Pryor v. Brignole

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Pryor v. Brignole

J. XAVIER PRYOR v. TIMOTHY
BRIGNOLE ET AL.
(AC 44253)
(AC 44254)
Elgo, Moll and Cradle, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for breach of a contractual nondis-
paragement clause in connection with anonymous letters detailing criminal
charges that had been brought against the plaintiff that the defendant B
allegedly sent to various news outlets. The trial court denied the defendants’
special motions to dismiss, filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-
196a), and the defendants separately appealed. This court dismissed the
appeals for lack of a final judgment. On the granting of certification, the
defendants appealed to our Supreme Court, which held that the trial court’s
denials of the special motions to dismiss constituted appealable final judg-
ments, and it reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case
to this court for further proceedings. Held:

This court established a bright-line rule that clarified that a moving party,
to satisfy its burden under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), must demon-
strate that the allegations of the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim in
question are predicated on conduct that implicates its right to free speech,
its right to petition the government, or its right of association in connection
with a matter of public concern, and the focus of that inquiry should be on
the substance of those allegations as set forth in the pleadings and not on
an admission or denial of those allegations by the moving party.

The trial court improperly construed the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to
require a moving party to admit to engaging in the conduct alleged in
the operative complaint and, thus, the court improperly denied the special
motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on that basis.

The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court properly
dismissed the defendants’ special motions to dismiss on the basis that the
conduct alleged in his complaint, which referenced the plaintiff’s criminal
charges, did not involve a matter of public concern.

The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the defendants waived their
ability to file special motions to dismiss because the motions were untimely

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Pryor v. Brignole
filed, as the trial court implicitly granted the defendants’ motions for exten-
sions of time and the plaintiff expressly invited the court to address the
merits of the special motions to dismiss.
Argued October 23, 2024—officially released April 1, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Budzik,
J., denied the defendants’ special motions to dismiss,
from which the defendants filed separate appeals with
this court, which granted the plaintiff’s motions to dis-
miss the appeals; thereafter, the defendants, on the
granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme
Court, which consolidated the appeals and reversed
this court’s judgments and remanded the case to this
court for further proceedings. Reversed; further pro-
ceedings.
Mario K. Cerame, for the appellant in Docket No.
AC 44253 (named defendant).
Sarah F. D’Addabbo, for the appellant in Docket No.
AC 44254 (defendant Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC).
J. Xavier Pryor, self-represented, the appellee in
Docket Nos. AC 44253 and AC 44254 (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. These appeals involve a novel issue of statu-
tory interpretation regarding a legal standard for which
neither the language of the statute nor its legislative
history provides clear resolution. It thus falls to this
court to divine, as best we can, the proper construction
of that statutory standard, ever mindful that it is the
prerogative of our General Assembly to modify, alter,
and amend the laws of this state.
In these related appeals, the defendants, Timothy
Brignole and the law firm of Brignole, Bush & Lewis,
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Pryor v. Brignole

LLC (law firm), appeal from the judgments of the trial
court denying their special motions to dismiss filed
pursuant to Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute,1 General
Statutes § 52-196a, in this breach of contract action
brought by the self-represented plaintiff, J. Xavier
Pryor.2 On appeal, the defendants claim that the court
improperly construed § 52-196a (e) (3)3 to require a
moving party, as part of its initial burden under the
first prong of that statute, to admit to engaging in the
conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. In response,
the plaintiff argues that the alleged conduct did not
involve a matter of public concern, as required by § 52-
196a (e) (3), and that the defendants waived their ability
to file special motions to dismiss because those motions
were untimely. We agree with the defendants that the
court improperly interpreted § 52-196a (e) (3) and,
accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court.

We begin by noting that § 52-196a constitutes a ‘‘spe-
cial statutory benefit’’; Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332,
1
‘‘SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332,
337 n.4, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2467, 209
L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021).
2
The appeal in Docket No. AC 44253 is brought by Brignole in his individual
capacity, while the appeal in Docket No. AC 44254 is brought by the law
firm. Both appeals involve similar claims and briefing by the parties regarding
the propriety of the court’s denial of their special motions to dismiss. For
that reason, we discuss them interrelatedly in this opinion.
3
General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3) provides: ‘‘The court shall grant a
special motion to dismiss if the moving party makes an initial showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing party’s complaint,
counterclaim or cross claim is based on the moving party’s exercise of its
right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association
under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state
in connection with a matter of public concern, unless the party that brought
the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim sets forth with particularity the
circumstances giving rise to the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim and
demonstrates to the court that there is probable cause, considering all
valid defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits of the complaint,
counterclaim or cross claim.’’
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372, 246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141
S. Ct. 2467, 209 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021); that ‘‘provides a
moving party with the opportunity to have [a] lawsuit
dismissed early in the proceeding and stays all discov-
ery, pending the trial court’s resolution of the special
motion to dismiss.’’ Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. 636, 659,
280 A.3d 402 (2022). ‘‘A special motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to § 52-196a . . . is not a traditional motion to
dismiss based on a jurisdictional ground. It is, instead,
a truncated evidentiary procedure enacted by our legis-
lature in order to achieve a legitimate policy objective,
namely, to provide for a prompt remedy.’’ Elder v.
Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818, 824, 254 A.3d 1001
(2021); see also Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 965,
293 A.3d 851 (2023) (D’Auria, J., dissenting) (‘‘[o]n an
expedited basis and on a quickly assembled record, a
trial judge serves as a gatekeeper, promptly weeding
out and dismissing lawsuits that plainly have been filed
for [an] illegitimate purpose’’); Barry v. State Bar of
California, 2 Cal. 5th 318, 328, 386 P.3d 788, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 124 (2017) (noting ‘‘the anti-SLAPP statute’s
central purpose of preventing SLAPPs by ending them
early and without great cost to the SLAPP target’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
Section 52-196a (e) (2) instructs that, ‘‘[w]hen ruling
on a special motion to dismiss, the court shall consider
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits of the
parties attesting to the facts upon which liability or a
defense, as the case may be, is based.’’4 Our recitation
of the relevant facts is gleaned from such materials in
the record before us.
4
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants filed affidavits in support of or
in opposition to the special motions to dismiss. On January 13, 2020, Brignole
filed an affidavit in support of his motion for an extension of time to file a
responsive pleading, which pertained only to the issue of precisely when
he ‘‘discovered a copy of the summons and complaint . . . taped to a deco-
rative door to [his] home . . . .’’
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At all relevant times, Brignole was the owner, man-
ager, and principal of the law firm, which previously
employed the plaintiff as an associate attorney. In 2015,
the law firm brought a civil action against the plaintiff
and another entity. In March, 2018, the plaintiff and the
law firm resolved that action by executing a settlement
agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff paid the law
firm $45,000 in exchange for a general release of all
causes of action. The settlement agreement also
included a nondisparagement clause, under which the
defendants agreed ‘‘to not disparage or criticize [the
plaintiff] and to not do or say anything that could harm
the [plaintiff’s] interests or reputation . . . .’’
