Czunas v. Mancini

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Czunas v. Mancini

SANDRA E. CZUNAS v. RICHARD J. MANCINI
(AC 45848)
Cradle, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis-
solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
denying his motion to modify his child support obligation and ordering
him to pay $10,000 to the plaintiff to defend against his appeal. Subse-
quent to the dissolution judgment, the parties had entered into several
stipulated agreements that reduced the defendant’s weekly child support
obligation and expanded his parenting time with the parties’ minor child.
The defendant claimed, inter alia, that it was inequitable for him to
continue paying child support in light of the parties’ shared parenting
plan. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
found that there had been no substantial change in the parties’ circum-
stances since the date of the previous child support order so as to
warrant a modification of his child support obligation; there was no
change in the custody of the child that would have required the redirec-
tion of child support to the defendant under the applicable statute (§ 46b-
224), as the parties alternated weekends with the child and had enjoyed
shared custody for several years, and the extension of the defendant’s
weekend parenting time from Sunday evening to Monday morning consti-
tuted a minimal change, extending his time with the child by little more
than twelve hours every other week, including when the child was
sleeping between Sunday evenings and Monday mornings.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the defendant
to pay the plaintiff $10,000 for attorney’s fees to defend against his
appeal; the court’s determination that the defendant had substantial
liquid assets that the plaintiff did not have was supported by the parties’
financial affidavits.
Argued February 8—officially released June 18, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford and tried to the court, Prestley, J.;
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation
agreement; thereafter, the court, Abery-Wetstone, J.,
denied the defendant’s motion to modify child support,
and the defendant appealed to this court; subsequently,
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Czunas v. Mancini

the court, Abery-Wetstone, J., granted the plaintiff’s
motion for attorney’s fees, and the defendant filed an
amended appeal; thereafter, this court dismissed the
appeal in part. Affirmed.
Kenneth J. McDonnell, for the appellant (defendant).
David P. Mester, with whom was P. Jo Anne Burgh,
for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. In this postjudgment marital dissolution
matter, the defendant, Richard J. Mancini, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to
modify child support and awarding attorney’s fees to
the plaintiff, Sandra E. Czunas, to defend against this
appeal. The defendant claims that the court (1) improp-
erly found that there had not been a substantial change
in circumstances since the date of the entry of the prior
child support order that warranted a modification of
that order, and (2) the court abused its discretion in
awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of
$10,000 to defend against this appeal. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims on
appeal. The trial court, Prestley, J., dissolved the par-
ties’ marriage on July 25, 2013, incorporating into the
judgment of dissolution the parties’ separation agree-
ment, which provided, inter alia, that they would have
joint legal custody of their minor child, his primary
residence would be with the plaintiff and the defendant
would have parenting time both during the week and
on weekends.1 The agreement also provided that the
defendant would pay $265 per week in child support.
1
Specifically, the dissolution judgment provided: ‘‘The [defendant] shall
have the following parenting time with the minor child:
‘‘(a) In weeks One, Two, Three and Four: [The defendant] shall have
parenting time with [the minor child] every Tuesday from the pick up after
work and overnight and return to [day care] . . . the following morning.
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On December 13, 2016, the parties entered into a
stipulation, which, inter alia, expanded the defendant’s
parenting time, providing that the child would be with
the defendant every Tuesday and Wednesday night and
alternating weekends from Friday night until Sunday
evening.
On April 21, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to
modify child support, alleging, inter alia: ‘‘There has
been a substantial change in circumstances in that the
defendant has suffered a significant reduction in his
income, while the plaintiff’s income has likely increased
significantly. In addition, the parties share physical cus-
tody of the minor child, and the plaintiff earns more
than the defendant.’’ On July 5, 2017, the parties entered
into a court-approved written agreement, which, inter
alia, modified the defendant’s child support obligation
to $200 per week in compliance with the child support
guidelines.
On April 29, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to
modify, seeking to have his weekends with the minor
child extended to Monday mornings. On September 27,
2021, the parties entered into another stipulation so
modifying the parties’ parenting plan.2
‘‘(b) In weeks Two and Four: [The defendant] shall pick up [the minor
child] on Thursday after work and return him to the [plaintiff] at 7:30 p.m.
