Robinson v. V. D.

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Robinson v. V. D.

MICHAEL ROBINSON ET AL. v. V. D.*
(AC 46477)
Cradle, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his special motion
to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). He claimed
that the court, inter alia, erred in determining that his alleged conduct, in
connection with an application for a civil protection order and with respect
to certain union grievance proceedings, did not relate to an exercise of a
protected right in connection with a matter of public concern and, thus,
fell outside the scope of § 52-196a. Held:

The trial court erred in failing to dismiss all counts of the plaintiffs’ underly-
ing complaint, with the exception of the statutory and common-law vexatious
litigation counts, as they were barred by absolute immunity under the litiga-
tion privilege.

The trial court erred in concluding that the defendant failed to meet his
initial burden of proving that the allegations in the complaint regarding his
conduct during the course of the union grievance proceedings implicated
the exercise of his constitutional right to petition the government in connec-
tion with a matter of public concern, the allegations of the complaint having
sufficiently implicated potential and significant issues regarding the hiring
practices within a governmental entity.

The plaintiffs could not demonstrate probable cause that they would have
prevailed on their claims of statutory or common-law vexatious litigation
to the extent that those counts were based on the union grievance proceed-
ings and, therefore, the special motion to dismiss should have been granted
as to those counts.

The trial court properly denied the special motion to dismiss with respect
to the defendant’s efforts to obtain a civil protection order, the defendant’s
conduct having arisen out of a wholly private dispute between the parties
that did not have any appreciable connection to a matter of public concern,
thus falling outside the ambit of § 52-196a and its intended protections.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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Robinson v. V. D.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ alternative ground for affirming the trial court’s
decision, § 52-196a did not, on its face or as applied, violate the plaintiffs’
constitutional right to a jury trial under either the federal or state constitu-
tions, as § 52-196a does not require trial courts to resolve disputed issues
of fact or to dismiss claims that otherwise would have survived summary
judgment or a motion for a directed verdict.
The plaintiffs failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that either prong
of the separation of powers doctrine set forth in the state constitution was
implicated by § 52-196a.
Argued March 4—officially released November 26, 2024

Procedural History

Action for, inter alia, defamation, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New London, where the court, Knox, J., denied the
defendant’s special motion to dismiss, and the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further
proceedings.
Jon L. Schoenhorn, with whom, on the brief, was
Sebastian Ullman, certified legal intern, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
Michael P. Carey, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Daniel E. Livingston and Mary E. Kelly filed a brief
for the Connecticut AFL-CIO as amicus curiae.
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, V. D., appeals from
the judgment of the trial court denying his special
motion to dismiss the underlying civil action pursuant
to General Statutes § 52-196a,1 our state’s anti-SLAPP
1
General Statutes § 52-196a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) In any civil
action in which a party files a complaint . . . against an opposing party
that is based on the opposing party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right
to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a
matter of public concern, such opposing party may file a special motion to
dismiss the complaint . . . .
***
‘‘[e] (3) The court shall grant a special motion to dismiss if the moving
party makes an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the opposing party’s complaint . . . is based on the moving party’s exercise
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Robinson v. V. D.

statute. The civil action filed by the plaintiffs, Michael
2

Robinson and Mary Robinson, seeks compensatory
damages and injunctive relief for defamation, invasion
of privacy by false light, statutory and common-law
vexatious litigation, and intentional and negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The defendant claims that
(1) the court improperly denied his special motion to
dismiss the action on the ground that his alleged con-
duct did not relate to an exercise of a protected right
in connection with a matter of public concern and, thus,
fell outside the scope of § 52-196a,3 and, (2) even if he
is not entitled to a dismissal of the action pursuant to
§ 52-196a, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion over this action because the defendant is entitled
to absolute immunity under the litigation privilege for
his alleged conduct, all of which occurred in the course
of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. In addition to
of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of
association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, unless the party
that brought the complaint . . . sets forth with particularity the circum-
stances giving rise to the complaint . . . and demonstrates to the court
that there is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that the party
will prevail on the merits of the complaint . . . .
***
‘‘(h) The provisions of this section shall not . . . (3) affect, limit or pre-
clude the right of a party filing a special motion to dismiss to any defense,
remedy, immunity or privilege otherwise authorized by law . . . .’’
2
‘‘SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation,
the distinctive elements of [which] are (1) a civil complaint (2) filed against
a nongovernment individual (3) because of their communications to govern-
ment bodies (4) that involves a substantive issue of some public concern.
. . . The purpose of a SLAPP suit is to punish and intimidate citizens who
petition state agencies and have the ultimate effect of chilling any such
action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn.
332, 337 n.4, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2467,
209 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021).
3
The Connecticut AFL-CIO filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
defendant’s contention that the court improperly denied his special motion
to dismiss. It argues that protecting public employees against retaliatory
lawsuits for exercising their right to engage in mandatory union grievance
procedures is precisely the type of ill that § 52-196a was designed to prevent.
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Robinson v. V. D.

disputing the defendant’s claims, the plaintiffs raise as
an alternative ground for affirming the denial of the
special motion to dismiss that § 52-196a violates both
the state and federal constitutions.4 We conclude that
the question of whether the plaintiffs’ action is barred
by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege
implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
and, thus, must be considered prior to addressing the
merits of the special motion to dismiss. We agree with
the defendant that, with the exception of those counts
sounding in vexatious litigation, the complaint is barred
by absolute immunity. With respect to the remaining
vexatious litigation counts, we affirm in part and reverse
in part the court’s decision to deny the special motion
to dismiss, we reject the plaintiffs’ alternative ground
for affirmance, and we remand the matter for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
The following relevant facts and procedural history,
which are undisputed for purposes of this appeal, were
set forth by our Supreme Court in its earlier opinion
in this matter.5 See Robinson v. V. D., 346 Conn. 1002,
4
The plaintiffs argue that § 52-196a is unconstitutional for multiple rea-
sons. First, both facially and as applied, it deprives them of their state and
federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and to petition for grievances.
See Conn. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 10, and 19; U.S. Const., amend. I. Second, they
argue that the statute violates the separation of legislative and judicial
powers as set forth in article second and article fifth, § 1, of the constitution
of Connecticut.
5
Our Supreme Court previously transferred this appeal to itself, pursuant
to Practice Book § 65-1, in order to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ pending motion
to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. See Robinson v. V. D.,
346 Conn. 1002, 1003 n.3, 293 A.3d 345 (2023). Our Supreme Court denied
the motion to dismiss, concluding that a trial court’s denial of a § 52-196a
special motion to dismiss that raises a colorable claim under our anti-SLAPP
statute is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong
of the test annunciated in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566
(1983). See Robinson v. V. D., supra, 1004. After concluding on the basis
of its review of the record that the defendant had presented a colorable
claim, it transferred the appeal back to this court for further proceedings
on the merits of the appeal. Id., 1011.
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Robinson v. V. D.

