Peo in Interest of SBS

26CA0232 Peo in Interest of SBS 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0232
Costilla County District Court No. 24JV30011
Honorable Kimberly Karn, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of S.B.S., a Child,
and Concerning L.S.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Pawar and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Keri Williams, Special County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem
Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for
Appellant

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¶ 1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, L.S. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child
legal relationship with S.B.S. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 Following the child’s birth, the Costilla County Department of
Social Services (the Department) received a referral expressing
concern about mother’s living situation and medical neglect of the
child. The Department placed the child and then-fifteen-year-old
mother together in foster care and filed a petition in dependency or
neglect.
¶ 3 Based on mother’s admission, the court adjudicated the child
dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.
The treatment plan required mother to (1) receive an appropriate
education; (2) participate in a psychological evaluation and follow
all recommendations; (3) attend parenting classes and demonstrate
the skills necessary to safely parent the child; (4) attend all family
time; (5) provide a safe and nurturing living environment for the
child; (6) demonstrate sobriety; (7) attend all the child’s medical
appointments; and (8) sign releases allowing the Department to

2
communicate with all providers. Mother didn’t object to the
treatment plan objectives.
¶ 4 In October 2024, after the child was diagnosed with “failure to
thrive,” the court authorized the foster parents to “step in” and help
mother care for the child if the child’s needs weren’t being met. But
in November 2024, after mother refused the foster parents’ help, the
child was again diagnosed with failure to thrive, and the court
granted the Department’s emergency request to place mother and
the child in separate foster homes. Shortly thereafter (and
approximately two and a half months after the petition was filed),
mother ran away and was found in Kansas near the home of her
father (maternal grandfather). The Department then placed mother
with maternal grandfather, where she stayed for the remainder of
the case.
¶ 5 The Department and the child’s guardian ad litem later moved
to terminate mother’s parental rights. Sixteen months after the
Department filed the petition, and following an evidentiary hearing,
the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated mother’s legal
relationship with the child.

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II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 6 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied
with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has
not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2026.
¶ 7 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.
T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for
clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on
those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
The credibility of witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight
of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn
therefrom are all within the discretion of the juvenile court. A.M.,
¶ 15.

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III. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶ 8 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by relying on
missed family time to conclude that she had not complied with her
treatment plan.1 We disagree.
A. Additional Legal Principles
¶ 9 A treatment plan is successful if it renders a parent fit. People
in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo. 1982). Absolute
compliance with every provision of the treatment plan is not
required. People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 333 (Colo.
2006). However, partial compliance, or even substantial
compliance, may not necessarily result in a successful plan that
renders the parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905,
909 (Colo. App. 2005). It’s a parent’s responsibility to ensure
successful completion of their treatment plan. People in Interest of
A.H., 736 P.2d 425, 428 (Colo. App. 1987).
¶ 10 When a child is under six years old at the time a petition is
filed, the court can’t find that a parent reasonably complied with a
1 Our analysis focuses solely on the juvenile court’s findings related
to mother’s family time objective because, as mother explained in
her reply brief, her argument on appeal is narrowly tailored to that
objective, not her “overall compliance with her treatment plan.”

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treatment plan when the parent either hasn’t attended family time
with their child “as set forth in the treatment plan, unless good
cause can be shown for failing to attend,” or “exhibits the same
problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate
improvement.” § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(A), (B).
B. Analysis
¶ 11 The juvenile court determined that although mother was
capable of completing her treatment plan, she failed to comply with
it and exhibited the same problems without adequate improvement.
See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B). In so determining, the court found that
mother hadn’t substantially complied with the objective that she
regularly attend family time because she missed, cancelled, or
prematurely ended approximately sixty percent of her visits, many
without good cause. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(A). The court found
that, despite the Department’s efforts to coordinate in-person family
time, mother refused to return to Colorado. As a result, until she
returned to Colorado the week before the termination hearing,
mother hadn’t seen the child in person in more than a year.
¶ 12 Mother contends that the court’s findings that she didn’t
regularly attend family time, refused to return to Colorado to have a

