Camozzi v. Pierce

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Camozzi v. Pierce

MYRON CAMOZZI v. ERIC PIERCE
(AC 46938)
Suarez, Westbrook and Keller, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant on
the complaint and on the count of the defendant’s counterclaim seeking to
quiet title to a certain parcel of real property. A 1951 deed conveyed the
entirety of a five acre tract of property, which included the parcel in dispute
in the present action, to G. In 1975, G signed a deed as grantor that used
the same boundary description as the 1951 deed but included a different
acreage call. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improp-
erly found that the 1975 deed conveyed the entirety of the property that
had been conveyed by the 1951 deed, including the disputed parcel. Held:
The trial court’s finding that the 1975 deed did not sever the disputed parcel
from the property was not clearly erroneous, as the court, noting that an
established rule of deed construction provides that boundary descriptions
prevail over acreage calls and that the 1975 deed and the 1951 deed used
the same adjoining owner descriptions as the boundaries of the property,
properly relied on the adjoining owner descriptions instead of the acreage
calls in determining that the disputed parcel was not severed from the prop-
erty.
The trial court’s finding that no evidence other than the acreage call in the
1975 deed indicated that the disputed parcel was severed from the property
was not clearly erroneous.
Argued November 13, 2024—officially released February 11, 2025

Procedural History

Action, inter alia, seeking a declaratory judgment as
to the title to certain real property, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Middlesex, where the defendant filed a counterclaim;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Shah, J.;
subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew his claim for statu-
tory theft, and the court, Shah, J., rendered judgment
for the defendant on the remaining counts of the com-
plaint and on the counterclaim, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Robert J. Piscitelli, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Andrew P. Barsom, for the appellee (defendant).
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Camozzi v. Pierce

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. In this action regarding title to a
1.46 acre parcel of land (disputed parcel), the plaintiff,
Myron Camozzi, appeals from the judgment of the trial
court rendered in favor of the defendant, Eric Pierce,
on the plaintiff’s complaint seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and alleging trespass and theft and on
the defendant’s counterclaim alleging that he is the
owner of the disputed parcel. On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the court improperly found (1) that the
chain of title to 105 Westbrook Road in Deep River
(property) included the disputed parcel, and (2) that
no evidence other than the acreage call1 indicates that
the disputed parcel was severed from the property.2
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the court.
The following facts and procedural history were
found by the trial court or are undisputed in the record.
In 1951, Marie Cook conveyed the property subject to
this appeal, a five acre parcel of land, to George J.
Ressler (George I) by warranty deed.3 In 1975, George
1
‘‘An ‘acreage call’ is the designated quantity of land as specified in a
deed.’’ U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Palmer, 88 Conn. App. 330, 331 n.1, 869
A.2d 666 (2005).
2
In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts four separate claims
of error. For ease of discussion, we address certain claims together. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff’s first claim, that the court erred in finding that the 1975
deed conveyed the entire property, his second claim, that the court erred in
determining that the deeds’ descriptions of which lands border the property
(adjoining owner description) are more reliable than the acreage call for
determining the property’s boundary, and his third claim, that the court
erred in affording more weight to the boundary description than the acreage
call in determining whether the property includes the disputed parcel, each
posit that the court improperly favored the adjoining owner description
instead of the acreage call in construing the chain of title to the property.
We therefore address the plaintiff’s first, second, and third claims together.
3
In 1951, Cook conveyed two parcels of land to George I. The 1951 deed
applicable to both parcels specifies that the other parcel conveyed by Cook
contained ‘‘about one (1) acre, more or less.’’ Cook’s conveyance of this
other parcel is not relevant to this appeal.
The 1951 deed describes the parcel that is the subject of this appeal as
‘‘containing twenty-six (26) acres, more or less.’’ Below the term ‘‘twenty-
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Camozzi v. Pierce

I conveyed the property to his grandson, George M.
Ressler (George II), by quitclaim deed. Although the
1975 deed purported to convey a parcel containing only
four acres, more or less, it provided the same boundary
description as the 1951 deed.4

In 1996, George II conveyed the property to himself
and Anna Ressler (Resslers) using the same boundary
and acreage descriptions as set forth in the 1975 deed.
In 1997, the Resslers granted a mortgage on the property
to Long Beach Mortgage Company, which subsequently
assigned the mortgage to Norwest Bank Minnesota,
N.A. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., foreclosed on the
property in 2000 and conveyed it to the plaintiff by
limited warranty deed on October 5, 2001. The 2001
deed contained the same boundary and acreage descrip-
tions as set forth in the 1975 deed.
six (26) acres’’ is a notation of ‘‘5 acres.’’ During the trial in this matter, the
following exchange occurred between the plaintiff’s counsel and Richard
Gates, the plaintiff’s expert witness, regarding this discrepancy:
‘‘Q. Now I’m going to show you . . . a deed from [Cook] back to George
[I]. Do you recognize that deed?
‘‘A. Yes, sir. I do.