1004–1007, 293 A.3d 345 (2023). ‘‘The parties are civilian
employees of the United States Coast Guard (Coast
Guard). Michael Robinson works as a locksmith at the
United States Coast Guard Academy in New London
(academy) and previously served as an assistant coach
for the academy’s skeet shooting team. Mary Robinson
works as a human resources specialist at the Coast
Guard headquarters. The defendant is employed as a
carpenter/mason at the academy and, in 2019, was tem-
porarily promoted to the new position of construction
control inspector.
‘‘In late 2019 or early 2020, after applying for the full-
time, permanent construction control inspector posi-
tion, the defendant was informed that he had not been
selected for the position. The defendant then resumed
his job as a carpenter/mason. Thereafter, the defendant
filed a formal, written grievance through his union rep-
resentative [in which he] alleged that the plaintiffs were
involved in a quid pro quo arrangement with the candi-
date selected for the position and the official who had
selected the candidate. The defendant also alleged that
he was denied the position, in part, because of his
known affiliation with the union . . . . A hearing took
place, at which, the plaintiffs contend, the defendant
made certain statements consistent with the allegations
in the written grievance. Administrative officials with
the Coast Guard subsequently investigated both of the
plaintiffs and cleared them of any wrongdoing.
‘‘Thereafter, in June, 2020, the parties attended a com-
petitive shooting event at a gun club in Burrillville,
Rhode Island. After the event was over, Michael Rob-
inson and the defendant had a verbal altercation in
the parking lot, during which they exchanged certain
insults. Thereafter, the defendant served an application
for a [civil protection] order on Michael Robinson. A
hearing took place in the Superior Court, which dis-
missed the application.
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Robinson v. V. D.

‘‘In December, 2020, the plaintiffs filed the present
action against the defendant, alleging in their complaint
that the defendant made false accusations against them
on numerous occasions, namely, in the union grievance,
during the proceedings which resulted from it, in the
application for the [civil protection] order, and during
the hearing that took place in the Superior Court on
the [civil protection] order application. . . .
‘‘In January, 2021, the defendant filed a special motion
to dismiss, pursuant to § 52-196a, arguing that the plain-
tiffs’ allegations in this action arose from the exercise
of his rights of free speech, to petition the government,
and to associate as a member of a labor union under
the Connecticut constitution and the first amendment
to the United States constitution. The defendant also
alleged, among other defenses, that the plaintiffs’ action
violated public policy and that his statements were
immune from the defamation claims, as they arose dur-
ing judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
‘‘The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and, following a
hearing, the trial court denied the special motion to
dismiss. The court found that the defendant’s conduct
as alleged in the complaint was not protected under
§ 52-196a because it addressed private concerns, rather
than a matter of public concern, as defined in subsec-
tion (a) (1) of the statute. The court further concluded
that the defendant’s conduct during the work-related
grievance process was personal in nature because it
related to his employer’s denial of the defendant’s pro-
motion and did not address the general practices of
the employer. As such, the court determined that the
defendant’s conduct during that process was not related
to a matter of public concern under the government,
zoning and other regulatory matters category of the
definition [of a matter of public concern found in § 52-
196a (a) (1) (C)]. . . . In addition, the trial court found
that the defendant’s actions did not relate to a matter
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Robinson v. V. D.

of public concern under the public official or public
figure category [of § 52-196a (a) (1) (D)] because the
defendant had failed to establish that the plaintiffs’ posi-
tions gave them substantial control or responsibility
over governmental affairs or that there was a significant
public interest in either position that went beyond the
general interest in all public sector employees. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the defendant had failed
to meet his burden of showing, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the complaint was based on the exercise
of his right of free speech, to petition the government, or
of association.’’ (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 1004–1007.
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s deci-
sion to this court, following which the plaintiffs filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
The defendant then moved to stay proceedings until
our Supreme Court issued a decision in Pryor v. Brig-
nole, 346 Conn. 534, 292 A.3d 701 (2023), in which the
parties also had raised the issue of whether an appeal
from the denial of a § 52-196a special motion to dismiss
is an appealable final judgment. Id., 536–37. This court
granted the defendant’s motion for a stay on September
29, 2021, and deferred ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion
to dismiss. In July, 2022, pursuant to Practice Book
§ 65-1, our Supreme Court transferred this appeal to
itself and ordered the parties to file appellate briefs
addressing only the threshold jurisdictional issue.
On May 2, 2023, our Supreme Court released its deci-
sion in Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 293 A.3d 851
(2023), in which it held that the denial of a special
motion to dismiss that raises a colorable claim to the
anti-SLAPP protections of § 52-196a is an immediately
appealable final judgment. Id., 964. That same day, the
court also released its decisions in Pryor v. Brignole,
supra, 346 Conn. 534, and in the present appeal.
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Robinson v. V. D.

With respect to the present matter, our Supreme
Court concluded that the defendant ‘‘has asserted a
colorable claim that at least some of the statements
forming the basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint were based
on the defendant’s exercise of his right to petition the
government, as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute. Right to petition the government is defined in rele-
vant part as communication in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a legislative, execu-
tive, administrative, judicial or other governmental
body. . . . General Statutes § 52-196 (a) (3) (A). A
party seeking protection under the statute must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the exercise
of that right is in connection with a matter of public
concern, as defined in § 52-196a (a) (1). . . . Courts
have found that mixed questions of private and public
concerns may be protected under the first amendment
and that the fact that a statement evolves from a per-
sonal dispute does not preclude some aspect of it from
touching [on] matters of public concern. . . .

‘‘The defendant presented evidence before the trial
court that his actions related to a matter of public con-
cern because they (1) arose from a collective bargaining
agreement between the Coast Guard and the American
Federation of Government Employees, Council 120, to
which the defendant belongs, and (2) related to impro-
prieties in the hiring process at the academy that went
beyond his own personal position, specifically, that
Coast Guard hiring officials disfavor persons with a
union affiliation when hiring.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. V. D., supra,
346 Conn. 1008–1009.

Our Supreme Court concluded on the basis of its
review of the record and the plain meaning of right to
petition the government that ‘‘the defendant has at least
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Robinson v. V. D.

a superficially well founded claim that some of his state-
ments, particularly those relating to the grievance pro-
cess, qualify as communications relating to an issue
under consideration by a governmental body, namely,
the Coast Guard. . . . In addition, the defendant has
asserted a colorable claim that his statements during the
grievance process relate to a matter of public concern.
Although these statements evolved from a personal dis-
pute between the parties, the statements could conceiv-
ably be of concern to the general public because the
allegations related to hiring practices within a govern-
mental entity. In particular, the defendant’s speech
touches on the possible existence of anti-union senti-
ment within the academy and quid pro quo arrange-
ments between management officials as it relates to
hiring. Therefore, the defendant has at least a superfi-
cially well founded claim that his conduct concerns not
only him, but others at the academy and the general
community at large.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 1009–10.
Having determined that the appeal was taken from
an appealable final judgment, our Supreme Court trans-
ferred the appeal back to this court pursuant to Practice
Book § 65-1 ‘‘for further proceedings according to law.’’6
Id., 1011. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant claims that the underlying action is
barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privi-
lege because all the relevant conduct alleged in the
underlying complaint occurred during the course of
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Although the
defendant raised the issue of absolute immunity in his
6
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision and remand order, the
Office of the Appellate Clerk issued a letter to the parties informing them
that the appeal had been assigned a new docket number and setting a
schedule for filing briefs on the merits of the appeal.
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Robinson v. V. D.

