In re Probate Appeal of Murrell

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In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
IN RE PROBATE APPEAL OF
MARQUEA MURRELL
(AC 47876)
Clark, Westbrook and Flynn, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment denying her
appeal from decrees of the Probate Court granting the defendant’s motion
to remove the plaintiff as the fiduciary of the estate of their father, M,
denying the plaintiff’s petition to administer M’s estate, and granting the
defendant’s petition to administer the estate. The plaintiff claimed that the
Superior Court improperly concluded that the defendant was M’s biological
son because the defendant had failed to satisfy the legal requirements set
forth in the Connecticut Parentage Act (§ 46b-450 et seq.). Held:
The Superior Court properly upheld the decrees issued by the Probate Court,
as the Superior Court’s conclusion that the defendant was M’s biological
son was legally sound and supported by the record, in that a child support
judgment rendered by a family support magistrate in 1994 against M con-
cerning the support of the defendant and subsequent child support related
judgments demonstrated that M’s paternity had been adjudicated by a court
of competent jurisdiction prior to the January 1, 2022 effective date of the
Connecticut Parentage Act, the 1994 judgment was presumptively valid as
a final judgment and the plaintiff did not sustain her burden of overcoming
that presumption, and, therefore, according to the plain language of the
statute (§ 46b-553), the legal requirements set forth in the Connecticut
Parentage Act did not apply.
Argued December 8, 2025—officially released July 7, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal from two decrees of the Probate Court for
the district of Greater Windsor, inter alia, granting
the defendant’s motion to remove the plaintiff as the
fiduciary of the estate of Mark Murrell, denying the
plaintiff’s petition to administer the estate, and approv-
ing the defendant’s petition to administer the estate,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland and tried to the court, Gordon, J.; judgment
denying the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Keith Yagaloff, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Robert K. Killian, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
Opinion
FLYNN, J. In this appeal, we are called upon to review
whether the record before us suffices to justify the Supe-
rior Court’s conclusion that Jemar Smith is the biological
son of the decedent, Mark Murrell.1 This is the appeal
of Mark Murrell’s daughter, Marquea Murrell, aris-
ing from the judgment of the Superior Court denying
her appeal from two decrees of the Probate Court for
the district of Greater Windsor regarding the admin-
istration of the estate of her father, Mark Murrell. On
appeal, Marquea Murrell claims that the Superior Court
improperly concluded that Jemar Smith is the biological
son of her father, the decedent, Mark Murrell, because
Jemar Smith failed to satisfy the legal requirements set
forth in the Connecticut Parentage Act, General Statutes
§ 46b-450 et seq.
For reasons that follow, we conclude, in the exercise
of our plenary review of the relevant statutes and judg-
ments and the record presented, that a child support
judgment by a family support magistrate, Ina Forman,
rendered in 1994 against Mark Murrell, concerning the
support of Jemar Smith, and subsequent child support
related judgments demonstrate that Mark Murrell’s
paternity had already been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction prior to the January 1, 2022
effective date of the Connecticut Parentage Act. Implicit
in these judgments was a finding that Mark Murrell was
Jemar Smith’s father, as only a parent can be ordered by
law to support his or her child. As a result, we conclude
that, pursuant to the plain language of General Statutes
§ 46b-553, the other legal requirements set forth in the
Connecticut Parentage Act, General Statutes § 46b-450
et seq., for determining parentage, do not apply to the
present case.2 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the Superior Court.
1For ease of reference, we refer to Jemar Smith; Mark Murrell; Marquea
Murrell; and Jemar Smith’s mother, Rochelle Smith Jones, by their full
names throughout this opinion.
2We therefore do not decide, because it is unnecessary to our decision,
but leave to another day, the broader question raised by Marquea Murrell

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
The following facts, as found by the Superior Court
or as are undisputed in the record, and procedural his-
tory are relevant to this appeal. Mark Murrell died on
May 7, 2023. On May 22, 2023, Marquea Murrell filed
a petition for administration of his estate. Thereafter,
upon application by Marquea Murrell, the Probate Court,
Deneen, J., issued an ex parte order appointing Marquea
Murrell as the administrator of Mark Murrell’s estate.
Jemar Smith subsequently filed a motion, dated June
7, 2023, in which he requested that the court revoke its
appointment of Marquea Murrell as the administra-
tor of Mark Murrell’s estate because Marquea Murrell,
inter alia, failed to disclose that he is a biological son,
and therefore an heir, of Mark Murrell.3 Jemar Smith
further requested that the court replace Marquea Mur-
rell with an independent third-party administrator. On
that same date, Jemar Smith also filed a petition for the
administration of Mark Murrell’s estate.
Following a hearing on June 19, 2023, the Probate
Court issued a decree on June 22, 2023, in which it
removed Marquea Murrell as the administrator of
Mark Murrell’s estate and appointed Attorney Peter
M. Berry as the temporary administrator. The Probate
Court recognized that it had authority to reconsider
its initial order pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to
2023) § 45a-128 (a), which provides in relevant part that
“any order or decree made by a court of probate ex parte
may, in the discretion of the court, be reconsidered and
modified or revoked by the court. Reconsideration may
be made on the court’s own motion or, for cause shown
satisfactory to the court, on the written application of
any interested person. . . .” The Probate Court concluded
that Jemar Smith presented sufficient evidence that he
as to whether the Connecticut Parentage Act now eliminates resort to
the consideration of common-law proof and procedures.