‘‘Q. And is there a difference in the description between the two prior
deeds? I’m sorry, the acreage call.
‘‘A. Yes. It’s the twenty-six acres . . . . [T]his document was bracketed
and underneath it, someone wrote five acres . . . . [T]his was done in 1951.
‘‘Q. And . . . was it your opinion that the five acres was a more accurate
depiction of this parcel?
‘‘A. Yes, sir.’’
Because neither party disputes on appeal that the 1951 deed from Cook
to George I conveyed a parcel containing five acres, more or less, all refer-
ences to the 1951 deed are to Cook’s conveyance of the second parcel
containing five acres, more or less.
4
The 1951 and 1975 deeds both describe the parcel being conveyed using
substantially the same language. The 1975 deed describes the parcel as
follows: ‘‘Bounded northerly by land now or formerly of George [I], and
land now or formerly of Charles Heidtman, Sr., partly by each; easterly by
land now or formerly of Natalie Isaacs; southerly by land now or formerly
of said Natalie Isaacs, and land now or formerly of Charles Heidtman, Jr.,
partly by each; and westerly by land now or formerly of said Charles Heidt-
man, Jr. and by highway, partly by each . . . .’’
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On December 4, 2001, Russell Waldo completed a
survey of the property (Waldo survey). The Waldo sur-
vey showed that the plaintiff owned a 5.12 acre parcel
bound northerly by land now or formerly of George I
and land now or formerly of Agnes Ressler. In 2002, in
a separate lawsuit, the Resslers sought a temporary
injunction against the plaintiff with respect to the prop-
erty. See Ressler v. Camozzi, Superior Court, judicial
district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (Feb-
ruary 10, 2004). In 2003, Richard Gates completed an
additional survey of the property (Gates survey). The
Gates survey showed that the plaintiff owned a 3.66
acre portion of the property that was bound northerly
by the disputed parcel, a 1.46 acre parcel belonging to
the estate of George I. The Gates survey additionally
showed that the disputed parcel was bound northerly
by land now or formerly of the estate of George I and
land now or formerly of Agnes Ressler. On February
10, 2004, in the matter between the plaintiff and the
Resslers, the court, Hon. Daniel F. Spallone, judge trial
referee, rendered judgment by stipulation in which the
Resslers forfeited any rights that they may have had
to the property, including to the disputed parcel. This
stipulation was not recorded in the land records.

On June 8, 2004, the administrator of the estate of
Agnes Ressler conveyed the entire property, including
the disputed parcel, to the plaintiff by quitclaim deed
(2004 deed), describing the property as the 5.12 acre
parcel depicted in the Waldo survey. The 2004 deed
states: ‘‘The purpose and intent of this deed is to confirm
the boundary line between the herein described prop-
erty, which is currently owned by the [plaintiff], and
adjoining property currently owned by the Grantor, con-
firming that the Grantor makes no claim of ownership
in any of said herein described property, as such has
never been owned by [the] Grantor.’’
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In 2005, the plaintiff mortgaged the property to Web-
ster Bank (bank) using the same boundary and acreage
description as set forth in the 1975 deed. The bank
subsequently foreclosed on the property, and, on Febru-
ary 25, 2019, the Superior Court rendered a judgment
of foreclosure by sale. On March 28, 2019, after the
judgment of foreclosure was rendered but before the
foreclosure sale took place, the plaintiff conveyed the
disputed parcel, ‘‘containing 1.46 acres,’’ to Elizabeth
Morgan by quitclaim deed.5 The bank obtained title to
the property on May 24, 2019, following the foreclosure
sale, and subsequently sold it to the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) by quitclaim deed
on July 12, 2019. The bank’s deed to Fannie Mae used
the same boundary and acreage description as set forth
in the 1975 deed. On March 13, 2020, Fannie Mae con-
veyed the property to the defendant by special warranty
deed. The defendant recorded his deed in the land
records on March 26, 2020. On June 17, 2020, Morgan
conveyed the disputed parcel back to the plaintiff by
quitclaim deed. Despite the foreclosure and convey-
ances, the plaintiff has continued to occupy the dis-
puted parcel since 2004.6
5
We note that the plaintiff does not argue that he severed the disputed
parcel from the property by way of the March 28, 2019 quitclaim deed to
Morgan and that he is entitled to the disputed parcel as a result of such
severance. Rather, the plaintiff’s argument on appeal is that the disputed
parcel has been excluded from the property’s chain of title since George I
severed the disputed parcel in 1975, and, therefore, the bank’s 2005 mortgage
on the property excluded the disputed parcel. We conclude in part II of this
opinion, however, that the court properly found that George I did not sever
the disputed parcel in 1975 and that the plaintiff granted the bank a mortgage
on the entire property. Furthermore, Elton Harvey, the defendant’s expert,
testified that the plaintiff conveyed the disputed parcel to Morgan subject
to the bank’s mortgage and, when Morgan conveyed the disputed parcel
back to the plaintiff on June 17, 2020, she no longer held title to convey
because of the bank’s foreclosure. Because the plaintiff does not raise any
further claims regarding the significance of his conveyance to Morgan and
her subsequent conveyance back to him, we do not discuss any additional
legal implications of the plaintiff’s conveyance to Morgan.