On June 10, 2018, the plaintiff was arrested and
charged with assault in the third degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-61 and risk of injury to a child
in violation of General Statutes § 53-21, a fact memorial-
ized on the Judicial Branch website.5 In his complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that, on or about June 20, 2018,
Brignole sent or caused to be sent to ‘‘various news
outlets and persons’’ an anonymous letter bearing the
headline ‘‘Attorney Beats Wife In Front of Child,’’ which
set forth the factual basis for the charges against the
plaintiff, identified the plaintiff by his name, date of
birth, and office address, and opined that his conduct
was a matter of ‘‘public concern’’ because it implicated
his fitness to practice law and that the judicial system
was likely to cover up the matter due to his status as
an attorney.6 The plaintiff further alleged that Brignole
5
A copy of the plaintiff’s criminal case detail published on the Judicial
Branch website was appended to Brignole’s special motion to dismiss as
an exhibit.
6
The anonymous letter states in relevant part: ‘‘To Whom It May Concern:
‘‘On June 10, 2018 [the plaintiff] ([o]ffice, 525 Windsor [Avenue], Windsor,
CT) was arrested in West Hartford . . . on charges of [a]ssault [in the third]
[d]egree ‘with intent to cause grave physical injury’ and [r]isk of [i]njury to
a [m]inor, a [c]lass C [f]elony. While driving a car in West Hartford with his
young child in the back seat, [the plaintiff] got in an argument with his wife
and he punched her in the face. When he stopped the car, she fled to an
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specified the plaintiff’s law office as the return address
on each correspondence to make it ‘‘appear that the
information came from the plaintiff’s staff.’’
The plaintiff commenced the present action on Sep-
tember 29, 2019.7 His complaint contained two counts
adjacent store and called [the] police. The police observed [that] she had
a swollen eye from being punched.
‘‘Under [rule 8.4 of the] Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct . . .
it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the fitness of a lawyer. Commentary: [l]awyers are
subject to discipline when they violate these rules and ‘offenses involving
violence, dishonesty and breach of trust are in that category.’
‘‘I bring this to your attention out of public concern and under your
watchful eye of enforcing the rules and public mandates. The fact that [the
plaintiff] is a lawyer going around assaulting people reflects badly on the
legal community as a whole. As a lawyer in the Hartford [c]ourts he is held
to a high standard of public trust. His [w]ife and [c]hild are real victims and
he needs to be held accountable. Just because he is a lawyer the system
will try to cover this up. You are our [v]ictims’ [a]dvocates. Help us please.’’
7
Approximately three months later, the plaintiff filed a request for leave
to amend his complaint. Although plaintiffs normally are permitted to seek
amendment of their complaints in accordance with our rules of practice, it
is unclear how that precept operates when a special motion to dismiss has
been filed pursuant to § 52-196a. As we have noted, the ‘‘special statutory
benefit’’ provided by § 52-196a; Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 336 Conn. 372; is
intended to provide ‘‘a prompt remedy’’; Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204
Conn. App. 824; and to minimize expense for moving parties. For that reason,
one Connecticut court recently held that ‘‘[a] plaintiff cannot avoid a special
motion to dismiss by seeking leave to amend its complaint. To allow a
plaintiff to do so would undermine the policy objective of providing a prompt
remedy for those sued because of their exercise of their first amendment
rights.’’ Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center,
Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S (February 23, 2024).
In so concluding, the court relied on California precedent, which has
provided guidance to the courts of this state in interpreting our anti-SLAPP
statute; see, e.g., Pryor v. Brignole, 346 Conn. 534, 546 n.9, 292 A.3d 701
(2023); Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 686, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024),
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, A.3d (2025); and stated: ‘‘California
courts generally refuse to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaints to avoid
a special motion to dismiss, finding it being antithetical to the purpose of
an anti-SLAPP statute.’’ Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch
Recovery Center, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
The court then cited a decision of the California Court of Appeal, which
states: ‘‘Allowing a SLAPP plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once
the court finds the prima facie showing has been met would completely
undermine the statute by providing the pleader a ready escape from . . .
[the] quick dismissal remedy. Instead of having to show a probability of
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sounding in breach of contract. In count one, the plain-
tiff alleged that Brignole’s actions in sending the anony-
mous letter constituted a breach of the nondisparage-
ment provision of the settlement agreement, which
caused him to suffer $55,533.33 in economic damages
and deprived him of the benefit of the agreement. Count
two incorporated by reference the allegations of count
one and further alleged that Brignole ‘‘committed the
success on the merits, the SLAPP plaintiff would be able to go back to the
drawing board with a second opportunity to disguise the vexatious nature
of the suit through more artful pleading. This would trigger a second round
of pleadings, a fresh motion to strike, and inevitably another request for
leave to amend. By the time the moving party would be able to dig out of
this procedural quagmire, the SLAPP plaintiff will have succeeded in his
goal of delay and distraction and running up the costs of his opponent. . . .
Such a plaintiff would accomplish indirectly what could not be accomplished
directly, i.e., depleting the defendant’s energy and draining his or her
resources. . . . This would totally frustrate the [l]egislature’s objective of
providing a quick and inexpensive method for unmasking and dismissing
such suits.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services,
Inc., 122 Cal. App. 4th 1049, 1055–56, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882 (2004).
We need not resolve the novel question of whether, as a matter of Connecti-
cut law, a party is entitled to amend their complaint following the filing of
a special motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a. In the present case,
Brignole’s counsel noted at the hearing on the special motions to dismiss
that the plaintiff had recently filed a request to amend his complaint and
expressed uncertainty as to how that procedural vehicle operates in the
context of special motions to dismiss. Counsel then argued that his client
should have an opportunity to respond to the substance of the plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend and—in the event that the request was
granted—‘‘to respond to [the] amended complaint with a special motion to
dismiss as well.’’ Counsel opined that ‘‘the special motion to dismiss, I think,
has its own operation by statute. It’s not like a normal motion to dismiss.’’
He also volunteered to prepare ‘‘a second motion to dismiss’’ later that
afternoon in response to the plaintiff’s amended complaint ‘‘if it would help
the court . . . .’’ Counsel further observed that the scenario in which a
nonmoving party seeks to amend its complaint following the filing of a
special motion to dismiss was ‘‘something that’s not contemplated in the
statute’’ and concluded by stating, ‘‘honestly, however the court sees fit to
deal with it, as long as everybody’s heard.’’ In response, the court stated:
‘‘[J]ust so . . . we’re clear, I’m going to deal with the pleadings as they
are.’’ The plaintiff thereafter expressed his agreement with that approach,
stating: ‘‘[W]ith regard to the amended complaint, it has not been granted
yet. . . . I’ll concede that the amended complaint is a nullity because it
hasn’t been granted yet.’’ In this appeal, the propriety of the court’s decision
to defer consideration of the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his com-
plaint is not at issue.
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aforementioned breach of contract in his official capac-
ity as manager, owner, and principal’’ of the law firm.