3Jemar Smith filed this motion jointly with Cynthia Earven, the mother
and guardian of Cymarie Earven, also an alleged child of Mark Murrell.
The Probate Court subsequently found that insufficient evidence was
presented to demonstrate that Cymarie Earven is an heir of Mark Mur-
rell. That conclusion is not at issue in this appeal.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
is the biological son of Mark Murrell and explained that,
“[d]ue to [Marquea Murrell’s] failure to list and notify
additional heirs on her initial petition to this court, and
based on the strained relationship between the parties,
the court finds that it is necessary to appoint a third-
party fiduciary to administer this estate.” In addition,
the Probate Court stated that it would hold a hearing on
the parties’ petitions for administration of Mark Mur-
rell’s estate “in due course.”
Following a hearing on July 11, 2023, the Probate
Court issued a second decree on July 17, 2023, in which
it approved Jemar Smith’s petition for the administra-
tion of the estate. The Probate Court appointed Attorney
Berry as the “full administrator” of Mark Murrell’s estate
and ordered him to, inter alia, settle the estate within
one year. The Probate Court also dismissed Marquea
Murrell’s petition with prejudice.
On July 21, 2023, Marquea Murrell commenced an
appeal in the Superior Court. She appealed from both
the June 22, 2023 decree and the July 17, 2023 decree,
claiming, inter alia, that the Probate Court “[relied] on
an erroneous determination that Jemar Smith was [Mark
Murrell’s] child” when it revoked her appointment as the
administrator of the estate and dismissed her petition for
administration of the estate. Specifically, she argued, in
relevant part, that the Probate Court did not apply the
correct legal standard in determining that Jemar Smith
was Mark Murrell’s child.
The Superior Court, Gordon, J., held a full evidentiary
hearing on April 23, 2024, at which both parties were
represented by counsel. The court heard testimony from
Marquea Murrell; Jemar Smith; Rochelle Smith Jones,
Jemar Smith’s mother; and Natalia Smith Vargas, Jemar
Smith’s daughter. The parties also submitted documen-
tary evidence, including a defective acknowledgment of
paternity signed by Mark Murrell in July 1993;4 a copy
of a claim filed on May 10, 2023, with the Department
4As explained subsequently in this opinion, it is undisputed that the
acknowledgment of paternity signed by Mark Murrell in July 1993 is

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
of Veterans Affairs (VA form) related to Mark Murrell’s
funeral benefits, which had been filled out together by
the parties and listed Marquea Murrell as Mark Mur-
rell’s daughter and Jemar Smith as Mark Murrell’s
son; and a certified copy of a Superior Court file, which
included, inter alia, a petition for child support filed by
Rochelle Smith Jones in 1993, when Jemar Smith was age
sixteen,5 seeking support from Mark Murrell as Jemar
Smith’s father, a judgment granting Rochelle Smith
Jones’ petition and issuing a child support judgment in
1994 against Mark Murrell by a Superior Court family
support magistrate, and a wage withholding judgment
of support issued by the Support Enforcement Division
of the Superior Court against Mark Murrell on August
23, 1999.
On May 8, 2024, the Superior Court issued a memo-
randum of decision affirming the decrees of the Probate
Court. What was before the Probate Court and, thus,
the Superior Court on appeal sitting as a Probate Court,
was the issue of whether the Probate Court properly (1)
revoked the appointment of Marquea Murrell as admin-
istrator of Mark Murrell’s estate, in its first decree, and
appointed a temporary independent administrator, and
(2) issued a subsequent decree appointing the temporary
independent administrator, Attorney Berry, as the per-
manent administrator of the estate. Both the Probate
Court and the Superior Court on the appeal from probate
reached the central issue, which Marquea Murrell had
raised and briefed, of whether Jemar Smith was a bio-
logical son of Mark Murrell, underlying both the Probate
Court’s decrees and the Superior Court’s judgment.
defective insofar as he listed his own name on the line designated for the
information about the child, and he did not list Jemar Smith’s name.
5As explained subsequently in this opinion; see footnote 15 of this
opinion; Rochelle Smith Jones provided testimony, which the court
found credible, that Mark Murrell enlisted in the United States Navy
when he learned that she was pregnant. The delay in her filing the peti-
tion for child support was caused by Mark Murrell’s whereabouts being
unknown until she later learned that he had returned to Connecticut.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
The Superior Court explained that both parties had
acknowledged that the Probate Court had statutory
authority to determine parentage pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-454 (a) (2), which provides in relevant
part: “(a) Petitions to adjudicate parentage shall be filed
in the Family Division of the Superior Court, except
that . . . (2) petitions to determine parentage after the
death of the child or the person whose parentage is to
be determined shall be filed in the Probate Court . . . .”
See also General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 46b-571 (h)
(“after the death of the alleged genetic parent of a child
born to an unmarried birth parent, a party deemed by
the court to have a sufficient interest may file a claim
for parentage on behalf of such alleged genetic parent
with the Probate Court for the district in which either
the alleged genetic parent resided or the party filing the
claim resides”).
