Estate of Archuleta

23CA1709 Estate of Archuleta 11-07-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1709
Mesa County District Court No. 20PR155
Honorable Jeremy Chaffin, Judge

In re the Estate of Gloria Frances Archuleta, deceased.

Maria Paula Gross,

Appellant,

v.

Michael Ray Archuleta,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ*
Welling and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 7, 2024

Davis Law Group, J.R. Davis, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant

Chris Mahre & Associates, Chris Mahre, Grand Junction, Colorado, for
Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Maria Paula Gross1 appeals an order of the probate court

asserting that the court erred in granting the petition to admit her

mother’s will to formal probate and for formal appointment of a

personal representative (the order). She also contends the court

erred in admitting a real estate appraisal into evidence. We perceive

no error and affirm the order.

I. Background

¶2 Four adult children — Paula, Michael, Anthony, and

Deanna — survived their mother, Gloria Archuleta, who died on

November 30, 2020.

¶3 Approximately three weeks before Gloria’s death, she signed a

document titled “Last Will and Testament” (the will) that, among

other things, named Michael as her first choice for appointment of

personal representative of her estate. That same day, Gloria also

signed a beneficiary deed for her home that granted a 40% interest

to Michael and 20% each to Paula, Anthony, and Deanna.

1 The parties’ briefs refer to appellant as Paula; we will do the same.

Since the other parties are related and share the same last name,
we refer to them by their first names.

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¶4 In January 2021, Michael filed a petition for formal probate of

the will and formal appointment of personal representative (the

petition). Shortly after Michael filed the petition, Paula filed a

competing petition and an objection to the validity of the will

(objection). Paula’s objection contested the will’s formalities and

Gloria’s testamentary capacity to sign the will and asserted that

Michael unduly influenced Gloria.

¶5 In August 2023, the probate court held an evidentiary hearing

on the competing petitions and objections and heard testimony

from Paula, Michael, Anthony, Deanna, Kristina Ross, and Kathleen

Gerlock. Kristina provided Gloria with in-home nursing care the

months before Gloria signed the will, and Kathleen notarized2

Gloria’s signature on the will and beneficiary deed.

¶6 After considering the testimony of the witnesses and exhibits

admitted into evidence, the district court made its findings of fact

2 Although Kathleen notarized Gloria’s signature on the will and

beneficiary deed, Kathleen later stated that Gloria was not present
when she notarized Gloria’s signature. Michael testified that
Kathleen had Gloria acknowledge that Gloria signed the documents
by telephone.

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and conclusions of law on the record and issued the order. This

appeal followed.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶7 Paula contends the probate court erred in admitting the will to

probate because the evidence was insufficient to support the court

finding by clear and convincing evidence that the will represented

Gloria’s intent. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶8 We generally review findings of fact under a clear error or

abuse of discretion standard, while conclusions of law are typically

reviewed de novo. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455 Co., 3 P.3d 18,

22 (Colo. 2000).

¶9 A trial court’s determination of factual disputes is accorded

great deference. In re Estate of Schumacher, 253 P.3d 1280, 1282

(Colo. App. 2011). Thus, we will not disturb its determinations of

factual questions that are necessary to carrying out a testator’s

expressed intent unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Estate of

Shuler, 981 P.2d 1109, 1117 (Colo. App. 1999). Clearly erroneous

means the findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence

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in the record considered as a whole. In re Estate of Perry, 33 P.3d

1235, 1237 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 10 Paula filed an objection to the petition preserving the issue for

our review.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 11 For a will to be valid, a testator must comply with the

formalities set forth in section 15-11-502(1), C.R.S. 2024, which

requires that a will be in writing, signed by the testator, and either

witnessed by two or more individuals or acknowledged by the

testator before a notary public. In re Estate of Davies, 2022 COA

90, ¶ 15. However, a document is not necessarily precluded from

being considered as that testator’s will under section

15-11-503(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, if minor flaws in the execution of the

will exist and so long as “the proponent of the document or writing

establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent

intended the document or writing to constitute,” as relevant here,

“[t]he decedent’s will.” Compare In re Estate of Sky Dancer, 13 P.3d

1231, 1233 (Colo. App. 2000) (concluding that the General

Assembly authorized trial courts to permit the probate of wills

which are flawed in execution, but nevertheless reflect the testator’s

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intent), with In re Estate of Wiltfong, 148 P.3d 465, 468 (Colo. App.

2006) (noting that in 2001, the General Assembly adopted section

15–11–503(2) “to limit the harmless error concept to minor flaws in

the execution of wills”).

¶ 12 Section 15–11–503(2) “establishes the condition precedent that

a document be ‘signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or

her will’ before a court may move to the next step and decide

whether there is clear and convincing evidence the decedent

intended the document to be a will.” Wiltfong, 148 P.3d at 468

(quoting § 15-11-503(2)).

¶ 13 A proponent of a will has the primary burden of proof to show

that the testator executed a document intended to be their will in

accordance with the requirements of the law and that the document

was the free and voluntary act of the testator. Snodgrass v. Smith,

94 P. 312, 313 (Colo. 1908). “Likewise, the burden of proof to show

undue influence is upon the one who asserts it.” Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 14 It is undisputed that Gloria’s will did not comport with the

formalities set forth in section 15-11-502(1) nor was it holographic

under section 15-11-502(2). But the probate court found that

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Gloria acknowledged the will; thus, the remaining matter for the

court to decide, and the primary issue raised on appeal by Paula,

was whether Michael presented clear and convincing evidence that

Gloria intended the document she signed that was titled “Last Will

and Testament” to be her will.

