Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States , Anon- Profit Religious Corporation v. Russian Federation, Aforeign State , Et Al .

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 11, 2024 Decided August 6, 2024
No. 23-7036
AGUDAS CHASIDEI CHABAD OF U NITED STATES , A
NON- PROFIT RELIGIOUS CORPORATION ,
APPELLEE
v.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, A FOREIGN S TATE , ET AL .,
APPELLEES
TENEX-USA I NCORPORATED,
APPELLANT
Consolidated with 23-7037
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:05-cv-01548)
Carolyn B. Lamm and Nicolle Kownacki argued the cause
for appellant TENEX-USA, Inc. With them on the briefs were
Jacqueline L. Chung and Ena Cefo.

-- 1 of 24 --

2
Wesley W. Whitmyer, Jr. and David C. Tobin were on the
briefs for appellant State Development Corporation VEB.RF.
Robert P. Parker argued the cause for appellee. With him
on the brief were Steven M. Lieberman and Paul S. Macri.
Before: SRINIVASAN , Chief Judge, W ILKINS and CHILDS ,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion of the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN .
SRINIVASAN , Chief Judge: For the third time, we consider
an appeal in this long-running lawsuit brought by Agudas
Chasidei Chabad of United States to reclaim religious property
unlawfully expropriated by the Russian state. Years ago,
Chabad obtained a default judgment against the Russian
Federation and several of its agencies along with an order
directing them to return the expropriated property. The
defendants ignored that order, so the district court imposed
monetary sanctions against them, payable to Chabad. The
sanctions have now accrued to over $175 million and have been
made enforceable through interim judgments.
This appeal arises out of Chabad’s attempt to collect on
those sanctions judgments by attaching the property of three
companies it contends the Russian Federation owns and
controls. We hold that Chabad may not do so. As a foreign
state, the Russian Federation has sovereign immunity from
civil suits unless its immunity has been abrogated by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The district court believed
that it had jurisdiction over the Russian Federation pursuant to
that Act’s “expropriation exception” to immunity. Our
precedents, however, establish that the expropriation exception
is inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. The district

-- 2 of 24 --

3
court thus does not have—and has never had—jurisdiction over
Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation.
Because the district court entered the default judgment and
sanctions judgments against the Russian Federation in excess
of its jurisdiction, those judgments are void as against the
Federation. And without the judgments against the Federation,
there is no predicate for Chabad to attach the property of
companies the Federation allegedly owns and controls. We
vacate the district court’s decision concluding otherwise.
I.
A.
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States (Chabad) is a
religious movement of Russian origin dating back to the 1700s.
Over its first century and a half, Chabad accumulated a library
of more than 12,000 volumes containing its history and central
teachings (the Library). It also compiled an archive of the
writings of its spiritual leaders, or Rebbes, documents it
considers sacred (the Archive). Collectively, the Library and
the Archive are known as “the Collection.” As our first
decision in this case recognized, “[t]he religious and historical
importance of the Collection to Chabad . . . can hardly be
overstated.” Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n
(Chabad I), 528 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
During the twentieth century, the Soviet Union took both
pieces of the Collection from Chabad—the Library in the
1920s and the Archive after the end of World War II. Since
their expropriation, the Library and Archive have resided in
Russia in the custody of government agencies now called the

-- 3 of 24 --

4
Russian State Library (RSL) and the Russian State Military
Archive (RSMA).
B.
Chabad filed this lawsuit in 2004, naming as defendants
the Russian Federation, the RSL, the RSMA, and the Russian
Ministry of Culture and Mass Communications. Chabad
sought, among other relief, an order directing the Collection’s
return.
As a basis for jurisdiction, Chabad invoked the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et
seq. The FSIA affords a blanket grant of immunity to foreign
states (and their agencies and instrumentalities) from the civil
jurisdiction of American courts, subject to certain exceptions.
Id. §§ 1604–1611. Chabad relied on the FSIA’s so-called
“expropriation exception,” which allows courts to hear certain
claims against foreign states involving “property taken in
violation of international law.” Id. § 1605(a)(3).
The case first reached our court after the district court
granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district
court held that, under the FSIA’s expropriation exception, it
had jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims against the RSMA but
not over its claims against the RSL. Agudas Chasidei Chabad
of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 19–20, 31 (D.D.C.
2006). We affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding
that the district court had jurisdiction over both. Chabad I, 528
F.3d at 939, 955.
But neither the district court nor our court examined
whether there was jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims against
the Russian Federation itself or whether the Federation instead
was immune from suit. Although our opinion remarked that