In summarizing the evidence that had been presented
at the hearing, the court found credible Rochelle Smith
Jones’ testimony that she was impregnated by Mark
Murrell when she was sixteen years old, that it was not
consensual on her part, and that she did not have sexual
intercourse with any other person for several years. In
addition, the court found not credible Marquea Murrell’s
testimony that the VA form applying for veterans’ burial
benefits and several other documents had been “ ‘forged’ ”
and, instead, credited Jemar Smith’s testimony that
the VA form accurately reflects what Marquea Murrell
and Jemar Smith voluntarily submitted jointly, which
indicated that he was the son of Mark Murrell.6
The court explained that the parties disagreed regard-
ing the criteria that could be considered in making a
parentage determination. Marquea Murrell’s position
6Marquea Murrell and Jemar Smith had provided additional conflicting
testimony throughout the hearing. For instance, they disagreed as to
when they first met; whether Marquea Murrell previously acknowledged
that she was Jemar Smith’s sister and the aunt of his daughters; whether
Jemar Smith had attended certain family functions; and regarding
the extent to which Jemar Smith was involved in medical decisions
concerning Mark Murrell at the hospital immediately prior to his death.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
was that the only appropriate criteria for the court to
consider is set forth in the “presumption of parentage”
statute, General Statutes § 46b-488 (a) (3), which is part
of the Connecticut Parentage Act. Section 46b-488 pro-
vides in relevant part that “(a) . . . a person is presumed
to be a parent of a child if . . . (3) The person, jointly with
another parent, resided in the same household with the
child and openly held out the child as the person’s own
child from the time the child was born or adopted and
for a period of at least two years thereafter, including
any period of temporary absence. (b) The parentage of a
presumed parent under subdivision (3) of subsection (a)
of this section shall be established by a court adjudication
or signing of a valid acknowledgment of parentage under
sections 46b-476 to 46b-487, inclusive.” The portion of
that statute that is applicable to our analysis refers to
establishment of parentage by “a court adjudication . .
. .” General Statutes § 46b-488 (b).
Marquea Murrell argued that Jemar Smith could not
satisfy the criteria of § 46b-488 (a) (3) because Mark
Murrell did not jointly, with another parent, reside in
the same household with Jemar Smith; the acknowledg-
ment of paternity signed by Mark Murrell was invalid
insofar as it failed to identify Jemar Smith as Mark
Murrell’s child and instead identified Mark Murrell as
both the father and the child; and there was no court adju-
dication that Mark Murrell was Jemar Smith’s father.
Jemar Smith, on the other hand, argued that the court
could take “a wider variety of factors into consideration
when making a parentage determination,” including
the testimony from Rochelle Smith Jones regarding the
circumstances surrounding her impregnation and the
VA form identifying Jemar Smith as Mark Murrell’s
son. More significantly, Jemar Smith also argued that
the child support judgments rendered by the family sup-
port magistrates reflected that there had been a court
adjudication of parentage, satisfying the requirements
of the Connecticut Parentage Act.
The court concluded that “[Marquea Murrell’s] view
of the Probate Court’s authority is too narrow, and . . .

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
although a rebuttable presumption of parentage may be
created by satisfying one or more of the criteria set forth
in [§] 46b-488 (a) (3), the court may also take other factors
into consideration.”7 However, the court also signifi-
cantly concluded that, “even if all other evidence [was]
disregarded, the August 23, 1999 withholding order for
support identifying [Mark Murrell] as the ‘obligor’ vis-
à-vis [Jemar Smith] is sufficient to create a rebuttable
presumption of parentage pursuant to [§ 46b-488], which
presumption [Marquea Murrell] failed to overcome or
rebut.” Accordingly, the court denied Marquea Murrell’s
appeal. Marquea Murrell subsequently filed a motion
for reargument and reconsideration, which the court
summarily denied. This appeal followed.
We begin with the standard of review. “An appeal from
a Probate Court to the Superior Court is not an ordinary
civil action. . . . When entertaining an appeal from an
order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court
takes the place of and sits as the court of probate. . . . In
ruling on a probate appeal, the Superior Court exercises
the powers, not of a constitutional court of general or
[common-law] jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salce v. Cardello,
348 Conn. 90, 103, 301 A.3d 1031 (2023).
When, as in the present case, no record was made of the
probate proceedings,8 “a probate appeal is not so much
7The court concluded, on the basis of “the totality of the evidence
presented,” that “there was a sufficient basis for the Probate Court to
conclude that [Jemar Smith] is [Mark Murrell’s] biological son . . . .”
The court explained: “Having carefully considered [Marquea Murrell’s]
appeal, including all documentary evidence submitted in support of
the appeal; and having carefully considered [Jemar Smith’s] answer,
together with all of the documentary evidence introduced into evidence,
including the testimony of [Rochelle Smith] Jones and the withholding
order; and having conducted a full day proceeding at which both parties
had a full opportunity to present their respective positions; the court
concludes that there was and is sufficient evidence to conclude that
[Mark Murrell] is [Jemar Smith’s] biological father.”