¶ 15 The probate court concluded that Michael satisfied his burden

with clear and convincing evidence because the signature and

initials on the will belonged to Gloria; Anthony and Deanna testified

that the will comported with their understanding of Gloria’s intent,

which included providing Michael with a larger percentage of her

estate; Kristina’s and Kathleen’s testimony corroborated Gloria’s

testamentary intent; “[a]ll of the witnesses generally testified that

[Gloria] was able to understand what was going on [and] able to

make decisions up until the last few days of her life”; and all

witnesses, except Paula, testified that Michael appropriately cared

for and loved Gloria and did not attempt to exert any influence on

her.

¶ 16 After the probate court took testimony from Gloria’s four adult

children and the two non-interested parties, Kristina and Kathleen,

and admitted exhibits into evidence, it assessed the credibility of

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the witnesses and weighed the evidence it received. The probate

court found that “all of the testimony presented show[ed] clear and

convincing evidence that [Gloria] intended [the] document . . . to be

her will” and that Paula failed to establish by a preponderance of

the evidence that Michael unduly influenced Gloria or that Gloria

lacked capacity.

¶ 17 Specifically, the court afforded the testimony of Anthony and

Deanna weight when they “testified unequivocally that the will

comported with their understanding of their mother’s intent” and

when Deanna testified that Gloria could not be convinced to do

anything she did not want to do.

¶ 18 The court received and weighed competing testimony, which

falls squarely in its province to assess the credibility of witnesses

and to find facts. See Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 796 (Colo. 1979)

(“The sanctity of trial court findings is derived from the recognition

that the trial judge’s presence during the presentation of testimonial

evidence provides an unparalleled opportunity to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded the

evidence which is before the court.”).

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¶ 19 When we consider the record as a whole, it demonstrates that

the probate court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence. See Perry, 33 P.3d at 1237. Three out of the four adult

children testified that the will represented Gloria’s testamentary

intent. Two of the adult children, Anthony and Deanna, testified

and confirmed that they should receive less interest in Gloria’s

estate than their brother, Michael, and they did not join their sister,

Paula, in her objection to the will even though they would likely

have received a larger share of Gloria’s estate under an informal

probate. Their testimony is strong support for the credibility of

their understanding that Gloria intended to provide more for

Michael than for her other adult children. Also, Kristina testified

that Gloria acknowledged that she desired to have the will notarized

and had the capacity to express such intent. Further, Kathleen

testified that Gloria expressed her desire for Michael to have her

home.

¶ 20 The probate court’s finding that Gloria acknowledged the will

and intended the document to be her will is supported by

substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. See id.

Thus, we discern no error and will not disturb the court’s

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determination in carrying out Gloria’s expressed intent here. See

Shuler, 981 P.2d at 1117.

III. Admission of Evidence

¶ 21 Next, Paula contends that the probate court improperly

admitted into evidence an appraisal of Gloria’s home under the

business record exception to hearsay. Michael asserts that the

probate court allowed the admission of the appraisal as a business

record because it was relevant to matters in dispute, which

included undue influence, and that if the probate court did err in

admitting the appraisal any error was harmless. Assuming,

without deciding, that the business record exception to hearsay did

not permit the admission of the appraisal, any error in its

admission here was harmless.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 22 We review a trial court’s ruling admitting evidence under an

abuse of discretion standard. Genova v. Longs Peak Emergency

Physicians, P.C., 72 P.3d 454, 458 (Colo. App. 2003). A court

abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair or when it misapplies the law. Rains v.

Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8.

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¶ 23 However, even if an abuse of discretion is found, “[a] court’s

erroneous evidentiary ruling is reversible only if a substantial right

of a party is affected; that is, if the error substantially influenced

the outcome of the case.” In Interest of L.B., 2017 COA 5, ¶ 58; see

Askew v. Gerace, 851 P.2d 199, 201-02 (Colo. App. 1992); see also

C.R.C.P. 61.

¶ 24 Paula preserved this issue for our review through her

counsel’s objection to the admission of the appraisal into evidence

at the evidentiary hearing.

B. Analysis

¶ 25 Here, the probate court’s findings did not reference the

appraisal. Based on the absence of any findings about the

appraisal, it appears the court did not use the appraisal at all.

Even Paula agrees that it is unclear how the probate court used the

appraisal. Further, the appraisal could have only been relevant to

Gloria’s intent if the estate’s size relative to the parties’ financial

positions would have made it more or less likely that Gloria

intended the distribution of her estate expressed in her contested

will. But the court made no mention of the size of the estate, and

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there was no evidence presented concerning the financial position of

the parties.

¶ 26 Instead, the probate court’s findings regarding Gloria’s intent

all concerned the testimony of witnesses about her state of mind

and expressed intent to leave Michael a larger interest in her estate

because of his care for her at the end of her life and the time and

expense he put into her home. Thus, we conclude that the

admission into evidence of the appraisal did not substantially

influence the outcome of the case. See L.B., ¶ 58.

IV. Disposition

¶ 27 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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