-- 4 of 24 --

5
we “reverse [the district court’s] finding of Russia’s
immunity,” just what precisely we meant by that statement vis-
à-vis the Russian Federation is unclear, since we at times in the
opinion referred to all the defendants collectively as “Russia”
and conducted no analysis specific to the Russian Federation.
Id. at 955 (emphasis added); see generally De Csepel v.
Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1105–06 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
The upshot of Chabad I was that all the defendants,
including the Russian Federation, remained in the case. In the
wake of our decision, however, the defendants withdrew from
the litigation. The Russian Federation, speaking on behalf of
itself and its agencies, asserted its belief that “a Court in the
United States does not have the authority to adjudicate rights
in property that in most cases always has been located in the
Russian Federation.” Statement with Respect to Further
Participation at 1 (June 26, 2009), J.A. 92. The Federation thus
concluded that further participation in the case would be
inconsistent with its “sovereignty.” Id. at 2, J.A. 93.
Approximately a year later, the district court granted
Chabad a default judgment against all defendants and ordered
them to surrender the Collection. After the defendants failed
to comply, the court imposed contempt sanctions, requiring the
defendants to pay Chabad $50,000 per day until they returned
the Collection. The defendants, though, neither paid the
sanctions nor returned the Collection. In the ensuing years, the
court entered interim judgments of accrued sanctions, which
now total more than $175 million.
C.
Unable to execute directly against the assets of the absent
defendants to satisfy the accumulating sanctions judgments,

-- 5 of 24 --

6
Chabad looked elsewhere. It sought, in particular, to collect
from entities in the United States with connections to the
Russian state. That effort eventually led Chabad to Tenex-
USA, a third-tier subsidiary of the Russian State Atomic
Energy Corporation, and State Development Corporation
VEB.RF (VEB), a Russian state development bank. See
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n (Chabad II),
19 F.4th 472, 474–75 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
Our second decision in this case, Chabad II, followed
Chabad’s efforts to subpoena information from Tenex-USA
and VEB about their assets and ownership. Id. As relevant
here, Tenex-USA responded to the subpoena by seeking partial
vacatur of the default judgment and sanctions judgments
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Id. Tenex-
USA argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation under the
FSIA’s expropriation exception. Id. at 475. And Tenex-USA
maintained that, absent jurisdiction as to the Russian
Federation, there was no basis for Chabad to seek attachment
of Tenex-USA’s assets based on its alleged ties to the
Federation. Id.
We disposed of Chabad II without reaching that
jurisdictional question. We held that, regardless of the district
court’s jurisdiction over the Russian Federation, Tenex-USA
could not invoke Rule 60(b) to void the judgments against the
Russian Federation. Id. at 477. That rule allows only “a party
or its legal representative” to seek relief from judgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b). And Tenex-USA was neither a party to the
judgments—the parties instead were the Russian Federation

