Peo v. Meyer

22CA1932 Peo v Meyer 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1932
Adams County District Court No. 10CR1042
Honorable Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ryan John Meyer,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
Dunn and Richman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 17, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Ryan John Meyer, appeals the district court’s order

denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

¶2 In April 2010, Meyer and three accomplices — Kenneth Lacey,

Tikim Alexander, and Ryan Harrison — drove to the victim’s house

to steal money and drugs. Meyer parked his van a short distance

from the house, and he and the accomplices waited for the victim to

leave. Once the victim left, Lacey, Alexander, and Harrison broke

into the victim’s house; however, they were interrupted when she

returned home with her children. One accomplice phoned Meyer,

who was in the van, and Meyer entered the house. The accomplices

took the victim and the children down to the basement at gunpoint,

and they searched the house. When police arrived to investigate a

report of suspicious activity, Meyer and his accomplices fled the

scene. Later, they were all apprehended. See People v. Meyer, slip

op. at ¶ 2 (Colo. App. No. 12CA2166, Sept. 15, 2016) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶3 At a jury trial, Lacey testified about the incident. None of the

other accomplices testified, nor did the victim. Meyer was convicted

of two counts of second degree kidnapping, aggravated robbery, first

1
degree burglary, first degree trespassing, two counts of child abuse,

second degree burglary, two counts of crime of violence sentence

enhancers, and three counts of habitual criminal sentence

enhancers. Id. at ¶ 1. On direct appeal, a division of this court

vacated Meyer’s conviction for second degree burglary but otherwise

affirmed the judgment. Id.

¶4 In 2020, Meyer petitioned for postconviction relief under Crim.

P. 35(c), asserting that he had received ineffective assistance from

trial counsel and that he was entitled to an extended proportionality

review of his sentences under Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M.1

Regarding his trial counsel, Meyer asserted that counsel did not

adequately (1) investigate the victim or call her to testify;

(2) investigate Harrison or call him to testify; and (3) pursue a plea

agreement from the prosecution. The district court granted an

evidentiary hearing on Meyer’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim regarding the victim but denied his other claims without a

1 Meyer also raised other claims in his postconviction motion, but

we deem them abandoned because he does not pursue them on
appeal. See People v. Ortega, 266 P.3d 424, 428 (Colo. App. 2011).

2
hearing. After a hearing on Meyer’s claim pertaining to the victim,

the court denied that claim too.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶5 We disagree with Meyer that the district court erred by

denying his claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.

A. General Law and Standard of Review

¶6 In postconviction proceedings, the legality of the judgment and

the regularity of the proceedings leading up to the judgment are

presumed, and the defendant bears the burden to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence the allegations in the postconviction

motion. People v. Firth, 205 P.3d 445, 449 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶7 “A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective

assistance from his counsel.” People v. Ardolino, 69 P.3d 73, 76

(Colo. 2003). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The defendant must show both

that (1) their attorney’s performance was deficient and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced them. Id. at 687; Dunlap v.

People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2007). If the court determines

that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient, it

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need not consider the prejudice prong. See People v. Sparks, 914

P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. App. 1996). Likewise, if the court concludes

that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, the court may

resolve the claim on that basis alone. See People v. Garcia, 815

P.2d 937, 941 (Colo. 1991).

¶8 Deficient performance is that which falls outside “the wide

range of professionally competent assistance.” People v.

Washington, 2014 COA 41, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). To establish

prejudice, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Id. at ¶ 23. A reasonable probability is

one sufficient to undermine confidence in the case’s outcome. Id.

¶9 Review of a district court’s denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) claim after

an evidentiary hearing presents a mixed question of fact and law.

See People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 16. We defer to the

court’s factual findings if supported by the evidence, but we review

de novo the court’s legal conclusions. See id.; People v. Johnson,

2022 COA 2, ¶ 9. As to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

in particular, we review de novo the district court’s ultimate

4
determinations about whether counsel’s performance was deficient

or prejudicial under the Strickland standard. See Sifuentes, ¶ 16.

¶ 10 And we review de novo a district court’s denial of a Crim. P.

35(c) claim without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Gardner, 205

P.3d 1262, 1266 (Colo. App. 2010).

B. The Victim

¶ 11 Meyer alleged that his trial counsel did not sufficiently

investigate the victim’s account of the incident or call her as witness

at trial. Meyer also alleged that he was prejudiced by this failure

because the victim’s testimony would have contradicted Lacey’s

testimony implicating Meyer. To reiterate, the district court denied

this claim after an evidentiary hearing. We agree with the court

that Meyer did not show prejudice from counsel’s failure to further

investigate the victim or call her as a witness.2 We reach this

conclusion for two reasons: (1) the record makes clear that the

victim would have refused to testify even if called as a witness and

(2) her account of the incident did not substantially contradict

Lacey’s trial testimony.