6
There is a garage located on the disputed parcel, which the plaintiff inhab-
ited.
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On August 19, 2022, the plaintiff commenced this
action against the defendant regarding the disputed par-
cel. In his complaint, the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that he holds title to the disputed parcel7 and
a permanent injunction against the defendant’s use of
the disputed parcel. He also stated claims against the
defendant for trespass and statutory theft. On Decem-
ber 22, 2022, the defendant filed an amended answer,
which included a statement, pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 47-31 (d),8 and a special defense alleging that he
is the owner of the disputed parcel by virtue of the
March 13, 2020 deed from Fannie Mae. The defendant
also asserted a counterclaim against the plaintiff in
which he sought a judgment, pursuant to § 47-31, that
he is the owner of the disputed parcel free and clear
of any interest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter
filed a reply containing a statement, pursuant to § 47-
31 (d), that he claims an interest in the disputed parcel.
7
In particular, the plaintiff sought ‘‘an order pursuant to [General Statutes
§] 52-29 declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the [disputed parcel]
free and clear of any claim by the defendant.’’ Section 52-29 provides in
relevant part: ‘‘The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare
rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration . . . .’’
Ordinarily, actions to determine title in real property are governed by General
Statutes § 47-31; see Koennicke v. Maiorano, 43 Conn. App. 1, 9, 682 A.2d
1046 (1996); which provides in relevant part: ‘‘An action may be brought by
any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property,
or both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any
part of it . . . for the purpose of determining . . . interest or claim, and
to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the
property. . . .’’ Nevertheless, ‘‘the distinction [between a declaratory judg-
ment action and a quiet title action] is without a difference. Although actions
for declaratory judgments most often involve contract disputes, declaratory
judgments also involve property rights.’’ Gemmell v. Lee, 42 Conn. App. 682,
686 n.5, 680 A.2d 346 (1996).
8
General Statutes § 47-31 (d) provides: ‘‘Each defendant shall, in his
answer, state whether or not he claims any estate or interest in, or encum-
brance on, the property, or any part of it, and, if so, the nature and extent
of the estate, interest or encumbrance which he claims, and he shall set
out the manner in which the estate, interest or encumbrance is claimed to
be derived.’’
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The matter was tried before the court, Shah, J., on
June 13, 2023. Both parties presented the testimony of
expert land surveyors in support of their claims. Gates,
the plaintiff’s expert, and Elton Harvey, the defendant’s
expert, both agreed that George I acquired the property
in 1951 and conveyed a parcel to George II in 1975. The
experts disagreed, however, as to whether the 1975
deed severed the disputed parcel from the property.
Gates testified that the plaintiff holds title to the dis-
puted parcel because the acreage calls in the chain of
title indicate that the disputed parcel was severed from
the property. Harvey, on the other hand, explained that
‘‘every property description in the eighty-two year chain
of title to the . . . property uses the same description,
which calls for [the] property to be bounded on the
north by the properties that are shown on [the Gates
survey] as being the adjoining properties to the north
of the disputed parcel. . . . If the disputed parcel was
not part of the defendant’s property, then his property
would be bounded on the north by the disputed parcel,
which is contrary to what the land records reflect.’’
(Citations omitted.)
On September 7, 2023, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision in which it made the following findings:
‘‘As [a deed’s description of which lands border the
property (adjoining owner description)] is the most reli-
able call for determining a property’s boundary, that
call established that the disputed parcel is part of the
property that was conveyed to the plaintiff in [2001],
was mortgaged by the plaintiff in [2005], was the subject
of the lis pendens in [2018], was the subject of the
committee deed in [2019], was the subject of the deed
[to Fannie Mae] in [2019], and was conveyed to the
defendant in [2020]. Additionally, there is no record of
the prior lawsuit or the terms of any stipulated judgment
evidencing any ownership of the plaintiff in the land
records, and the plaintiff did not offer the stipulation
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Camozzi v. Pierce

into evidence.’’ The court further found the following:
‘‘[T]he defendant has shown that he has legal title to
the disputed parcel through the special warranty deed
he was granted on March [13], 2020. Although there is
a discrepancy in the description of the total acreages
between some of the deeds in the chain of title, the court
is satisfied that the boundary descriptions identical in
all the deeds provide for the same transfer of land,
which includes the disputed parcel.’’