6
relationship with the child, hadn’t seen the child in person in over a
year, and lacked emotional attachment with the child were contrary
to the evidence presented during the hearing. But mother’s
contentions are belied by the record.
¶ 13 The family time supervisor testified that mother cancelled or
prematurely ended about sixty percent of her video family time for
reasons such as going to a birthday party and “ha[ving] something
else to do.” During her testimony, mother acknowledged that she
had missed “a few” family time sessions and had “[n]ot entirely”
completed her treatment plan. And the caseworker and
caseworker’s supervisor testified that, until the week before the
termination hearing, mother had generally refused to return to
Colorado for in-person family time (although at one point she did
agree to return if the Department helped her get a driver’s license
and provided her with a car).
¶ 14 Consequently, when mother saw the child in person the week
before the termination hearing, it had been more than a year since
she last participated in in-person family time with the child. And
despite the Department scheduling two in-person family time
sessions during the week before the termination hearing, mother

7
attended only one. The caseworker and family time supervisor
opined that, as a result of mother’s limited engagement in family
time, there was no emotional attachment or bond between mother
and the child. The court credited that testimony, as it was entitled
to do. See A.M., ¶ 15.
¶ 15 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the court erroneously
“faulted” her for not exercising in-person family time even though
she “was literally given no options to exercise in-person parenting
time.” Mother contends that the lack of in-person family time was
“beyond her control” because there were no foster home placements
available for her in Colorado. She argues that because there were
no available placements, she “was given no opportunity” to form an
attachment with the child, and the court’s reliance on that lack of
attachment to support its termination order was error. We aren’t
persuaded.
¶ 16 Our review of the record reveals that after mother ran away to
Kansas, the Department tried to arrange for her return to Colorado
for in-person family time by discussing it with her on at least six
different occasions, investigating temporary placement options in
Colorado, and offering to pay for her transportation costs. But its

8
efforts were hampered by mother’s minimal and inconsistent
communication, lack of cooperation with inquiries about friends
and family with whom she could stay in Colorado, and overall
refusal to return. Approximately five months before the termination
hearing, the Department arranged in-person family time in
Colorado for mother, but she didn’t attend. And four months before
the termination hearing, the court authorized an in-person visit in
Kansas if mother demonstrated “a pattern of engagement in family
time” and the foster family could travel with the child for the visit.
But the record reflects that mother’s family time participation
continued to be inconsistent.
¶ 17 We acknowledge that mother’s circumstances at the time of
the child’s birth and throughout this case were incredibly difficult,
at best. She was a young teenager when the petition was filed, and
due to concerns about the care she was receiving from her own
mother (maternal grandmother), she was placed in foster care in
Colorado before running away to Kansas and ultimately being
placed in maternal grandfather’s home.
¶ 18 Mother was in her third foster home placement at the time the
treatment plan was adopted. Despite the Department’s ongoing

9
efforts to find placement for mother in Colorado, the only licensed
foster care agency in the San Luis Valley area declined to consider
her due to its concerns about her behavior while she was in prior
placements, and mother was resistant to the Department’s efforts to
identify placement options outside of that area.
¶ 19 The Department included a mental health component in
mother’s proposed treatment plan due to concerns she was
experiencing postpartum depression or other mental health
conditions that impacted her ability to care for the child and her
willingness to follow the rules of her foster placements. As already
noted, the court adopted the mental health objective. But mother
didn’t complete the psychological evaluation required by her
treatment plan, and although she attended some therapy sessions,
her participation was “inconsistent” and “uncooperative.”
¶ 20 The Department also attempted to assess kin placements for
mother in Colorado, including with maternal grandmother and a
family friend. But the identified kin didn’t comply with the
Department’s attempts to assess their willingness and ability to
safely care for mother. And mother refused to provide any other
information to help the Department identify additional kin