2 Hence, we need not consider whether counsel’s performance was

deficient.

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¶ 12 The victim testified at the postconviction hearing. She said

multiple times that she would not have testified at Meyer’s trial if

she had been called as a witness because she would not “feel

comfortable testifying in somebody’s defense who was in my home.”

She also explained that she would have invoked her Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination due to the evidence

found in her home indicating that she manufactured drugs. In fact,

the victim said she would have refused to testify at Meyer’s trial

even if the trial court had limited the questioning so as not to elicit

testimony incriminating her and even if the trial court would have

held her in contempt for refusing to testify. The victim then

acknowledged a caveat: she said that, if a contempt finding would

have risked revocation of her probation and resulted in her ensuing

arrest, such a situation would “more than likely” have been a

“factor” in deciding whether to testify.

¶ 13 Based on the victim’s testimony at the postconviction hearing,

the district court gleaned from the “conflicting information” that “it

appears” Meyer’s trial counsel “could have cajoled” the victim into

testifying at trial. It is not clear whether this is a factual finding or

merely an observation about a possible inference that could be

6
drawn from the victim’s testimony. But to the extent this

constitutes a factual finding, we conclude that the record does not

support it. See People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 47, ¶¶ 35-36

(concluding that a trial court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous

when the record showed that the court “misremembered or

misunderstood testimony” from the evidentiary hearing).

¶ 14 As discussed, the victim acknowledged that, if a contempt

finding could have threatened her probation and led to her arrest,

she might have reconsidered her refusal to testify at Meyer’s trial.

The record shows, however, that the victim was not on probation at

the time of the trial. While she had pleaded guilty to charges

related to the drugs found in her home, she had not been sentenced

yet. (After Meyer’s trial, she was sentenced to probation.)

Therefore, her concerns about a revocation of probation could not

have influenced her decision about testifying at Meyer’s trial.

Because the possible exception to her refusal to testify at his trial

did not apply, the victim’s adamant declarations that she would

have refused are uncontradicted. Therefore, Meyer did not show

prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to call the victim as a witness.

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¶ 15 Moreover, even if the victim had testified, we do not perceive a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have

been different because the victim’s account of the incident (as

revealed at the postconviction hearing) was largely consistent with

Lacey’s testimony, the chief witness against Meyer. Lacey’s

testimony covered a wide range of topics, many of which the victim

did not address because she had no knowledge of them.

¶ 16 Lacey testified in detail about Meyer’s planning of the crimes

and how the crimes unfolded on scene. As relevant here, Lacey

testified that only he, Alexander, and Harrison initially entered the

victim’s house. After the victim returned home, Lacey said Harrison

and Alexander seized her at gunpoint and made her lie face down

on the floor. Lacey testified that Meyer then entered the house

wearing a red bandana over his face and asked the victim “where

everything was at.”

¶ 17 At the postconviction hearing, the victim testified that she saw

two Black men in her house,3 one of whom pointed a gun at her

and forced her to lie down on the floor. She said she saw only those

3 Meyer is not a Black man.

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two people but heard “three or four” different voices in the house.

As to the people whom she heard but did not see, the victim

testified that they did not try to communicate with her. Finally, the

victim said she had never seen Meyer before the hearing.

¶ 18 According to Meyer, the victim’s testimony that she did not see

him in the house would have been exculpatory at trial. We agree it

would have been, to a limited extent. But the victim’s account did

not contradict Lacey’s testimony, who never indicated that the

victim saw Meyer. Instead, Lacey testified that Meyer did not enter

the house until after the victim was forced to lie face down on the

floor and that Meyer was wearing a bandana over his face. As the

district court aptly put it, “Lacey’s testimony placed [Meyer] in [the]

[v]ictim’s home yet out of sight of [the] [v]ictim.” In fact, the victim’s

account that she was forced to lie on the floor and that she heard

some people whom she did not see was consistent with Lacey’s

testimony about what happened.

¶ 19 As best we can tell, only one aspect of the victim’s testimony

contradicted Lacey’s testimony. Lacey testified that Meyer asked

the victim “where everything was at” after he entered the house.

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But the victim testified that none of the people whom she heard but

did not see tried to communicate with her.