On the basis of these findings, the court rendered
judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s complaint
because (1) the defendant held title to the disputed
parcel by virtue of the 2020 deed from Fannie Mae and
(2) the plaintiff was the record owner of the disputed
parcel until 2019 and thus could not demonstrate that
he acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse pos-
session.9 The court additionally found that the plaintiff
could not prove his trespass claim because he is not
the owner of the disputed parcel, and he had abandoned
his statutory theft claim in his posttrial brief. The court
also rendered judgment for the defendant on his quiet
title counterclaim. This appeal followed. Additional
facts will be set forth as necessary.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard
of review. ‘‘[A] court’s interpretation of the language
of a deed presents a question of law. Therefore, insofar
as our assessment of the judgment involves the court’s
interpretation of [a] deed of conveyance, our review is
plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank
9
‘‘[T]he essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall
be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years
under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the
claimant without license or consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Roberson v. Aubin, 120 Conn. App. 72, 74, 990 A.2d 1239 (2010).
The court found that ‘‘the plaintiff owned the disputed parcel until 2019, so
he cannot show that he held the disputed parcel by ousting another rightful
owner without the consent of the owner.’’
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Camozzi v. Pierce

National Assn. v. Palmer, 88 Conn. App. 330, 334, 869
A.2d 666 (2005). ‘‘In conducting a plenary review we
must decide whether [the court’s] conclusions are
legally and logically correct and find support in the
facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Bank of New York Mellon v. Mazzeo,
195 Conn. App. 357, 369, 225 A.3d 290 (2020). ‘‘To the
extent that the court has made findings of fact, our
review is limited to a determination of whether the
court’s conclusions were clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
Palmer, supra, 334. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. . . . Under the clearly erroneous
standard of review, a finding of fact must stand if, on
the basis of the evidence before the court and the rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, a
trier of fact reasonably could have found as it did.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Circulent, Inc. v.
Hatch & Bailey Co., 217 Conn. App. 622, 630, 289 A.3d
609 (2023). With these principles in mind, we turn to
the plaintiff’s claims on appeal.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
found that the 1975 deed conveyed the entire property,
including the disputed parcel, to George II because (1)
the 1975 deed is clear and unambiguous, (2) the lan-
guage of the 1975 deed conveyed only four acres of
the property, and (3) both experts agree that George I
retained the disputed parcel. He further argues that the
court improperly relied on the adjoining owner descrip-
tion instead of the acreage call in determining whether
the 1975 deed conveyed the disputed parcel to George
II. We are not persuaded.
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‘‘In determining the location of a boundary line
expressed in a deed, if the description is clear and
unambiguous, it governs and the actual intent of the
parties is irrelevant. . . . When the description of a
boundary line in a deed is ambiguous, however, the
question of what the parties intended that line to be is
one of fact for the trial court. . . . In the construction
of an ambiguous instrument of conveyance, the decisive
question of fact is the intent of the parties to the instru-
ment.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Gleason v. Atkins, 225 Conn. App. 745, 765, 317
A.3d 1168, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 901, 322 A.3d 1059
(2024).
We begin with the language of the 1975 deed, which
describes the parcel being conveyed as follows:
‘‘Bounded northerly by land now or formerly of George
[I], and land now or formerly of Charles Heidtman, Sr.,
partly by each; easterly by land now or formerly of
Natalie Isaacs; southerly by land now or formerly of
said Natalie Isaacs, and land now or formerly of Charles
Heidtman, Jr., partly by each; and westerly by land
now or formerly of said Charles Heidtman, Jr. and by
highway, partly by each, containing four (4) acres, more
or less. Being a portion of the [five acre] parcel
described in a deed from Marie Cook to George [I]
dated November 8, 1951 . . . .’’
In the present matter, the parties disagree as to
whether we should employ a plenary or a clearly errone-
ous standard of review. The plaintiff argues that the
1975 deed is clear and unambiguous as to its acreage
call and, therefore, plenary review applies. The defen-
dant, on the other hand, argues that this appeal does
not require us to construe a deed and, therefore, we
review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error.
Alternatively, the defendant argues that the 1975 deed
is clear and unambiguous as to its boundary description
and, therefore, plenary review applies. Insofar as this
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Camozzi v. Pierce

appeal requires us to review the court’s finding of the
grantor’s intent as expressed in the 1975 deed, it
involves the construction of a deed. See Gleason v.
Atkins, supra, 225 Conn. App. 782 (appellate court con-
strued deed to determine boundary line of property).
Therefore, we must first determine whether the 1975
deed is ambiguous.
Although both parties argue that the 1975 deed is
clear and unambiguous, they assert different interpreta-
tions of the grantor’s intent. We are mindful that ‘‘[t]he
mere fact that the parties advance different interpreta-
tions of the language in question does not necessitate
a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Freidheim v. McLaughlin,
217 Conn. App. 767, 783, 290 A.3d 801 (2023). However,
‘‘[a] latent ambiguity arises from extraneous or collat-
eral facts that make the meaning of a deed uncertain
although its language is clear and unambiguous on its
face. . . . Latent ambiguity exists where, although lan-
guage in a deed appears to be certain on its face, it is
rendered uncertain when compared to the land that it
is purported to describe.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221
Conn. App. 657, 679–80 n.12, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024). Such is the
case here.