On November 12, 2019, the law firm filed a motion
for an extension of up to thirty days to file a responsive
pleading to the complaint; Brignole filed a similar
request seven days later. On November 22, 2019, Brig-
nole, acting in a self-represented capacity,8 filed two
motions with the court. The first was a motion seeking
the court’s permission to extend the time to file a special
motion to dismiss in accordance with § 52-196a (c).9
The second was a special motion to dismiss the plain-
tiff’s action pursuant to § 52-196a. At the outset of that
pleading, Brignole averred that the allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint were ‘‘baseless.’’ He then stated
that, ‘‘for sake of the motion, [he] takes well-pleaded
facts as though they are true.’’ With respect to the first
prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), Brignole argued that the
speech alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint was ‘‘pre-
sumptively protected’’ under the first amendment and
that it ‘‘falls within the aegis of § 52-196a’’ because crimi-
nal prosecutions are a matter of public concern. He
also argued that the plaintiff could not meet his burden
under the second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), which
requires the plaintiff to establish probable cause that
he will prevail on the merits of his complaint.10
8
On December 12, 2019, Attorney Mario K. Cerame filed an appearance
on behalf of Brignole, who at all times thereafter has been represented
by counsel.
9
General Statutes § 52-196a (c) provides: ‘‘Any party filing a special motion
to dismiss shall file such motion not later than thirty days after the return
date of the complaint, or the filing of a counterclaim or cross claim described
in subsection (b) of this section. The court, upon a showing of good cause
by a party seeking to file a special motion to dismiss, may extend the time
to file a special motion to dismiss.’’ The return date in this case was October
15, 2019.
10
As exhibits to his special motion to dismiss, Brignole appended copies
of (1) an attorney grievance complaint that the plaintiff filed against Brignole,
(2) the anonymous letter in question, (3) the plaintiff’s criminal case detail
from the Judicial Branch website, and (4) the written dismissal of the plain-
tiff’s attorney grievance against Brignole issued by the ‘‘Grievance Panel for
[Geographical Area Thirteen] and the Town of Hartford’’ on May 2, 2019.
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The law firm filed a separate special motion to dis-
miss the plaintiff’s complaint on November 27, 2019,
which is similar to Brignole’s special motion in all mate-
rial respects. The law firm first noted that, ‘‘as a prelimi-
nary matter, [the law firm] denies the allegations in the
complaint.’’ It then argued, ‘‘taking the allegations as
true,’’ that the anonymous letter allegedly sent by Brig-
nole constituted an exercise of his right to free speech
on a matter of public concern and that the plaintiff
could not meet his burden of showing probable cause
that he will succeed on the merits of his breach of
contract claim.
On December 6, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection
to the law firm’s special motion to dismiss, claiming
that it was untimely under § 52-196a (c), as it was filed
more than thirty days after the return date of the com-
plaint. Curiously, the plaintiff then stated: ‘‘In spite of
the foregoing, should the court deem it appropriate, the
plaintiff wishes to have [the law firm’s] special motion
to dismiss decided on the merits, thereby making the
court’s ruling the law of the case. [The law firm] has
waived any claimed first amendment rights to free
speech as it relates to this matter [by virtue of the
nondisparagement clause of the separation agreement].
. . . [The law firm’s] motion should be denied on the
merits.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Three weeks later, the
plaintiff filed an objection to Brignole’s special motion
to dismiss, claiming that it was untimely under § 52-
196a (c) and that Brignole had waived any claimed first
amendment rights by virtue of the nondisparagement
clause of the separation agreement. The plaintiff thus
argued that Brignole’s special motion to dismiss should
be denied.
The court heard argument on the special motions to
dismiss on January 13, 2020. At that time, the court
That written dismissal notes that Brignole denied the factual allegations set
forth in the plaintiff’s attorney grievance complaint.
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invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs on
the issue of whether speech that allegedly violated a
nondisparagement clause could fall within the ambit of
an anti-SLAPP statute.11 Both defendants filed supple-
mental briefs in accordance with that directive.
In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court
rejected the defendants’ argument that circulation of
the anonymous letter constituted an exercise of free
speech on a matter of public concern entitled to the
protections of § 52-196a. The court stated that the
‘‘problem’’ with that contention was that Brignole, as
manager, owner, and principal of the law firm, ‘‘denie[d]
sending the letters at issue and, thus, denie[d] engaging
in any speech at all, protected or not.’’ The court empha-
sized that the defendants had ‘‘submitted no facts what-
soever from which the court can determine that . . .
Brignole was exercising his free speech rights. Indeed,
[the] pleadings affirmatively state that [Brignole] did
not make the statements attributed to him by the com-
plaint.’’ The court rejected the defendants’ argument
that, for purposes of analyzing a moving party’s burden
under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), a court may
assume the truth of the allegations of the complaint.
Rather, the court reasoned that, to properly invoke the
special statutory benefit provided by § 52-196a, a mov-
ing party must make a threshold showing, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that it has been sued for exer-
cising its first amendment rights. The court concluded
that the defendants had failed to meet that burden and,
accordingly, denied their special motions to dismiss.12
11
At the hearing, the court noted that § 52-196a was ‘‘relatively new’’ and
that ‘‘there are other states that have similar statutes that are older.’’ The
court thus offered the parties an opportunity to file simultaneous supplemen-
tal briefs on the issue of whether there are any cases from other states
applying their anti-SLAPP statutes in a factual scenario similar to the pres-
ent case.
12
Although the plaintiff argued that § 52-196a does not apply to speech
that violates a nondisparagement clause between the parties, the trial court
did not address that issue. As our Supreme Court has noted, that issue of
contractual waiver ‘‘more properly [is] considered under the second [prong]
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From those judgments, the defendants filed separate
appeals with this court. The plaintiff thereafter filed
motions to dismiss those appeals for lack of an appeal-
able final judgment, which this court granted. The
defendants appealed the propriety of that determination
to our Supreme Court, which, in a divided opinion,
concluded that a trial court’s denial of a colorable spe-
cial motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a is an
appealable final judgment under State v. Curcio, 191
Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). See Pryor v. Brignole,
346 Conn. 534, 538, 292 A.3d 701 (2023).13 The court
thus remanded the appeals to this court ‘‘for further
proceedings according to law.’’ Id., 546. In accordance
with that directive, we now consider the claims pre-
sented by the parties in these appeals.
of § 52-196a (e) (3).’’ Pryor v. Brignole, 346 Conn. 534, 546 n.9, 292 A.3d
701 (2023); accord Thompson v. Inglewood Unified School District, Docket
No. B264151, 2016 WL 5462850, *5 n.4 (Cal. App. September 29, 2016)
(explaining that ‘‘[t]he mere existence of the non-disparagement clause does
not defeat defendants’ ability to meet their burden’’ under step one of
California’s anti-SLAPP statute and that, ‘‘[w]hether [the] speech violated
the non-disparagement clause is an issue more appropriately addressed in
the step [two] probability of prevailing on the claims analysis’’); Lowes v.
Thompson, 331 Or. App. 406, 411, 546 P.3d 311 (‘‘unchallenged evidence of
a waiver of the rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute can satisfy a
plaintiff’s burden to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion once a defendant has
satisfied [its] burden at the first step’’), review allowed, 372 Or. 560, 551
P.3d 398 (2024). In this appeal, the plaintiff has not raised that contractual
waiver issue as an alternative ground of affirmance pursuant to Practice
Book § 63-4 (a) (1), and the parties have not briefed it. Accordingly, it is
not properly before us.
