Peo v. Czeponis

23CA0005 Peo v Czeponis 11-14-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0005
Boulder County District Court No. 19CR2137
Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Michael David Czeponis,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Fox and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 14, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lauretta A. Martin Neff, Alternate Defense Counsel, Montrose, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Michael David Czeponis (Czeponis), appeals the

judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of

five counts of sexual assault on a child and one count each of

criminal mischief, assault, cruelty to animals, and harassment.

¶2 He contends that the district court erred by (1) giving a time-

fused deliberation instruction and making a mid-deliberation juror

replacement, depriving him of a fair trial; and (2) allowing the jury

to rewatch A.S.’s forensic interview during deliberations. We

disagree with his contentions and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶3 Czeponis and his five children, A.S., E.S., K.C., S.C., and M.C.,

lived in an apartment. Due to housing instability, Czeponis’ friends

and their three children, T.L., S.L., and A.L., later moved in with

Czeponis and his children. Czeponis spent a lot of time with the

children, as well as K.L., who was a friend of the children.

¶4 One day, Czeponis and his oldest daughter, A.S., got into an

argument over A.S.’s relationship with her partner. Czeponis lost

his temper and punched A.S. giving her a bloody nose and black

eye. During the same incident, Czeponis also injured his friends’

dog; poured alcohol on E.S.’s bed; kicked E.S.; and sent threatening

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text messages to R.E., A.S.’s partner. Czeponis then got drunk and

added graffiti to a skate park with angry language targeting his

children.

¶5 A few days after this incident, the friends’ child T.L. disclosed

to family and social workers that Czeponis had been sexually

assaulting her. T.L. stated in a forensic interview that, on several

instances, Czeponis had touched her breasts and vagina. And on at

least one occasion, T.L. woke up naked, and Czeponis was touching

her breasts and vagina with his hands and mouth and then rubbed

his penis against the outside of T.L.’s vagina. Following this

interview, all the children were removed from Czeponis’ home.

¶6 Five days later, A.S. recounted the events that led to Czeponis

punching her. In addition to the physical assault, A.S. disclosed

that Czeponis had inappropriately touched her and that he would

cuddle with her while he was completely naked. Ten months after

A.S.’s interview, S.L. came forward and accused Czeponis of

inappropriately touching her. S.L. stated that Czeponis touched

her breasts over her bra on several occasions.

¶7 About six months after S.L.’s disclosure, K.L., the friend of

Czeponis’ children, stated in a forensic interview that on two

2
separate occasions Czeponis pushed her up against a wall and then

ran his hand up under her shirt and touched her bra.

¶8 Czeponis was charged with five counts of sexual assault on a

child — two counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position

of trust – pattern of abuse (T.L. and A.S.); two counts of sexual

assault on a child by one in a position of trust – victim less than

fifteen and as part of a pattern of abuse (S.L. and K.L.); and sexual

assault on a child – pattern of abuse (T.L.) — two counts of third

degree assault (A.S. (punch) and A.S. (choke)); child abuse (S.L.);

two counts of harassment (S.L. and E.S.); criminal mischief; cruelty

to animals; and violation of a protection order.

¶9 Czeponis did not testify at trial but defended on theories that

there was no corroborating evidence, and the children were

motivated to get out of a bad living situation. A jury convicted

Czeponis on all charges but acquitted him of third degree assault

(A.S. (choke)) and child abuse (S.L.).1 He was sentenced to sixty-six

years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

1 The harassment and violation of a protection order charges were

severed and dismissed after Czeponis’ conviction.

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II. Time-Fused Deliberation and Alternate Juror

¶ 10 Czeponis contends that the district court misspoke and gave

the jury a time-fuse instruction depriving him of a fair trial. He also

contends that the court’s error was further exacerbated when the

jury had to begin deliberations anew with an alternate juror. We

disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 11 After the first day of deliberations, the district court told the

jury, “[The bailiff] has been in communication with the alternate

jurors and they remain available as alternates, but it remains most

efficient if you are able to complete the deliberations tomorrow.”