Even if the boundary description and acreage call
appear clear and unambiguous on the face of the 1975
deed, the two descriptions conflict when compared
with the property. Although the boundary description,
in light of the 1951 deed’s boundary description and
the Waldo survey, reasonably implies that the parcel
contains five acres, more or less, the acreage call
describes a parcel containing four acres, more or less,
and the parties disagree as to which description pre-
vails. Thus, a latent ambiguity exists in the 1975 deed
because the grantor’s intent is unclear as to whether
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Camozzi v. Pierce

he intended to convey four or 5.12 acres. We therefore
review the court’s finding of the grantor’s intent for
clear error. See Stefanoni v. Duncan, 282 Conn. 686,
704, 923 A.2d 737 (2007) (‘‘[w]hen there is a latent ambi-
guity, the meaning of the ambiguous . . . deed is an
issue of fact for the trial court and we cannot disturb its
finding, based as it is upon evidence of the surrounding
circumstances and the situation of the property, which
legally supports it’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
‘‘Our basic rule of construction is that recognition
will be given to the expressed intention of the parties
to a deed . . . and that it shall, if possible, be so con-
strued as to effectuate the intent of the parties. . . .
In arriving at the intent expressed . . . in the language
used, however, it is always admissible to consider the
situation of the parties and the circumstances con-
nected with the transaction, and every part of the writ-
ing should be considered with the help of that evidence.
. . . In the construction of a deed or grant, the language
is to be construed in connection with, and in reference
to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of
the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and
the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . [I]f
the meaning of the language contained in a deed or
conveyance is not clear, the trial court is bound to
consider any relevant extrinsic evidence presented by
the parties for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Atkins,
supra, 225 Conn. App. 765–66.
The plaintiff argues that the language of the 1975
deed shows that George I conveyed a portion of the
property to George II and retained the remaining por-
tion. In support of his argument, the plaintiff points to
the provisions of the 1975 deed that describe the parcel
as ‘‘containing four (4) acres, more or less,’’ and as
‘‘[b]eing a portion of the [five acre] parcel described in
[the 1951] deed from Marie Cook to George [I] . . . .’’
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The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the 1975
deed contained the same boundary descriptions as the
1951 deed and, therefore, the 1975 deed conveyed the
entire property, including the disputed parcel, to George
II. The trial court agreed with the defendant, and we
conclude that its finding is not clearly erroneous.

‘‘[W]hen a deed sets forth two different descriptions
of the property to be conveyed, the one containing the
less certainty must yield to that possessing the greater,
if apparent conflict between the two cannot be recon-
ciled.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocamora
v. Heaney, 144 Conn. App. 658, 667, 74 A.3d 457 (2013).
‘‘It is well settled as a rule of the construction of deeds
that [w]here the boundaries of land are described by
known and fixed monuments which are definite and
certain, the monuments will prevail over courses and
distances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Koen-
nicke v. Maiorano, 43 Conn. App. 1, 10, 682 A.2d 1046
(1996). ‘‘Adjacent land may be a monument if the bound-
ary of it is fixed.’’ Marshall v. Soffer, 58 Conn. App.
737, 744, 756 A.2d 284 (2000); see also Koennicke v.
Maiorano, supra, 11 (‘‘[t]he land of an adjoining owner
whose boundaries can be fixed by known monuments
is also considered to be a monument to establish a
boundary’’). ‘‘On the other end of the spectrum, [t]he
general rule is that the designated quantity of land called
for, here acreage, is the least reliable aspect of the
description determining the intent by the parties.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thurlow v. Hulten,
173 Conn. App. 694, 726, 164 A.3d 858 (2017); see also
U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Palmer, supra, 88 Conn.
App. 335 (‘‘[i]t is widely recognized that acreage calls
are the least reliable interpretation of a description’’).
Accordingly, ‘‘[t]he court attaches little weight to the
call for [the number of] acres,’’ especially when ‘‘[the]
deed uses the words ‘more or less,’ indicating that the
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parties to that deed did not intend the acreage call to
be precise.’’ Thurlow v. Hulten, supra, 714.
Here, the 1951 deed conveyed five acres, more or
less, to George I, and the 1975 deed purportedly con-
veyed four acres, more or less, to George II. The acreage
calls, therefore, could be read to suggest that George
I conveyed a portion of the property that he acquired
in 1951 and retained the remaining portion. Both deeds,
however, describe the same adjoining owners as the
boundaries of the property; see footnote 4 of this opin-
ion; suggesting that the intent of the 1951 and 1975
deeds was to convey the same property. Harvey testified
that, since 1941, the description of abutting owners in
the chain of title to the property has remained the same
with calls for the property to be bound northerly by
the properties that are north of the disputed parcel. He
further testified that, had George I retained the disputed
parcel, the 1975 deed would have referred to the dis-
puted parcel as the property’s northern boundary. More-
over, although the 1975 deed states that the parcel being
conveyed is a portion of the parcel conveyed in the
1951 deed, there is no evidence in the record to show
that George I retained the disputed parcel as neither
he nor his estate ever conveyed the disputed parcel
separate from the property.