special motion to dismiss, the trial court declined to
address it.7 Ordinarily, ‘‘[o]nly in [the] most exceptional
circumstances can and will [an appellate] court con-
sider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not
been raised and decided in the trial court. . . . A claim
that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, however,
may be raised at any time during the proceedings,
including for the first time on appeal.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Mangiafico v. Farmington, 331
Conn. 404, 429–30, 204 A.3d 1138 (2019). Because the
defendant’s absolute immunity claim implicates the trial
7
The court reasoned that, despite the defendant having expressly stated
in the opening paragraph of his special motion to dismiss that the motion
was brought ‘‘[p]ursuant to Practice Book §§ 10-6 and 10-30, and [General
Statutes] § 52-196a,’’ he had failed expressly to request that the court treat
his motion as ‘‘a hybrid motion, combining a special motion to dismiss
with a standard motion to dismiss.’’ The court further indicated that other
Superior Court decisions had expressed a general disfavor for hybrid
motions, albeit in other contexts, because our rules of practice do not
expressly authorize them. The court concluded: ‘‘Given the expedited time
requirements pertaining to a statutory special motion to dismiss, the limited
inquiry of a special motion to dismiss, and the defendant’s failure to cogently
argue that his motion incorporated a Practice Book § 10-30 motion to dis-
miss, the court will not recognize this special motion to dismiss as a hybrid
motion nor entertain it as one.’’ Although a court certainly has ‘‘broad
discretion to manage its docket and resolve cases as it sees fit’’; M. B. v.
S. A., 194 Conn. App. 727, 735, 222 A.3d 551 (2019); which arguably would
include the discretion to reject a so-called hybrid motion, it is axiomatic
that questions pertaining to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court ‘‘may
be raised at any time and by any party . . . and that [o]nce . . . raised,
[the challenge] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan, 125 Conn. App. 464, 473, 10 A.3d 52 (2010).
Moreover, § 52-196a (h) expressly provides that a party’s use of the statute
‘‘shall not . . . (3) affect, limit or preclude the right of a party filing a special
motion to dismiss to any defense, remedy, immunity or privilege otherwise
authorized by law . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the defendant
has not raised the trial court’s failure to address his absolute immunity
claim as a claim of error on appeal. Instead, he raises the issue as a matter
for this court to decide in the first instance, and, thus, we do not reach
whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the issue
when raised.
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Robinson v. V. D.

court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a thresh-
old issue that we must address before turning to the
merits of the special motion to dismiss.8 See Bruno v.
Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 719, 161 A.3d 630
(2017) (‘‘litigation privilege provides an absolute immu-
nity from suit and, thus, implicates the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction’’);9 see also American Tax
Funding, LLC v. Design Land Developers of Newtown,
Inc., 200 Conn. App. 837, 844, 240 A.3d 678 (2020) (‘‘sub-
ject matter jurisdiction . . . is a threshold matter that
must be resolved first’’).

We begin by setting forth the appropriate legal stan-
dard and relevant principles of law. ‘‘When a . . . court
decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial
motion to dismiss, it . . . [ordinarily] must take the
facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including
those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
construing them in a manner most favorable to the
8
‘‘A special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a . . . is not a
traditional motion to dismiss based on a jurisdictional ground. It is, instead,
a truncated evidentiary procedure enacted by our legislature in order to
achieve a legitimate policy objective, namely, to provide for a prompt rem-
edy. . . . It is, in this respect, similar to a motion for summary judgment.’’
(Citation omitted.) Elder v. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818, 824, 254 A.3d
1001 (2021). In other words, a special motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-
196a does not itself implicate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
9
Courts have deemed that certain claims of immunity, such as sovereign
immunity, implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, properly
are raised by way of a motion to dismiss. See Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 81
Conn. App. 382, 398, 840 A.2d 557 (2004), aff’d, 274 Conn. 533, 877 A.2d 773
(2005). Other immunities and privileges, however, such as qualified quasi-
judicial immunity and governmental immunity, have been held not to impli-
cate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, more appropriately are
raised as a special defense and subsequently tested via a motion to strike
or a motion for summary judgment. Id., 398–99. Our Supreme Court has
stated that absolute immunity serves a similar purpose as ‘‘the sovereign
immunity enjoyed by the state.’’ Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital,
272 Conn. 776, 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005). Accordingly, absolute immunity
under the litigation privilege, like sovereign immunity, implicates subject
matter jurisdiction.
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Robinson v. V. D.

pleader. . . . When deciding whether the [litigation]
10

privilege applies, every presumption in favor of the
court’s jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote added; internal quotations marks
omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120,
136–37, 314 A.3d 583 (2024).
Courts often have used the terms absolute immunity
and litigation privilege interchangeably. See Tyler v.
Tatoian, 164 Conn. App. 82, 83 n.1, 137 A.3d 801, cert.
denied, 321 Conn. 908, 135 A.3d 710 (2016). ‘‘The litiga-
tion privilege is a long-standing [common-law] rule that
communications uttered or published in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long
as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the
controversy. . . . The privilege . . . applies to every
step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . .
including to statements made in pleadings or other doc-
uments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding.
. . . The privilege originated in response to the need
to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accus-
ers for defamation. . . . [It] then developed to encom-
pass and bar defamation claims against all participants
in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, par-
ties, and witnesses. . . . Subsequently, the privilege
was expanded to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims
arising from communications or communicative acts
10
As explained in more detail by our Supreme Court in Conboy v. State,
292 Conn. 642, 650, 974 A.2d 669 (2009), ‘‘[t]rial courts addressing motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter different
situations, depending on the status of the record in the case.’’ The court in
Conboy agreed with analogous federal jurisprudence that ‘‘[l]ack of subject
matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the
complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evi-
denced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.’’ Id., 651. In the present
case, neither party has asserted that the absolute immunity issue requires
resolution of any disputed jurisdictional facts. Accordingly, we can resolve
the question of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the allegations in
the complaint and those facts that are undisputed as evidenced in the record.
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Robinson v. V. D.