(Emphasis added.) The next morning, outside of the presence of the

jury, defense counsel asked the court, “When we were breaking last

night with the jurors, I might have misheard, but I thought I heard

the Court say something about it would be most efficient if you

could complete your deliberations tomorrow, meaning today.” The

district court interrupted and stated, “I hope you did. The Court

said, of course, we have the alternates available, but it would be

most efficient if the [jury] would be able to return tomorrow to

complete [its] deliberation.” Defense counsel replied, “That’s

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probably what you said. And I, in my sleep deprived state, heard it

wrong.” Czeponis did not seek any further inquiry or relief.

¶ 12 The district court and the parties then continued their

conversation about the need to replace a juror who was unavailable

to continue deliberations due to an emergency. The district court

brought in the eleven remaining members of the jury, explained

that one of the previous jurors was unable to continue

deliberations, and inquired whether the jurors would be able to

“incorporate a new juror into [the] deliberations and begin anew.”

The district court gave the jurors an opportunity to meet and

discuss this development in private.

¶ 13 The jury returned; the court confirmed with each member of

the jury that they could begin deliberations anew by setting aside

any prior discussions. The district court then conducted a detailed

inquiry into the alternate juror before adding her to the jury,

ensuring that the juror heeded the court’s instructions even though

she was not a member of the original twelve jurors. The court

provided the jury with new verdict forms, at the jury’s request, and

the alternate juror joined the deliberations.

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B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 14 The Attorney General argues that Czeponis waived the time-

fused instruction issue. We conclude that Czeponis forfeited it.

¶ 15 The purpose of an objection is to afford the district court “an

opportunity to focus on the issue and hopefully avoid the error.”

Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 22 (quoting Martinez v. People, 244

P.3d 135, 139 (Colo. 2010)). “[M]erely calling an issue or fact to the

court’s attention, without asking for any relief, is insufficient to

preserve an issue for review.” Id. at ¶ 23. But here, the court’s

response to defense counsel implies its recognition that if it had

given the jury a time limitation, such would have been improper.

This position is reflected when the court said that it “hope[d]” that

defense counsel misheard the court’s statement. But even though

defense counsel brought this issue to the court’s attention, there

was no further inquiry or relief sought. In this situation, we

conclude that this issue is, at most, forfeited.

¶ 16 Forfeiture is “the failure to make the timely assertion of a

right” and generally occurs through neglect. Id. at ¶ 29; People v.

Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 41-44 (acquiescence is forfeiture, not

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waiver). Unlike waiver, forfeiture does not extinguish appellate

review, and therefore, we review for plain error. Forgette, ¶ 30.

¶ 17 Plain error is error that is both “obvious and substantial” and

that “so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so

as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

conviction.” People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)

(quoting People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Colo. 2003)).

¶ 18 “[W]ith respect to jury instructions, reversal under a plain

error standard requires a defendant to ‘demonstrate not only that

the instruction affected a substantial right, but also that the record

reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to his [or

her] conviction.’” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)

(quoting Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 255-56 (Colo. 1997)).

“[A]n erroneous jury instruction does not normally constitute plain

error where the issue is not contested at trial or where the record

contains overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Miller,

113 P.3d at 750.

¶ 19 Czeponis preserved his argument that the district court’s time-

fuse instruction deprived him of a fair trial.

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C. Time-Fuse Jury Instruction

¶ 20 Defense counsel was correct that the court misspoke because

the court’s instruction suggested that the jury must complete

deliberations by the end of the next day. Although we agree with

Czeponis that the district court’s jury instruction was erroneous, we

conclude it is not reversible error.

¶ 21 It is the district court’s duty to instruct the jury on all matters

of law. Garcia, 28 P.3d at 343. “We review de novo whether a

particular jury instruction correctly states the law.” People v.

Nerud, 2015 COA 27, ¶ 35.