-- 6 of 24 --

7
and its agencies—nor any party’s legal representative. Chabad
II, 19 F.4th at 477.
The case thus returned to the district court. Chabad then
moved to attach the U.S. property of Tenex-USA, its parent
company Tenex Joint-Stock Company (Tenex JSC), and VEB,
and to execute on that property to satisfy the sanctions
judgments it held against the Russian Federation. Chabad
argued that all three companies were alter egos of the Russian
Federation and that their property should be considered
Russian Federation property for purposes of enforcing the
judgments.
The district court denied Chabad’s motion without
prejudice. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n,
659 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2023). The court first held that
Chabad had satisfied the FSIA’s expropriation exception as to
the Russian Federation, so the Federation lacked immunity
with respect to the judgments entered against it. Id. at 7–10.
The court next concluded that, for the most part, Chabad had
satisfied a separate FSIA exception to the immunity from
attachment that the FSIA otherwise confers on foreign state
property. Id. at 10–11.
While the court ruled in Chabad’s favor in those respects,
it further determined that Chabad had not fulfilled the FSIA’s
requirement to provide notice of a default judgment to a
defendant before attaching its assets to satisfy the judgment.
Id. at 11–15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c)). Although Chabad
had served the default judgment on the Russian Federation, it
had not served the sanctions judgments. Id. at 12–15. The
court therefore denied Chabad’s motion without prejudice,
directing Chabad to serve the sanctions judgments on the
Russian Federation and then file a renewed attachment motion.
Id. at 15. Because the court rested its decision on lack of notice,

-- 7 of 24 --

8
it did not resolve whether the property of Tenex JSC, Tenex-
USA, or VEB is in fact property of the Russian Federation to
which Chabad has a legitimate claim. Id.
VEB and Tenex-USA now appeal. They argue, among
other things, that the district court erred in asserting jurisdiction
over Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation under the
FSIA’s expropriation exception. (Because Tenex-USA
purports to speak only for itself, not Tenex JSC, we refer
almost entirely to Tenex-USA throughout the remainder of the
analysis. And because VEB raises no arguments of its own and
merely incorporates those of Tenex-USA, we generally do not
refer separately to VEB, although most of what we say about
Tenex-USA applies to VEB too.)
II.
We begin by confirming our jurisdiction over this appeal.
Chabad raises four jurisdictional objections, none of which has
merit.
First, Chabad contends that Tenex-USA lacks standing to
appeal a decision in its favor—viz., the district court’s denial
of Chabad’s attachment motion. Chabad is correct that, in
general, “a party cannot appeal from a favorable judgment.”
15A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3902 (3d ed. 2023); see also California v.
Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (per curiam). The district
court, though, did not deny Chabad’s attachment motion
outright; instead, it denied the motion without prejudice. And
a party is “within its rights to appeal a dismissal without
prejudice on the grounds that it wants one with prejudice.” El
Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

-- 8 of 24 --

9
The reason is that an order dismissing a case (or, as here,
denying an attachment motion) without prejudice “subject[s]
the defendant to the risk . . . of further litigation.” Disher v.
Info. Res., Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1989). That is the
case here. The district court’s order expressly contemplates
that Chabad will “file its motion again” and “have the
opportunity and authority to collect upon a renewed motion.”
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 15. But
if Tenex-USA had gotten the ruling it wanted—a denial of
Chabad’s motion with prejudice—further proceedings would
be foreclosed, and Tenex-USA would be out of the case.
Tenex-USA may take this appeal in an effort to achieve that
more favorable outcome.
Second and similarly, Chabad argues that Tenex-USA
seeks to appeal the district court’s reasoning, rather than its
judgment, contrary to the basic principle that a party may only
appeal “judgments, not opinions.” United States v. Simpson,
430 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). But Tenex-USA in fact asks us to
review a judgment—or, more accurately, an order—not merely
an opinion. Tenex-USA seeks review of the portion of the
district court’s order that denies Chabad’s motion without
prejudice rather than with prejudice. And because we may
review an order to that effect, we also may review the reasons
the court denied the order without prejudice rather than with
prejudice. See El Paso Nat. Gas, 750 F.3d at 885.
Third, Chabad maintains that we already determined in
Chabad II that Tenex-USA lacks standing to raise the issue of
the Russian Federation’s immunity. Chabad misunderstands
Chabad II’s holding. Chabad II, as noted, held that Tenex-
USA could not attack the judgments in this case through a Rule
60(b) motion because Tenex-USA was not “a party or its legal
representative” in the litigation resulting in those judgments.