occurring in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, including, but not limited to, claims for
tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, fraud, and violations of [the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-
110a et seq.]. . . .
‘‘The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is that
in certain situations the public interest in having people
speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will
occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and
malicious statements. . . . Participants in a judicial
process must be able to testify or otherwise take part
without being hampered by fear of defamation [or other
retaliatory litigation]. . . . [In] determining whether a
statement is made in the course of a judicial proceeding
. . . the court must decide as a matter of law whether
the [alleged statement is] sufficiently relevant to the
issues involved in . . . [the] proceeding, so as to qual-
ify for the privilege. . . . The test for relevancy is gen-
erous, and judicial proceeding has been defined liber-
ally to encompass much more than civil litigation or
criminal trials.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349
Conn. 137–38.
In deciding whether a person is entitled to absolute
immunity under the litigation privilege, ‘‘[courts] must
first determine whether the proceedings [in question]
were [judicial or quasi-judicial] in nature. The judicial
proceeding to which [absolute] immunity attaches has
not been defined very exactly. It includes any hearing
before a tribunal which performs a judicial function,
ex parte or otherwise, and whether the hearing is public
or not. . . . It extends also to the proceedings of many
administrative officers, such as boards and commis-
sions, so far as they have powers of discretion in
applying the law to the facts which are regarded as
judicial or quasi-judicial, in character.’’ (Emphasis
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added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kruger v.
Grauer, 173 Conn. App. 539, 547–48, 164 A.3d 764, cert.
denied, 327 Conn. 901, 169 A.3d 795 (2017).
In addition to the application of law to fact require-
ment, our Supreme Court has identified additional fac-
tors for courts to consider in determining whether a
proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature. These factors
include whether the body conducting the proceeding
has the power to ‘‘(1) exercise judgment and discretion;
(2) hear and determine or to ascertain facts and decide;
(3) make binding orders and judgments; (4) affect the
personal or property rights of private persons; (5) exam-
ine witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a
hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose penalties.
. . . These factors are not exclusive; nor must all fac-
tors militate in favor of a determination that a proceed-
ing is quasi-judicial in nature for a court to conclude
that the proceeding is, in fact, quasi-judicial. . . .
[T]hese factors are [i]n addition to, not in lieu of, the
application of the law to fact requirement.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Priore v.
Haig, 344 Conn. 636, 648, 280 A.3d 402 (2022). It is also
important for courts ‘‘to consider whether there is a
sound public policy reason for permitting the complete
freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity
provides.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 652.
Our Supreme Court recently summarized that a pro-
ceeding will only be considered quasi-judicial if ‘‘the
proceeding at issue is specifically authorized by law,
applies law to fact in an adjudicatory manner, contains
adequate procedural safeguards, and is supported by a
public policy encouraging absolute immunity for pro-
ceeding participants.’’ Khan v. Yale University, 347
Conn. 1, 10, 295 A.3d 855 (2023). Accordingly, ‘‘whether
a particular proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, for
the purposes of triggering absolute immunity, will
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depend on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.’’ Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 645.
In the present case, the alleged conduct of the defen-
dant occurred in connection with two separate and
distinct proceedings: (1) the filing and pursuit of a union
grievance and (2) the filing and pursuit of an application
for a civil protection order. With respect to the griev-
ance proceedings, the plaintiffs allege in the underlying
complaint that the defendant made a number of false
accusations against them, both in the written grievance
complaint and in oral statements made during the griev-
ance hearing. Specifically, the complaint provides that
the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs had used their
positions within the Coast Guard to influence the hiring
process, including by engaging in an improper quid pro
quo with Coast Guard officials and the person who
eventually was hired for the permanent promotion
sought by the defendant.11 With respect to the civil pro-
tection order proceedings, which arose out of the par-
ties’ altercation at the gun show, the complaint alleges
11
Paragraphs nine and ten of the complaint contain the following recitation
of the defendant’s alleged offensive conduct during the course of the griev-
ance proceedings: the defendant ‘‘falsely alleged that [the plaintiffs], through
their alleged conduct in the hiring process for the construction control
inspector position, had violated merit system principles (‘MSP’) because
there had been a ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement between the selecting official
and the successful applicant (‘JW’) in which Mary Robinson, using her
position as [a human resources] specialist, in some way participated. . . .
‘‘[T]he defendant also falsely alleged that: a. Michael Robinson was part
of the alleged conspiracy; b. JW is the best childhood friend of one of the
Robinsons’ sons; c. The hiring official was pressured into selecting JW acting
against his better judgment; d. Mary Robinson had the means to and may
have inappropriately influenced the referral lists used to select a candidate,
and covered her tracks with various deceptions; e. Michael Robinson said
that he would lie to protect Mary Robinson because she could get in a lot
of trouble; f. Veterans’ preference laws were violated; g. JW was unfairly
advanced through the quid pro quo arrangement and his personal relation-
ship with [human resources] officials, while [the defendant] was unfairly
treated because of his known affiliation with the union; h. Management
favors persons who do not affiliate with the union; i. Mary Robinson threat-
ened to investigate anyone who organized or helped the union to organize;
j. An insinuation that wrongdoing led to a change in Mary Robinson’s scope
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that the defendant made several false allegations and
statements regarding the plaintiffs, both in his applica-
tion for a civil protection order and during the subse-
quent hearing on the application before the Superior
Court.12 Having considered all relevant factors, we are
of work circa 2010 when it was determined that Michael Robinson’s position
as [National Association of Government Employees] union steward, which
he had just obtained at that time, raised an appearance of potential conflicts
of interest, and an assertion that both Robinsons were accused of unfair
labor practices based on this situation; k. Mary Robinson had exerted inap-
propriate control over hiring at the academy for years; l. Mary Robinson
received the ‘report of hire’ of JW although she should not have had access
to it; m. Michael Robinson, acting on his own behalf and on behalf of Mary
Robinson, relentlessly harassed and threatened [the defendant] about the
grievance; n. Mary Robinson cut another employee ‘out of the loop’ on the
JW hiring process; o. Mary Robinson ‘helped’ JW with his resume for the
job posting but did not help anyone else; p. Michael Robinson encouraged
[the defendant] not to post for the open position because Mary Robinson
could get him a supervisory job; q. Michael Robinson made ‘continual transits
to and from [Mary Robinson’s] office with reports about [the defendant];
and r. Michael Robinson threatened and harassed [the defendant] about
filing the grievance.’’
12
Paragraphs twenty-five through twenty-seven of the complaint contain
the following recitation of the defendant’s alleged conduct as it relates to
the civil protection order: In the civil protection order application, the
defendant ‘‘falsely claimed that he was unsafe at work because Michael
Robinson had followed and threatened him at work . . . [and] that he was
in imminent danger. . . . [The defendant] falsely accused Michael Robinson
of having ‘laid in wait [for him at the gun show] in attempt to threaten and
harass [him]. . .’; of stalking him at work several times and threatening him
about the [union grievance]; kicking at and attempting to take the trailer
hitch from his vehicle; backing into his vehicle; continuing ‘to come at’ him
as he was walking to his vehicle and that another club member had to
physically restrain him; and threatened his job.’’ At the contested hearing
on the civil protection order application, the defendant testified that ‘‘a. He
had told his supervisor at the academy that Michael Robinson had stalked
and harassed him at work; b. Michael Robinson tried to remove his trailer
hitch from and was kicking his vehicle after the [gun show]; c. Michael
Robinson carries a concealed weapon, implying that he was carrying a
weapon during the [gun show] incident . . . and that he would present a
danger if he were carrying one . . . d. Michael Robinson kicked open the
door of his own vehicle and ‘came at’ [the defendant]; e. (Implied that) his
[fourteen] year old son was in danger on account of Michael Robinson’s
behavior after the [gun show], and that he and his family generally were
unsafe when Michael Robinson was around; f. (Via a recording) said loudly
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persuaded that both the union grievance proceedings
and the proceeding on the civil protection order applica-
tion qualify as either a judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ing, and, accordingly, any pertinent statements made
within the context of those proceedings should be
afforded absolute immunity under the litigation privi-
lege.
First, we conclude that the union grievance proceed-
ings are quasi-judicial in nature for purposes of applying
absolute immunity. In Preston v. O’Rourke, 74 Conn.
App. 301, 314 n.6, 811 A.2d 753 (2002), this court recog-
nized and resolved a split in authority over ‘‘whether
communications made in the course of grievance or
arbitration proceedings provided for by collective bar-
gaining agreements should be accorded absolute . . .
immunity.’’ The court concluded that the ‘‘better result
is the protection of absolute immunity.’’ Id. That deter-
mination is consistent with our Supreme Court’s subse-
quent decision in Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc.,
271 Conn. 78, 80–81, 93, 856 A.2d 372 (2004), in which
it held that an investigation conducted by the internal
affairs division of the city of Hartford’s police depart-
ment constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding for the
purpose of affording absolute immunity to the citizen
whose claim of racial bias had given rise to the investiga-
tion. Although the court in Craig recognized ‘‘the debili-
tating affect that a false allegation of racial discrimina-
tion can have on a police officer’’; id., 95; it nonetheless
enough to be heard by several people that Michael Robinson is ‘crazy,’ has
‘mental health issues,’ should go see his doctor, and should ‘go get the help
you need, bud’; g. Michael Robinson threatened him with force; h. Michael
Robinson had damaged [the defendant’s] vehicle, but then admitted there
was no damage to either vehicle . . . i. The plaintiffs threatened his job,
threatened his livelihood, and ‘knowing that, you know, [Mary Robinson]
is in [human resources], and that he has this information, and I’m done
when I get back to the Coast Guard. I don’t feel safe’; and j. (implied that)
one or both of the plaintiffs committed perjury during the hearing, asking
Mary Robinson whether she thought it was ‘appropriate to not tell the truth
in court?’ ’’
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concluded ‘‘that the policy of encouraging citizen com-
plaints against those people who wield extraordinary
power within the community outweighs the need to
protect the reputation of the police officer against
whom the complaint is made.’’ Id., 96.
Here, as was the case in Craig, the Coast Guard
officials who heard the union grievance may not have
possessed all of the aforementioned enumerated pow-
ers that we look to in determining whether proceedings
are quasi-judicial. See Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn.
648. Such deficit is not dispositive, however, of whether
the proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature. Rather, we
look to the overall facts and circumstances in making
our determination.
The defendant was a federal employee and a member
of a collective bargaining unit, and he initiated a formal
grievance process as set forth in the relevant collective
bargaining agreement. The matter was then adjudicated
by Coast Guard administrative officials, who ascer-
tained and evaluated the relevant facts and exercised
judgment and discretion in applying all relevant rules,
regulations and procedures applicable to the union
grievance process. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (setting
forth minimum requirements for grievance procedures
in collective bargaining agreements governed by federal
labor relations statutes). The officials’ resolution of the
grievance had the potential to impact not only the
employment status and other rights of the defendant as
the complainant but potentially those of the plaintiffs,
other Coast Guard personnel engaged in the hiring pro-
cess, and the recipient of the job sought by the defen-
dant. Accordingly, we perceive nothing of import in the
present case that warrants treating the union grievance
proceedings differently than the proceedings at issue
in Craig or Preston. Moreover, as a matter of sound
policy, extending absolute immunity to the union griev-
ance proceedings helps to alleviate any possible chilling
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effect on employees who may have good faith criticisms
regarding the hiring practices of powerful government
agencies like the Coast Guard. In short, we are per-
suaded that the union grievance proceedings at issue
were quasi-judicial in nature.
Very little additional discussion is warranted as to
whether the proceeding pertaining to the application
for a civil protection order was a judicial proceeding
for purposes of absolute immunity. The filing of the
application initiated an action in the Superior Court that
resulted in a hearing at which a judge heard testimony,
ascertained the relevant facts, and exercised judgment
and discretion in applying the relevant law. The decision
on the application potentially affected the personal
rights of the parties. Applications for civil protection
orders will often involve the disclosure of highly per-
sonal and potentially unfavorable information that is
highly pertinent to the order being sought. Sound public
policy favors granting absolute immunity in this context
so that parties seeking the court’s protection will not
be chilled from bringing these matters to the attention
of the court for fear of subsequent civil litigation.
Having reviewed the allegations set forth in the com-
plaint; see footnotes 11 and 12 of this opinion; we con-
clude that the written statements and/or factual asser-
tions that the defendant allegedly made regarding the
plaintiffs in his grievance application and in the applica-
tion seeking a civil protection order, as well as any
oral statements or testimony made during the hearings
before the Superior Court or the Coast Guard adminis-
trative officials, qualify as statements made during the
course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Specifi-
cally, the subject matter of the alleged statements and
assertions—irrespective of their veracity or any ill
intent on the part of the defendant—all directly related
either to the defendant’s purported rationale for bring-
ing his union grievance or for seeking a civil protection
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order. In other words, all statements were pertinent to
the subject matter of the grievance or protection order
proceedings such that they qualify for absolute immu-
nity under the litigation privilege.
As previously noted, absolute immunity pursuant to
the litigation privilege bars not only actions for defama-
tion but a variety of legal theories or causes of actions
that similarly may be construed as retaliatory on the
basis of written and oral statements made during the
course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. See
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 137–38.
Thus, absolute immunity bars not only the plaintiffs’
defamation count but also those counts of the plaintiffs’
complaint sounding in invasion of privacy by false light
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582, 612–13,
271 A.3d 53 (2022) (litigation privilege bars negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim); Simms v. Sea-
man, 308 Conn. 523, 569, 69 A.3d 880 (2013) (claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to
litigation privilege); Tucker v. Bitonti, 34 Conn. Supp.
643, 647, 382 A.2d 841 (App. Sess. 1977) (absolute immu-
nity bars claim of invasion of privacy if challenged con-
duct occurred in course of judicial proceedings).
We nevertheless agree with the plaintiffs that, in
accordance with our Supreme Court’s holding in Rioux
v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 927 A.2d 304 (2007), absolute
immunity cannot be invoked to bar those counts seek-
ing to recover on theories of statutory and common-
law vexatious litigation. Id., 343. The court in Rioux
explained that absolute immunity does not attach to
statements that provide the grounds for the tort of vexa-
tious litigation, reasoning as follows: ‘‘[T]he fact that
the tort of vexatious litigation itself employs a test that
balances the need to encourage complaints against the
need to protect the injured party’s interests counsels
strongly against a categorical or absolute immunity
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Robinson v. V. D.