¶ 22 There is no per se ban on “time-fuse” jury instructions in

Colorado. Cf. Goff v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971);

Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966). Rather,

our supreme court has chosen a “case-by-case examination of the

particular facts of each case where the instruction is given” to

determine whether the time-fuse instruction has a coercive effect.

Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896, 899 (Colo. 1983).

¶ 23 For four reasons, we are not convinced the erroneous

instruction constituted plain error.

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¶ 24 First, the district court made its incorrect statement while

referencing the potential need for alternate jurors and how it would

remain most efficient if the original jurors were able to complete

deliberations without substitutions. And the court’s statement did

not stress the time deadline or threaten a mistrial. See People v.

Fell, 832 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Colo. App. 1991); Goff, 446 F.2d at 626.

Nor did the court say that the jury had to meet the purported

deadline, only that it would be “most efficient” if it did so.

¶ 25 Second, the jury heard the district court read through the

formal instructions and received copies of the same. The formal

instructions had no mention of any deadline. Johnson v. People,

2019 CO 17, ¶ 16 (“[W]e must presume that the jury followed all of

the court’s instructions.”); Smit v. Anderson, 72 P.3d 369, 375

(Colo. App. 2002) (Absent a contrary showing, jurors are “presumed

to have understood and heeded the trial court’s instructions.”).

Indeed, the alternate juror was instructed in the presence of the

other jurors to begin deliberations anew, the venire confirmed they

could conduct deliberations anew, and the court provided the jury

with new verdict forms.

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¶ 26 Third, time-fuse instructions generally have a “coercive effect”

when the court orders deliberations to be completed within a short

time period. See Allen, 660 P.2d at 898 (a fifteen-minute deadline

to reach a verdict before the court would declare a mistrial may

have prevented the jury from reaching a well-considered verdict);

People v. Hill, 355 N.Y.S.2d 612, 612 (App. Div. 1974) (per curium)

(a ten-minute deadline was coercive considering the court’s threat

that jurors would be sequestered overnight if they did not reach a

verdict); State v. Mason, 588 S.W.2d 731, 734-35 (Mo. Ct. App.

1979) (a fifteen-minute deadline was coercive). In this case, there

was an entire day of deliberations between the erroneous

instruction and the verdict.

¶ 27 But even if we were to consider the district court’s statement

about the alternates out of context, the parties have not cited, nor

are we aware of, any Colorado case law finding a “time-fuse”

instruction to be coercive when the jury was provided a full day to

deliberate. Our conclusion is bolstered by two other considerations

on this point. There was no evidence that the jury was then

deadlocked and that this erroneous instruction caused them to

reach a verdict. Cf. Gibbons, ¶ 35; People v. Lazdins, 728 P.2d 354,

10
355-56 (Colo. App. 1986). And the jury returned a split verdict

indicating that they considered the evidence and that the error did

not contribute to the verdict. See Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789,

795-96 (Colo. 1987).

¶ 28 Fourth and finally, there was substantial evidence supporting

the verdict. There were four outcry witnesses who made claims

against Czeponis. Three of the outcry witnesses came forward after

they were already out of Czeponis’ house and no longer living with

or relying on him for care. And the prosecution presented text

message screenshots between S.L. and Czeponis demonstrating

Czeponis’ manipulative and inappropriate tendencies.

¶ 29 The victim outcries and statements reflect age-appropriate

descriptions of the assaults. See Pierson v. People, 2012 CO 47, ¶

19 (“[T]he sexual knowledge displayed by the child-victim in this

case involved little more than a basic awareness of male sexual

anatomy and an awareness that applying pressure to her own

external genitalia could be painful.”). T.L. stated Czeponis was

rubbing her “lower area,” and she was “scared and confused.” T.L.

was “visibly upset, sniffling and appeared to be wiping away tears”

during her forensic interview.

11
¶ 30 In fact, all victims appeared shaken and scared when giving

their forensic interviews. K.L. stated that Czeponis “pushed [me] up

against the wall and hurt me; sexually assaulted me, I guess.” She

continued, he “held me there and touched me in places where a

grown man shouldn’t touch a little girl.” She stated, “[H]e touched

my top area.” S.L. stated that Czeponis forced her to cuddle with

him, and he would “run his hand up and down her leg and side and

chest area.” S.L. also said that Czeponis, while cuddling with her,

made her put her hand “really close” to his penis.