In addition, we note that the trial court did not explicitly rule on the
timeliness objection raised by the plaintiff, which we discuss in part III of
this opinion. The court also did not reach the issue of whether the plaintiff
satisfied his burden under the second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to establish
probable cause that he will prevail on the merits of his complaint. That
issue, which encompasses the contractual waiver claim raised by the plaintiff
in its objections to the special motions to dismiss; see Pryor v. Brignole,
supra, 346 Conn. 546 n.9; is a matter for the court to resolve on remand.
13
Our Supreme Court likewise was divided in two companion cases
released the same day as Pryor v. Brignole, supra, 346 Conn. 534. See
Robinson v. V. D., 346 Conn. 1002, 293 A.3d 345 (2023); Smith v. Supple,
supra, 346 Conn. 928.
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I
On appeal, the defendants claim that the court
improperly concluded that they could not meet their
initial burden under § 52-196a (e) (3) of demonstrating
that the plaintiff’s complaint was based on Brignole’s
exercise of the right to free speech in light of their
denial that Brignole engaged in the conduct alleged
therein—namely, sending the anonymous letter regard-
ing the plaintiff’s June 10, 2018 arrest to various news
outlets and persons. The defendants submit that the
pertinent inquiry under the first prong of § 52-196a (e)
(3) focuses on the allegations of the complaint, counter-
claim or cross claim and does not require a moving party
to admit to any facts. That claim presents a question
of first impression in this state.14
The defendants’ claim involves an issue of statutory
interpretation, over which our review is plenary. See,
e.g., 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District
Commission, 336 Conn. 819, 827, 251 A.3d 56 (2020).
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case
. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General
Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of
the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such rela-
tionship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambig-
uous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall
14
The plaintiff did not address the defendants’ claim regarding the proper
interpretation of § 52-196a (e) (3) in his appellate briefs or at oral argument
before this court. The burden nonetheless remains on the defendants, as
appellants, to establish reversible error on the part of the trial court. See
Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 145, 101 A.3d 279, cert. denied,
315 Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107 (2014).
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not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and
unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance
to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
and [common-law] principles governing the same gen-
eral subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Vitti v. Milford, 336 Conn. 654, 660, 249 A.3d
726 (2020).
A
Our analysis, as always, begins with the language of
the statute, which ‘‘affords a defendant a substantive
right to avoid litigation on the merits that can be costly
and burdensome’’; Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn.
949; through ‘‘the dismissal of a SLAPP suit.’’ Id., 935.
The statutory right to seek such a dismissal is memorial-
ized in § 52-196a (b), which provides: ‘‘In any civil action
in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross
claim against an opposing party that is based on the
opposing party’s exercise of its right of free speech,
right to petition the government, or right of association
under the Constitution of the United States or the Con-
stitution of the state in connection with a matter of
public concern, such opposing party may file a special
motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross
claim.’’15 The subsections that follow set forth the proce-
dure that governs the exercise of that right. See, e.g.,
General Statutes § 52-196a (c) (setting deadline to file
15
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (2) defines ‘‘ ‘[r]ight of free speech’ ’’ as
‘‘communicating, or conduct furthering communication, in a public forum
on a matter of public concern . . . .’’
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (3) defines ‘‘ ‘[r]ight to petition the govern-
ment’ ’’ as ‘‘(A) communication in connection with an issue under consider-
ation or review by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other
governmental body, (B) communication that is reasonably likely to encour-
age consideration or review of a matter of public concern by a legislative,
executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body, or (C) com-
munication that is reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort
to effect consideration of an issue by a legislative, executive, administrative,
judicial or other governmental body . . . .’’
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special motion to dismiss); General Statutes § 52-196a
(d) (providing for stay of discovery upon filing of special
motion to dismiss); General Statutes § 52-196a (f) (pro-
viding for award of costs and attorney’s fees to prevail-
ing party).
Section 52-196a (e) pertains to the conduct of the
court in acting on a special motion to dismiss. See
General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (1) (requiring court to
hold expedited hearing on special motion to dismiss);
General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (2) (requiring court to
consider pleadings and affidavits of parties in ruling on
special motion to dismiss); General Statutes § 52-196a
(e) (4) (requiring court to rule on special motion to
dismiss ‘‘as soon as practicable’’). The subdivision at
issue here, § 52-196a (e) (3), specifies the legal standard
to be applied by the trial court in ruling on a special
motion to dismiss. It provides: ‘‘The court shall grant
a special motion to dismiss if the moving party makes
an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,16
that the opposing party’s complaint, counterclaim or
cross claim is based on the moving party’s exercise of
its right of free speech, right to petition the government,
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (4) defines ‘‘ ‘[r]ight of association’ ’’ as
‘‘communication among individuals who join together to collectively
express, promote, pursue or defend common interests . . . .’’
16
To be clear, although § 52-196a (e) (3) references the preponderance
of the evidence standard, the statutory scheme does not provide for an
evidentiary hearing of any kind. Rather, the court is obligated to hold an
expedited hearing on the special motion to dismiss and thereafter render
a ruling in light of the ‘‘pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits
of the parties attesting to the facts upon which liability or a defense, as the
case may be, is based.’’ General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (2). We note in this
regard that, during the legislative debate on the bill that became § 52-196a,
Representative Doug Dubitsky inquired as to whether it contemplated ‘‘an
evidentiary hearing that would take place . . . .’’ 60 H.R. Proc., Pt. 16, 2017
Sess., p. 6888. In response, Representative William Tong explained: ‘‘I think
it contemplates that the court will certainly conduct a hearing. It doesn’t
contemplate that a specific evidentiary hearing so docketed would occur
but it provides that there will be a hearing on the evidence presented, the
pleading, supporting and opposing affidavits . . . .’’ Id., p. 6889.
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or right of association under the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state in connec-
tion with a matter of public concern, unless the party
that brought the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim
sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving
rise to the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim and
demonstrates to the court that there is probable cause,
considering all valid defenses, that the party will prevail
on the merits of the complaint, counterclaim or cross
claim.’’17 (Footnote added.) General Statutes § 52-196a
(e) (3).

‘‘[I]n deciding a special motion to dismiss under § 52-
196a (e) (3), Connecticut courts must undertake a two-
pronged, burden shifting analysis.’’ Smith v. Supple,
supra, 346 Conn. 933. ‘‘Pursuant to § 52-196a (e) (3), a
party that files a special motion to dismiss bears the
initial burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the opposing party’s complaint . . .
is based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of
free speech, right to petition the government, or right
of association . . . in connection with a matter of pub-
lic concern . . . . If that burden is met, the burden
shifts to the party that brought the complaint to demon-
strate that there is probable cause, considering all valid
defenses, that the party will prevail on the merits of
the complaint . . . . For a special motion to dismiss
to be granted, the court must resolve both prongs in
favor of the moving party.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Mulvihill v. Spinnato, 228
Conn. App. 781, 787–88, 326 A.3d 251, cert. denied, 350
Conn. 926, 326 A.3d 248 (2024). In the present case, the
court concluded that the defendants had not met their
burden under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) and
17
Section 52-196a (g) provides that any findings or determinations made
by the court pursuant to § 52-196a (e) ‘‘shall not be admitted into evidence
at any later stage of the proceeding or in any subsequent action.’’
