Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************

Page 0 	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 	0, 0
2 	, 0 	0 Conn. App. 749
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
STACY SMITH v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47425)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes, appealed, on
the granting of certification, from the habeas court’s judgment denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the court improperly
rejected his claim that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assis-
tance when advising him with respect to a pretrial plea offer from the
state. Held:
The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner’s criminal trial
counsel did not render deficient performance in advising the petitioner
regarding the state’s plea offer, as the court credited counsel’s testimony
that he advised the petitioner about the offer, including that it contained a
right to argue for a lesser sentence, which he explained to the petitioner,
as well as the elements of the offenses at issue, the state’s evidence and
the maximum penalties the petitioner faced, and the petitioner did not
indicate to the court or his counsel that he did not understand what a right
to argue meant.
Argued March 26—officially released September 2, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment
denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
J. Patten Brown III, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).
Rebecca Z. Oestreicher, special deputy assistant
state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharm-
ese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Elizabeth M. Mose-
ley, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee
(respondent).

Page 1	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL	0, 0
0 Conn. App. 749 	, 0 	3
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Stacy Smith, appeals,
following the granting of his petition for certification
to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court deny-
ing his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly rejected his claim that his trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance in advising him with
respect to a pretrial plea offer from the state. We affirm
the judgment of the habeas court.
On the basis of the evidence presented at the petition-
er’s criminal trial, the jury reasonably could have found
the following facts, as set forth by this court in the
petitioner’s direct appeal. See State v. Smith, 174 Conn.
App. 172, 166 A.3d 691, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 910, 170
A.3d 680 (2017). ‘‘The charged events occurred between
October, 2007, and October, 2009, when the victim 1 was
thirteen, fourteen and fifteen years old. At that time,
she lived with her mother, M, two older brothers, and
a younger sister. Until the end of 2009, the victim’s
family socialized ‘almost every weekend’ with D, who
was the victim’s godmother and M’s best friend, and
D’s sons. In 2006, the victim met the [petitioner] for the
first time at a Dunkin’ Donuts store and learned that
he was the father of D’s oldest son. The [petitioner]
was thirty-seven or thirty-eight years old at the time,
recently had finished serving a prison sentence for fed-
eral narcotics violations, and was living in a halfway
house and working at Dunkin’ Donuts. Shortly there-
after, the [petitioner] and D resumed their previous
relationship, and, in the winter of 2007, the [petitioner]
moved into D’s East Hartford home.
1 ‘‘In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-
86e.’’ State v. Smith, supra, 174 Conn. App. 174 n.1.

Page 2 	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 	0, 0
4 	, 0 	0 Conn. App. 749
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
‘‘In the summers of 2007, 2008 and 2009, the victim
and her family regularly attended get-togethers at D’s
home with D, her sons, and the [petitioner]. During that
time, the victim also frequently babysat for D’s younger
son at D’s house. On those occasions, the [petitioner]
would often be present. The [petitioner’s] inappropriate
behavior toward the victim started in 2007, when the
victim was socializing with D’s family and babysitting
at D’s house. Specifically, between 2007 and 2008, the
[petitioner] began talking to the victim about sex, he
would caress her calf while they were watching a movie,
and he would show her ‘in his phone . . . other girls
he was messing with other than [D], telling [her] things
that he would do with them and . . . what [she] should
do with other guys if [she] was dating someone.’
‘‘In 2008, the [petitioner] began kissing and touching
the victim while she was babysitting or attending social
gatherings at D’s house. The [petitioner] put his fingers
in her vagina and touched her breasts or buttocks multi-
ple times between October, 2008 and October, 2009.
On one occasion in the summer of 2008, the [petitioner]
performed oral sex on the victim while she was babysit-
ting for D. Although the victim asked him to stop and
tried to push him off of her, he continued for about
thirty seconds and stopped when he heard D’s car pull
into the driveway. On several occasions when the [peti-
tioner] was kissing or touching the victim, he would
unzip his pants and pull out his penis. Although the
[petitioner] asked the victim to perform oral sex on
him two or three times, she refused, and he ‘laughed
it off.’
‘‘In 2010, the victim’s family stopped socializing with
D’s family because the [petitioner] ‘was getting abusive’
with D, and M did not want her daughters ‘to be around
all that arguing.’ The last time the victim saw the [peti-
tioner] was at a Fourth of July party at D’s house in