from a claim of vexatious litigation.’’ Id., 347. The court
noted that the stringent requirements that a plaintiff
must establish, including that the prior proceeding was
initiated by the defendant against the plaintiff and had
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, ‘‘provide adequate
room for both appropriate incentives to report wrong-
doing and protection of the injured party’s interest in
being free from unwarranted litigation. Thus, because
the tort of vexatious litigation strikes the proper bal-
ance, it is unnecessary to apply an additional layer of
protection to would-be litigants in the form of absolute
immunity.’’ Id.
For the reasons provided, we conclude that, with the
exception of the statutory and common-law vexatious
litigation counts, all counts of the plaintiffs’ underlying
complaint are barred by absolute immunity under the
litigation privilege and, therefore, must be dismissed.
Because, however, the vexatious litigation counts are
not subject to dismissal on that same ground, we still
must consider whether the court improperly failed to
dismiss those counts pursuant to the defendant’s spe-
cial motion to dismiss.
II
In addition to invoking absolute immunity, the defen-
dant claims that the trial court improperly denied his
special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a
on the ground that the conduct alleged in the complaint
failed to relate to a matter of public concern and, thus,
fell outside of the protections afforded by § 52-196a.
For the reasons that follow, we agree that the trial court
should have granted the special motion to dismiss in
part because, with respect to the alleged statements
made in connection with the grievance proceeding, the
defendant’s conduct related to the exercise of a pro-
tected right in connection with a matter of public con-
cern, and the plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, estab-
lish probable cause that they can prevail on their
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vexatious litigation counts with respect to the grievance
proceeding.
‘‘A special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-
196a . . . is not a traditional motion to dismiss based
on a jurisdictional ground. It is, instead, a truncated
evidentiary procedure enacted by our legislature in
order to achieve a legitimate policy objective, namely,
to provide for a prompt remedy.’’ Elder v. Kauffman,
204 Conn. App. 818, 824, 254 A.3d 1001 (2021). Section
52-196a (e) (3), as previously noted, provides as follows:
‘‘The court shall grant a special motion to dismiss if
the moving party makes an initial showing, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the opposing party’s com-
plaint . . . is based on the moving party’s exercise of
its right of free speech, right to petition the government,
or right of association13 under the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state in connec-
tion with a matter of public concern, unless the party
that brought the complaint . . . sets forth with particu-
larity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint
. . . and demonstrates to the court that there is proba-
ble cause, considering all valid defenses, that the party
will prevail on the merits of the complaint . . . .’’
(Emphasis added; footnote added.) Accordingly, by its
plain language, the statute requires courts to engage in
13
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) provides in relevant part the following
definitions: ‘‘(2) ‘Right of free speech’ means communicating, or conduct
furthering communication, in a public forum on a matter of public concern;
(3) ‘Right to petition the government’ means (A) communication in connec-
tion with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,
administrative, judicial or other governmental body, (B) communication
that is reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of a matter
of public concern by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other
governmental body, or (C) communication that is reasonably likely to enlist
public participation in an effort to effect consideration of an issue by a
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body;
(4) ‘Right of association’ means communication among individuals who
join together to collectively express, promote, pursue or defend common
interests . . . .’’
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Robinson v. V. D.