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therefore did not consider whether the plaintiff satisfied
his corresponding burden under its second prong.
Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the first prong of
§ 52-196a (e) (3), which obligates the moving party to
establish ‘‘that the opposing party’s complaint, counter-
claim or cross claim is based on the moving party’s
exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the
government, or right of association’’ under the federal
or state constitutions.18 In construing that language, the
defendants emphasize that it centers on the nature of
the complaint at issue. They contend that the salient
question under the first prong is whether a fair reading
of the complaint indicates that it pertains to alleged
conduct that may be considered an exercise of first
amendment rights. In their view, whether or not the
moving party admits or denies those allegations is irrele-
vant to that threshold inquiry. The defendants further
argue that a contrary construction would deprive defen-
dants of protection for anonymous speech and situa-
tions in which a plaintiff patently lies about a defen-
dant’s speech or conduct. Moreover, because the
second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) involves a merits
based analysis to determine whether the plaintiff has
established probable cause of prevailing on the com-
plaint, the defendants argue that the moving party’s
admission or denial of the material allegations more
properly is considered as part of that secondary analy-
sis.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court
adopted a different construction. Because § 52-196a (b)
and (e) (3) explicitly require proof that a complaint is
based on the moving party’s exercise of its first amend-
ment rights, the court concluded that a party may avail
18
We note that § 52-196a (b), which memorializes the statutory right to
seek a prompt dismissal of a SLAPP suit at the outset of litigation, contains
largely identical language.
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itself of the special motion to dismiss procedure author-
ized by § 52-196a—and meet its statutory burden under
the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3)—only when it
acknowledges that it has exercised those rights as
alleged in the complaint. In this regard, we note that
Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted ‘‘to
address situations in which people have spoken out on
matters of public concern’’ and thereafter were sub-
jected to abusive litigation. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 336 Conn. 382 n.36;
see also Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 944 n.13
(§ 52-196a is intended to provide ‘‘a mechanism that can
save money for defendants that are wrongly targeted
for simply exercising their rights . . . on the [first]
[a]mendment and other matters of public concern’’
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).
When a moving party pursuing a special motion to dis-
miss denies exercising its first amendment rights, the
protections provided by § 52-196a arguably have no
application. See Pryor v. Brignole, supra, 346 Conn.
552 (D’Auria, J., dissenting).
Under our rules of statutory construction, ambiguity
arises whenever statutory language is subject to more
than one plausible interpretation. See, e.g., Redding v.
Georgetown Land Development Co., LLC, 337 Conn.
75, 84 n.9, 251 A.3d 980 (2020) (‘‘[o]ur case law is clear
that ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at
issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpre-
tation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Commis-
sioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Com-
mission, 307 Conn. 53, 68, 52 A.3d 636 (2012)
(‘‘[b]ecause we believe that both of these interpreta-
tions are plausible, we conclude that the language [in
question] is ambiguous’’). In our view, it is plausible
that the legislature intended the inquiry under the first
prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to focus exclusively on the
allegations of the complaint to determine whether they
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allege conduct that implicates the moving party’s first
amendment rights, particularly because the second
prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) entails a merits based determi-
nation. At the same time, it is equally plausible that the
legislature’s repeated use of the phrase ‘‘based on the
moving party’s exercise’’ of its first amendment rights
in § 52-196a (b) and (e) (3) was a deliberate attempt to
confine the protections of our anti-SLAPP statute to
parties that had, in fact, exercised those rights. Under
that scenario, the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) would
require the moving party, as part of its initial burden,
to demonstrate that it had engaged in the exercise of
first amendment rights. We therefore conclude that the
statutory language in question is subject to more than
one plausible interpretation. For that reason, § 52-196a
(e) (3) is ambiguous as applied to the facts of this
case. Accordingly, resort to extratextual materials is
warranted. See, e.g., State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn.
1, 17, 981 A.2d 427 (2009).
B
The legislative history of § 52-196a provides
important context for the present discussion.19 It never-
theless does not resolve the novel question before us.
In 2017, the legislature passed No. 17-71 of the 2017
Public Acts (P.A. 17-71), which became effective on
January 1, 2018, joining dozens of states that already
had enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. The legislative history
of P.A. 17-71, §1, indicates that it was modeled after
anti-SLAPP statutes from other states. See 60 S. Proc.,
Pt. 6, 2017 Sess., p. 2236, remarks of Senator John A.
Kissel (explaining that P.A. 17-71 ‘‘is a compilation of
some of the best laws . . . from throughout the United
States’’); 60 H.R. Proc., Pt. 16, 2017 Sess., p. 6884,
remarks of Representative William Tong (noting that
19
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants discuss the legislative history
of § 52-196a in any manner in their respective appellate briefs.
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‘‘twenty-nine other states have adopted . . . legisla-
tion very similar to the construct we have here’’). As
Klarn DePalma, vice president and general manager at
WFSB-TV 3, testified at the hearing on P.A. 17-71, the
language of the proposed bill was ‘‘similar to [existing
anti-SLAPP statutes in] California, Oregon, Texas and
Washington.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hear-
ings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 2017 Sess., p. 4602.
The legislative history also indicates that, in enacting
P.A. 17-71, our General Assembly sought to balance a
defendant’s first amendment rights with a plaintiff’s
right to pursue a claim in our courts, a right guaranteed
by our state constitution.20 As DePalma testified, P.A.
17-71 ‘‘would protect individuals and organizations that
speak, petition the government, and associate with oth-
ers on [a] matter of public [concern] from lengthy,
expensive litigation, while preserving the ability of peo-
ple and businesses to file meritorious lawsuits.’’ Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8,
2017 Sess., p. 4602. Eric Parker, an investigative
reporter, testified similarly that P.A. 17-71 ‘‘gives defen-
dants a way to short circuit litigation that’s only
designed to harass, threaten and intimidate. It sets up
a clear test. If the complaint shows a bare minimum of
validity, it moves forward. If it does not, the defendant
can end the litigation quickly and without the months
of delays and expenses that come with it. It doesn’t
mean valid lawsuits won’t get prosecuted. Those claims
do exist and they should be allowed to move forward.
The plaintiffs deserve every ounce of the rights the
courts give them. But when a lawsuit aims to just silence
free speech, especially on a matter of public concern,
this bill establishes a special motion to dismiss.’’ Conn.
20
The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 10, provides in relevant
part: ‘‘All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law . . . .’’
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Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9,
2017 Sess., pp. 4779–80.
The legislative debate on P.A. 17-71 also demon-
strates that the General Assembly was keenly aware of
the need to balance those constitutional interests. As
Representative Rosa C. Rebimbas noted: ‘‘[T]his legisla-
tion does provide for an expedited hearing and the
purpose . . . [strikes] a gentle balance between free
speech by being able to resolve any issues once it’s
brought before the court’s attention . . . .’’ 60 H.R.