Page 3	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL	0, 0
0 Conn. App. 749 	, 0 	5
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
2010, at which the [petitioner] tried to pull the victim
into a room and to kiss her, but she was able to escape.
‘‘In January, 2011, the victim told M about the [peti-
tioner’s] actions. The next day, M took the victim to
the East Hartford Police Department, where they met
with Officer Daniel Zaleski. Zaleski spoke with the vic-
tim separately for about twenty minutes, during which
time the victim disclosed the pertinent details about
the [petitioner’s] repeated sexual conduct toward her.
Zaleski then referred the case to a juvenile investigator,
Detective Samuel Kelsey, who investigated sexual
assaults involving minors, and reported the matter to
the Department of Children and Families (department).
‘‘On February 1, 2011, after receiving a phone call
from Kelsey requesting to speak with him about the
allegations against him, the [petitioner] voluntarily went
to the East Hartford Police Department and gave a
statement. According to Kelsey, the [petitioner] admit-
ted to having had ‘close contact’ with the victim ‘in an
inappropriate nature, [such] as touching her breast and
vagina.’ Specifically, during this interview with Kelsey,
the [petitioner] ‘said at no time did he have sex with
her; he said he was under the influence of alcohol and
he can’t remember all the events but he does admit
having made contact with her; he said he was very sorry
and that he would like to make amends in any way
deemed necessary, this is not him . . . but that’s no
excuse.’ After Kelsey reduced the [petitioner’s] state-
ment to writing, the [petitioner] initialed and signed it.
The entire interview lasted approximately forty minutes.
‘‘After the interview, in the lobby of the police station,
the [petitioner] was met by Betzalda Torres, an investi-
gator employed by the department who was investigat-
ing the alleged physical neglect and sexual abuse of the
victim by the [petitioner]. After Torres reviewed the

Page 4 	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 	0, 0
6 	, 0 	0 Conn. App. 749
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
allegations against [the petitioner] involving the physi-
cal neglect and sexual abuse of the victim, for the pur-
poses of the investigation by the department, the [peti-
tioner] ‘basically, confirmed that what [the victim] said
was correct, did not deny it, and . . . [he] was feeling
apologetic to the family for what he ha[d] done.’ The
[petitioner] told Torres that he had been sexually inap-
propriate with the victim and that he had ‘many’ discus-
sions with her regarding sex and her virginity. During
this interview, the [petitioner] was not specific as to the
details of the actual acts he performed, but he explained
that his alcohol and drug use played a role and he ‘took
full responsibility’ for being ‘sexually inappropriate
toward [the victim].’ ’’ Id., 174–77.
The petitioner subsequently was arrested. Id., 177.
The petitioner was represented at his criminal trial by
Attorney R. Bruce Lorenzen. Prior to trial, the state
made a plea offer to the petitioner. The state offered
a five year sentence of incarceration, with a right to
argue for a lesser sentence, in exchange for a guilty
plea to sexual assault. 2 The case was continued several
times from December, 2011, through March, 2012, for
the petitioner to consider the plea offer. During this
period, the trial court informed the petitioner twice that
the plea offer allowed the petitioner the right to argue
for a lesser sentence. In March, 2012, the petitioner
rejected the plea offer, and the trial court, Alexander,
J., conducted a canvass of the petitioner.3 The case then
proceeded to trial.
2 The record is unclear regarding the degree of sexual assault to which
the petitioner would have pleaded guilty under the terms of the plea offer.
3 The following colloquy occurred between the trial court and the peti-
tioner:
‘‘The Court: . . . This was down for accept or reject on a plea agreement
that did give [the petitioner] a right to argue for a lesser sentence on some
reduced charges. Did he want to accept it or did he want to reject it.
‘‘[Lorenzen]: Your Honor, we’d respectfully decline the offer.
‘‘The Court: And you have gone over that pretrial offer with your attorney.
Is that correct?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Correct.