¶ 20 We cannot conclude that this single discrepancy between

Lacey’s testimony at trial and the victim’s testimony at the

postconviction hearing established a reasonable probability that the

trial’s outcome would have been different if the victim had testified

at trial.4 The only relevant import would have been to impeach

Lacey’s testimony, but the impeachment would have related only to

one detail of the entire episode, and the defense otherwise

impeached Lacey’s testimony extensively.

¶ 21 For instance, on cross-examination, defense counsel pointed

out that (1) Lacey had been previously convicted of attempted

robbery; (2) Lacey refused to speak with the prosecution until he

received a favorable plea deal; and (3) some aspects of Lacey’s

testimony were inconsistent with his earlier statements to police.

4 Meyer argues that, according to a document produced in discovery

before trial, the victim identified Lacey and Alexander as the men
who threatened her with a gun and kidnapped her. Meyer says this
information would have conflicted with Lacey’s testimony identifying
Harrison and Alexander as the assailants. At the postconviction
hearing, however, the victim did not identify who threatened her
with a gun and kidnapped her. Therefore, her testimony did not
contradict Lacey’s account on this point.

10
Defense counsel also challenged Lacey’s testimony based on

contradictory statements Lacey allegedly made to an inmate while

in prison, and that inmate was also called to testify. In light of this

considerable impeachment of Lacey’s credibility, we are not

convinced that a single contradictory statement from the victim

would have swayed the jury’s verdict in a meaningful way —

especially given that the victim’s testimony would not have excluded

Meyer’s presence in her home. Cf. Margerum v. People, 2019 CO

100, ¶ 16 (concluding that the district court’s error in limiting

impeachment of a witness was harmless, in part because the jury

received important other evidence bearing on the witness’s

credibility).

¶ 22 Reenforcing our conclusion is the fact that the victim’s

account did not contradict Lacey’s testimony that Meyer was the

“mastermind” of the crimes. Her statements did nothing to

challenge Lacey’s testimony that Meyer planned the crimes. And as

the district court noted, other physical evidence corroborated

Lacey’s version of events. For example, gloves and a prybar were

found in Meyer’s van, and gloves and a red bandana that contained

traces of Meyer’s DNA were found near the victim’s house.

11
¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that Meyer did not show that he was

prejudiced by his trial counsel’s decision not to further investigate

the victim or call her as a witness at trial.

C. Harrison

¶ 24 Next, Meyer contends that his counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate and call Harrison as a witness at trial. The

district court denied this claim without a hearing. Because Meyer’s

allegations, even if true, do not show prejudice from counsel’s

performance, we conclude that the court’s ruling was correct.

¶ 25 In his Rule 35(c) motion, Meyer contended that Harrison

would have contradicted Lacey’s trial testimony. For example,

Meyer claimed that Harrison would have testified to the following:

• The men originally intended to buy marijuana from the

victim, not to rob her.

• Harrison believed that it was Lacey’s idea to break into

the victim’s home.

• Harrison did not see the victim come home, nor did he

talk to Meyer about her.

• Harrison did not see Lacey and Alexander take the victim

and her children to the basement.

12
• Meyer entered the house but did not see or speak with

the victim.

¶ 26 The district court decided that Meyer did not sufficiently allege

deficient performance or prejudice in counsel’s failing to investigate

or present Harrison’s alleged account at trial. The court noted that

evidence admitted at trial showed that Meyer had sought to

communicate with Harrison in an apparent attempt to influence his

potential testimony at trial. Specifically, Meyer had written a letter

to a third party asking them to contact Harrison and give Harrison

a version of the incident that implicated Lacey and exculpated

Meyer. The court concluded that calling Harrison to testify at trial

would have further highlighted Meyer’s attempts to influence

Harrison’s testimony, thus undermining Meyer’s defense. In

addition, the court determined that, even if Harrison had testified,

his testimony would have been “thoroughly discredited” and that

there was “no reasonable probability that his testimony would have

produced a different result.”

¶ 27 Like the district court, we find significant the evidence

showing that Meyer attempted to influence Harrison’s testimony —

an attempt to give Harrison a version of the incident to “drill . . .

13
into his head.” Meyer’s version conveniently inculpated Lacey,

while minimizing Meyer’s involvement. Although Meyer argues that

his letter attempting to influence Harrison was not received by the

intended recipient, the testimony that Harrison would have given at

trial (as alleged in Meyer’s postconviction motion) largely matched

the version of events that Meyer sought to drill into Harrison’s head

before trial.