Proc., supra, pp. 6881–82. Representative Tong, who
sponsored the bill in the House of Representatives, like-
wise recognized that a plaintiff who files suit ‘‘has gener-
ally a right to have his or her claims heard . . . .’’ Id.,
p. 6909; accord Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150
n.11 (R.I. 2008) (anti-SLAPP statutes ‘‘pit two sets of
fundamental constitutional rights against each other:
(1) defendants’ rights of free speech and petition and
(2) plaintiffs’ rights of access to the judicial system
and rights to non-falsely maligned reputations’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The proper construction of
§ 52-196a, therefore, must be cognizant of those consti-
tutional interests.
Unfortunately, the legislative history is silent on the
precise question before us, which is whether a moving
party may satisfy its initial burden under the first prong
of § 52-196a (e) (3) without admitting to engaging in
an exercise of a first amendment right. Moreover, the
legislative history contains statements that support the
competing constructions advanced by the defendants
and the trial court.
The trial court construed the first prong of § 52-196a
(e) (3) as requiring the moving party to demonstrate,
as part of its initial burden, that it had engaged in the
exercise of a first amendment right. That interpretation
is supported by several statements in the legislative
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history that suggest that § 52-196a was enacted to pro-
tect parties who had, in fact, exercised those rights. As
Representative Tong stated: ‘‘[T]he statute contem-
plates that the person [who brings a special motion to
dismiss] is exercising their right of free speech, their
right of petition, their right of association . . . .’’ 60
H.R. Proc., supra, p. 6895. Tong similarly stated that
P.A. 17-71 ‘‘provides for a special motion to dismiss so
that early in the process somebody who’s speaking and
exercised their constitutional right can try to dismiss
a frivolous or abusive claim that has no merit . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., p. 6879. Tong later remarked
that ‘‘the purpose of the statute and the way that it
operates is to provide that a [party] can dismiss a claim
. . . because they’re exercising their constitutional
right to free speech.’’ Id., p. 6950; see also Conn. Joint
Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 2017
Sess., p. 4602 (statement of DePalma that P.A. 17-71
‘‘would protect individuals and organizations that
speak, petition the government, and associate with oth-
ers on [a] matter of public [concern]’’); Conn. Joint
Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2017
Sess., p. 4917 (letter from Michael P. Ryan, president of
the Connecticut Broadcasters Association, explaining
that ‘‘anti-SLAPP laws were enacted [in other states]
to help private citizens who spoke out at public hear-
ings’’); id., p. 4929 (letter from Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America noting that ‘‘SLAPP suits are baseless
lawsuits brought for the purpose of silencing those who
exercise their [f]irst [a]mendment rights’’ and express-
ing support for anti-SLAPP statutes, ‘‘which provide a
means for those sued for [the] exercise of their [f]irst
[a]mendment rights on public issues’’); id., p. 4922 (let-
ter from David McGuire, executive director of American
Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut, stating that ‘‘a
SLAPP suit . . . is a civil lawsuit or counterclaim filed
against individuals or organizations who speak out on
issues of public interest or concern’’).
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At the same time, the legislative history contains
other statements that may be read to support the defen-
dants’ contention the legislature intended the inquiry
under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to focus exclu-
sively on the allegations of the complaint to determine
whether they allege conduct that implicates the moving
party’s first amendment rights, thereby permitting the
moving party to deny or assume the truth of the allega-
tions for purposes of that analysis. During the debate
in the House of Representatives, Representative Rich-
ard A. Smith raised a question on the ‘‘section [of P.A.
17-71] that gives the [trial court] some guidance to
decide on how or whether or not to grant this type of
motion?’’ 60 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 6902. In response,
Representative Tong referenced the provision of P.A.
17-71 that set forth ‘‘the relative burdens among the
parties’’ and explained that it required the moving party
‘‘to make . . . a competent showing before the court
that in fact a claim implicates the exercise of a constitu-
tional right . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Later in that
debate, Representative Arthur J. O’Neill remarked: ‘‘I
thought that . . . the person filing a special motion to
dismiss . . . had to show [that] the subject matter of
the lawsuit was a matter of public concern or a right
to freedom of speech or a right to petition the govern-
ment and a right of association, which is given a defini-
tion; and if that’s what is in effect being targeted—one
of those rights is the target of the underlying lawsuit.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., p. 6938; cf. 60 S. Proc., supra,
p. 2235, remarks of Senator Paul R. Doyle (‘‘the real
intent of the legislation is to assist people that are sued
on their free speech rights to have a means to quickly
get rid of frivolous lawsuits’’).
Although legislative history can be illuminating when
it documents a clear intention on the part of legislators
in enacting a given statute, it provides little guidance
when it contains conflicting statements or a clouded
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reflection of legislative deliberation. See, e.g., Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
568, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 162 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2005) (‘‘[L]egisla-
tive history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contra-
dictory. Judicial investigation of legislative history has
a tendency to become . . . an exercise in looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)); Washington Alliance of Technol-
ogy Workers v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 50 F.4th
164, 203 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (Henderson, J., concur-
ring) (noting ‘‘the danger of using legislative history’’
when it contains ‘‘conflicting legislative history’’), cert.
denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 78, 217 L. Ed. 2d 14
(2023); Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 431 (7th Cir.
2019) (‘‘[c]onflicting statements among members of
Congress . . . reveal the unreliability of this legislative
history’’); Little v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,
690 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 2012) (‘‘[t]he divergent mes-
sages that can be obtained from legislative history ren-
der [it] prone to selective use’’); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (‘‘[o]ften there is so much
legislative history that a court can manipulate the mean-
ing of a law by choosing which snippets to emphasize’’);
DuBaldo Electric, LLC v. Montagno Construction, Inc.,
119 Conn. App. 423, 451–52, 988 A.2d 351 (2010) (con-
cluding that, because ‘‘[t]he legislative history sur-
rounding [General Statutes] § 52-249a is murky’’ and
‘‘[c]ertain portions of the legislative history support the
claims of each party,’’ ‘‘[t]he legislative history of § 52-
249a plainly is not a clear and unequivocal expression
of intent’’). Given the murky, and at times contradictory,
nature of the legislative history of § 52-196a, we cannot
resolve the interpretive question before us on that
basis alone.
C
As our Supreme Court has observed, § 52-196a
‘‘affords a defendant a substantive right to avoid litiga-
tion on the merits that can be costly and burdensome
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. . . .’’ Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 949. The
defendants thus argue that § 52-196a must be broadly
construed in favor of parties that file special motions
to dismiss, consistent with the maxim that remedial
statutes are to be ‘‘liberally construed in favor of those
whom the legislature intended to benefit.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Larsen Chelsey Realty Co.
v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 492, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995).
We perceive several problems with the defendants’
contention. Although the aim of § 52-196a undoubtedly
is salutary, the scant legislative history on this point
suggests that the General Assembly intended its applica-
tion to be narrow, rather than far-reaching, in scope.
