Peo in Interest of EAL

24CA1015 Peo in Interest of EAL 12-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1015
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 21JV976
Honorable Elizabeth Strobel, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.A.L., a Child,

and Concerning R.H.K.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Dunn and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 12, 2024

Kerry C. Tipper, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Elizabeth A. McClintok, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 R.H.K. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating his parent-child legal relationship with E.A.L. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 At the time of the child’s birth in November 2021, both the

child and the child’s mother tested positive for controlled

substances.

¶3 Three days later, the Denver Department of Human Services

filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the child. The

juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to the Department,

and the child was placed in foster care.

¶4 In July 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected. The following month, the court adopted a

treatment plan for father. The plan required father to, among other

things, (1) comply with the terms and conditions of his probation;

(2) refrain from conduct that would result in his incarceration;

(3) complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow the

evaluator’s recommendations; (4) submit to drug screenings as

requested; (5) consistently engage in parenting time with the child;

and (6) secure stable and substance-free housing.

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¶5 In September 2023, the Department moved to terminate

father’s parental rights.

¶6 In May 2024, following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile

court entered a judgment terminating father’s parental rights. In

doing so, the court made the following findings:

• The child was adjudicated dependent and neglected.

• Father didn’t reasonably comply with his treatment plan.

• Father never addressed an outstanding warrant in a

criminal case. Thus, he failed to “ensure that

incarceration [would] not take him away from his child.”

• The Department made repeated referrals for a substance

abuse evaluation, but father was unresponsive. And

despite over sixty requests for urinalysis screenings, he

failed to produce a single sample, raising concerns about

his commitment to sobriety.

• The Department tried to assist father with his housing

needs. For example, the Department acted reasonably by

requesting verifying documents, such as a lease

agreement, before providing him with a loan or cash for

an apartment, “especially [when] [he] appear[ed] . . . to

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have significant substance abuse issues.” See In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1 (a district

court’s oral findings supplement its written order). He

didn’t provide the necessary documentation or follow up

with the Department. And the Department’s policy of

providing emergency hotel vouchers only to parents with

a child currently in their care was a reasonable approach

to allocating its limited resources.

• Father didn’t successfully form a relationship with the

child. He was granted supervised parenting time twice a

week after his release from incarceration in March 2022.

However, he only attended two visits and was later

dismissed from the program. He then had one visit

supervised by the foster family. More referrals were

made, but he didn’t attend orientation sessions, missed

scheduled check-ins, and never had another visit.

• The Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

father as a parent.

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• Father was an unfit parent due to his lack of progress on

his treatment plan and concerns about his ongoing

substance abuse.

• Although father had thirty months to address his issues

and demonstrate his ability to be a fit and appropriate

parent, he did not. Therefore, his conduct or condition

will unlikely change within a reasonable time. And the

child needed permanency already.

• Termination of father’s parental rights was the only

viable option to ensure the child’s best interests, as there

were no less drastic alternatives.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

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604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 9.

¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights,

including whether the Department made reasonable efforts,

presents a mixed question of fact and law, People in Interest of

A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8, because it involves application of the

termination statute to evidentiary facts, People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15.

¶9 We won’t disturb the juvenile court’s factual findings if the

evidence in the record supports them. S.Z.S., ¶ 10. The credibility

of the witnesses, as well as the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence and the inferences and conclusions to be

drawn from it, are all matters within the court’s province. Id.

B. Discussion

¶ 10 Father contends that the juvenile court’s termination

judgment cannot stand because the Department didn’t make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify him with the

child. Specifically, he argues that the Department’s failure to give

him emergency hotel vouchers to address his lack of housing

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prevented him from entering a sober living house and engaging in

treatment. We disagree.

¶ 11 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services

must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite

families. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2024. Reasonable efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care”

for a child in out-of-home placement, and the reasonable efforts

standard is satisfied when services are provided in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024. See S.Z.S., ¶ 13; § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 12 The juvenile court should analyze whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan.” People in Interest of My.

K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33; see also People in Interest of S.N-

V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). The parent then is

responsible for using those services to comply with the plan. People

in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And

the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in

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treatment when determining whether the department made

reasonable efforts. People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 13 Father suggests that section 19-3-208 required the

Department to provide him with housing to meet its reasonable

efforts obligation. But nothing in section 19-3-208 expressly

requires the Department to provide housing to parents in

dependency and neglect cases. Rather, at most, section 19-3-

208(2)(b)(III) mandates that the Department provide “[i]nformation

and referral services to available public and private assistance

resources,” “as determined necessary and appropriate by individual

case plans.” Because the record shows that the Department did so,

we discern no error.

¶ 14 The caseworker testified that while father’s homelessness was

a barrier to him complying with the treatment plan’s objectives, the

Department provided him with resources that he failed to utilize.

The caseworker recalled that at one point the Department denied

father’s request for an emergency hotel voucher because the child

wasn’t in his care. A few months later, the Department denied

another request for a hotel voucher for the same reason. The

Department then provided father with contact information for

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several sober living facilities, but he never pursued those options.

At another point, father requested a “hardship loan” for an

apartment. The caseworker informed him that the Department

didn’t provide such loans but offered to assist him with a security

deposit. Yet father failed to follow up with that offer. The

caseworker also sent father resources for housing, but again father

didn’t respond or follow up.

¶ 15 We conclude that the Department satisfied its obligation to

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify him with

the child. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285 (juvenile court didn’t err

where the evidence showed that the department provided the parent

with information that the parent could’ve used to find housing).

Accordingly, we won’t disturb the juvenile court’s termination

judgment. See S.Z.S., ¶ 10.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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