-- 9 of 24 --

10
19 F.4th at 477 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). But Chabad II
did not foreclose the possibility of Tenex-USA ever raising a
sovereign-immunity argument.
In fact, the court specifically recognized that VEB—
identically situated to Tenex-USA—could have raised such an
argument in an appeal of the denial of its motion to quash
Chabad’s subpoena. Id. at 476. And rightly so: a nonparty
may challenge an order on sovereign-immunity grounds if the
nonparty “has an interest that is affected” by the order—as long
as it does so through an appropriate procedural vehicle.
Aurelius Cap. Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120,
127–28 (2d Cir. 2009); see Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 7
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, 61 F.4th
984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The district court’s order plainly
affects Tenex-USA’s interest in its United States property. So
even if Tenex-USA could not protect that interest through a
Rule 60(b) motion, it can do so in this appeal.
Finally, Chabad submits that the denial without prejudice
of its attachment motion cannot be appealed until the district
court’s proceedings have come to an end. It is true that our
jurisdiction ordinarily is limited to appeals from “final
decisions of the district courts” that end the litigation on the
merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But under the collateral order
doctrine, there is a “‘small class’ of collateral rulings that,
although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately
deemed ‘final’” and immediately appealable. Mohawk Indus.,
Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1949)).
The district court’s ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
Russian Federation under the FSIA’s expropriation exception
meets the three conditions that render an interlocutory decision
an immediately appealable collateral order. See Johnson v.

-- 10 of 24 --

11
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1995). First, the court
conclusively decided that it has jurisdiction. See Agudas
Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 10. Second, the
issue of a court’s jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state
is important and separate from the ultimate merits question in
the ongoing collection proceedings: whether Tenex-USA’s
property is in fact attachable. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir.
2004). And third, the denial of sovereign immunity is
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see EM Ltd.
v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 2012)
(explaining that “[i]n post-judgment litigation,” the relevant
final judgment is the “judgment that concludes the collection
proceedings”). “[S]overeign immunity,” we have explained,
“is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of
litigation, and not just a defense to liability on the merits.”
Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1126 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Because our conclusion as to the Russian Federation’s
immunity suffices to resolve this appeal, and because a
particular ruling in an order may be immediately appealable
even if the order in its entirety is not, see Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 896 F.3d 520, 527–28 (D.C. Cir.
2018), we need not consider whether we have jurisdiction at
this time to review other rulings in the district court’s order.
III.
Tenex-USA’s primary submission is that the district court
lacks—and has always lacked—jurisdiction over Chabad’s
claims against the Russian Federation. Accordingly, Tenex-
USA says, the default judgment and sanctions judgments the

-- 11 of 24 --

12
court entered against the Russian Federation are void. And as
a result, Chabad is without a legal predicate to attach Tenex-
USA’s property in satisfaction of those judgments, even
assuming that property is Russian Federation property in the
relevant sense (which Tenex-USA vigorously denies).
We agree with Tenex-USA’s argument: under our
precedents, the FSIA’s expropriation exception does not
abrogate the Russian Federation’s sovereign immunity in the
circumstances of this case. And we reject Chabad’s contention
that, even if the district court lacks jurisdiction over its claims
against the Russian Federation, the principle of jurisdictional
finality precludes us from giving effect to that conclusion at
this stage of the proceedings.
A.
1.
The FSIA establishes that “a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of
the States” unless an exception to immunity applies. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1604. The sole exception in play in this case is the
“expropriation exception.” That exception divests foreign
sovereign immunity “in any case”
[1] in which rights in property taken in
violation of international law are in issue
and [2A] that property or any property
exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or [2B]
that property or any property exchanged
for such property is owned or operated by
an agency or instrumentality of the

-- 12 of 24 --

13
foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United
States . . . .
Id. § 1605(a)(3) (bracketed labels added). A district court thus
has jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state or its
agencies and instrumentalities under the expropriation
exception if rights in property are at issue, that property has
been taken in violation of international law, and the appropriate
“commercial-activity nexus requirement” is satisfied. De
Csepel, 859 F.3d at 1104.
In Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 146 (D.C.
Cir. 2016), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Fed.
Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169 (2021), we held
that “[t]he nexus requirement differs somewhat for claims
against the foreign state . . . as compared with claims against
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state.” Simon
understood clause 2A to be the only path to jurisdiction over
claims against a foreign state itself: the property that is the
subject of the claims (or property exchanged for it) must be
“present in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity” that the foreign state “carrie[s] on” in the United
States. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). And Simon
correspondingly read clause 2B to be the only basis for
jurisdiction over claims against an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state: the property need not be present in the United
States, but it must be “owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state” that is “engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States.” Id.
Simon was decided years after Chabad I, and Simon did
not discuss the fact that Chabad I apparently kept the Russian
Federation in this case. See pp. 4–5, supra. But under Simon’s