See 60 S. Proc., supra, p. 2237, remarks of Senator Kissel
(explaining that legislature ‘‘worked very closely with
the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association to make sure
that it was not overly broad’’ and that ‘‘it is narrowly
tailored for these [SLAPP] suits which have . . . a
chilling effect on first amendment rights’’); Conn. Joint
Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2017
Sess., p. 4922 (letter from American Civil Liberties
Union of Connecticut expressing support for ‘‘a care-
fully calibrated anti-SLAPP legislation’’).
Moreover, had the legislature intended to mandate a
broad interpretation of § 52-196a, it certainly knew how
to do so; see Genesky v. East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246,
258, 881 A.2d 114 (2005); as it expressly has done in
other contexts. See, e.g., General Statutes § 9-368o
(‘‘[a]ny provision of the general statutes . . . relating
to the right to vote shall be construed liberally’’); Gen-
eral Statutes § 10a-109p (‘‘[§§] 10a-109a to 10a-109y,
inclusive, being necessary for the welfare of the state
and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect
the purposes thereof’’); General Statutes § 38a-861
(‘‘[§§] 38a-858 to 38a-875, inclusive, shall be liberally
construed to effect the purpose under [§] 38a-859’’);
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General Statutes § 45a-468 (b) (‘‘[§§] 45a-468 to 45a-
468m, inclusive, and [§] 45a-369 shall be liberally con-
strued and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses’’). The legislature did not include such a directive
in our anti-SLAPP statute. Contra Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 425.16 (a) (Deering Supp. 2021) (California anti-
SLAPP statute ‘‘shall be construed broadly’’); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 60-5320 (k) (2016) (‘‘[t]he provisions of the [Kan-
sas anti-SLAPP statute] shall be applied and construed
liberally to effectuate its general purposes’’); Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 31.152 (6) (West 2017) (Oregon anti-SLAPP
statute ‘‘to be liberally construed in favor of the exer-
cise’’ of first amendment rights).
In addition, the legislative history plainly indicates
that the General Assembly, in enacting § 52-196a, was
cognizant of the need to carefully balance a defendant’s
first amendment rights with a plaintiff’s right to pursue
a claim in our courts, a right secured under article first,
§ 10, of our state constitution. See 60 H.R. Proc., supra,
pp. 6881–82, remarks of Representative Rebimbas (‘‘this
legislation does provide for an expedited hearing and
the purpose . . . [strikes] a gentle balance between
free speech by being able to resolve any issues once
it’s brought before the court’s attention’’); id., p. 6909,
remarks of Representative Tong (explaining that plain-
tiff who files lawsuit ‘‘has generally a right to have his
or her claims heard’’); Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2017 Sess., p. 4780, testimony
of Eric Parker (‘‘valid lawsuits’’ should ‘‘be allowed to
move forward’’ and plaintiffs who bring them ‘‘deserve
every ounce of the rights the courts give them’’); see
also Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 967 (D’Auria,
J., dissenting) (legislative history of § 52-196a indicates
that ‘‘the legislature balanced the rights of plaintiffs
who claim damages to pursue legal action in our courts
. . . and the rights of defendants who claim that the
action is nothing more than retaliation for exercising
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their protected constitutional rights’’ (citation omitted;
footnote omitted)). Because the legislature expressly
acknowledged the competing constitutional interests
at stake and delicately balanced them in crafting § 52-
196a, we are hesitant to mandate a liberal construction
of that statute in favor of moving parties, as urged by
the defendants. Indeed, in the seven years since it was
enacted, neither our Supreme Court nor any Connecti-
cut court has applied that maxim of statutory interpreta-
tion to § 52-196a. We decline the defendants’ invitation
to do so now.
D
The legislative history of § 52-196a also indicates that
it was predicated on, and borrowed heavily from, anti-
SLAPP statutes enacted in other states.21 See 60 S. Proc.,
Pt. 6, 2017 Sess., p. 2236, remarks of Senator Kissel;
Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary,
Pt. 8, 2017 Sess., p. 4602, remarks of Klarn DePalma;
see also Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 953 n.22
(‘‘[a]n examination of . . . sister state case law is par-
ticularly instructive . . . because the legislative his-
tory of our anti-SLAPP statute signifies that it was mod-
eled after anti-SLAPP statutes that came before it in
other states’’). For that reason, a review of relevant
authority from sibling states is pertinent to the present
inquiry.
We begin with a case from Texas, whose anti-SLAPP
statute served as a model for § 52-196a. See Conn. Joint
Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 2017
Sess., p. 4602, remarks of Klarn DePalma. Like § 52-
196a, the Texas anti-SLAPP statute ‘‘provides a proce-
dure for expeditiously dismissing a non-meritorious
21
As one court noted, ‘‘[o]ver thirty states now have anti-SLAPP statutes
in place, and while the particular language varies, the stated purpose of
anti-SLAPP legislation is consistent.’’ Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers,
639 S.W.3d 651, 659 (Tenn. App. 2021).
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legal action that is based on, relates to, or is in response
to the party’s exercise of . . . the right of free speech
. . . defined as a communication made in connection
with a matter of public concern.’’ (Footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Hersh v. Tatum, 526
S.W.3d 462, 463 (Tex. 2017). Moreover, like § 52-196a
(e) (3), the legal standard articulated in the Texas anti-
SLAPP statute contains two prongs that impose recipro-
cal burdens on parties. See Tex. Civil Code Ann. § 27.005
(West 2019). Under its first prong, a party may move
to dismiss a civil action if that action ‘‘is based on,
relates to, or is in response to a party’s exercise of . . .
the right of free speech . . . the right to petition; or
. . . the right of association . . . .’’ Tex. Civil Code
Ann. § 27.005 (b) (1) (West 2019). As with Connecticut’s
anti-SLAPP statute; see General Statutes § 52-196a (e)
(2); the Texas anti-SLAPP statute directs its courts to
consider, inter alia, ‘‘the pleadings’’ and the ‘‘supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the
liability or defense is based.’’22 Tex. Civil Code Ann.
§ 27.006 (West 2019).
In Hersh v. Tatum, supra, 526 S.W.3d 463, the Texas
Supreme Court confronted the precise question now
before this court—whether ‘‘a defendant [may] obtain
dismissal of a suit [under the first prong of Tex. Civil
Code Ann. § 27.005] alleging such a communication if
she denies making it?’’ The defendant in that case
denied making the statements in question; in response,
22
Like other jurisdictions, Texas has seen a proliferation of appellate
litigation since adopting its anti-SLAPP statute. As one commentator notes:
‘‘Since being enacted in 2011, the Texas Anti-SLAPP statute is by far the
subject of more appeals than any other topic. Texas courts of appeals have
issued already over 350 opinions concerning the statute’s reach, while dozens
more await rulings. At least 15 anti-SLAPP cases are now pending in the
Texas Supreme Court. No one should be surprised to learn that more than
one in ten of the opinions now coming out of the appellate courts of Texas
concern anti-SLAPP.’’ D. Felton, ‘‘Avoid the SLAPP Trap,’’ 57 Houston Law.
22 (2019).