8In the present case, the parties did not provide this court or the
Superior Court with any transcripts of the proceedings before the
Probate Court. See O’Sullivan v. Haught, 348 Conn. 625, 638, 309
A.3d 1194 (2024) (“[u]nder [General Statutes] § 45a-186, if a record,

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
an appeal as a trial de novo . . . . The Superior Court sits
as a probate court and takes jurisdiction of the order
or decree appealed from and [tries] that issue de novo.”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Rutherford v. Slagle, 352 Conn. 27,
34–35, 334 A.3d 988 (2025); see also Stroll v. Pass, 236
Conn. App. 357, 364, 348 A.3d 843 (2025), cert. denied
sub nom. In re Probate Appeal of Stroll, 354 Conn. 906,
349 A.3d 297 (2026).
“In appeals in which the trial court has ruled on a
probate appeal de novo, we treat our scope of review as
we would with any other Superior Court proceeding.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salce v. Cardello,
210 Conn. App. 66, 72, 269 A.3d 889 (2022), aff’d, 348
Conn. 90, 301 A.3d 1031 (2023). Because the questions
raised in the present case involve the interpretation and
application of certain statutes, our review is plenary. See,
e.g., Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn.
586, 594, 181 A.3d 550 (2018) (application of statute
involves question of law over which review is plenary).
“[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a
harmonious and consistent body of law . . . and we must
construe legislation found in separate statutes harmo-
niously whenever possible.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Clue v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 353 Conn. 97, 111–12, 340 A.3d 1102 (2025).
Moreover, “[t]he construction of . . . [a] judgment is a
question of law for the court [and] . . . our review . . . is
plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v.
Perry, 130 Conn. App. 720, 724, 24 A.3d 1269 (2011);
see also Fredo v. Fredo, 234 Conn. App. 106, 121, 343
A.3d 525 (2025).
Prior to addressing Marquea Murrell’s claim in the
present case, we also provide an overview of the legal
including a transcript, of the testimony was made before the Probate
Court pursuant to [General Statutes] §§ 51-72 and 51-73, the Superior
Court shall review the decree of the Probate Court using an abuse of
discretion standard” (emphasis added; footnotes omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). At the start of the April 23, 2024 hearing, the
Superior Court indicated that it would proceed with a de novo review of
the Probate Court’s decrees, and neither party expressed any objection.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
principles governing the distribution of an intestate
estate, which are applicable when a decedent dies without
a will, and a determination of parentage in conjunction
therewith. When a person dies intestate, probate courts
are, inter alia, required to determine who constitutes
the decedent’s heirs at law and are, therefore, entitled
to notice of proceedings; and further, to determine who
has entitlement to aliquot shares of the estate upon its
settlement under an order of distribution to the fidu-
ciary. See General Statutes § 45a-303 (a); see also General
Statutes § 45a-433 et seq.
The distribution of an intestate estate to the children
of a decedent is governed by General Statutes § 45a-438.
In 1978, our elected members of the General Assembly
amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 45-274—now
codified as § 45a-438—by enacting Public Acts 1978,
No. 78-199, which determined that, under our law, as
a matter of public policy, all children, whatever the cir-
cumstances of their conception, or their parents’ marital
status at that time or the time of their birth, had the
right to inherit from a parent under the law of intestacy.
Specifically, No. 78-199 of the 1978 Public Acts, which
was codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 45-274
(b) (2), provides in relevant part that “[a] child born out
of wedlock shall inherit from (A) his or her mother and
(B) his or her father, provided such father (i) has been
adjudicated the father of such child by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, or (ii) has acknowledged under oath in
writing to be the father of such child.” Section 45-274
was transferred to § 45a-438 in 1991.9
Section 45a-438 now provides in relevant part that
“(b) . . . for the purposes of this chapter, a child and the
child’s legal representatives shall qualify for inheritance
from or through the parent if parentage is established
in accordance with the provisions of the Connecticut
9Section 103 of No. 21-15 of the 2021 Public Acts amended subsection
(b) of § 45a-438 by deleting the language regarding a child being “born out
of wedlock” and establishing a father’s paternity and replacing it with
the provision, set forth more fully in the body of this opinion, for estab-
lishing parentage in accordance with the Connecticut Parentage Act.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
Parentage Act or by adoption. If parentage is based on
subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 46b-488 or
sections 46b-495 to 46b-505, inclusive, of the Connecti-
cut Parentage Act, parentage shall be established by a
voluntary acknowledgment of parentage under sections
46b-476 to 46b-487, inclusive, of the Connecticut Parent-
age Act, or by court adjudication.” (Emphasis added.)
The Connecticut Parentage Act, which became effec-
tive on January 1, 2022; see Public Acts 2021, No. 21-15,
§ 1; is modeled on the 2017 revision of the Uniform Par-
entage Act.10 See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hear-
ings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 2021 Sess., pp. 2402, 2517, 2546,
2572. The Connecticut Parentage Act includes several
provisions that govern proceedings to adjudicate parent-
age. See General Statutes §§ 46b-458 through 46b-491.
Marquea Murrell’s claim in the initial briefing of the
present case centers around § 46b-488 (a), which sets
forth certain circumstances in which a presumption of
parentage arises pursuant to the Connecticut Parentage
Act. Marquea Murrell claimed, inter alia, that the Supe-
rior Court erred in concluding that Jemar Smith is Mark
Murrell’s biological son because he had not established
that there had been a court adjudication of paternity
pursuant to § 46b-488 (a) (3) and none of the other pre-
requisites set forth in the Connecticut Parentage Act
had been met.11 In response, Jemar Smith argued in his
10The model law was approved by the Uniform Law Commission, also
known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which is comprised of “practicing lawyers, judges, legislators
and legislative staff and law professors, who have been appointed by
state governments . . . to research, draft and promote enactment of
uniform state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable
and practical.” National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Parentage Act (2017) (last modified January 25,
2024), p. 2, available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/
final-act-96?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068
f&tab=librarydocuments (last visited June 22, 2026).