The plaintiff contends that both experts agreed on
the basis of the 1975 deed that George I retained the
disputed parcel, but his assertion is belied by the record.
Although Harvey’s report initially stated that the reduc-
tion in the acreage call from five acres to four acres
‘‘would lead to the logical conclusion that there was a
remaining portion of the property in George [I] after
this conveyance,’’ the report ultimately concluded that
the 1975 deed did not sever the disputed parcel. Harvey
also testified at trial that the 1975 deed conveyed the
entire property, including the disputed parcel, to George
II on the basis of the bounding owner descriptions in
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each deed in the chain of title. He further testified that
it is not unusual for acreage calls in a deed to be differ-
ent from the actual acreage of a property. Thus, the
court reasonably could have found that Harvey did not
agree with Gates that George I retained the disputed
parcel.
Moreover, the court, as the trier of fact, was entitled
to determine what portion, if any, of the expert opinions
to credit or reject. ‘‘It is well settled that the credibility
of an expert witness is a matter to be determined by
the trier of fact. . . . The credibility of expert wit-
nesses and the weight to be given to their testimony
. . . is determined by the trier of fact. . . . [T]his court
does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must defer to the [trier
of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
based on its firsthand observation of their conduct,
demeanor and attitude. . . . The [trial] judge, as the
trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Mourning v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn.
App. 444, 455, 150 A.3d 1166 (2016), cert. denied, 324
Conn. 908, 152 A.3d 1246 (2017); see also Menard v.
State, 346 Conn. 506, 521–22, 291 A.3d 1025 (2023) (‘‘a
trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the
testimony of an expert’’). Thus, the court was entitled
to credit Harvey’s expert opinion that George I did not
retain the disputed parcel in the 1975 deed.
The adjoining owner description in the 1975 deed
indicates that George I conveyed the same property to
George II that Cook had conveyed to George I in 1951.
Because boundary descriptions prevail over acreage
calls, the trial court’s finding that the 1975 deed did
not sever the disputed parcel from the property is not
clearly erroneous.
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The plaintiff nevertheless argues that the court
improperly relied on the adjoining owner description
instead of the acreage call in determining whether the
1975 deed conveyed the disputed parcel to George II
because (1) the court disregarded George I’s clear intent
as expressed in the 1975 deed, (2) the acreage call is
more reliable than the boundary description, (3) George
I did not need to change the adjoining owner description
in the 1975 deed, and (4) there is no significance to the
fact that the names of the abutters remained the same
in all of the deeds in the multiple chains of title. We
disagree.
Here, the plaintiff asked the court to quiet title on
the basis of the acreage calls in the property’s chain of
title, which describe a parcel containing four acres,
more or less. The defendant, on the other hand, asked
the court to quiet title on the basis of the boundary
descriptions in the property’s chain of title, which indi-
cate that the chain of title conveys the same property
that Cook conveyed to George I in 1951. The court
noted that, although the acreage call in the 1975 deed
arguably would support a finding that George I retained
the disputed parcel, the boundary description indicates
that he conveyed the entire property. The court there-
after determined that ‘‘[the adjoining owner descrip-
tion] is the most reliable call for determining a proper-
ty’s boundary [and] that call established that the
disputed parcel is part of the property . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)
The plaintiff argues that the court’s reliance on the
adjoining owner description in the 1975 deed disregards
George I’s clearly expressed intent to retain the dis-
puted parcel and, therefore, ‘‘is contrary to the rules of
construction.’’ As we have already discussed, however,
the established rules of construction provide that
‘‘[w]here the boundaries of land are described by known
and fixed monuments,’’ including adjacent land with
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fixed boundaries, such descriptions prevail over acre-
age calls, which are the least reliable land description.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thurlow v. Hulten,
supra, 173 Conn. App. 726. Thus, the court’s finding as
to George I’s intent as expressed by the language of
the boundary description in the 1975 deed is not clearly
erroneous.
Although the plaintiff acknowledges that our case
law provides that boundary descriptions are more reli-
able than acreage calls, he contends that the rule should
not apply in this case because the acreage call in the
1975 deed is reliable. We are not persuaded.
The 1975 deed expressly describes the parcel as con-
taining four acres, more or less, indicating that the acre-
age call is, at best, an estimate rather than a precise
measurement of the parcel. See id., 714. There was also
a discrepancy in the property’s acreage when Cook
conveyed it to George I in the 1951 deed. See footnote 3
of this opinion. Moreover, Harvey testified that acreage
calls are the last factor to consider, after natural or
artificial monument calls and metes and bounds
descriptions, when determining a property’s bound-
aries. This opinion is supported by our case law, which
consistently states that acreage calls are an unreliable
method for identifying property. See Feuer v. Hender-
son, 181 Conn. 454, 461, 435 A.2d 1011 (1980) (‘‘any
discrepancy between acreage designated in deeds and
that determined by a surveyor, as found by the court,
can be accounted for by the fact that many old deeds
contain imprecise measurements’’); Steinman v. Maier,
179 Conn. 574, 575, 427 A.2d 828 (1980) (‘‘the designa-
tion of unsurveyed acreage contained in old deeds is
quite unreliable’’); Thurlow v. Hulten, supra, 173 Conn.