10
placement options. Moreover, even if the Department had
succeeded in its efforts to find a placement in Colorado, mother
continued to indicate that she wouldn’t return. In essence, mother
voluntarily absented herself from the case. Cf. People in Interest of
A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (noting that a department is not required
to continue providing services when a parent “voluntarily absents”
themself from a proceeding).
¶ 21 Mother also contends that when the child was placed in a
separate foster home in November 2024, the Department and
juvenile court restricted her family time without a hearing, in
violation of section 19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2026. She argues that this
resulted in “no in-person parenting time [being] offered to [her]
between November 2024 and June 2025.”
¶ 22 We agree with mother that, under section 19-3-217(3), she
was entitled to a hearing within seventy-two hours of the child’s
emergency placement change to address any ongoing restriction of
family time. It doesn’t appear from our review of the record that
such a hearing occurred. However, less than three weeks later,
mother agreed to virtual family time after she left her placement in
Colorado and ran away to Kansas.

11
¶ 23 The court continually reviewed its family time orders and
found it wasn’t in the child’s best interests for the Department to
take her to Kansas for family time. Instead, the court ordered that
it was best for the child for any in-person family time to occur in
Colorado “with people [the child knew] and fe[lt] comfortable with.”
See People in Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 17 (the child’s
health and safety are “the paramount concerns” in determining the
appropriate family time services).2 Mother doesn’t challenge the
substance of these orders on appeal. See id. at ¶¶ 18-35 (allowing a
parent to raise concerns regarding interim family time orders via
appeal of a termination judgment).
¶ 24 Given mother’s agreement to virtual family time shortly after
the child’s foster placement was changed and the court’s ongoing
consideration of whether in-person family time was in the child’s
best interests (which mother doesn’t challenge), we fail to see — and
mother fails to identify — how she was prejudiced by the court’s
2 Although the court authorized that at least one family time
session could occur in Kansas if mother consistently engaged in her
existing family time plan, it ordered that the “[l]onger-term plan for
building [the] relationship between [mother] and [the child] must
still happen in Colorado.”

12
failure to hold the hearing required by section 19-3-217(3). Thus,
the court’s error was harmless.3 See C.A.R. 35(c) (directing
appellate courts to disregard any error that does not affect the
parties’ substantial rights); People in Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81,
¶ 20 (noting that an error is harmless unless “it can be said with
fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome
of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself” (citation
omitted)); see also People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 587
(Colo. App. 2003) (concluding that an error was harmless because
the party made “no argument . . . that she suffered harm” as a
result of the error).
¶ 25 Finally, although mother asserts that the Department violated
her substantial rights by failing to arrange in-person family time,
mother doesn’t assert any error in the juvenile court’s reasonable
efforts determination. See § 19-3-604(2)(h) (requiring a juvenile
court to consider whether a department made reasonable efforts to
3 We decline to address mother’s assertion, raised for the first time
in her reply brief, that we should review the court’s error for
constitutional harmlessness. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013
COA 43, ¶ 24 (declining to address arguments raised for the first
time in the reply brief).

13
rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family when determining if a
parent is unfit). Indeed, mother conceded during oral argument
that she isn’t contesting the court’s reasonable efforts
determination. Thus, we decline to consider this argument further.
See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004).
¶ 26 Because the juvenile court’s findings regarding mother’s lack
of compliance with the family time objective of her treatment plan
are supported by the record, we discern no error. See S.R.N.J-S.,
¶ 10.
IV. Mother’s Fitness to Parent
¶ 27 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that
she “ha[d] the same issues as she did at the beginning of th[e] case”
and “ha[d] not evidenced any change to ensure that she is a fit
parent.” We discern no reversible error.
A. Additional Legal Principles
¶ 28 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).
Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent
provides nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