-- 13 of 24 --

14
interpretation of the expropriation exception, the Russian
Federation ought to have been dismissed: a claim against a
foreign state must fit within clause 2A, which, as noted,
requires the expropriated property in issue to be present in the
United States. Yet it is undisputed that the expropriated
property giving rise to this suit—the Collection—is not present
in the United States. Nonetheless, Chabad I said (without
elaboration) that it was overturning the district court’s “finding
of Russia’s immunity.” 528 F.3d at 955.
Although Simon did not address that seeming tension with
Chabad I, our court directly confronted it the following year in
De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary. De Csepel, like this case
and Simon, was an expropriation-exception suit against a
foreign sovereign (Hungary) concerning property located
outside the United States. 859 F.3d at 1104–05. The plaintiffs
argued that, under Chabad I, jurisdiction existed over Hungary
even though the expropriated property was not in the United
States. Id. at 1105. Hungary responded by relying on Simon,
under which jurisdiction over Hungary could arise only
pursuant to clause 2A, which is inapplicable when the property
is outside the United States. Id. at 1104.
We sided with Hungary, holding that Simon’s
interpretation of the expropriation exception governed. We
reasoned that Chabad I had not in fact “held that a foreign state
loses immunity if the second nexus requirement [clause 2B] is
met.” Id. at 1105 (first alteration in original). “The issue of the
Russian state’s immunity,” we explained, “was completely
unaddressed by the district court and neither raised nor briefed
on appeal” in Chabad I. Id. What is more, the Chabad I court
“did not explain why it kept the Russian Federation in the
case.” Id. It instead “reversed the district court with no
explanation at all,” id. at 1106, stating in a single conclusory
sentence that it “reverse[d] [the district court’s] finding of

-- 14 of 24 --

15
Russia’s immunity,” id. at 1105 (quoting Chabad I, 528 F.3d
at 955) (second alteration in original). Such a “cursory and
unexamined statement[] of jurisdiction,” we determined, had
“no precedential effect.” Id. at 1105–06 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Simon, by contrast, had “expressly
considered and decided the question of foreign state immunity
under the expropriation exception.” Id.
We have applied the expropriation exception on more than
one occasion since De Csepel. In each instance, we considered
ourselves bound by Simon’s construction of § 1605(a)(3). See
Schubarth v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 891 F.3d 392, 399–
401 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Philipp v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 894
F.3d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2018), rev’d in part on other grounds,
592 U.S. 169 (2021). Accordingly, De Csepel and our
subsequent decisions have consistently held that “a foreign
state is immune to claims for the expropriation of property not
present in the United States.” Schubarth, 891 F.3d at 394–95.
2.
Under Simon and De Csepel, the expropriation exception
cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims
against the Russian Federation in this case. The expropriated
property those claims involve, the Collection, sits in Russia,
not the United States. And as we have now held several times,
expropriated property must be located in the United States for
jurisdiction to lie under the expropriation exception over claims
against a foreign state. Simon, 812 F.3d at 146. Even if
Chabad I could be read to have reached a different conclusion,
our decision in De Csepel resolved that Simon, not Chabad I,
controls.
In nonetheless concluding that it had jurisdiction over
Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation, the district
court relied on Chabad I. The court read Chabad I to have