App. 714 (‘‘the words ‘more or less,’ indicat[e] that the
parties to that deed did not intend the acreage call to
be precise’’). Accordingly, the court reasonably could
have inferred that George I did not know the precise
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acreage of the property and intended the 1975 deed’s
acreage call to be an estimate rather than a precise and
reliable description of the property. Thus, the court’s
finding that the adjoining owner description is more
reliable than the acreage call is not clearly erroneous.
The plaintiff additionally argues that the boundary
description does not show that George I conveyed the
entire property to George II because George I was the
northern abutter before and after the 1975 conveyance
and, therefore, the adjoining owner description did not
need to be changed. Specifically, he argues that the
1951 deed referred to George I as the northern abutter
because he owned the land to the north of the property,
and he remained the northern abutter in the 1975 deed
because he retained the disputed parcel. Again, we dis-
agree.
The plaintiff’s argument disregards the express lan-
guage of the 1951 and 1975 deeds, which describe the
property as ‘‘[b]ounded northerly by land [now or for-
merly] of George [I], and land [now or formerly] of
Charles Heidtman, Sr., partly by each . . . .’’ (Empha-
sis added.) Although Heidtman, Sr., appears in the chain
of title to land north of the disputed parcel, there is no
evidence in the record that he ever held title to the
property or the disputed parcel. Accordingly, if George
I intended the disputed parcel to be the property’s north-
ern boundary, then the 1975 deed would describe the
northern boundary as the land of George I only, rather
than the lands of both George I and Heidtman, Sr.
Because the 1951 and 1975 deeds refer to the lands of
George I and Heidtman, Sr., as the northern boundary,
the court’s findings that the 1951 and 1975 deeds con-
veyed the same property is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the adjoining owner
descriptions in the chain of title have no bearing on the
determination of the property’s boundaries because it
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is not unusual for a deed to leave the names of abutters
unchanged. In support of this argument, the plaintiff
points to the chains of title to the property and its
abutters to ‘‘demonstrate that the names of abutters
were not updated each time there was a conveyance
of property, even if those individuals no longer owned
the abutting property.’’ We are not persuaded.
Even if the adjoining owner descriptions in the prop-
erty’s chain of title reflect names of people who no
longer own the adjoining lands, the parties can identify
those lands by tracing the chains of title. Therefore, the
adjoining owner descriptions in the chain of title to the
property are reliable because they allow the parties to
identify the adjoining properties. See Marshall v. Soffer,
supra, 58 Conn. App. 744 (parties could identify proper-
ty’s boundary where deed described adjoining property
as ‘‘now or formerly of Katherine Link Knapp’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, because the chain of title expressly refers to
adjoining lands as the property’s boundaries, the court
properly relied on the adjoining owner descriptions
instead of the acreage calls in determining that the
disputed parcel was not severed from the property.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
found that ‘‘there is no other support that the disputed
parcel was and remained a separate property, as Harvey
testified to after searching title to the adjoining proper-
ties to determine if there was a remaining parcel that
George [I] had not conveyed.’’ The plaintiff argues that
this finding is clearly erroneous because (1) George I
retained title to the disputed parcel until the plaintiff
purchased it in 2004, (2) the Gates survey identified the
disputed parcel as separate from the property, (3) the
plaintiff has improved, occupied, maintained, insured,
and paid the taxes on the disputed parcel since 2004,
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(4) the plaintiff did not mortgage the disputed parcel
to the bank and, therefore, the bank could not foreclose
on it, and (5) the defendant did not acquire the disputed
parcel. We disagree.
The plaintiff first argues that the court’s finding is
clearly erroneous because George I retained the dis-
puted parcel in the 1975 deed and held title to it until
his heirs, the Resslers, filed the quiet title action against
the plaintiff, which was settled when the Resslers sold
the disputed parcel to the plaintiff in 2004. As previously
discussed in this opinion, however, George I did not
retain title to the disputed parcel when he conveyed it
to George II in 1975. Furthermore, each conveyance
between 1975, when George II acquired title, and 2001,
when the plaintiff first acquired title, used the same
boundary description and acreage call as the 1975 deed.
Accordingly, the court reasonably could have inferred
that each conveyance between 1975 and 2001 conveyed
the entire property, including the disputed parcel.