¶ 31 Accordingly, we discern no reversible error.

D. Alternate Juror

¶ 32 Czeponis argues that the incorporation of an alternate

juror the next morning “exacerbate[d] this time pressure,” and he

suggests that the cumulative impact of the “mistaken time-fuse”

and “mid-deliberation juror substitution” deprived him of a fair

trial. We disagree.

¶ 33 In Castro v. People, 2024 CO 56, ¶ 75, our supreme court

reaffirmed its case law holding that, while a mid-deliberation

replacement of a juror raises a presumption of prejudice to the

defendant’s right to a fair trial, the presumption may be rebutted if

12
the district court follows the procedures in People v. Burnette, 775

P.2d 583, 588 (Colo. 1989). See also Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d

478, 490 (Colo. 1999). Burnette identified specific concerns that,

because of a mid-deliberation substitution, the substitute juror

• may not have a realistic opportunity to express her views

and to persuade others;

• will not have been part of the dynamics of the prior

deliberations, including the interplay of influences among

and between jurors, that advanced the other jurors along

their paths to a decision;

• will not have the benefit of the unavailable juror’s views;

and

• may be thrust into service due to a lone juror who cannot

in good conscience vote for conviction and feigns illness

in order to place the burden of decision on an alternate.

Burnette, 775 P.2d at 588. To overcome the presumption of

prejudice, Burnette indicates a court should take “extraordinary

precautions” such as

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• instructing the alternate that she is not discharged, must

continue to follow the court’s instructions, and must not

form an opinion based on external information;

• questioning the alternate about her activities and

information received after being released and whether he

or she followed the court’s instructions;

• instructing the original jurors that they must put their

previous deliberations out of their minds and begin

deliberations anew;

• asking the original jurors individually if they can put

their prior deliberations out of their minds and start over;

and

• asking the original jurors if they can be receptive to the

alternate’s attempt to assert a nonconforming view.

See id. at 590-91; see also Carrillo, 974 P.2d at 491-93.

¶ 34 Further, “an appellate court must be satisfied that ‘under the

circumstances of the case, the precautions were adequate to

achieve that result.’” Carrillo, 974 P.2d at 493 (quoting Burnette,

775 P.2d at 590). Castro, ¶ 75, went through the precautions

undertaken by the district court in that case and indicated the

14
procedure was a “model for trial courts” confronted with

substitution of a juror mid-deliberation.

¶ 35 We conclude that any presumption of prejudice the alternate

juror substitution caused was rebutted by the district court’s

precautions, which substantially included the procedures from

Castro and Burnette.

¶ 36 It explained the situation clearly and gave the original jurors

time to think about and discuss whether they would be able to

properly include the alternate juror. The jury convened for about

five to seven minutes. When the jury returned, the district court

instructed the eleven jurors that they must incorporate and respect

the alternate juror’s opinions, that they must inform the alternate of

any previous discussions, and that any partial verdicts reached

“would need to be set aside, [and must incorporate] the new juror’s

opinions and positions, perspectives before finalizing any verdict.”

See Johnson, ¶ 16. The foreperson of the original jury stated that,

after a private discussion with the jury panel, “we felt comfortable

integrating the alternate juror.” And the district court polled each

of the original jurors to ensure that the foreperson’s statement was

accurate as to every juror.

15
¶ 37 The court also took all appropriate precautions with respect to

the alternate juror. Before seating the alternate, the court gave her

specific instructions to follow the court’s previous directives, to not

form an opinion about the case, and to keep an open mind. The

district court ensured that the alternate juror “did not have any

communication with anyone about the trial” and that the juror did

“not research any issues concerning the trial.” The court confirmed

that the alternate juror was not approached by anyone about the

case, had not formed any opinions, and was not exposed to any

information concerning the case. And at the conclusion of

evidence, the district court did not discharge the alternate jurors

but advised them of their ongoing responsibilities, although they

would not begin deliberations with the twelve original jurors.