11Marquea Murrell also contended that the Superior Court improperly
took into account other evidence of the parent-child relationship between
Jemar Smith and Mark Murrell, such as the defective acknowledgment
of paternity and Rochelle Smith Jones’ testimony, as the Connecticut
Parentage Act sets forth the exclusive framework for determining

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
initial brief to this court that the Superior Court properly
determined that Mark Murrell was his biological father
because the family support magistrates’ child support
judgments demonstrate that there had been a court
adjudication establishing paternity and, therefore, he
established a presumption of paternity pursuant to § 46b-
488, in accordance with the Connecticut Parentage Act.
After oral argument, this court, sua sponte, ordered
the parties to submit supplemental memoranda “address-
ing the effect, if any, of the transitional provision of the
Connecticut Parentage Act . . . § 46b-553, on the outcome
of this appeal.”12 Section 46b-553 provides: “Sections
46b-450 to 46b-553,13 inclusive, [the Connecticut Par-
entage Act] apply to a proceeding in which no judgment
has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a
person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated
by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by
operation of law.” (Emphasis added; footnote added.)
In her supplemental memorandum, Marquea Murrell
maintains that the Connecticut Parentage Act governs
in the present case, although § 46b-553 directs that the
Connecticut Parentage Act does not apply to adjudica-
tions of parentage that took place prior to January 1,
parentage in probate matters and does not provide for the consideration
of such evidence. Marquea Murrell cites several Superior Court cases
in support of this proposition. See Davis v. Burrill, Superior Court,
judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. FA-22-5015463-S (February
6, 2023) (describing Connecticut Parentage Act as “comprehensive revi-
sion of our state statutes regarding parentage” that “creates a cohesive
statutory framework”); see also Portalatin v. Dorantes, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. FA-24-6083949-S (October
29, 2024) (describing Connecticut Parentage Act as “a comprehensive
act designed to revise and modernize the statutes regarding the creation
and maintenance of legal parent-child relationships” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Notably, the Connecticut Parentage Act has not yet
been addressed by either this court or our Supreme Court.
12Neither Marquea Murrell nor Jemar Smith initially briefed the
effect of § 46b-553—before the Probate Court for the district of Greater
Windsor, or the Superior Court in the appeal from the Probate Court, or
this court—until we ordered supplemental briefing on that provision.
13Sections 46b-450 to 46b-553 comprise the Connecticut Parentage
Act in its entirety. See General Statutes § 46b-450.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
2022. Marquea Murrell contends that “[n]o pre-2022
judgment adjudicated [Jemar] Smith to be [Mark] Mur-
rell’s child”; that legal parentage is different from bio-
logical parentage; that General Statutes § 46b-471 (10)
recognizes adjudications made only in proceedings for
dissolution, annulment or legal separation of marriage,
pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-468 (b); that “[t]he
Probate Court and the Superior Court made post-2022
parentage determinations,” rather than enforcing prior
adjudications; that the written acknowledgment of pater-
nity signed by Mark Murrell was ineffectual to determine
parentage; that a wage withholding judgment cannot be a
statutory path to parentage; and that the Superior Court
could not consider other evidence outside the ambit of
the Connecticut Parentage Act.
In his supplemental memorandum, Jemar Smith ini-
tially states that § 46b-553 has no bearing on the issue
presently before this court. In the remainder of his
supplemental memorandum, however, Jemar Smith
emphasizes the language in § 46b-553 stating that the
provisions of the Connecticut Parentage Act “apply to
a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before
January 1, 2022 . . . .” (Emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) He argues that, in the pres-
ent case, there had already been a judgment of paternity
by way of a family support magistrate’s child support
judgment rendered in 1994.
“In accordance with [General Statutes] § 1-2z, we begin
our analysis with the plain language of the relevant stat-
utes . . . .” Stamford v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings, 351 Conn.
298, 306, 330 A.3d 102 (2025); see also Villages, LLC v.
Longhi, 166 Conn. App. 685, 703, 142 A.3d 1162, cert.
denied, 323 Conn. 915, 149 A.3d 498 (2016).
Having carefully considered the points raised in the
parties’ supplemental memoranda, we conclude that,
under the plain language of § 46b-553, the Connecticut
Parentage Act does not apply to the present case because
Mark Murrell’s paternity had already been adjudicated

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
by a court of competent jurisdiction by way of a family
support magistrate’s child support judgment rendered on
January 28, 1994, and subsequent child support related
judgments. The judgments of the family support mag-
istrates on which we rely were effective decades before
the January 1, 2022 effective date of the Connecticut
Parentage Act. By its express terms, the Connecticut
Parentage Act does not apply to proceedings where such
a judgment entered prior to January 1, 2022. General
Statutes § 46b-553.