a two step process when resolving an anti-SLAPP
motion to dismiss. First, the court must determine if
the defendant has demonstrated that the complaint is
based on the defendant’s exercise of one of the enumer-
ated rights and in connection with a matter of public
concern. Our review of whether a defendant satisfies
this initial burden by alleging conduct that falls within
the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute involves a question
of statutory construction over which our review is ple-
nary. See Chapnick v. DiLauro, 212 Conn. App. 263,
269, 275 A.3d 746 (2022). Second, if the court determines
that a defendant has met this initial burden, it must
turn to whether the plaintiffs can demonstrate probable
cause that they will prevail on the merits of the com-
plaint, taking into consideration all valid defenses.

Section 52-196a (a) (1) defines a ‘‘[m]atter of public
concern’’ as ‘‘an issue related to (A) health or safety,
(B) environmental, economic or community well-being,
(C) the government, zoning and other regulatory mat-
ters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an
audiovisual work.’’14 Although appellate courts in this
state have not had an opportunity to meaningfully ana-
lyze the statutory definition regarding what constitutes
a matter of public concern, both state and federal courts
have addressed what constitutes a matter of public
concern in the context of considering whether speech
or conduct is protected under the first amendment. As
14
With regard to whether the defendant’s alleged conduct during the union
grievance proceedings involved a matter of public concern, the trial court
properly considered whether the matter satisfied the ‘‘government, zoning,
and other regulatory matters’’ category; see General Statutes § 52-196a (a)
(1) (C); or the ‘‘public official or public figure’’ category. See General Statutes
§ 52-196a (a) (1) (D). With regard to the alleged conduct during the protection
order proceedings, the court first noted that the defendant had not clearly
articulated a basis for dismissal but nonetheless considered whether that
conduct potentially involved a matter of public concern under the ‘‘health
or safety’’ category. See General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (1) (A).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit recently stated: ‘‘[S]peech on matters of public con-
cern is at the heart of [f]irst [a]mendment protection.
. . . Whether speech addresses a matter of public con-
cern is to be determined by the content, form, and
context of [the relevant] statement, as revealed by the
whole record. . . . Speech that relates to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community
. . . which may include conduct implicat[ing] public
safety and welfare . . . for example, generally falls
within the heart of the [f]irst [a]mendment’s protec-
tion.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Rupp v. Buffalo, 91 F.4th
623, 635 (2d Cir. 2024).
Moreover, courts in California and Nevada, which
have similar anti-SLAPP statutes, have utilized the fol-
lowing principles for distinguishing between a public
and private interest: ‘‘First, public interest does not
equate with mere curiosity. . . . Second, a matter of
public interest should be something of concern to a
substantial number of people. . . . Thus, a matter of
concern to the speaker and a relatively small, specific
audience is not a matter of public interest. . . . Third,
there should be some degree of closeness between the
challenged statements and the asserted public interest
. . . the assertion of a broad and amorphous public
interest is not sufficient . . . . Fourth, the focus of the
speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather
than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another
round of [private] controversy. . . . Finally, those
charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct,
create their own defense by making the claimant a
public figure. . . . A person cannot turn otherwise pri-
vate information into a matter of public interest simply
by communicating it to a large number of people.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wein-
berg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4d 1122, 1132, 2 Cal. Rptr.
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Robinson v. V. D.

3d 385 (2003); see also Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev.
65, 68, 481 P.3d 1222 (2021); 61A Am. Jur. 2d 448, Plead-
ing § 380 (2021). We agree that these factors are useful
in evaluating whether a defendant’s actions implicate
a matter of public concern for purposes of our anti-
SLAPP statute.
Turning first to the alleged conduct related to the
defendant’s efforts to obtain a civil protection order,
we agree with the trial court’s analysis that this conduct
arises out of a wholly private dispute between the par-
ties that does not have any appreciable connection to
a matter of public concern. Accordingly, such conduct
falls outside the ambit of § 52-196a and its intended
protections. As the trial court aptly explained in its
memorandum of decision, a number of Superior Court
decisions have held that a party’s statements pertaining
to criminal activities potentially may implicate a matter
of public concern under the ‘‘health or safety’’ prong
of the statutory definition. See General Statutes § 52-
296a (a) (1) (A). In those cases, however, the criminal
activity in question had a connection not just to the
health and safety of the parties involved but potentially
to the health and/or safety of the public or community
at large. This context is missing in the present case.
Although the defendant’s application for a civil protec-
tive order concerned some activity that, if charged and
proven, potentially was criminal in nature, we are not
convinced that the health and safety of the public itself
is implicated so as to raise a matter of public concern
under § 52-196a. Rather, the allegations and statements
made by the defendant involved conduct that was
wholly personal in nature, arising out of a verbal argu-
ment between the parties. The defendant has failed
to convince us on appeal that the court improperly
determined that the conduct alleged in the complaint
regarding the civil protection order did not involve a
health or safety issue connected to a matter of public
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concern and thus was not entitled to the protections
of § 52-196a. Accordingly, the court properly denied in
part the special motion to dismiss.
Contrastingly, we conclude that the court errone-
ously concluded that the defendant failed to meet his
initial burden of proving that the allegations in the com-
plaint regarding his conduct during the course of the
union grievance proceedings implicated the exercise of
his constitutional right to petition the government in
connection with a matter of public concern. As set
forth subsequently in this opinion, we agree with the
defendant that the court’s reasoning for denying the
special motion to dismiss, at least with respect to this
aspect of the complaint, cannot be sustained. In addi-
tion, pursuant to the second part of the § 52-196a analy-
sis, we conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate probable cause that they would
prevail on their vexatious litigation counts with respect
to the grievance proceedings because the grievance
action was not an action brought against the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the court should have granted in part the
special motion to dismiss.
There is no dispute that the Coast Guard, as a federal
agency, is a governmental body. Accordingly, the state-
ments forming the basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint with
respect to the grievance proceedings unquestionably
were communications made in the context of the defen-
dant exercising his right to petition the government, as
contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute, as they were
made ‘‘in connection with an issue under consideration
or review by a legislative, executive, administrative,
judicial or other governmental body . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (3) (A). The
record before the court also established that his alleged
statements pertaining to the grievance related to a mat-
ter of public concern because they involve a dispute
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Robinson v. V. D.

