it. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
Unlike with complete preemption, ordinary preemption can
only be raised as a defense to state law claims and cannot be
used as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 89 F.4th at 154–55.
1.
Section 301 of the LMRA is one such statute that
completely preempts state law under some circumstances. See
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (explaining that the complete
preemption doctrine “is applied primarily in cases raising
claims pre-empted by [Section] 301 of the LMRA”).
Section 301 governs claims “for violation of a contract
between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce or for violation
of a contract between such labor organizations.” Wooddell v.
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 71, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991).
While Section 301 does not preempt every state law claim
relating to a labor contract, Section 301 preempts state law
claims that are “substantially dependent upon analysis of the
terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
(1985). The question is “whether evaluation of the [state law]
claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the
terms of the labor contract.” Id. at 213. “[W]hen the meaning
of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that
a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the
course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim
to be extinguished” under Section 301. Livadas v. Bradshaw,
512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994).
It is undisputed that Searcy’s state law claims implicate the
Agent Regulations. But despite the NFLPA Defendants’ claim

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to the contrary, the Agent Regulations do not qualify as a labor
contract under Section 301. The Agent Regulations are an
agreement between the NFLPA (a labor organization) and
agents or prospective agents (a third party). Such an agreement
falls outside of Section 301’s reference to contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees or
between such labor organizations.
At issue here is whether Searcy’s state law claims also
implicate the CBA, which, unlike the Agent Regulations, is a
labor contract covered by Section 301. The CBA states that the
NFLPA “shall have sole and exclusive authority to
determine . . . the grounds for . . . denying certification of an
agent.” NFL-NFLPA CBA, Art. 48, § 1 (2011). Since Section
9(a) of the NLRA grants the NFLPA authority to be the
“exclusive representative[]” of players, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a),1
the NFLPA does not derive its authority to set up an agent
regulation system from the CBA. Searcy also did not challenge
the NFLPA’s exclusive authority.
Rather than challenging the NFLPA’s exclusive authority,
Searcy’s state law claims challenge how the NFLPA scores its
exam for prospective agents, sets the passing score for that
exam, and decides when to grant certification, along with a
related arbitration issue. The CBA does not address these
issues. The CBA does prohibit the NFLPA from removing
certified agents without an appeal in most circumstances and
from disciplining or decertifying agents based on their
negotiation performance, CBA, Art. 48, § 1, but these issues
are not presented by Searcy’s complaint.
1 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes[] shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining . . . .”).

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Without more, the resolution of Searcy’s state law claims
is not “substantially dependent” upon or “inextricably
intertwined” with the terms of the CBA. Allis-Chalmers, 471
U.S. at 213, 220. Even though the Agent Regulations and the
CBA are related to each other, they are two separate
agreements. And resolving Searcy’s state law claims does not
require the District Court to interpret the CBA. As the District
Court would only need to construe the Agent Regulations to
resolve these claims, these claims are not completely
preempted by Section 301 through the CBA. The District
Court, as a result, does not have federal question jurisdiction
over them.
The NFLPA Defendants point to Black v. National
Football League Players Association, 87 F. Supp. 2d. 1
(D.D.C. 2000). In that case, an agent raised a state law claim
against the NFLPA regarding the way the NFLPA conducted
his agent disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 3–4. The district court
found that the claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the
terms of the CBA. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The district court
explained that “Black’s state law claim [could not] be
described as independent of the collective-bargaining
agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We disagree with Black’s conclusion that any state
law claim involving the Agent Regulations necessarily
implicates the CBA and is therefore completely preempted.
The Sixth Circuit has previously rejected that same line of
reasoning as well. See Porter v. Nat’l Football League Players
Ass’n, No. 21-1420, 2022 WL 2666060, at *5 (6th Cir. July 11,
2022) (“declin[ing] to adopt the reasoning outlined in Black”
and explaining that “[t]he fact that the [Agent] Regulations are
in some sense dependent on a collective-bargaining agreement
does not mean they are themselves a labor contract covered by
§ 301”).
2.

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Whether Searcy’s state law claims are preempted by
Section 9(a) of the NLRA is irrelevant. Unlike Section 301 of
the LMRA, Section 9(a) of the NLRA does not provide for
complete preemption, see Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 398 &
n.12—and only complete preemption can serve as the basis for
federal question jurisdiction, see Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F.4th
at 150, 155 (explaining that the Supreme Court has found
complete preemption in only three statutes, including Section
301 of the LMRA but not Section 9(a) of the NLRA, and noting
that ordinary preemption does not serve as the basis for federal
question jurisdiction).
B.
Having concluded that the District Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Searcy’s state law claims, we now turn
to the question of whether the District Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over Searcy’s FAA claim.
The FAA “does not itself create” subject matter
jurisdiction, so the District Court needs an “independent
jurisdictional basis” to resolve Searcy’s FAA claim. Badgerow
v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 4 (2022) (quoting Hall St. Assocs. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008)).
If the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Searcy’s other claims “that are so related” to his FAA claim
“that they form part of the same case or controversy,” the
District Court would have supplemental jurisdiction over his
FAA claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, because the
District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
Searcy’s other claims, it cannot exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his FAA claim. And the District Court does
not have an alternative basis for exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over his FAA claim.
C.

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In the District Court, Searcy filed a motion to file a second
amended complaint after this Court remanded the case for
review of the prior Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Searcy sought to
drop his negligent misrepresentation and FAA claims. We
affirm the District Court’s denial of that motion because
allowing Searcy to amend his compliant would be fruitless; it
would not change the result that the District Court lacks
jurisdiction over all of Searcy’s claims.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
denial of Searcy’s motion to file a second amended complaint
and the District Court’s dismissal of claims against the NFLPA
Defendants on different grounds. We remand this case to the
District Court with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
So ordered.

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