¶ 38 The court provided the jurors with new verdict forms, and the

jurors, after the alternate was placed, posed a question to the court,

indicating that the jurors started deliberations anew. The jurors

deliberated for nearly an entire day before reaching a split verdict.

This is even longer than in Castro, where that jury’s deliberations of

five and a half hours was noted by the supreme court to be “a

16
substantial amount of time to deliberate.” Castro, ¶ 80.2 And there

was no evidence presented that the dismissed juror was a lone

holdout for acquittal.

¶ 39 Because the district court painstakingly followed the

procedures outlined in Burnette and Carrillo, and because the

specific circumstances of this case do not demonstrate that

Czeponis was prejudiced, we conclude that the district court’s

substitution of an alternate juror did not deprive him of a fair trial.

III. A.S.’s Forensic Interview

¶ 40 Czeponis contends that the district court failed to fulfill its

responsibility to guard against unfair or prejudicial use of A.S.’s

forensic interview during jury deliberations prejudicing Czeponis.

We disagree.

2 We acknowledge that, unlike in Castro v. People, 2024 CO 56,

¶ 77, the court in this case did not take any notes the jurors may
have had in their possession from the first deliberation. But the
district court substantially complied with the procedures from
Castro and People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583, 590 (Colo. 1989), and
given the amount of time they deliberated, the record does not
indicate that the possession of any notes adversely affected the jury
beginning deliberations anew.

17
A. Additional Facts

¶ 41 After the court seated the alternate juror, the jury asked the

court if it could review A.S.’s forensic interview. The district court

noted its inclination was to say, “[Y]es” and that “[j]urors are

referred to the information in the court’s policy for electronic

exhibits, reminded to not give special weight to this evidence, and

asked to review jury instruction number 9 and instruction number

25.” The prosecution agreed with the district court.

¶ 42 Czeponis objected, citing DeBella v. People, 233 P.3d 664

(Colo. 2010), and People v. Jefferson, 2017 CO 35. Czeponis argued

that the video “operate[s] as the functional equivalent of unsworn

testimony, unsworn and unconfronted,” and that since the jury will

not be able to rewatch the testimony provided in the court room,

viewing the forensic interview again will have “undue weight.”

Czeponis argued that it would violate “his rights to cross-

examination and confrontation, violat[ing] due process and a fair

trial.”

¶ 43 Although Czeponis maintained his objection, he stated that if

the video was going to be shown to the jury, it should be “done in

the courtroom with all of us present, and the court reading the

18
limiting instruction as opposed to anyone else.” The prosecutor

responded that A.S. testified in court, and Czeponis had the

opportunity to cross-examine her but chose not to do so.

¶ 44 The district court concluded that the jury could view the video.

The court reiterated the instructions it had already given to the jury

and noted that the video included limiting instructions at three

separate times. The court noted that A.S. was also present and

available for cross-examination after she testified.

¶ 45 In response to the jury’s questions, the district court

responded, “Yes. Please: (1) refer to the letter addressing viewing of

electronic exhibits; (2) do not give special weight to this evidence;

and (3) review jury instructions #9 and #25.” The jury then

rewatched A.S.’s forensic interview in the courtroom, and the bailiff

read the limiting instructions three times. In relation to the charges

concerning only A.S., the jury found Czeponis guilty of sexual

assault on a child by one in a position of trust and guilty of one

count of third degree assault (punch) but not guilty of the other

count of third degree assault (choking).

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B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 46 “[C]ontrol over the use of exhibits during jury deliberations

remains firmly within the discretion of the trial court.” DeBella, 233

P.3d at 666; Jefferson, ¶¶ 25, 29.

¶ 47 “It is a long-standing principle of appellate review that an

appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the

trial court where a matter is committed to the trial court’s

discretion.” Debella, 233 P.3d at 666. Therefore, appellate courts

will not disturb the district court’s decision unless the decision “was

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair” or if “it misapplie[d]

the law.” Jefferson, ¶ 25.