that was governed by a valid collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Coast Guard and the defendant’s
union and raised potential improprieties in the hiring
process at the academy that necessarily implicated
more than just the defendant’s own employment and
personal grievances. In particular, the defendant’s
speech touched on the possible existence of anti-union
sentiment within the academy and quid pro quo arrange-
ments between management officials and others related
to hiring. Although the defendant’s statements also con-
cerned the personal dispute between the parties, the
allegations sufficiently implicate potential and signifi-
cant issues regarding the hiring practices within a gov-
ernmental entity, which are issues that would be of
concern to the general public. Accordingly, we disagree
with the court’s reasoning that the defendant’s special
motion to dismiss failed due to his failure to establish
that his alleged conduct with respect to the grievance
proceedings did not relate to an exercise of a protected
right in connection with a matter of public concern.
This does not end the query, however. Even if the
court failed to properly recognize that the defendant,
at least in part, met his initial burden under § 52-196a,
the plaintiffs may yet prevail in defeating the special
motion to dismiss if they can demonstrate probable
cause that they can prevail on the merits of their vexa-
tious litigation counts regarding the grievance proceed-
ings. A determination of whether allegations of a com-
plaint, assuming they are true, demonstrate the
existence of probable cause raises a question of law.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to remand the matter to
the trial court. Instead, on the basis of our plenary
review of the record, we conclude that the plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate probable cause that they will pre-
vail on their claim of statutory or common-law vexa-
tious litigation to the extent those counts are based on
the grievance proceedings.
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Robinson v. V. D.

