Peo v. Sepulveda

23CA1429 Peo v Sepulveda 11-21-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1429
Larimer County District Court No. 21CR884
Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ramon Sepulveda,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER VACATED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Tow and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 21, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Ramon Sepulveda, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Ramon Sepulveda, appeals the district court’s

order denying his motion for return of seized property. Because we

conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we

vacate the order.

I. Background

¶2 Sepulveda pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of a

controlled substance and one special offender count, in exchange

for the dismissal of multiple other drug-related counts. In June

2022, the district court sentenced him to concurrent twenty-year

terms in prison on each of the two counts to which he pleaded

guilty.

¶3 Sepulveda did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence,

nor did he file a motion for postconviction relief. Rather, in April

2023, he filed a “MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ORDER THE

RETURN OF THE DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY.” In it, he requested

the return of a laptop, smart phone, clothing, photos, and

miscellaneous personal effects.

¶4 The prosecution objected to the motion. It stated that a

codefendant still had a pending case, which required preservation of

the evidence.

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¶5 The district court agreed with the prosecution and denied

Sepulveda’s motion.

II. Analysis

¶6 Sepulveda contends that the district court erred by denying

his motion to return seized property because the prosecution did

not present “adequate proof” that the seized property was being

used in another criminal investigation, and the court did not

conduct a hearing. The Attorney General counters that the order

should be vacated because the district court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction over the motion. We agree with the Attorney

General.

¶7 We review de novo whether a court has jurisdiction. Strepka

v. People, 2021 CO 58, ¶ 14.

¶8 “[A] district court may address a motion for return of property

only if it has jurisdiction over the case.” Id. at ¶ 13. With respect to

a post-sentence motion for return of lawfully seized property — like

the one Sepulveda filed here — our supreme court clarified when a

district court has jurisdiction over such motions in Woo v. El Paso

County Sheriff’s Office, 2022 CO 56.

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¶9 In Woo, our supreme court held that if a district court has

subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal case, it may exercise

ancillary jurisdiction over a defendant’s motion to order law

enforcement to return lawfully seized property. Id. at ¶ 40. But the

jurisdiction is not perpetual. The district court “retains subject

matter jurisdiction over a criminal case until the deadline to lodge a

direct appeal expires or a direct appeal is timely perfected.” Id. at

¶ 42. If the defendant does not appeal, and the deadline to appeal

expires, the district court is divested “of authority to act on matters

that affect the judgment,” including motions for the return of seized

property. Id. at ¶ 37. However, the court may “reacquire[] such

jurisdiction following a direct appeal, during postconviction

proceedings, or after any appeal related to those proceedings.” Id.

at ¶ 42.

¶ 10 Here, Sepulveda neither appealed nor filed a motion for return

of property before the deadline to do so expired. Therefore, the

district court lost jurisdiction after the forty-nine-day deadline to

appeal expired in July 2022. See C.A.R. 4(b)(1) (except when

additional time is granted, criminal defendants have forty-nine days

“after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” to file a notice

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of appeal). And although Woo held that the district court may

reacquire jurisdiction to act on a motion for return of property

during postconviction proceedings, Sepulveda did not file a motion

for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35.

¶ 11 Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide

Sepulveda’s motion for return of seized property, we vacate the

court’s order.

III. Additional Claims

¶ 12 To the extent Sepulveda raises issues on appeal that he did

not raise in the district court — such as a violation of his

constitutional rights — we decline to address any such issues. See

People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34.

IV. Disposition

¶ 13 The order is vacated.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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