Page 5	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL	0, 0
0 Conn. App. 749 	, 0 	7
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
‘‘[F]ollowing a jury trial, [the petitioner] was con-
victed of two counts of sexual assault in the second
degree, four counts of risk of injury to a child, and one
count of sexual assault in the fourth degree. The [trial]
court, Dewey, J., subsequently sentenced the [peti-
tioner] to a total effective sentence of thirty years incar-
ceration, followed by five years of special parole.’’ Id.,
177. The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal. Id., 174.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that Lorenzen had rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel. After a trial on the
petitioner’s single count, amended petition, the habeas
court, Bhatt, J., denied the petition on the ground that
the petitioner had not proven deficient performance or
prejudice with respect to his allegations that Lorenzen
failed to advise the petitioner regarding his plea offer.4
The habeas court granted the petitioner’s petition for
certification to appeal. This appeal followed.
We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘In a habeas
appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts
found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erro-
neous, but our review of whether the facts as found by
the habeas court constituted a violation of the petition-
er’s constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
sel is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Jamison v. Commissioner of Correction, 167 Conn.
App. 312, 319, 143 A.3d 1136, cert. denied, 323 Conn.
934, 151 A.3d 383 (2016).
‘‘The Court: And you understand that when the case goes to trial the state
can proceed on the original charges, which may have higher penalties after
trial. You understand all that?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Um-hum.
‘‘The Court: Yes? Okay.’’
4 The habeas court also rejected the petitioner’s claim that Lorenzen had
rendered deficient performance with respect to alleged failures to present
evidence of coercive police tactics and to locate favorable witnesses. The
petitioner does not challenge those determinations on appeal.

Page 6 	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 	0, 0
8 	, 0 	0 Conn. App. 749
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
‘‘The petitioner bears the burden of proving ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under the well established
standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). . . .
In cases . . . involving plea negotiations, to prevail on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the peti-
tioner must establish that (1) counsel’s performance
was deficient, and (2) there was a reasonable probabil-
ity that—but for the deficient performance—the peti-
tioner would have accepted the plea offer, and that the
trial court would have assented to the plea offer. . . .
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will succeed
only if both prongs [of Strickland] are satisfied. . . .
It is axiomatic that courts may decide against a peti-
tioner on either prong [of the Strickland test], which-
ever is easier.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction,
223 Conn. App. 645, 654–55, 309 A.3d 411, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 956, 310 A.3d 380 (2024).
On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly rejected his ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the
court improperly rejected his claim that Lorenzen, when
advising the petitioner on the state’s plea offer, failed
to explain the elements of the charged offenses, the
state’s evidence against him, the petitioner’s potential
exposure, and the petitioner’s right to argue for a lesser
sentence. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correc-
tion, argues that the court properly concluded that the
petitioner had failed to demonstrate that Lorenzen ren-
dered deficient performance. We agree with the respon-
dent.
At the habeas trial, the petitioner and Lorenzen testi-
fied. The habeas court credited Lorenzen’s testimony
with respect to his discussions with the petitioner about
the plea offer. Lorenzen testified that he had advised
the petitioner with respect to the elements of the

Page 7	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL	0, 0
0 Conn. App. 749 	, 0 	9
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
offenses, the state’s evidence, and the petitioner’s expo-
sure to the maximum penalties. 5 Lorenzen told the peti-
tioner, as he would with his other clients, that the plea
offer included the right to argue. 6 Relatedly, Lorenzen
advised the petitioner about how the sentencing judge
viewed the right to argue and that there was a possibility
of receiving a sentence of less than five years of incar-
ceration.
On the basis of its factual findings, the habeas court
determined that the petitioner had not proven that Lore-
nzen engaged in deficient performance with respect to
advising him about the plea offer. In crediting Loren-
zen’s testimony, the court found that Lorenzen’s perfor-
mance was not deficient because ‘‘he advised [the peti-
tioner] of the offer, including the fact that it contained
a right to argue for less—and also advised him of what
that meant—as well as the elements of the offense, the
state’s evidence and the penalties [the petitioner] was
exposed to.’’ In addition, the court further supported
its finding that Lorenzen had discussed what the right
to argue meant by crediting Lorenzen’s testimony that
he had informed the petitioner of the presiding judge’s
position on the right to argue. The habeas court found
5 During the habeas trial, Lorenzen testified about his advice to the peti-
tioner, which included meeting with the petitioner to review the plea offer;
discussing the plea offer more than once with him; and requesting continu-
ances for the petitioner to consider the plea offer, because the petitioner
was reluctant to accept the plea offer. Lorenzen further testified that he did
not ‘‘have a recollection of a verbatim discussion with [the petitioner]’’ but
that he would have discussed, as he would have with other clients, the
allegations, evidence, defenses, and penalties with the petitioner. Relatedly,
Lorenzen testified that it was his practice to advise clients of the risks of
going to trial; he told the petitioner that the plea was ‘‘the very safe play’’
and it ‘‘was likely to work out to his detriment to go to trial.’’
6 Lorenzen testified that he had advised the petitioner that ‘‘[t]his is it,’’
that the petitioner would have to go before a judge to say whether he was
taking the plea offer, and that there may be a possibility of entering a plea
pursuant to a plea agreement with the state if he changed his mind later,
but that there was no guarantee.