14
physical, emotional, and mental health needs and conditions.
People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A
juvenile court can also consider a parent’s noncompliance with a
treatment plan in determining unfitness. People in Interest of D.P.,
181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
B. Analysis
¶ 29 Mother asserts that the court’s findings were unsupported by
the record because she demonstrated change by engaging in
parenting classes, attending therapy, establishing a more
appropriate living environment for the child, and working to enroll
in a GED program. To be sure, the record reflects that mother had
made such progress.
¶ 30 But mother’s argument takes the court’s findings out of
context. Reviewing the disputed findings in the context of the
court’s entire order, it’s clear that the court didn’t ignore or
disregard mother’s progress. Indeed, the court acknowledged
mother’s completed parenting classes, therapy attendance,
demonstrated sobriety, and improved living situation before finding
that she exhibited the same issues that interfered with her ability to
parent when the case began. The juvenile court thus considered

15
the mother’s treatment plan progress as a whole before concluding
that she had “not evidenced any change to ensure that she is a fit
parent.” See id.
¶ 31 The record supports the court’s findings. Specifically, mother
failed to complete the psychological evaluation or otherwise
adequately address her emotional self-regulation; demonstrate
improved parenting skills, including the ability to recognize the
child’s cues during family time; or regularly attend family time or
the child’s medical appointments, despite being given information
about how to participate virtually in both. The caseworker opined
that mother could not provide nurturing and safe parenting
sufficient for the child’s needs and conditions and, thus, was unfit.
¶ 32 Moreover, even assuming that the juvenile court erred by
finding that mother had not made “any” changes, we conclude that
any error was harmless. Specifically, the court found that, “[t]o the
extent that [m]other may have complied with portions of her
treatment plan, . . . it was not sufficient to rehabilitate [her].” And,
as discussed above, the court’s record-supported findings — which
mother doesn’t contest — overwhelmingly support the conclusion
that the treatment plan wasn’t successful in rehabilitating mother

16
and she wasn’t able to provide nurturing and safe parenting
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions, notwithstanding her partial compliance. See
C.C., ¶ 20.
V. Additional Time to Comply
¶ 33 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by not giving her
more time to comply with her treatment plan. We disagree.
A. Additional Legal Principles
¶ 34 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change in a reasonable time and whether the parent can
therefore become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile court may
consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,
the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of
the parent’s conduct or condition. D.L.C., 70 P.3d at 588-89. The
determination of a reasonable period is fact specific and varies from
case to case. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25. But
a reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be
determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. Id.

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B. Analysis
¶ 35 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred because the
changes she made during the case supported giving her additional
time to comply with her treatment plan. However, the court did
consider allowing mother more time before determining that it
“would not result in her completing her treatment plan as she
evidences no motivation and no effort to comply.” In so finding, the
court considered that mother already had fifteen months to work on
her treatment plan and had not made significant progress, and she
remained resistive and uncooperative at the time of the termination
hearing. Thus, the court concluded that mother was unlikely to
become a fit parent within a reasonable period of time.
¶ 36 The record supports the court’s findings. As discussed above
in Parts III.B and IV.B, although mother exhibited some progress,
she didn’t substantially comply with her treatment plan overall.
The caseworker testified that throughout the case mother had been
“very combative,” uncooperative, and focused more on “putting . . .
barriers up” than “mitigating the issues” that necessitated the
Department’s involvement with the family. And the family time
supervisor expressed concern about mother’s ability to manage her

18
anger based on her reactions to his feedback. Considering mother’s
lack of progress throughout the case, the caseworker opined that
mother’s conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a
reasonable period of time.
¶ 37 We’re not persuaded by mother’s argument that “[t]he child’s
conditions and needs supported allowing . . . mother additional
time to comply with her treatment plan.” The court determined that
the young child had been in out-of-home placement for over a year
and needed “stability and a permanent home.” See S.Z.S., ¶ 25.
Mother’s argument that the child “was in a stable place and
allowing [m]other additional time to regain custody would have
supported the child’s needs” essentially asks us to reweigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,
which we can’t do. See id. at ¶ 29.
¶ 38 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s decision not to
give mother more time to work on her treatment plan.
VI. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 39 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination when placement
with maternal grandfather had been approved by an Interstate