¶ 48 Not all abuses of discretion warrant reversal. Debella, 233

P.3d at 667. “Only those erroneous rulings that ‘substantially

influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial’ should be

upset.” Id. (quoting People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 310 (Colo. 2003)).

“However, if the influence of the error on the trial is apparent, or if

one is left ‘in grave doubt’ as to its effect on the verdict or the

fairness of the trial proceedings, the conviction cannot stand.” Id.

(quoting Welsh, 80 P.3d at 310).

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C. Analysis

¶ 49 In Debella, our supreme court held that a district court failed

to ensure that evidence given to a jury with unfettered access

during deliberations would not be given undue weight or emphasis

because it “did not (1) give a limiting instruction with respect to the

victim’s videotaped statement; (2) wait for a jury request to review

the videotape; or (3) obtain counsel’s agreement to allow the jury to

have access to the tape.” 233 P.3d at 668 (quoting People v.

DeBella, 219 P.3d 390, 404 (Colo. App. 2009) (Daily, J.,

dissenting)).

¶ 50 In this case, however, the district court appropriately exercised

its discretion by limiting the jury’s access to A.S.’s forensic

interview. The district court waited for the jury to request a review

of a videotape. See Jefferson, ¶ 56 (citing Frasco v. People, 165 P.3d

701, 702 (Colo. 2007)). After hearing Czeponis’ objections to the

rewatching of the interview, the district court, in responding

affirmatively to the jury’s request, specifically instructed the jury to

“not give special weight to this evidence.” See id. at¶ 19; see Smit,

72 P.3d at 375.

21
¶ 51 In addition to the “weight” instruction, the district court

instructed the jury to “review jury instructions #9 and #25.” Jury

instruction #9 stated, “You are again instructed that you cannot

consider that evidence except for the limited purpose I told you

about when it was admitted.” Jury instruction #25 identified the

evidence of out-of-court statements made by A.S. and instructed

the jury that it is its duty to “determine the weight and credit to be

given any such statements.” It further instructed the jury that it

should “consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of

the statements, the circumstances under which the statements

were made, and any other evidence that has been admitted that you

choose to consider for this purpose.”

¶ 52 The district court had also established rules controlling how

the jury was able to view the interview, which it reiterated in its

response to the jury’s request. The district court required the

exhibit to be “played or viewed once . . . in its entirety.” The district

court also prohibited “slow mode or fast forwarding” and instructed

the jury to “not deliberate in front of the bailiff.” See Jefferson, ¶ 57

(district courts have discretion to “craft alternative mitigation

22
procedures.” (citing DeBella, 233 P.3d at 669)). The jury watched

the video in the courtroom in the presence of the bailiff.

¶ 53 In this case, the district court exercised control over the jury’s

access to the videotape and “observe[d] caution” that the jury was

not giving undue weight to the video, and the video was one of

several videos depicting descriptions of Czeponis’ abuse. Id. at ¶ 38

(quoting DeBella, 233 P.3d at 669); see also People v. Johnson, 2016

COA 15, ¶¶ 38-40 (district court did not abuse its discretion when it

imposed certain restrictions and controlled access to the videotaped

interview); People v. Smalley, 2015 COA 140, ¶¶ 64-68 (district

court properly exercised its discretion when it waited for the jury to

request the recorded calls, sought input from counsel, assessed the

benefits of the exhibits to the jury and whether it would cause

undue prejudice, and then crafted a limiting instruction); cf.

Jefferson, ¶ 38.

¶ 54 The jury reached a split verdict as to A.S., acquitting Czeponis

of third degree assault (choking). This split verdict further suggests

that the jury was not unduly prejudiced by viewing A.S.’s forensic

video. See People v. Larsen, 2017 CO 29, ¶ 16 (An improper use of

23
prejudicial information “would have been reflected by across-the-

board guilty convictions.”).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 55 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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