-- 15 of 24 --

16
allowed for jurisdiction over a foreign state under either clause
2A or clause 2B of the expropriation exception. Agudas
Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 8. And it thought
that our later decisions—including Simon and De Csepel—did
not mandate a different result, because they departed from
Chabad I, an earlier and, in the court’s view, binding precedent.
Id. at 9. As the district court saw things, Chabad I established
the law of the circuit, and it remains the law of the circuit
because we have not overruled it en banc. Id. at 9–10.
We appreciate that, at one time, there might have been
uncertainty about whether Chabad I or Simon supplied this
circuit’s law on the proper interpretation of the expropriation
exception. But our decision in De Csepel definitively settled
the matter in favor of Simon. We extensively analyzed the
issue and squarely held that Chabad I did not create “[b]inding
circuit law” because it never held “that a foreign state loses
immunity if the second nexus requirement is met.” De Csepel,
859 F.3d at 1105 (alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Chabad I’s passing remark about
“Russia’s immunity,” De Csepel emphasized, had “no
precedential effect.” Id. at 1105–06 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
De Csepel’s authoritative reading of Chabad I is now itself
binding circuit law, which the district court (and our court)
must follow unless we reconsider the issue en banc. Lest any
doubt remain about the law in this circuit, we reiterate once
again: there is no jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign
state under the FSIA’s expropriation exception unless the
expropriated property is located in the United States. De
Csepel forecloses reliance on Chabad I to conclude otherwise.

-- 16 of 24 --

17
B.
Chabad advances two reasons why we nevertheless should
not apply Simon in this case. The first is readily dismissed:
Chabad asks us to reconsider Simon’s holding, but we are
bound by that holding after De Csepel, no less than were the
panels in Schubarth and Philipp. And in any event, for the
reasons explained in De Csepel, we would adopt Simon’s
construction of the expropriation exception even if we were
free to interpret the FSIA on a blank slate. De Csepel, 859 F.3d
at 1107–08.
Chabad also argues that, even if Simon is the law today,
the principle of jurisdictional finality precludes us from
revisiting the district court’s jurisdiction over its claims against
the Russian Federation at this stage of the proceedings. We
conclude, however, that jurisdictional finality poses no barrier
to our applying our governing precedent in this case.
Under the doctrine of jurisdictional finality, “principles of
res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations—both
subject matter and personal.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9
(1982). The usual rule is that “[a] party that has had an
opportunity to litigate the question of . . . jurisdiction” may not
“reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse
judgment.” Id.
To support application of that principle here, Chabad relies
on Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d
1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which we described two options
available to a defendant who questions the jurisdictional basis
of a lawsuit against it. First, such a defendant “may appear,
raise the jurisdictional objection, and ultimately pursue it on
direct appeal. If he so elects, he may not renew the
jurisdictional objection in a collateral attack.” Id. at 1547.

-- 17 of 24 --

18
“Alternatively, the defendant may refrain from appearing,
thereby exposing himself to the risk of a default judgment.
When enforcement of the default judgment is attempted,
however, he may assert his jurisdictional objection.” Id.
According to Chabad, the Russian Federation took option
one: it initially appeared in the case, contested jurisdiction,
appealed, and lost (in Chabad I). That result, Chabad reasons,
cannot now be challenged in enforcement proceedings
following the default judgment, because a party that appears
and challenges jurisdiction cannot “renew the jurisdictional
objection in a collateral attack.” Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d
at 1547.
The Practical Concepts framework does not control in this
case. To begin with, the defendant in Practical Concepts had
not appeared in the case prior to the entry of a default judgment
against it, so only the second path we described was relevant to
our disposition. Id. at 1545. Nor did we purport to establish
any ironclad rule in Practical Concepts, stating only that
defendants “generally” face the choice we described. Id. at
1547. Our use of indefinite language was appropriate, given
that equitable considerations and exceptions have always
informed the application of res judicata. See Canonsburg Gen.
Hosp. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 295, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The
Practical Concepts passage on which Chabad relies thus
provides “generally” applicable guidance, but it does not
delimit the full range of permissible outcomes. And several
features of the present case persuade us that applying
jurisdictional finality is unwarranted.
First, the party now contesting jurisdiction, Tenex-USA,
was not a defendant in the case when it was filed or when the
district court entered the default judgment. See Chabad II, 19
F.4th at 477. Indeed, Tenex-USA had no reason even to be

