Estate of Enderson

24CA0777 Estate of Enderson 12-26-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0777
Weld County District Court No. 23PR264
Honorable Julie C. Hoskins, Judge

In the Matter of the Estate of Evelyn L. Enderson, deceased.

Keith Enderson,

Appellant,

v.

Larry Enderson and Carolyn Ragsdale,

Appellees.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Grove and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 26, 2024

Keith Enderson, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellees
¶1 In this probate case, Keith Enderson, an alleged heir to the

Evelyn L. Enderson estate, appeals the district court’s order finding

that he was not a beneficiary of the estate and, therefore, lacked

standing to object to the co-personal representatives’ administration

of the Herman Enderson estate, which contained a disputed parcel

of property that passed from Evelyn’s estate. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Herman E. Enderson and Evelyn L. Enderson were husband

and wife. On July 10, 2000, by a warranty deed that was recorded

on July 14, 2000, Daniel K. Fix and Barbara J. Fix conveyed to

Herman1 and Evelyn the property located in Yuma County that is at

the heart of Keith’s dispute. We will refer to this land as the

Subject Property.

¶3 Herman and Evelyn owned the Subject Property in equal

shares as tenants in common.

¶4 On January 31, 2009, Evelyn died testate. Her last will and

testament, dated September 4, 1984, provided:

1 We refer to members of the Enderson family by their first name

because they share the same last name. In doing so, we mean no
disrespect.
1
I devise all my residuary estate, being all
property, wherever situated, in which I may
have any interest at the time of my death not
otherwise effectively disposed of by my will or
codicil, to my husband Herman E. Enderson, if
he survives me.

If my husband does not survive me, I devise all
of my said estate and property to my children,
namely: Carolyn A. Ragsdale, Larry Enderson,
Peggy Sorenson, and Keith Enderson, in equal
shares; provided, however, that if any of them
does not survive me, the share of such
deceased child shall be distributed to his or
her living issue, by representation, and if none,
to my then living issue, by representation.

(Emphasis added.)

¶5 The will named Larry and Ragsdale as co-personal

representatives.

¶6 On February 2, 2013, Herman died testate. On February 12,

2013, Herman’s last will and testament was admitted to probate

and Larry Enderson was appointed as personal representative of

the estate.

¶7 On January 27, 2020, during the administration of Herman’s

estate, the beneficiaries engaged in a settlement conference that

resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While the

2
MOU did not expressly address the Subject Property, it contained a

default provision (Paragraph I.o.) that states:

The remaining assets can be distributed as
agreed upon by Larry Enderson, Peggy
Sorensen, and Carolyn Ragsdale. Keith, Larry,
Peggy, and Carolyn shall all execute a release
of any and all claims, known or unknown,
direct or indirect, against the Estate and/or
against each other.

¶8 Pursuant to the MOU, Larry, Sorensen, and Ragsdale agreed

that the surface interests in the Subject Property should be

conveyed to Sorensen and Ragsdale in equal parts.

¶9 On October 16, 2023, Ragsdale and Larry, as co-personal

representatives of Evelyn’s estate, executed a co-personal

representatives’ deed that conveyed the surface interest in the

Subject Property to Sorensen, Kenneth Albert Ragsdale, and

Ragsdale. The deed was recorded on October 30, 2023.

¶ 10 Keith objected to the co-personal representatives’ deed and

claimed that the conveyance of the Subject Property contradicted

Evelyn’s last will and testament, which required the estate property

to be divided in equal shares and given to Ragsdale, Larry,

Sorensen, and Keith. He reasoned that because his parents held

3
the Subject Property as tenants in common (as opposed to joint

tenancy), Evelyn’s half-portion passed to her estate when she died

and thus, to the beneficiaries of her estate (of which he was one)

rather than to Herman.

¶ 11 The district court denied Keith’s objection based on a lack of

standing. Relying on the language of Evelyn’s Last Will and

Testament, which provided that all of her assets passed to her

surviving spouse, Herman, the district court also found that Keith

had no legal grounds for objecting to the co-personal

representatives’ actions because Herman was the sole beneficiary of

Evelyn’s estate since he survived her death.

II. Standing

¶ 12 Keith contends the district court erroneously determined he

lacked standing to object to the co-representatives’ deed. Even

assuming the court erred in its standing determination, we

conclude that he is not a beneficiary of Evelyn’s estate and therefore

affirm the court’s order.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 13 Standing is a threshold issue that must be satisfied to decide

the case on the merits. HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 892
4
(Colo. 2002). Because standing is a jurisdictional matter, we review

the district court’s determination de novo. Friends of the Black

Forest Reg’l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 80 P.3d 871, 876-77

(Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 14 In a probate proceeding, a party must be an “interested

person” to have standing to contest a will or initiate formal

proceedings. § 15-10-201(21), (27), C.R.S. 2024; see also In re

Estate of Little, 2018 COA 169, ¶ 38. An interested person

includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses,
creditors, beneficiaries, trust directors, and
any others having a property right in or claim
against a trust estate or the estate of a
decedent, ward, or protected person, which
may be affected by the proceeding. It also
includes persons having priority for an
appointment as a personal representative and
other fiduciaries representing the interested
person. The meaning as it relates to particular
persons may vary from time to time and is
determined according to the particular
purposes of, and matter involved in, any
proceeding.

§ 15-10-201(27), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 15 Upon the death of a person, his real and personal property

devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will and

testament. § 15-12-101, C.R.S. 2024. “The legal title to estate

5
property vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death of the

decedent.” Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 (Colo. App. 2008).

B. Analysis

¶ 16 We begin by noting that Keith is Evelyn’s child and might be

an “interested person” under section 15-10-201(27). However, even

if we assume the court erred in its standing determination, we

discern no error in the court’s ruling because it is consistent with

the language of Evelyn’s Last Will and Testament. That document

provides that upon Evelyn’s death, all of her assets, including her

one-half interest in the Subject Property, passed to her surviving

spouse, Herman. See § 15-12-101. Moreover, under Evelyn’s will,

Keith could only become a beneficiary of her estate if Herman

predeceased her. However, because Herman survived Evelyn, Keith

never became a beneficiary of the estate and had no legal interest in

the Subject Property at the time of Evelyn’s death. Instead, at

Evelyn’s death, legal title to the Subject Property vested in Herman,

Pierce, 194 P.3d at 510, so the Subject Property became part of

Herman’s estate when he died. Thus, Larry, Sorensen, and

6
Ragsdale have authority to convey the Subject Property as they see

fit under Paragraph I.o. of the MOU.

¶ 17 Accordingly, even if the court erred in finding that Keith lacked

standing, we discern no error in its order finding that no legal

grounds existed for him to object to the conveyance of the Subject

Property as part of the administration of Herman’s estate.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE LUM concur.

7