Page 8 	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 	0, 0
10 	, 0 	0 Conn. App. 749
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
that ‘‘[s]uch a conversation would only have been neces-
sary if [Lorenzen] and [the petitioner] were discussing
what a right to argue for less meant.’’
The habeas court also made other findings that sup-
ported its determination that Lorenzen did not perform
deficiently. First, the court found that the petitioner did
not indicate to Lorenzen that he did not understand
what a right to argue meant. Second, the court refer-
enced two separate occasions when the trial court
stated in the presence of the petitioner that the plea
offer called for a right to argue7 and two occasions
when the trial court stated that the state was modifying
the plea offer slightly. 8 The habeas court found that,
during those four hearings, the petitioner never stated
to the trial court that he did not know that his plea
offer included a right to argue or that he did not under-
stand what the right to argue meant.
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude
that the habeas court properly determined that Loren-
zen’s advice with respect to the plea offer was not
deficient. The petitioner does not challenge any of the
7 During a December 15, 2011 hearing, the trial court stated to the peti-
tioner: ‘‘[T]here was some discussion of a plea agreement, and you have to
decide whether you want to take a plea agreement or whether you want to
have a trial. It did involve the change of charge by the state with a lesser
sentence being argued for, and your next court date to decide is . . . Janu-
ary 19 [2012]. [Your counsel] will see you after court.’’ During a March 29,
2012 hearing, the trial court stated to the petitioner: ‘‘[Come] on up, sir.
This was down for accept or reject on a plea agreement that did give [the
petitioner] a right to argue for a lesser sentence on some reduced charges.’’
8 On January 19, 2012, the trial court stated: ‘‘[T]here’s some additional
information. Today was down for accept or reject. But the parties need to
investigate it a little further. It may change your offer. . . . So, I’m going
to give them until February 16 [2012] to see if what was indicated as the
offer is going to stay or if it’s going to change to something—it looks like
more in your benefit.’’
On February 16, 2012, the trial court indicated that the ‘‘state modified
the offer slightly or in some ways—at least as it relates to the amount of
time that you could be exposed to as a maximum. You have to go over . . .
whether you want the plea agreement, whether you want the trial.’’

Page 9	CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL	0, 0
0 Conn. App. 749 	, 0 	11
Smith v. Commissioner of Correction
court’s underlying factual findings as clearly erroneous.
Instead, he directs this court to his own testimony at
the habeas trial, which the habeas court did not credit.
See Bridges v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn.
App. 742, 749–50, 152 A.3d 71 (2016) (‘‘[T]his court does
not retry the case or evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses. . . . The habeas judge, as the trier of facts,
is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given to their testimony.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 917,
154 A.3d 1008 (2017). The petitioner did not demon-
strate that Lorenzen’s advice to the petitioner ‘‘ ‘fell
below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of 	reasonableness.’ ’’
Franko v. Commissioner of Correction, 165 Conn. App.
505, 518, 139 A.3d 798 (2016). We, therefore, agree with
the habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner has
not proven deficient performance. 9
The judgment is affirmed.
9 Because we have decided the petitioner’s claim on the basis of the
performance prong of Strickland, we need not discuss the prejudice prong.
See Bonds v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 654–55
(‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that courts may decide against a petitioner on either prong
[of the Strickland test], whichever is easier’’).