¶ 28 Moreover, the evidence of the burglary tools found in Meyer’s

van, a receipt for purchase of the burglary tools, and gloves and a

bandana with Meyer’s DNA on them would have cast serious doubt

on any testimony by Harrison that the initial plan was merely to

buy drugs from the victim (not to rob her) and that Lacey came up

with the burglary plan only after they discovered that the victim

was not home. So, given the powerful evidence undermining

Harrison’s credibility, we agree with the district court that there is

no reasonable probability that the jury would have been swayed by

Harrison’s testimony.

¶ 29 Additionally, Harrison’s alleged testimony would not have been

entirely favorable to Meyer. According to the postconviction motion,

Harrison would have placed Meyer inside the victim’s home —

14
where his accomplices brandished a weapon and kidnapped the

victim. And Harrison’s testimony would have emphasized for the

jury Meyer’s attempt to influence Harrison, further suggesting

Meyer’s consciousness of guilt.

¶ 30 Given all this, we conclude that Meyer’s allegations about

Harrison fail the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

D. Plea Negotiations

¶ 31 Meyer contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance with respect to a possible plea bargain with the

prosecution. Again, we disagree, but this time we conclude that

Meyer did not sufficiently allege deficient performance.

¶ 32 In his Rule 35(c) motion, Meyer alleged that his counsel

contacted the prosecution in November 2010 with an offer in which

Meyer would “plead guilty to the burglary charge in a 4-24 year

[sentencing] range, COV [crime of violence].” According to the

motion, the prosecutor rejected the offer, was difficult to negotiate

with, and was “generally not interested in plea negotiations because

he thought [Meyer] was the ‘mastermind’ of the crimes.” Meyer also

alleged that his counsel recalled later receiving a plea offer “in the

range of 30 years,” but Meyer rejected the offer. And after he was

15
convicted but before the habitual criminal adjudication, Meyer

received another plea offer that included a forty-two-year sentence

(less than half the sentence he eventually received), but he also

rejected that offer because he did not want to waive his right to

appeal.5

¶ 33 A defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel extends to

the plea-bargaining process. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144

(2012). Thus, a claim alleging ineffective assistance during plea

negotiations is subject to Strickland’s two-part analysis. Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).

¶ 34 Courts have recognized ineffective assistance claims regarding

plea negotiations in a few contexts: (1) counsel’s failure to initiate

plea negotiations; (2) counsel’s failure to convey an actual plea offer

to the defendant; and (3) counsel’s erroneous or incomplete advice

about a plea offer. See People v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55, ¶¶ 16-18;

Sifuentes, ¶¶ 17-18; People v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 913-14 (Colo.

App. 2006). Meyer’s counsel was not deficient under any of these

theories. According to Meyer’s allegations, his counsel initiated plea

5 Given his reason for rejecting the plea offer, it is questionable

whether Meyer would have accepted any plea deal.

16
negotiations and later conveyed the prosecution’s plea offers to

Meyer. And Meyer did not allege that his counsel gave him

inadequate advice about any plea offer.

¶ 35 Instead, Meyer alleged that his counsel was constitutionally

deficient because his counsel did not give so-called mitigating

information to the prosecution in hopes of securing a plea offer

better than the two offers that Meyer rejected. Meyer cites no

authority accepting this novel theory of ineffective assistance of

counsel in plea negotiations. The one case he cites about a failure

to present mitigating information concerned the sentencing stage of

a case. See Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1063.

¶ 36 Absent any authority holding that defense counsel performs

deficiently by not presenting mitigating information to the

prosecution in hopes of receiving a plea offer better than those the

defendant rejected — and given that we “must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance” — we conclude that Meyer’s

allegations (even if true) do not show deficient performance by his

counsel. Id. (citation omitted). Our decision is supported by the

fact that most of the allegedly mitigating information identified by

17
Meyer either had nothing to do with the charged incident (it dealt

with his childhood abuse) or was already possessed by the

prosecution because it was included in the discovery materials.

¶ 37 Moreover, Meyer did not allege in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion

that he had informed his trial counsel of his childhood abuse, much

less that he had authorized his counsel to share those personal

details with the prosecution. “Trial counsel’s alleged failure to

investigate or present mitigating evidence does not constitute

ineffective assistance ‘when the essential and foundational

information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld

from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.’” People v.

Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 295 (Colo. 1996) (citation omitted); see

also Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding

that “trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims to

which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying

facts . . . ; clairvoyance is not required of effective trial counsel”).

¶ 38 Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly denied

this claim without a hearing.

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III. Proportionality Review

¶ 39 Meyer maintains that the district court erred by rejecting his

request for another review of his sentence for constitutional

proportionality. He is mistaken in light of Rule 35(c)(3)(VII), which

provides that, with some exceptions, a court “shall deny any claim

that could have been presented in an appeal previously brought.”