We firmly reject Marquea Murrell’s contention that
both the Probate Court for the district of Greater Wind-
sor and the Superior Court on appeal from the Probate
Court were entering judgments after January 1, 2022,
and, therefore, the provisions of § 46b-553 do not apply to
the present case. Under that reasoning, § 46b-553 could
never be applied. Both courts have statutory authority
to determine whether a judgment entered prior to Janu-
ary 1, 2022, constitutes an adjudication of parentage
within the meaning of § 46b-553, thereby exempting
the proceeding from the provisions of the Connecticut
Parentage Act.
Our review of the record, including the certified copy
of the Superior Court file from Rochelle Smith Jones’
child support action marked as exhibit L, reflects evi-
dence of the following. On August 18, 1993, when Jemar
Smith was sixteen years old, his mother, Rochelle Smith
Jones,14 filed a child support petition against Mark Mur-
rell.15 On the petition, Rochelle Smith Jones listed Mark
14At the time of filing the petition for child support, the full name of
Jemar Smith’s mother was Rochelle Smith. As explained previously,
for ease of reference, we refer in this opinion to Jemar Smith’s mother
as Rochelle Smith Jones, which was her full name at the time of the
probate appeal in the present case.
15At the hearing before the Superior Court, Rochelle Smith Jones
testified that there was a child support order in place prior to 1993,
since around the time of Jemar Smith’s birth. Specifically, she testified
that Mark Murrell enlisted in the United States Navy upon learning
that she was pregnant, and she received a child support order she had
sought against Mark Murrell through the United States Navy after
Jemar Smith was born. She explained that she did not pursue that child

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
Murrell as the “acknowledged parent” of Jemar Smith.
An acknowledgment of paternity signed by Mark Mur-
rell and an affirmation of paternity signed by Rochelle
Smith Jones also were filed with the court on August 18,
1993.16 In Rochelle Smith Jones’ affirmation of pater-
nity, which she had signed under oath, she listed Mark
Murrell as Jemar Smith’s father. Although Mark Mur-
rell’s acknowledgment of paternity was notarized by a
commissioner of the Superior Court and lists Rochelle
Smith Jones as the child’s mother, he had listed his
own name, and not Jemar Smith’s name, on the line
designated for information about the child—which, if
taken literally, would have meant that Mark Murrell
was acknowledging that he was his own father and that
Rochelle Smith Jones was his mother. Mark Murrell’s
written acknowledgment was clearly defective. We hold,
however, that the various judgments holding Mark Mur-
rell responsible for payment of the support of Jemar
Smith were by law presumptively valid judgments.
Mark Murrell was served process for the support action
on December 28, 1993. A hearing was held on January
28, 1994, at which Rochelle Smith Jones was present,
support order because she did not know where Mark Murrell was living
at that time, and she filed the new petition for child support in 1993,
when she learned that he was back in Connecticut.
Although the Superior Court did not make any findings as to an ear-
lier child support order, Jemar Smith’s counsel argues, on appeal to
this court, that there must have been an earlier hearing and an earlier
child support judgment, prior to Rochelle Smith Jones’ 1993 petition,
because the court found an arrearage of $12,025 in its January 28,
1994 judgment. Jemar Smith’s counsel contends that “[t]he records
of the earlier court hearing were not found.” In light of our conclusion
based on the child support judgments that are in the record, we need
not address this argument.
16General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46b-172 (a) provides in relevant
part: “In lieu of or in conclusion of proceedings under section 46b-160,
the written acknowledgment of paternity executed by the putative
father of the child when accompanied by an attested waiver of the right
to a blood test, the right to a trial and the right to an attorney and a
written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn to by the mother
of the child and filed with the superior court, for the judicial district in
which the mother of the child or the putative father resides shall have
the same force and effect as a judgment of that court . . . .”

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
and Mark Murrell did not appear. Aside from Mark Mur-
rell’s acknowledgment of paternity and Rochelle Smith
Jones’ affirmation of paternity filed on the same date as
Rochelle Smith Jones’ child support petition, the record
does not disclose what other evidence the family support
magistrate may have heard. On that same January 28,
1994 date, the family support magistrate, Ina Forman,
entered a default judgment against Mark Murrell—
which Mark Murrell never appealed—finding that he
owed an arrearage of $12,025. The court ordered Mark
Murrell to pay $65 per week for current child support
and $20 per week toward the arrearage. On August 23,
1999, the support enforcement division issued a wage
withholding judgment of $20 per week based on the fam-
ily support magistrate’s January 28, 1994 judgment.
The withholding judgment listed Mark Murrell as the
“obligor” of child support.
On December 8, 2011, the state of Connecticut support
enforcement services filed a motion for modification of
past due support on behalf of Mark Murrell, seeking a
decrease in his child support obligation. The support
enforcement officer sought a modification on the basis
of a substantial change in circumstances, due to the fact
that the existing support judgment deviated from the
child support guidelines by at least 15 percent. The sup-
port enforcement officer requested that the judgment for
past due support be modified commensurate with Mark
Murrell’s ability to pay. A family support magistrate
scheduled a hearing on the motion for March 16, 2012.
A copy of the motion and the court’s order for a hear-
ing was served on Rochelle Smith Jones on February 8,
2012, and mailed to Mark Murrell on February 21, 2012.
Mark Murrell was present at the hearing on March 16,
2012, and filed an appearance in the matter on that date.
The family support magistrate, Frederic Gilman, granted
the motion for modification, finding that the arrear-
age was $13,354.96 as of March 13, 2012, and ordered
Mark Murrell to pay $5 per week toward that arrearage.