-- 18 of 24 --

19
aware of the litigation until it received a subpoena from Chabad
in 2019, in the course of post-judgment enforcement
proceedings. So we see little reason to deny Tenex-USA the
benefit of FSIA law that was clearly established in our circuit
by the time Tenex-USA first became involved in the case.
After all, the reasoning of Practical Concepts by its own terms
applies in situations in which the party contesting jurisdiction
post-judgment was “[a] defendant who kn[ew] of” the initial
action against it. 811 F.2d at 1547. So, while a “party that has
had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question in a collateral
attack upon an adverse judgment,” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456
U.S. at 702 n.9, Tenex-USA is not such a party. Rather, Tenex-
USA contested jurisdiction at the first opportunity available to
it.
We recognize that it remains unresolved whether,
notwithstanding its “separate juridical status,” First Nat’l City
Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 621 (1983), Tenex-USA is in fact an alter ego of the
Russian Federation, as Chabad alleges. But even if Chabad is
correct on that score, it would not change the jurisdictional
finality analysis. The Russian Federation is an indirect
shareholder of Tenex-USA. And in general, a judgment
against the shareholder of a corporation binds the corporation
“only if” the corporation has “notice” of the “action resulting
in the judgment” and a “fair opportunity to defend” in that
action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 59(5) (Am. L.
Inst. 1982); 18A Wright & Miller, supra, § 4460. There is no
suggestion here that Tenex-USA was on notice of this suit or
had an opportunity to defend itself prior to the default
judgment. What is more, the Russian Federation’s actions—
with respect to the Collection and in this litigation—are
entirely disconnected from its status as an indirect Tenex-USA
owner. So it is immaterial to the jurisdictional-finality inquiry

-- 19 of 24 --

20
whether Tenex-USA’s corporate separateness from the
Russian Federation should be disregarded for attachment
purposes.
In addition, the issue of the Russian Federation’s immunity
was never adjudicated before entry of the default judgment that
now provides the predicate for attachment proceedings against
Tenex-USA. As we explained in De Csepel, the Russian
Federation’s immunity “was completely unaddressed by the
district court” in the proceedings that led to Chabad I and
“neither raised nor briefed on appeal.” 859 F.3d at 1105. The
issue then received at best a “drive-by” ruling in our court that
did not amount to a precedential holding. Id. at 1106 (quoting
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
And while the district court’s later opinion accompanying the
default judgment contained a jurisdictional analysis, that
analysis was limited to the RSL and RSMA and said nothing
specifically about the Russian Federation. See Agudas
Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 729 F. Supp. 2d
141, 146–48 (D.D.C. 2010). Given that procedural backdrop
and the other considerations weighing against the application
of jurisdictional finality, the Russian Federation’s immunity
need not be forever insulated from examination.
Settling a jurisdictional question correctly—rather than
simply settling it—is also particularly important when the
question concerns foreign sovereign immunity. “Actions
against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues
concerning the foreign relations of the United States,”
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493
(1983), and can have serious “diplomatic implications,”
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1, 19 (2019). This
case is illustrative: the United States informed the district court
several times that the imposition of contempt sanctions on the
Russian Federation “risk[ed] damage to significant foreign

-- 20 of 24 --

21
policy interests.” Statement of Interest of the United States at
10 (Aug. 29, 2012), J.A. 145; Statement of Interest of the
United States at 6–7 (Feb. 21, 2014), J.A. 166–67.
Mindful of such concerns, the Supreme Court has
explained that “the rule of law demands adherence to [the
FSIA’s] strict requirements.” See Harrison, 587 U.S. at 19.
And we have likewise cautioned that “[i]ntolerant adherence to
default judgments against foreign states could adversely affect
this nation’s relations with other nations and undermine the
State Department’s continuing efforts to encourage foreign
sovereigns generally to resolve disputes within the United
States’ legal framework.” FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v.
Democratic Republic of Congo, 447 F.3d 835, 838–39 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (quoting Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1551 n.19).
Those considerations do not give foreign states a free pass with
respect to jurisdictional finality. But they do counsel in favor
of rectifying an evident jurisdictional problem in the
circumstances of this case.
Finally, there is no indication of gamesmanship on the part
of the Russian Federation or Tenex-USA. It would be a
different case if, for instance, the Russian Federation had
appeared and contested jurisdiction, determined that its
arguments were unlikely to succeed, withdrawn and defaulted,
and then strategically reappeared in an attempt to challenge
jurisdiction a second time. Or one could imagine a scenario in
which a foreign state relied on its agencies or instrumentalities
for the specific purpose of raising or re-raising jurisdictional
arguments that otherwise would be precluded. In such
situations, applying jurisdictional finality would best promote
the values preclusion serves—judicial economy and the

