Peo in Interest of ASC-W

24CA0549 Peo in Interest of ASC-W 10-17-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0549
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30545
Honorable Elizabeth Joan McCarthy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.S.C-W., a Child,

and Concerning L.W.C. and C.S.P.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Navarro and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 17, 2024

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant, L.W.C.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant, C.S.P.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 C.S.P. (mother) and L.W.C. (father) appeal the judgment

terminating the parent-child legal relationships with their child,

A.S.C-W. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After the child tested positive for controlled substances at

birth, the Denver Department of Human Services filed a petition in

dependency and neglect. The juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for the

parents that required them to (1) address their substance abuse

and mental health issues and (2) provide for the child’s needs.

¶3 The Department later moved to terminate the parents’ parental

rights. A year and a half after the Department filed the petition and

following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶4 The parents first assert that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them

and reunify them with the child. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶5 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

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law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its

legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

¶6 Because the parents didn’t challenge the reasonableness of the

Department’s efforts before the termination hearing, the

Department and guardian ad litem contend the issue is

unpreserved. We needn’t resolve the preservation dispute, however,

because even if we assume the parents preserved this issue, the

outcome is the same.

B. Applicable Law

¶7 A department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate parents and reunite families before a court may

terminate parental rights. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 13; see also §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-

3-604(1)(c), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. Reasonable efforts means

the “exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with their

children. § 19-1-103(114).

¶8 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the

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services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(1)-(VI). If funding is

available, a department must also provide substance abuse

treatment and mental health services. § 19-3-208(2)(d)(IV)-(V).

¶9 To determine whether a department has satisfied its

reasonable efforts obligation, the juvenile court should consider

whether the services provided were appropriate to support the

parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911,

915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the

circumstances and accounting for all services and resources

provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire

treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,

¶ 33. The parent, however, is ultimately responsible for using the

services to comply with the plan, People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011), and the court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining

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whether the department made reasonable efforts, see People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

C. Analysis

¶ 10 The juvenile court found that the Department had made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunify them with

the child. Specifically, the court found that the Department made

multiple referrals for services and family time and that the

caseworker had “attempt[ed] to engage” the parents in their

treatment plans, but the parents failed to take advantage of the

offered services. The court also found the parents didn’t maintain

communication with the caseworker, but had they done so, the

caseworker “would have assisted them with getting into treatment

or re-engaging with [family time].”

¶ 11 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that, at the beginning of the case, mother was

already enrolled in outpatient substance use treatment (from an

earlier case), but she was eventually discharged for lack of

participation. The caseworker said that she had offered mother

inpatient treatment, but mother never responded to her. As for

father, the caseworker testified that the Department had provided

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him with a dual diagnosis evaluation, which recommended

outpatient treatment, but father refused to select a provider and

told the caseworker that he wanted to “find a place on his own.”

The record also shows that the Department provided the parents

with multiple referrals for supervised family time services, but the

parents either did not participate or the provider could not reach

them and had to close out the referral. The caseworker further

testified that the parents were offered life skills training, but mother

attended just a few sessions and father never engaged. Finally, the

caseworker said that she attempted to communicate with the

parents monthly, but they were mostly nonresponsive.

¶ 12 Despite these efforts, mother contends the Department should

have made additional referrals for family time and substance use

treatment. But the caseworker detailed the significant efforts made

with respect to family time referrals and attempts to reengage

mother with substance use treatment after she was discharged from

treatment. The caseworker also testified about mother’s lack of

response to attempts to reengage her and connect her with services.

And mother doesn’t explain why the Department had an obligation

to continue to provide referrals when mother failed to either

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communicate with the caseworker or engage in the provided

services. Given mother’s unwillingness to engage, the Department

had no obligation to persist with futile efforts. See id.

¶ 13 To the extent mother summarily states that the Department

didn’t satisfy its reasonable efforts obligations because it didn’t

perform a relative search and “failed to allow” mother to attend

unspecified appointments, she neither develops these statements

nor provides legal authority to support them. Because these

assertions aren’t self-explanatory — and we see no basis for them in

section 19-3-208(2)(b) — we are unable to consider these

arguments further. See, e.g., People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA

13, ¶ 64 (declining to consider undeveloped assertions).

¶ 14 We are equally unpersuaded by father’s suggestion that the

Department didn’t provide reasonable services to address his

depression and self-reported borderline personality disorder and

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post-traumatic stress disorder.1 The record shows that the

Department provided father with the services necessary to address

his mental health issues, see S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, but he

declined to participate when he rejected the Department’s providers

and said he would get his own, see A.V., ¶ 12. And though father

testified to his general distrust of women, the record shows that he

still failed to engage with offered services after the Department

provided him a male family time supervisor and life skills worker.

¶ 15 Given all this, we conclude that the Department provided the

parents with the necessary resources for them to complete their

treatment plans, but they did not take advantage of those resources

to become fit parents in a reasonable time.

III. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 16 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination of parental

1 Because father doesn’t claim that the Department should have

made an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA) or that the ADA applied in this case, we don’t
consider the ADA here. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA
133, ¶ 21 (declining to consider an unpreserved ADA claim because
appellate courts “don’t (and, indeed, can’t) make findings of fact”
(quoting Carousel Farms Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019 CO
51, ¶ 19)).

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rights. He specifically asserts that the court could have given him

more time to demonstrate compliance with the treatment plan.

¶ 17 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives before entering a judgment terminating the parent-child

legal relationship under section 19-3-604(1)(c). People in Interest of

L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. In considering less drastic alternatives,

a court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 18 Because whether a parent is likely to become fit within a

reasonable time is a criterion for the termination of parental rights,

see § 19-3-604(1)(c)(III), we will assume, without deciding, that

giving a parent more time to comply with a treatment plan may be a

less drastic alternative. A reasonable time is not an indefinite time,

and it must be determined by considering the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24-25.

When a child is under six years old, as in this case, the juvenile

court must also consider the expedited permanency planning

provisions, which require that the child be placed in a permanent

home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

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¶ 19 Focusing on the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs,

the juvenile court found that there were no less drastic alternatives

to the termination of parental rights. In so finding, the court

observed that the child was young, needed permanency, and had no

“meaningful relationship with the parents.” The court also rejected

the request for additional time to engage in treatment, noting that

“the case has been open for 553 days with a lack of compliance”

and “there are no amendments to the treatment plan that would

allow [the parents] to be successful within a reasonable amount of

time.”

¶ 20 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that the Department offered father multiple referrals and services,

but he refused to engage in services or communicate with the

caseworker. Father’s condition remained unchanged. Father had

not visited the young child for many months and had no

relationship with the child. And the caseworker opined that the

child needed permanency and that termination of parental rights

was in the child’s best interests. Because the record supports the

juvenile court’s finding that no less drastic alternative to

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termination existed, we must affirm that decision. See People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

IV. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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