Moreover, the plaintiff argues that he acquired the
disputed parcel as a distinct parcel in 2004, but the 2004
deed expressly conveyed the 5.12 acre parcel depicted
in the Waldo survey, which shows the disputed parcel
as part of the property. ‘‘[A] reference to [a] map in [a]
deed, [f]or a more particular description, incorporates
[the map] into the deed as fully and effectually as if
copied therein. . . . [T]he identifying or explanatory
features contained in maps referred to in a deed become
part of the deed, and so are entitled to consideration
in interpreting the deed as though they were expressly
recited therein.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Walters v. Servidio, 227 Conn. App. 1, 11, 320 A.3d 1008
(2024). Because the deed specifies the Waldo survey,
that depiction governs our interpretation of the descrip-
tion in the deed. See Gleason v. Atkins, supra, 225 Conn.
App. 769 (‘‘[b]ecause the [deed] specifies that [a] map
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describes the parcel of land intended, that map is con-
trolling as to our interpretation of the description pro-
vided in the deed’’). Additionally, the 2004 deed states
that the parties intended to confirm the property’s
boundary line, that the estate of Agnes Ressler never
owned the property, and that the property consists of
5.12 acres. If the plaintiff had purchased the disputed
parcel from the estate of Agnes Ressler, then the deed
would state that it conveyed a parcel containing 1.46
acres previously owned by the estate of Agnes Ressler.
Accordingly, the court reasonably could have inferred
that the plaintiff did not purchase the disputed parcel
in 2004.
The plaintiff nevertheless argues that the court’s find-
ing is clearly erroneous because the Gates survey, pre-
pared by the plaintiff’s expert in 2003, after the plaintiff
acquired the property, shows the disputed parcel and
the property as two separate parcels. The Gates survey,
however, was not referenced in any deed in the chain
of title to the property. The Gates survey, therefore,
does not alter the boundary descriptions in the chain
of title. See Marshall v. Soffer, supra, 58 Conn. App.
742 (‘‘map was not referenced in any deed, and no deed
description after that date in the chain of title of either
the plaintiffs or the defendant was amended to reflect
any change in the boundaries of land conveyed,’’ so
map did not ‘‘alter the plaintiffs’ deeded description’’).
Moreover, the record reveals that the Gates survey
existed at the time of the 2004 deed to the plaintiff. The
court, therefore, reasonably could have inferred that if
the disputed parcel was separated from the property,
the deed would have specified the Gates survey instead
of the Waldo survey. Thus, the Gates survey does not
render the court’s finding clearly erroneous.
The plaintiff next argues that the court’s finding is
clearly erroneous because he has improved, occupied,
maintained, insured, and paid the taxes on the disputed
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parcel since 2004. He specifically argues that he fixed
the building located on the disputed parcel, that he
cleaned up the land, that he paid taxes and insurance
on the land, and that the disputed parcel has its own
driveway. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that
the plaintiff produced no evidence to show that he
maintained the disputed parcel separately from the
property. We agree with the defendant.
Although the plaintiff argues that he maintained the
disputed parcel separately, he did not introduce any
evidence, such as bills or checks, showing that he paid
property taxes and insurance on the disputed parcel
separate from those he paid on the property. Even if
the disputed parcel has its own driveway, the plaintiff
admits that it does not have its own address. Moreover,
the record reveals that the plaintiff applied for a zoning
permit in 2003 using the Waldo survey’s depiction of
the property as a 5.12 acre parcel. The only evidence
that the plaintiff offered to support his argument that
he maintained the disputed parcel separately was his
own testimony, which the court was free to credit or
reject. See State v. DeMarco, 311 Conn. 510, 519–20, 88
A.3d 491 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the
trier of fact to weigh conflicting testimony and make
determinations of credibility, crediting some, all or none
of any given witness’ testimony’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Rocamora v. Heaney, supra, 144
Conn. App. 668 (‘‘[an appellate] court does not try issues
of fact or pass upon the credibility of witnesses’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the court reason-
ably could have inferred that the plaintiff had once
owned and maintained the entire property, including
the disputed parcel. The court’s finding that no evidence
supports the plaintiff’s contrary contention, therefore,
is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that he did not mortgage
the disputed parcel to the bank, that the bank did not
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foreclose on the disputed parcel, and, therefore, the
bank did not sell the disputed parcel to the defendant.
Specifically, he argues that each conveyance of the
property between 1975 and 2020 excluded the disputed
parcel. As we have already discussed at length, how-
ever, each relevant conveyance of the property since
1951 conveyed the entire property, including the dis-
puted parcel. Thus, when the plaintiff mortgaged the
property in 2005, using the same boundary description
as the 1975 deed, he mortgaged the entire property,
including the disputed parcel. Consequently, when the
bank subsequently foreclosed on the property, obtained
title, and sold it to the defendant, it obtained title to
and sold the disputed parcel. Although each conveyance
described the parcel as four acres, more or less, the
adjoining owner descriptions consistently describe the
same parcel that Cook conveyed to George I in 1951.
Therefore, the record supports the court’s findings that
the plaintiff mortgaged the disputed parcel and that the
bank foreclosed on and sold the disputed parcel to the
defendant. Therefore, the court’s finding that ‘‘there is
no . . . support that the disputed parcel was and
remained a separate property’’ other than the acreage
call is not clearly erroneous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.