‘‘(c) In weeks One and Three: [The defendant] shall pick up [the minor
child] from [day care] on Friday after work and have [the minor child]
overnight until Saturday at 6 p.m.
‘‘(d) In weeks Two and Four: [The defendant] shall have time with [the
minor child] on Sunday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
‘‘(e) When the child turns three and a half (3 1/2) the week Two and Four
Thursday access shall become an overnight.’’
2
The stipulation also provided that the minor child would begin therapy
with Dr. Bruce Freedman and that the matter would be scheduled for a
status conference during the week of November 22, 2021, ‘‘to review Dr.
Freedman’s recommendations relating to continued therapy, Sunday over-
nights, appointment of a [guardian ad litem] and/or other relevant recommen-
dations.’’ There has been some dispute between the parties as to whether
the extension of the defendant’s weekends to include Sunday overnights
was temporary. That disagreement is irrelevant to the issues before us now.
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On July 15, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
modify child support, alleging, inter alia: ‘‘There has
been a substantial change in circumstances in that the
financial circumstances of one or both parties have
changed. Furthermore, the parties have a shared parent-
ing plan, and it is unfair and inequitable for the defen-
dant to continue paying child support to the plaintiff.’’
On September 13, 2022, the trial court, Abery-Wet-
stone, J., held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to
modify child support.3 At the hearing, the defendant did
not address the claim in his motion that there had been
‘‘a substantial change in circumstances in that the finan-
cial circumstances of one or both parties have changed.’’
Rather, counsel for the defendant clarified that he had
‘‘no additional evidence to present other than the shared
physical custody arrangement and the . . . change in
the [Sunday] overnight since 2017.’’ On the basis of that
change, the defendant requested that neither party be
ordered to pay child support. The court found that the
defendant failed to prove that there had been a substan-
tial change in circumstances since the date of the last
child support order and, therefore, denied the defen-
dant’s motion. On September 27, 2022, the defendant
filed this appeal.
On October 21, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for
counsel fees to defend against this appeal. On Novem-
ber 23, 2022, the court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s
motion. The court ordered the defendant to pay the
3
On September 13, 2022, the court also heard the parties’ outstanding
motions concerning custody, visitation and the appointment of a guardian ad
litem. Following the hearing, the court ordered, inter alia, that the defendant
would continue to have Sunday overnight visits with the minor child pursuant
to the September 27, 2021 stipulation, but that those visits would remain
‘‘temporary until further order of the court.’’ The court also granted the
plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The defendant
appealed from the court’s order appointing a guardian ad litem, but this
court, sua sponte, dismissed that portion of the defendant’s appeal for lack
of a final judgment.
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plaintiff $10,000 for attorney’s fees to defend against
the appeal. On December 6, 2022, the defendant timely
amended his appeal to include his challenge to the
award of attorney’s fees.
I
The defendant claims that the trial court improperly
found that there had not been a substantial change in
circumstances since the date of the entry of the prior
child support order that warranted a modification of
that order.4 Specifically, the defendant claims that the
‘‘new and changed circumstances of shared physical
custody’’—the extension of his weekends with the
minor child from Sunday evening to Monday morning—
entitled him to a modification of his child support obli-
gation. We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. As noted, at the hearing on the defen-
dant’s motion to modify, counsel for the defendant clari-
fied that he had ‘‘no additional evidence to present other
than the shared physical custody arrangement and the
. . . change in the [Sunday] overnight since 2017.’’ The
defendant testified that the parenting plan was modified
in 2021, extending his weekend parenting time to Mon-
day mornings. He asked that ‘‘no child support [be]
4
Since the date of the filing of this appeal, there was an incident that
resulted in the suspension of the defendant’s parenting time with the minor
child. On the basis of that change and the fact that the parties no longer
enjoyed a shared custody arrangement, which was the basis for the defen-
dant’s motion to modify child support, the plaintiff argues that the defen-
dant’s appeal is moot. As of the date of oral argument before this court,
the defendant’s parenting time had been reinstated, and he was enjoying
the same time with the minor child that he had been prior to the 2021
extension of his weekends to Monday mornings. On March 22, 2024, the
parties signed a stipulation that provided, inter alia, that the defendant’s
weekends with the minor child would be extended to Monday mornings
upon the June, 2024 end of the school year. Because the circumstances
that gave rise to the plaintiff’s mootness claim have resolved, we need not
address it.