-- 21 of 24 --

22
protection of opposing litigants. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
But there is no hint of anything like that in this case. The
Russian Federation withdrew from the litigation in 2009. And
nothing in the record indicates that, 15 years on, it is using
Tenex-USA to make arguments on its behalf. Rather, Tenex-
USA was a stranger to the case until years after the default
judgment, when Chabad served it with legal process in
enforcement proceedings. At that point, Tenex-USA
understandably began to challenge the district court’s exercise
of jurisdiction as inconsistent with our precedents.
For those reasons, the doctrine of jurisdictional finality
does not prevent us from applying in this case the interpretation
of the FSIA’s expropriation exception that governs in our
circuit—just as we would do in any other case presenting the
issue.
C.
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over
Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation when it
entered the default judgment and sanctions judgments, those
judgments are void as against the Federation. Consequently,
the judgments may not be enforced through attachment of
Tenex JSC’s, Tenex-USA’s, or VEB’s assets. See TIG Ins. Co.
v. Republic of Argentina, 967 F.3d 778, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Chabad’s claim on those assets is entirely derivative of its
claim on the Russian Federation’s assets. And without a valid
judgment against the Russian Federation, it no longer has any
such claim.
Though Chabad does not raise the point, we note that a
final judgment entered in excess of a court’s jurisdiction
typically is not void unless “the court that rendered judgment

-- 22 of 24 --

23
lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction.” Lee Mem’l
Hosp. v. Becerra, 10 F.4th 859, 863–64 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United Student Aid
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)). And given
the abstruseness of Chabad I’s jurisdictional determinations
and the fact that Simon had yet to be decided, we cannot say
there was no arguable basis for the district court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the Russian Federation when it entered the
default judgment and most of the sanctions judgments. But as
Lee Memorial Hospital v. Becerra recognized, we have
declined to apply the arguable-basis standard in cases involving
foreign sovereign immunity when the “objecting party”—here,
Tenex-USA—did not “appear[] in the challenged proceeding.”
Id. at 864 (quoting Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Since
that is the present situation, the judgments against the Russian
Federation are void simply because “the issuing court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether there existed
an ‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction.” Bell Helicopter, 734 F.3d
at 1181.
Our holding also requires the Russian Federation to be
dismissed from the case: absent an applicable FSIA exception,
it is immune from Chabad’s claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a),
1604. In arriving at that conclusion, we do not intend in any
way to downplay the wrongs Chabad has suffered or the
frustrations it has endured in its hundred-year effort to
reacquire its wrongfully taken sacred objects, of which this
lawsuit is only the latest chapter. The result we reach is simply
a consequence of the statute Congress enacted and the limits it
chose to set on claims against foreign states like the Russian
Federation. And we do not disturb the district court’s exercise
of jurisdiction over, or entry of judgment against, the RSL and
RSMA. Chabad remains free to proceed against those
entities—and perhaps also against the Russian Ministry of

-- 23 of 24 --

24
Culture and Mass Communications, although the Ministry’s
amenability to suit has not specifically been addressed to
date—as appropriate.
* * * * *
The district court stated that “unless and until it receives a
mandate” from this court directing it to dismiss the Russian
Federation, it “would continue to assert subject-matter
jurisdiction” over the Federation. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of
U.S., 659 F. Supp. 3d at 10. This opinion occasions such a
mandate. We vacate the district court’s order and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

-- 24 of 24 --