A vexatious litigation action brought either pursuant
to the common law or pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-568 requires the prior commencement of a civil
action and termination of that civil action in the plain-
tiffs’ favor. The Supreme Court has held that proceed-
ings initiated ‘‘before an administrative board that has
power to take action adversely affecting the legally
protected interests of [another]’’ can satisfy the prior
action requirement. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 248, 597
A.2d 807 (1991). The plaintiffs, however, cannot rely
on the defendant’s initiation of the grievance proceed-
ings as satisfying the prior action requirement for the
purposes of their statutory and common-law vexatious
litigation counts because the union grievance was not
an action brought against the plaintiffs, such as in a
civil or administrative action. Rather, a union grievance
is directed at the employer, claiming a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. Because the plaintiffs
cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate probable cause
that they would prevail on their vexatious litigation
counts with respect to the allegation pertaining to the
grievance proceedings, the special motion to dismiss
should be granted in part.
III
Finally, because we conclude that a portion of the
plaintiffs’ vexatious litigation counts are subject to dis-
missal pursuant to § 52-196a, we also must consider the
plaintiffs’ alternative ground for affirming the court’s
denial of the special motion to dismiss; namely, that
§ 52-196a is unconstitutional, both facially and as
applied. The plaintiffs first argue that the statute
requires the court to make factual findings that ought to
be left to a jury, and, thus, the statute is unconstitutional
because it deprives them of their state and federal con-
stitutional rights to a jury trial and to petition for griev-
ances. See Conn. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 10, and 19; U.S.
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Const., amend. I. Second, they argue that the statute
violates the separation of legislative and judicial powers
as set forth in article second and article fifth, § 1, of
the constitution of Connecticut. We conclude that both
arguments lack merit.
‘‘The constitutionality of a statute presents a question
of law . . . over which our review is plenary. . . .
While the courts may declare a statute to be unconstitu-
tional, our power to do this should be exercised with
caution, and in no doubtful case.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonilla, 131
Conn. App. 388, 392, 28 A.3d 1005 (2011). Our Supreme
Court has stated that, ‘‘[i]n our assessment of whether
[a] statute passes constitutional muster, we proceed
from the well recognized jurisprudential principle that
[t]he party attacking a validly enacted statute . . .
bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutional-
ity beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every
presumption in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jason B.,
248 Conn. 543, 556, 729 A.2d 760, cert. denied, 528 U.S.
967, 120 S. Ct. 406, 145 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1999). ‘‘Where a
statute is challenged as being unconstitutional on its
face, the burden is especially heavy.’’ State v. Ryan, 48
Conn. App. 148, 154, 709 A.2d 21, cert. denied 244 Conn.
930, 711 A.2d 729, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876, 119 S. Ct.
179, 142 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1998). With these principles in
mind, we address the plaintiffs’ arguments in turn.
A
The plaintiffs first argue that § 52-196a is unconstitu-
tional, both facially and as applied, because it requires
the court to make factual findings and, thus, deprives
them of their federal and state constitutional rights to
a jury trial and to petition for grievances. We conclude
that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of
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demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the statute
beyond a reasonable doubt.15
Article first, § 19, of the constitution of Connecticut,
as amended by article four of the amendments, provides
that ‘‘[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.’’
‘‘This particular provision of our constitution has been
consistently construed by Connecticut courts to mean
that if there was a right to a trial by jury at the time of
the adoption of the provision, then that right remains
intact. . . . It is generally held that the right to a jury
trial exists not only in cases in which it existed at
common law and at the time of the adoption of [the]
constitutional provisions preserving it, but also exists
in cases substantially [similar] thereto.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
277 Conn. 496, 509, 893 A.2d 371 (2006). ‘‘Litigants in
a civil case have a constitutional right to have a question
of fact decided by a jury. . . . Nevertheless, such a
right may be subjected to reasonable conditions and
regulations.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Beizer v. Goepfert, 28 Conn. App. 693,
703, 613 A.2d 1336, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 901, 615
A.2d 1044 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973, 113 S. Ct.
1416, 122 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1993); see also, e.g., General
Statutes § 52-215 (excluding certain types of cases from
15
No appellate court in this state has engaged in a detailed analysis regard-
ing the constitutionality of § 52-196a. But see Elder v. 21st Century Media
Newspaper, LLC, 204 Conn. App. 414, 428, 254 A.3d 344 (2021) (rejecting
claim that summary adjudications violate right to trial by jury), and Elder
v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 833 (2021) (adopting reasoning in Elder
v. 21st Century Media Newspaper, LLC, supra, 204 Conn. App. 414, to
summarily reject claim that § 52-196a was unconstitutional as applied
because its application infringed on constitutional rights to redress and to
trial by jury). At least one Superior Court, however, has upheld the statute
against similar constitutional challenges as those raised in the present
appeal. See Gifford v. Taunton Press, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district
of Danbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 11, 2019). Although the court’s
analysis is not binding on this court, it is well reasoned and persuasive and,
to the extent applicable, we adopt the reasoning in this opinion.
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right to jury trial and requiring parties to claim right to
jury within specified time period); Associated Invest-
ment Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Williams Associates IV,
230 Conn. 148, 155, 645 A.2d 505 (1994) (excluding
actions under CUTPA from right to jury trial).
Section 52-196a does not offend the right to a trial
by jury because it does not require trial courts to resolve
disputed issues of fact or to dismiss claims that other-
wise would survive summary judgment or a motion for
directed verdict. The plaintiff has not directed us to
any particular language in the anti-SLAPP statute that
requires a court to resolve disputed issues of fact.
Rather, the court is tasked first with considering, on
the basis of the facts as alleged in the complaint,
whether the defendant can show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the opposing party’s action is based
on the defendant’s exercise of a protected right. Only
if the defendant meets this burden, does the burden
then shift to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate only
that probable cause exists that the plaintiff will prevail
on the merits of the cause of action asserted. Probable
cause does not require fact-finding by the court. Rather,
‘‘[t]he legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief
in the existence of the facts essential under the law for
the action and such as would warrant a man of ordinary
caution, prudence and judgment, under the circum-
stances, in entertaining it.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, 286 Conn.
132, 137, 943 A.2d 406 (2008).
Thus, as explained by the Superior Court, a court
considering a special motion to dismiss ‘‘does not need
to make factual findings, but merely needs to determine,
given all of the evidence provided by the parties, if there
is any likelihood a reasonable juror could find in favor
of the plaintiff. . . . If the answer is no, the court must
dismiss the case and would, thus, only be dismissing a
case that would be subject to dismissal on a motion
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for directed verdict or to set aside the jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.’’ (Citation omitted.) Gifford v.
Taunton Press, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of
Danbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 11, 2019).
Accordingly, we conclude that the anti-SLAPP statute
does not, on its face or as applied, violate the plaintiffs’
constitutional right to a jury trial under either the fed-
eral or state constitutions.
B
The plaintiffs also argue that § 52-196a violates the
separation of legislative and judicial powers as set forth
in article second and article fifth, § 1, of the constitution
of Connecticut. According to the plaintiffs, § 52-196a
is constitutionally invalid because ‘‘it is essentially a
Practice Book rule, and usurps the power . . . [of] the
Judicial Branch to adopt rules of practice and govern
court procedure and to govern the conduct of litigation
in the state courts.’’ This argument lacks merit and
requires little discussion.
Article second of the constitution of Connecticut,
as amended by article eighteen of the amendments,
provides in relevant part: ‘‘The powers of government
shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit,
those which are legislative, to one; those which are
executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another. . . .’’ Conn. Const., amend XVIII.
‘‘[T]he primary purpose of [the separation of powers]
doctrine is to prevent commingling of different powers
of government in the same hands. . . . The constitu-
tion achieves this purpose by prescribing limitations
and duties for each branch that are essential to each
branch’s independence and performance of assigned
powers. . . . Nevertheless, [t]he rule of separation of
governmental powers cannot always be rigidly applied.
. . . Our state government is not divided in any such
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way that all acts of the nature of the functions of one
department can never be exercised by another depart-
ment; such a division is impracticable, and if carried
out would result in the paralysis of government. . . .
‘‘In challenges to a statute’s constitutionality on the
ground that it impermissibly infringes on the judicial
authority in violation of separation of powers princi-
ples, [a] statute will be held unconstitutional on [separa-
tion of powers] grounds [only] if: (1) it governs subject
matter that not only falls within the judicial power, but
also lies exclusively within judicial control; or (2) it
significantly interferes with the orderly functioning of
the Superior Court’s judicial role.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCleese,
333 Conn. 378, 415, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019).
Contrary to the assertions of the plaintiffs, they have
failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that either
prong of the aforementioned test is implicated by § 52-
196a. Although the plaintiffs would have us view § 52-
196a as usurping the role of the Superior Court to set
rules of practice governing court procedures and the
manner in which litigation is conducted by state courts,
this argument is a bridge too far. Rather than merely
mandating court procedures, the anti-SLAPP statute
creates a substantive statutory right to be free from
litigation, the purpose of which is to punish or intimi-
date citizens who exercise their rights to free speech
and/or to petition the government. The creation of such
rights is certainly within the powers and province of
the legislative branch. ‘‘[W]here public policy, as per-
ceived by the legislature, requires a simple and prompt
proceeding in order to implement parties’ rights, the
legislature is not prohibited by the constitution from
creating a statutory proceeding which provides for that
simplicity and promptness, and which, in order to insure
simplicity and promptness, enacts as part and parcel
of the statutory proceeding certain minimal procedural
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incidents. In such a case, the legislature is acting within
its historic and traditional function of defining rights
and prescribing remedies.’’ Fishman v. Middlesex
Mutual Assurance Co., 4 Conn. App. 339, 356, 494 A.2d
606, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57, and cert.
denied, 197 Conn. 807, 499 A.2d 57 (1985). Section 52-
196a clearly falls within this category of statute and,
despite including procedural directives, does not offend
principles of separation of power.
The plaintiffs have not claimed that § 52-196a con-
flicts with any existing rules of practice or procedure
promulgated by the Superior Court. Moreover, although
the promulgation and adoption of rules of practice
clearly fall within the power of the Judicial Branch; see
General Statutes § 51-14; it is not a power that lies
exclusively within judicial control. At times, the legisla-
ture may promulgate statutes that contain procedures
to be employed by the courts of this state. We simply
are unconvinced that § 52-196a significantly interferes
with the orderly functioning of the Superior Court’s
judicial role. As we have indicated, the statute is really
no more than a form of summary judgment. See Elder
v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 824. In short, we
reject the plaintiffs’ alternative ground for affirming the
court’s decision to deny the special motion to dismiss,
as that ruling pertains to the vexatious litigation counts
to the extent those counts are premised on the defen-
dant’s statements and/or actions in pursuing a civil pro-
tection order.
To summarize, we conclude that all counts of the
complaint, with the exception of the counts sounding
in common-law and statutory vexatious litigation, are
barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privi-
lege. With respect to the vexatious litigation counts, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the court’s decision
to deny the special motion to dismiss as to those counts,
concluding that the court should have granted the
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motion to the extent that those counts rely on state-
ments made in connection with the union grievance
proceedings, but properly denied the motion with
respect to any and all statements made in connection
with the proceedings to obtain a civil protection order.
The judgment is reversed in part as to the denial of
the motion to dismiss and the case is remanded with
direction to dismiss all counts of the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint except those portions of the statutory and com-
mon-law vexatious litigation counts related to the pro-
tection order proceedings; the judgment is affirmed in
all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.