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paid from one party to the other . . . .’’ Following the
defendant’s very limited testimony, counsel for the
defendant indicated that he had no further questions
for the defendant.5 At that time, the court told the defen-
dant: ‘‘[O]ther than a shared parenting plan, I need
another reason to deviate from the child support guide-
lines. You haven’t established that.’’ In response, coun-
sel for the defendant asserted that, although the defen-
dant’s financial affidavit was ‘‘relatively the same as it
was in 2017’’ there had been a change in the plaintiff’s
financial affidavit. The court explained: ‘‘The guide-
lines—both of your guidelines, show child support from
father to mother at $205 and $203. That is not a signifi-
cant change [from the $200 order]—it’s . . . within the
15 percent. So, you need another reason, other than a
shared parenting plan, to modify child support.’’ The
defendant indicated that ‘‘it was shared in 2017 . . .
the difference . . . is it’s been . . . since 2021 . . .
they had . . . full shared [custody] . . . .’’ The court
stated: ‘‘That, by itself, is not sufficient to deviate from
the child support guidelines down to zero. I need
another reason.’’ Counsel for the defendant argued that
‘‘[t]he other reason would be the increase in the plain-
tiff’s income since 2017.’’ The court reiterated: ‘‘But the
child support, based on their current incomes, has not
changed from 2017. . . . So, we don’t modify child sup-
port unless there’s been a substantial change in the
actual child support. It’s got to be 15 percent or more.
It’s not. . . . Both parties’ income has gone up a little
bit [since 2017]. The plaintiff in 2017 was showing gross
income of $1959. She’s currently showing gross income
of $2161. [The] defendant in 2017 was showing income
of $1859. It’s currently $2260. . . . The court needs
another reason other than simply shared custody to
5
Contrary to the representation by the defendant’s appellate counsel at
oral argument before this court, the trial court did not place any restrictions
whatsoever on the defendant’s ability to present evidence in support of his
motion to modify.
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deviate downwards.’’ Counsel for the defendant indi-
cated that he understood the court’s ruling and that he
had ‘‘no additional evidence to present other than the
shared physical custody arrangement and the . . .
change in the overnight since 2017.’’
‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-86 governs the modification
or termination of an alimony or support order after the
date of a dissolution judgment. When, as in this case,
the disputed issue is alimony [or child support], the
applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which
provides that a final order for alimony [or child support]
may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of
a substantial change in the circumstances of either
party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the party
seeking the modification bears the burden of demon-
strating that such a change has occurred. . . . To
obtain a modification, the moving party must demon-
strate that circumstances have changed since the last
court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable
to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of
changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a
party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire
as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modifi-
cation of the existing order. . . . A finding of a substan-
tial change in circumstances [or the lack of a substantial
change in circumstances] is subject to the clearly erro-
neous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) De Almeida-Ken-
nedy v. Kennedy, 224 Conn. App. 19, 30–31, 312 A.3d
150 (2024).
While § 46b-86 (a) broadly encompasses all cases in
which a change in a support order is contemplated,
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General Statutes § 46b-2246 addresses the distinct fac-
tual scenario of a change in custody and requires modifi-
cation of a child support order from the moment a court
transfers custody of minor children from a recipient of
child support to a payor of child support. See Coury
v. Coury, 161 Conn. App. 271, 297, 128 A.3d 517 (2015).
‘‘Modification . . . of a child support order upon a
change of custody under § 46b-224 . . . comports with
the default rule that child support follows the children
. . . .’’7 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 299.
Thus, although a change in custody warrants a modifi-
cation of child support, there was no change in custody
of the minor child in this case that would have triggered
§ 46b-224.8 In other words, there was no change in cus-
6
General Statutes § 46b-224 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever the . . .
Superior Court, in a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1,
orders a change or transfer of the guardianship or custody of a child who
is the subject of a preexisting support order, and the court makes no finding
with respect to such support order, such guardianship or custody order
shall operate to: (1) Suspend the support order if guardianship or custody
is transferred to the obligor under the support order; or (2) modify the
payee of the support order to be the person or entity awarded guardianship
or custody of the child by the court, if such person or entity is other than
the obligor under the support order.’’