A. Additional History

¶ 40 Before sentencing, Meyer sought a proportionality review of

the statutorily mandated sentence. After an abbreviated review, the

trial court concluded that the sentence was not unconstitutionally

disproportionate to Meyer’s crimes. He did not challenge that ruling

in his direct appeal.

¶ 41 In his postconviction motion, however, Meyer alleged that his

sentence is “grossly disproportionate and unconstitutional” and

that he is entitled to a proportionality review of his sentence. He

did not mention Rule 35(c)(3)(VII) or cite an exception to that

provision. In its response, the prosecution invoked Rule

35(c)(3)(VII), but Meyer again failed to address that provision in his

reply.

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¶ 42 The district court rejected Meyer’s request for a proportionality

review because it was procedurally barred by Rule 35(c)(3)(VII).

B. Analysis

¶ 43 On its face, Rule 35(c)(3)(VII) bars Meyer’s request for a

proportionality review of his sentences because he could have

raised the issue on direct appeal but did not do so. See People v.

McDonald, 2023 COA 23, ¶¶ 8, 24 (concluding that Rule 35(c)’s bars

on successive claims apply to a sentencing proportionality claim),

(cert. granted Nov. 14, 2023). On appeal, Meyer concedes that a

postconviction request for a proportionality review “is subject to the

provisions of Crim. P. 35(c),” but he then says, “there is a question

of whether a claim for postconviction relief under the Eighth

Amendment can ever be considered successive.” To the extent he

means to challenge the reasoning of McDonald, we reject the

challenge because we find that decision persuasive.

¶ 44 Meyer also contends that two exceptions to the procedural bar

apply to his claim: Rule 35(c)(3)(VII)(c) (section VII(c)) and Rule

35(c)(3)(VII)(e) (section VII(e)). The People answer that this

contention is not properly before us because Meyer did not raise

any such exceptions in his postconviction motion or reply. See

20
DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996) (“Issues not

raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief

will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”).

¶ 45 Regarding section VII(c), we disagree with the People because

Meyer relied on that provision in substance even though he did not

cite it. Section VII(c) excepts from the procedural bar “[a]ny claim

based on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously

unavailable, if that rule should be applied retroactively to cases on

collateral review.” In his postconviction motion, Meyer relied on

Wells-Yates, a decision announced after his convictions became

final. He argued that “[i]n Wells-Yates, our supreme court created a

new rule related to Eighth Amendment proportionality review and

otherwise clarified the doctrine.” Thus, Meyer essentially argued

that the district court should retroactively apply to his case the new

rule of constitutional law announced in Wells-Yates.

¶ 46 But, while Meyer adequately raised section VII(c), that

exception does not apply to his claim. As held in McDonald, “to the

extent Wells-Yates announced new constitutional rules, those rules

are procedural and don’t apply retroactively.” McDonald, ¶ 2. To

reiterate, we follow McDonald because it is well reasoned.

21
¶ 47 Regarding section VII(e), we agree with the People that Meyer

did not rely on it in his motion or reply. Section VII(e) excepts from

the procedural bar “[a]ny claim where an objective factor, external

to the defense and not attributable to the defendant, made raising

the claim impracticable.” But Meyer did not cite section VII(e) or an

objective factor that made raising his proportionality claim

impracticable in his direct appeal. Instead, he identified a new case

that, in his view, strengthened his proportionality claim — a claim

that he had raised before his sentencing and a claim that

defendants have raised for years well before Well-Yates. See, e.g.,

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). Therefore, Meyer’s

allegation that section VII(e) excepts his claim from the procedural

bar is not properly us. See DePineda, 915 P.2d at 1280; People v.

Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996) (“Allegations not

raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion or during the hearing on that

motion and thus not ruled on by the trial court are not properly

before this court for review.”).

¶ 48 In any event, even if the applicability of section VII(e) were

properly before us, we would reject Meyer’s reliance on that

provision. In his view, section VII(e) applies to a claim relying on a

22
change in the law announced after a defendant’s conviction became

final even if the change should not be applied retroactively under

the proper retroactivity analysis. Accepting Meyer’s view of

section VII(e) would render section VII(c) superfluous, even a nullity.

Therefore, we cannot accept his interpretation. See People v.

Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 32 (“[W]e must avoid interpretations that

render any provision in a statute superfluous.”).

¶ 49 As a result, we conclude that the district court properly denied

Meyer’s claim as successive under Rule 35(c)(3)(VII).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 50 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.

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