Peo in Interest of PG-E

23CA1832 Peo in Interest of PG-E 07-03-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1832

Adams County District Court No. 21JV277

Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of P.G-E., a Child,

and Concerning C.T.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE LUM

Harris and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced July 3, 2024

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Conor Hagerty, Assistant County Attorney,

Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem

Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for

Appellant

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¶ 1 C.T. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating her parent-child relationship with P.G-E. (the child).

Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the court erred by

concluding that she could not become fit within a reasonable time.

We perceive no error and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 The Adams County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect after the child was born to

mother, who had a history of methamphetamine use and was

behaving erratically at the hospital in the hours after the child’s

birth — hiding under the hospital bed and not allowing the hospital

staff to touch the child. Mother had five older children who were

not in her care.

¶ 3 The court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and

adopted a treatment plan. Mother’s treatment plan required her to

(1) communicate with case professionals; (2) demonstrate an ability

to provide for the child’s needs and engage with life skills services;

(3) obtain appropriate housing; (4) complete a dual diagnosis

evaluation and comply with any recommendations and urinalysis

testing; and (5) attend family time with the child.

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¶ 4 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights,

asserting that she had not complied with her treatment plan. After

a hearing, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion. By

that time, almost two years after the case opened, mother had given

birth to another child (daughter) who was then four months old.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent didn’t comply

with or wasn’t successfully rehabilitated by an appropriate, court-

approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2023; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA

79, ¶ 10.

¶ 6 When evaluating whether a parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider whether any

changes occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of S.K., 2019

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COA 36, ¶ 75. A reasonable time is not indefinite and must be

determined by considering the child’s condition and needs. Id.

¶ 7 Because the child was under the age of six when the petition

was filed, the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions

applied. § 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. Those provisions require

the court to place the child “in a permanent home as expeditiously

as possible.” § 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 8 Where resolution of an issue necessitates application of the

termination statute to evidentiary facts, it presents a mixed

question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO

14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear

error. C.R.C.P. 52. The credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all within the juvenile court’s

province. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo.

1982). But a determination of the proper legal standard to be

applied in a case and the application of that standard to the

particular facts of the case are questions of law that we review de

novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.

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III. Analysis

¶ 9 The juvenile court found that, despite a change in mother’s

circumstances — her recent and commendable sobriety and

progress in treatment — mother’s conduct or condition was unlikely

to change within a reasonable time because of her history of

substance abuse and lack of engagement in treatment. In reaching

this conclusion, the court considered mother’s “sustained lack of

compliance with [her] treatment plan,” her admission that she

wasn’t ready to parent the child, the lack of a relationship between

mother and the child, and the EPP requirements.

¶ 10 The juvenile court’s findings are supported by the record.

Both mother and the caseworker testified that, after daughter was

born, mother began engaging in voluntary treatment and has

reported sobriety. Since daughter’s birth, mother has been in

frequent contact with the caseworker. Mother’s testimony reflected

self-awareness about her addiction and how it has negatively

impacted her ability to parent.

¶ 11 Despite her impressive progress with treatment in the four

months before the termination hearing, the record supports the

court’s conclusion that mother did not substantially comply with

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her treatment plan. The caseworker testified that mother had

attended only three court hearings in the two years the case was

open and had a history of very inconsistent contact with case

professionals. Mother’s life skills worker had difficulty keeping in

contact with her. Until a few months before the termination

hearing, the Department did not know where mother was living and

suspected she was homeless. Mother never provided a urinalysis

test to the Department. She never provided the results of a dual

diagnosis evaluation to the Department and never participated in

treatment the Department arranged for her. Finally, although the

Department made family time available to mother, she never

participated in a visit with the child. The caseworker, whom the

court qualified as an expert in social work with an emphasis in

child protection, opined that mother was not successful with her

treatment plan and remained unfit.

¶ 12 During the termination hearing, mother testified that she was

“mentally . . . unsure of when [she] would feel healthy enough for

[the child to] fully come home.” Mother admitted that she was not

yet ready to parent the child because she needed to continue to

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work on her substance use and mental health as well as “other

areas in [her] life.”

¶ 13 The caseworker repeatedly opined that mother and the child

had no relationship. According to the caseworker’s expert

testimony, there was no reasonable amount of time in which

mother could become fit for the child. She opined that the child,

who had already waited two years, should not have to wait longer

for a permanent home, and that it was in his best interests for

mother’s parental rights to be terminated.

¶ 14 Although we, like the juvenile court, recognize that mother

made progress in the last four months before the termination

hearing, based on this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile

court erred when it determined that mother was unfit and that her

condition was unlikely to improve within a reasonable period of

time for the child.

IV. Disposition

¶ 15 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.