7
We note that the defendant’s motion to modify cited only § 46b-86 and
did not mention § 46b-224. Similarly, the defendant failed to cite any legal
authority in his principal appellate brief in support of his argument that a
change in custody may be a basis for a modification of child support.
8
The defendant argues that the trial court improperly held that a change
in custody cannot support a modification of child support without a change
in the parties’ financial circumstances. We disagree with this characterization
of the trial court’s reasoning. Although the court made comments at the
hearing on the defendant’s motion that could be construed as expressing
its belief that a change in custody, on its own, is insufficient to warrant
a modification of child support, we afford a trial court every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of its decision and thus decline to
construe the court’s comments as a misapplication of the law. See Leonova
v. Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285, 334, 242 A.3d 713 (2020), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021). Rather, we construe its remarks that it could
not modify child support based on a shared parenting plan alone as a
determination that it could not do so based on the minimal change in this
case, without more. Moreover, the record appears to reflect that the court’s
inartful comments may have been in response to the defendant’s request
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tody that required child support to be redirected to a
new custodial parent so that it followed the minor child.
Although the defendant’s parenting time on his week-
ends was extended from Sunday evening to Monday
morning, the parties essentially have enjoyed shared
custody of the minor child since 2016, as asserted by the
defendant in his 2017 motion to modify child support.9
Because the parties alternate weekends spent with the
minor child, the extension of the defendant’s weekends
implicates only every other Sunday evening, extending
his time with the minor child by little more than twelve
hours every other week, including when the child is
sleeping between Sunday evening and Monday morning.
We cannot conclude that the court erred in holding that
this minimal change, without more, did not constitute
a substantial change in circumstances that warranted
a modification of the child support order or a determina-
tion that there had been a change in custody.
II
The defendant also claims that the court abused its
discretion in ordering him to pay to the plaintiff $10,000
for attorney’s fees to defend against this appeal. We
disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our consideration of this claim. In the plaintiff’s
motion for attorney’s fees to defend against this appeal,
she alleged, inter alia, that, based on the parties’ respec-
tive financial affidavits, the ‘‘defendant is in a signifi-
cantly more enhanced financial position to pay attor-
ney’s fees to pursue the appeal.’’ At the November 23,
that neither party pay child support based on their shared parenting plan,
which would constitute a deviation from the child support guidelines.
9
As noted herein, the defendant specifically alleged in his motion to
modify that there had been a substantial change in circumstances in that
the financial circumstances of the parties had changed. He then stated, as
he did in his 2017 motion to modify, that the parties share physical custody
of the minor child. He did not allege that there had been a change in custody
or that any change in the parenting plan constituted a substantial change
in circumstances.
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2022 hearing, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion
and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $10,000 to
defend against this appeal, reasoning that the defendant
‘‘has substantial liquid assets that the plaintiff does not.’’
General Statutes § 46b-62 (a) supports an award of
attorney’s fees if, inter alia, the prospective recipient
of a fee award lacks ample liquid assets to cover the cost
of his or her own legal expenses. Leonova v. Leonov,
201 Conn. App. 285, 329, 242 A.3d 713 (2020), cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021). ‘‘A determi-
nation of what constitutes ample liquid funds . . .
requires . . . an examination of the total assets of the
parties at the time the award is made.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu, 169 Conn.
App. 243, 265, 149 A.3d 198, cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903,
151 A.3d 1289 (2016). ‘‘A trial court is not limited to
awarding fees for proceedings at the trial level. Con-
necticut courts have permitted postjudgment awards
of attorney’s fees to defend an appeal.’’ Leonova v.
Leonov, supra, 327. ‘‘Whether to allow counsel fees,
[under § 46b-62 (a)], and if so in what amount, calls for
the exercise of judicial discretion. . . . An abuse of
discretion in granting counsel fees will be found only
if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court
could not reasonably have concluded as it did.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Here, the court based its award of attorney’s fees on
its determination that the defendant had substantial
liquid assets that the plaintiff did not have. That determi-
nation is supported by the parties’ financial affidavits,
which reflect that the plaintiff had only $500 in a check-
ing account and no other liquid assets, whereas the
defendant had $160,000 in checking accounts. We there-
fore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding $10,000 to the plaintiff to defend against
this appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.