Mark Murrell subsequently made child support payments

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
totaling $6012.66, with the last payment taking place
on April 25, 2023, a couple of weeks before his May 7,
2023 death.
We conclude, in the exercise of our plenary review,
that the evidence of the antecedent family support mag-
istrate’s child support judgment rendered on January
28, 1994, and the subsequent child support related judg-
ments—including the August 23, 1999 withholding
judgment for support relied upon by the Superior Court17
and the modification of the child support judgment ren-
dered on March 16, 2012—were judgments sufficient
to establish that there had been a court adjudication of
parentage.
Marquea Murrell emphasizes her view that the child
support judgments were entered by default and that
there had not been a formal adjudication of paternity.
She argues that “[c]hild support orders alone are not
conclusive evidence of parentage.” We are not persuaded.
Although, as Marquea Murrell points out, the child
support judgments do not expressly state that Mark
Murrell was the father of Jemar Smith, we hold that
it was implicit in the family support magistrate’s child
support judgment rendered on January 28, 1994. We
do so because a person whose parentage is not legally
established cannot be charged with supporting a child
who is not his or her child. General Statutes § 46b-215,
which governs a family support magistrate’s author-
ity to render child support judgments, limits the legal
obligation of support to a person’s spouse and children.
Specifically, § 46b-215 provides in relevant part that “(a)
(1) The Superior Court or a family support magistrate
may make and enforce orders for payment of support
against any person who neglects or refuses to furnish
17Although Marquea Murrell contends that the 1999 wage withholding
judgment “is not a statutory pathway to parentage,” we do not consider
that wage withholding judgment standing alone but, rather, in the
exercise of our plenary review, in conjunction with the family support
magistrate’s 1994 child support judgment and the other child support
related judgments that followed, which were before the Superior Court
as part of exhibit L.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
necessary support to such person’s spouse or a child
under the age of eighteen or as otherwise provided in this
subsection, according to such person’s ability to furnish
such support, notwithstanding the provisions of section
46b-37. If such child is unmarried and a full-time high
school student, such support shall continue according to
the parents’ respective abilities, if such child is in need
of support, until such child completes the twelfth grade
or attains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first.
* * *
“(4) For purposes of this section, the term ‘child’ shall
include one born to parents [not] married to each other
whose alleged genetic parent . . . has been adjudged the
parent by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . .”18 Thus,
18General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46b-215 (a), which was in effect
at the time of the family support magistrate’s January 28, 1994 child
support judgment, similarly provided in relevant part: “The superior
court or a family support magistrate shall have authority to make and
enforce orders for payment of support against any person who neglects
or refuses to furnish necessary support to his or her spouse or a child
under the age of eighteen, according to his or her ability to furnish
such support, notwithstanding the provisions of section 46b-37. . . .
For purposes of this section, the term ‘child’ shall include one born
out of wedlock whose father has acknowledged in writing his paternity
of such child or has been adjudged the father by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or a child who was born before marriage whose parents
afterwards intermarry. . . . Said court or family support magistrate
shall also have authority to determine, order and enforce payment of
any support due because of neglect or refusal to furnish support prior
to the action. In the determination of support due based on neglect or
refusal to furnish support prior to the action, the support due for periods
of time prior to the action shall be based upon the obligor’s ability to
pay during such prior periods. . . .”
Notably, in the current revision of § 46b-215, there is a three year
limitation on retroactive child support that a court may order in the
case of a child born out of wedlock whose parents did not intermarry.
See General Statutes § 46b-215 (a) (7) (A) (“The court or family support
magistrate may also determine, order and enforce payment of any sup-
port due because of neglect or refusal to furnish support for periods
prior to the action. In the case of a child born out of wedlock whose
parents have not intermarried, a parent’s liability for such support
shall be limited to the three years next preceding the filing of a petition
or written agreement to support pursuant to this section.” (Emphasis
added.)). That particular limitation, however, was not in effect at the

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
a determination that Mark Murrell was Jemar Smith’s
father was a necessary prerequisite to the child support
judgments.
We similarly are not persuaded by Marquea Murrell’s
arguments that the definitions set forth in the Con-
necticut Parentage Act “distinguish legal parentage
from evidence suggesting biological parentage” and
that, pursuant to §§ 46b-468 (b) and 46b-471 (10), the
Connecticut Parentage Act recognizes the binding effect
of an adjudication of parentage only if it was made in
the context of a proceeding for a dissolution, annulment
or legal separation of marriage. Regardless of whether
Marquea Murrell’s interpretation of these provisions
is accurate, they are not applicable to the present case
pursuant to § 46b-553.