19
Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) home study. We
disagree.4
A. Additional Legal Principles
¶ 40 Before terminating parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the court must consider and eliminate less drastic
alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. In
considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,
¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other things,
whether the child is bonded with the parent, see People in Interest
of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009); and whether an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) provides adequate
permanence and stability for the child, see T.E.M., 124 P.3d at
910-11.
4 We decline to address mother’s assertion, raised for the first time
in her reply brief, that the juvenile court violated her substantive
due process rights by not narrowly tailoring the outcome of the case
to serve the compelling state interest of protecting the child. See
Drexler, ¶ 24.

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¶ 41 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
adequately meet the child’s needs; the less drastic alternative must
be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. Thus, if the court
considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that
termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the
alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 42 We must affirm the court’s determination of whether there is a
less drastic alternative if its findings are supported by the record.
People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
B. Analysis
¶ 43 Mother asserts that placement with maternal grandfather was
a less drastic alternative to termination because he had previously
been approved by an ICPC home study. See People in Interest of
O.J.R., 2025 COA 78, ¶ 15 (describing the ICPC as an interstate
agreement to facilitate interstate coordination in the out-of-state
placement of children). But a placement’s adequacy for the
purposes of the ICPC doesn’t equate to the placement being a less
drastic alternative to termination. See A.M., ¶ 27.
¶ 44 In considering whether an APR was a less drastic alternative
to termination, the court acknowledged that maternal grandfather’s

21
home had previously been approved by an ICPC home study that
had expired. The court further found that placement with maternal
grandfather wasn’t in the child’s best interests because maternal
grandfather had been uncooperative, hadn’t engaged in services,
and had failed to comply with his treatment plan in a dependency
or neglect case involving mother’s sibling. The court expressed
concern that, because of maternal grandfather’s work schedule,
mother would be the child’s caretaker even though she was unfit.
Considering the child’s lack of emotional attachment to mother and
need for permanence and stability, the court concluded that there
were no less drastic alternatives to termination that would be in the
child’s best interests. See N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 421; T.E.M., 124 P.3d
at 910-11.
¶ 45 The record supports the court’s findings. While maternal
grandfather had been approved as a placement for the child by an
ICPC home study earlier in the case, the home study had expired
approximately two months before the termination hearing.
Following the ICPC approval, the juvenile court continued to review
the child’s placement and determined that placement with the
foster parents was “the most appropriate, least restrictive placement

22
available to meet the needs of the child, the family, and the
community.” In support, the court noted mother’s lack of treatment
plan progress and its “serious concerns” regarding the “pattern of
visits” between mother and the child and mother’s ability to put the
child’s needs ahead of her own.
¶ 46 Regardless of the ICPC, the Department’s child welfare
supervisor and the caseworker expressed concern about placing the
child with maternal grandfather because of his prior and current
involvement in dependency or neglect cases. The caseworker
described maternal grandfather as “combative,” uncooperative,
lacking accountability, and substantially noncompliant with his
treatment plans. Thus, she opined that he wasn’t an appropriate
placement option for the child. Similarly, the family time supervisor
expressed concern that maternal grandfather believed he had
“nothing to change,” missed parenting classes, and had not
improved his parenting skills, all of which could impede his ability
to care for the child.
¶ 47 Moreover, mother and maternal grandfather acknowledged
that, based on his extensive work schedule, she would often be
caring for the child. But the caseworker opined that it wasn’t in the

23
child’s best interests to have an ongoing relationship with mother
based on the lack of attachment between mother and the child.
¶ 48 Thus, after weighing all the evidence, the juvenile court
ultimately concluded that placement with maternal grandfather was
not in the child’s best interests. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. And because the
record supports the juvenile court’s determination that there was
no less drastic alternative to termination, we discern no basis for
reversal. See B.H., ¶ 80.
VII. Disposition
¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE BROWN concur.