In addition, it makes no difference that the family
support magistrate’s 1994 child support judgment was
entered by default. “[A] defendant [in a child support
action], by failing to appear and contest the allegations
asserted in the support petition, judicially admitted
those facts contained in the petition. Put differently,
basic principles of fair notice to the served party and
his concomitant obligation to respond to the pleading
served on him apply within the context of family support
magistrate proceedings. . . . Accordingly, the failure of
a party to deny the material allegations contained in an
adversary’s pleading operates as an implied admission
of that allegation. This admission may extend from an
individual allegation, to a set of allegations, or, in the
case of a defaulting party who wholly fails to deny any
of the allegations asserted by an adverse party, to the
entirety of the pleader’s filing constituting a cause of
action. A default in an action for legal and equitable
relief admits the material facts constituting a cause of
action.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265
Conn. 723, 735–36, 830 A.2d 228 (2003).
time of the family support magistrate’s January 28, 1994 child sup-
port judgment in the present case. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1993)
§ 46b-215 (a); see also Public Acts 2006, No. 06-149, § 16.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
“Although the failure of a party to deny the material
allegations of a pleading operates so as to impliedly admit
the allegations, a default does not automatically trigger
judgment for, or the relief requested by, the pleader. The
pleader is entitled to an entry of judgment or a grant of
relief as a function of the nonresponsive party’s default
and the attendant implied admission only when the alle-
gations in the well pleaded filing are sufficient on their
face to make out a claim for judgment or relief.” Id.,
736–37. In the present case, Mark Murrell was “identi-
fied by name, address and legal status as ‘acknowledged
[parent]’ ” in Rochelle Smith Jones’ petition for child
support and, therefore, “[t]he assertions contained in
these documents not only gave proper notice to [him] as
to the consequences of his failure to appear and defend,
but also constituted a sufficient basis upon which an
adjudication of paternity may be made and an order of
child support may be entered.” Id., 738.
Finally, our conclusion is not undermined by Marquea
Murrell’s emphasis on Mark Murrell’s defective acknowl-
edgment of paternity19 and her attempt to collaterally
attack the judgment of Family Support Magistrate Ina
Forman in issuing the 1994 child support judgment,
to which Marquea Murrell was not a party and from
which Mark Murrell took no appeal. A collateral attack
on a judgment occurs when a party seeks to avoid a final
judgment in a separate proceeding from which no appeal
was taken in order to avoid the effect of that judgment,
which, in this case, was rendered more than thirty years
ago. Such attacks are not favored because they run coun-
ter to the long-standing policy supporting finality of
judgments. “[F]inal judgments are . . . presumptively
valid . . . and collateral attacks on their validity are
19Contrary to Marquea Murrell’s suggestion, the Superior Court did
not conclude—and Jemar Smith does not argue—that Mark Murrell’s
defective acknowledgment of paternity established his paternity by
operation of law. As explained throughout in this opinion, our conclu-
sion rests not on the acknowledgment of paternity but, rather, on the
adjudication of Mark Murrell’s paternity implicit in the family support
magistrate’s 1994 child support judgment and the related judgments
that followed.

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
disfavored. . . . The reason for the rule against collat-
eral attack is well stated in these words: The law aims
to invest judicial transactions with the utmost perma-
nency consistent with justice. . . . Public policy requires
that a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as
solemn records upon which valuable rights rest, should
not lightly be disturbed or overthrown. . . . [T]he law has
established appropriate proceedings to which a judgment
party may always resort when he deems himself wronged
by the court’s decision. . . . Unless it is entirely invalid
and that fact is disclosed by an inspection of the record
itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults
upon it.” (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn.
757, 771, 143 A.3d 578 (2016); see also Schoenhorn v.
Moss, 347 Conn. 501, 510, 298 A.3d 236 (2023) (citing
“our deep-rooted public policies favoring consistency
and stability of judgments, the orderly administration
of justice, and the prevention of inconsistent rulings” in
concluding that plaintiff’s action was collateral attack
on order imposed by different court in different action,
which was not permissible (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
As we previously have noted, our Supreme Court has
determined that a final judgment is presumptively valid
when collaterally attacked. Sousa v. Sousa, supra, 322
Conn. 771. Mark Murrell—who would have been the
proper party to appeal from the 1994 child support judg-
ment—did not contest his paternity or his obligation to
pay child support, even once he appeared in the matter
in 2012 regarding the motion for modification, and he
paid toward that child support obligation until shortly
before his death. The 1994 judgment, therefore, is pre-
sumptively valid. See id.
As a result, Mark Murrell’s paternity had “already been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction” prior
to the January 1, 2022 effective date of the Connecticut
Parentage Act, and, therefore, pursuant to § 46b-553,
the Connecticut Parentage Act does not apply in the

In re Probate Appeal of Murrell
present case. Accordingly, contrary to Marquea Murrell’s
claim, Jemar Smith was not required to satisfy the legal
requirements set forth in the Connecticut Parentage Act.
We, therefore, agree, albeit for different reasons,
with the Superior Court’s conclusion that the evidence
presented should result in upholding the Probate Court’s
conclusion that Jemar Smith was the son of Mark Mur-
rell. Marquea Murrell cannot prevail on her claim that
the Superior Court improperly shifted the burden to her
to disprove paternity. Jemar Smith had the benefit of
the presumptively valid judgment of the family support
magistrate in issuing the 1994 child support judgment,
which Marquea Murrell was attempting to collaterally
attack, and the subsequent judgments earlier noted.
Marquea Murrell did not sustain her burden of overcom-
ing that presumption. See Sousa v. Sousa, supra, 322
Conn. 771.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court’s
conclusion that Jemar Smith is Mark Murrell’s biologi-
cal son is legally sound and supported by the record. The
Superior Court, therefore, properly upheld the decrees
issued by the Probate Court that removed Marquea Mur-
rell as the fiduciary of Mark Murrell’s intestate estate
and appointed Attorney Berry as the permanent admin-
istrator.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.