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the plaintiffs ‘‘argued that [the defendant] cannot invoke
the [anti-SLAPP statute] while continuing to deny . . .
the communication that is the basis of their complaint.’’
Id., 465. After the trial court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the Texas Court of Appeals—like
the trial court in the present case—concluded that ‘‘a
defendant who denies making the communication
alleged [in the plaintiff’s complaint] cannot invoke’’ the
protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Id.

On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with
that determination. In so doing, it emphasized that the
anti-SLAPP statute obligates the trial court, in ruling
on a special motion to dismiss, to consider the plead-
ings, and the complaint in particular. As it stated:
‘‘Indeed, it would be impossible to determine the basis
of a legal action, and thus the applicability of the [anti-
SLAPP statute], without considering the plaintiff’s peti-
tion. . . . [T]he plaintiff’s petition . . . is the best and
all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action. . . .
The basis of a legal action is not determined by the
defendant’s admissions or denials but by the plaintiff’s
allegations.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 467. The court
thus reasoned that, ‘‘[w]hen it is clear from the plaintiff’s
pleadings that the action is covered by the [anti-SLAPP
statute], the defendant need show no more [under the
first prong of the legal standard set forth therein]. . . .
[A] defendant moving for dismissal need show only that
the plaintiff’s ‘legal action is based on, relates to, or is
in response to the [defendant’s] exercise of . . . the
right of free speech’ . . . that is, ‘a communication
made in connection with a matter of public concern’
. . . not that the communication actually occurred.’’
(Footnotes omitted.) Id. Accordingly, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had satis-
fied her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP
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statute ‘‘[b]y relying on the language used’’ in the plain-
tiffs’ complaint. Id., 468.
The Supreme Court of Nevada reached a similar
result in Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711, 499
P.3d 611 (2021). As our Supreme Court has observed,
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is ‘‘similarly worded’’ to
§ 52-196a. Pryor v. Brignole, supra, 346 Conn. 544. Like
§ 52-196a (e) (3), Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute mandates
that, ‘‘[u]nder step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation,
the [trial] court must ‘[d]etermine whether the moving
party has established, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the claim is based upon a good faith commu-
nication in furtherance of the right to petition or the
right to free speech in direct connection with an issue
of public concern.’ ’’ Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, supra,
711. The question presented in Spirtos was ‘‘how a
[trial] court at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation
should proceed when the moving party denies making
the alleged communication.’’ Id. Because that first
prong centers on the ‘‘claim’’ asserted against a defen-
dant, the court reasoned that the trial court ‘‘should
evaluate the statement forming the basis of the plain-
tiff’s complaint, which, in this case was the version
of the statement that [the plaintiff] alleged [that the
defendant] made.’’ Id., 715. The court explained that,
‘‘at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a [trial] court
and this court must evaluate the communication as it
is alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint and in any of the
plaintiff’s clarifying declarations.’’ Id. For that reason,
the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that ‘‘a moving
party’s denial that he or she made the alleged statements
has no relevance at step one of the anti-SLAPP evalua-
tion.’’ Id., 720.
Also germane to the inquiry before us is a decision
of the Court of Appeals of Kansas. In T & T Financial
of Kansas City, LLC v. Taylor, 2017 WL 6546634, *1
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(Kan. App. December 22, 2017) (unpublished opinion),23
the trial court denied a motion to dismiss a defamation
action pursuant to the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute ‘‘for
the sole reason that [the defendant] denied making
some of the communications identified’’ in the plaintiff’s
complaint; id., *4; the same basis on which the trial
court denied the special motion to dismiss in the present
case. In reviewing the propriety of that legal determina-
tion, the Court of Appeals of Kansas first noted that
the anti-SLAPP statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5320 (d),24
‘‘requires a two-step analysis for the [trial] court to
determine if the motion to strike should be granted.
First, a party bringing the motion to strike has the initial
burden of showing that the claim against which the
motion is based concerns a party’s exercise of the right
of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of
association. Second, if the moving party meets this ini-
tial burden, the burden then shifts to the responding
party to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the claim
by presenting substantial competent evidence to sup-
port a prima facie case.’’ Id.

Like the trial court in the present case, the plaintiff
in T & T Financial of Kansas City, LLC, focused on
23
T & T Financial of Kansas City, LLC, was not designated for publica-
tion. Its reasoning nonetheless was adopted by the Court of Appeals of
Kansas in the subsequent decision of Doe v. Kansas State University, 61
Kan. App. 2d 128, 143, 499 P.3d 1136 (2021).
24
The legal standard set forth in Kansas’ anti-SLAPP statute is similar to
that contained in § 52-196a (e) (3). It provides in relevant part: ‘‘A party
may bring a motion to strike the claim if a claim is based on, relates to or
is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to
petition or right of association. A party bringing the motion to strike has
the initial burden of making a prima facie case showing the claim against
which the motion is based concerns a party’s exercise of the right of free
speech, right to petition or right of association. If the moving party meets
the burden, the burden shifts to the responding party to establish a likelihood
of prevailing on the claim by presenting substantial competent evidence to
support a prima facie case. If the responding party meets the burden, the
court shall deny the motion. . . .’’ Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5320 (d) (2016).
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the language in the anti-SLAPP statute that requires
the moving party to demonstrate, as part of its initial
burden, that the opposing party’s claim concerns the
moving party’s exercise of a first amendment right. As
the Court of Appeals of Kansas explained, the plaintiff
‘‘contends that this language requires [the defendant]
to admit to the allegations in question before filing a
motion to strike. [The plaintiff] asserts that since [the
defendant] denies making the allegedly defamatory
statements, she could not have engaged in the exercise
of free speech; thus, she should not be afforded the
protection of the statute.’’ Id., *5. The Court of Appeals
of Kansas disagreed, stating: ‘‘[W]e conclude that
whether a party may properly bring a motion to strike
turns solely on the contents of the plaintiff’s claims.
[The anti-SLAPP statute] provides that a party may bring
a motion to strike if a claim is based on a party’s
exercise of a protected right. Moreover, a party bringing
the motion to strike has the initial burden of showing
that the claim against which the motion is based con-
cerns a party’s exercise of a protected right. Put simply,
step one of the analysis under [the anti-SLAPP statute]
only concerns the content of the claims. As a result,
whether [the defendant] later admits or denies the alle-
gations is not relevant regarding step one [of the] analy-
sis because the district court should only consider the
contents of the claims in the petition.’’ (Emphasis in
original.) Id. For that reason, the court concluded that
the trial court ‘‘erred by denying the motion to strike
based solely on the reason that [the defendant] denied
making some of the communications in question. We
interpret [the anti-SLAPP statute] to mean that a party
bringing a motion to strike has the initial burden of
showing that the claims in the plaintiff’s petition impli-
cate a protected right under the statute, and it is irrele-
vant whether the defendant admits or denies making
the statements in question.’’ Id., *6.
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The Court of Appeals of Kansas further observed that
‘‘[t]he fact that [the defendant] denied making some of
the statements in question may have a bearing on the
second step in the analysis under [the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute], but the [trial] court never reached the second step
in the case herein.’’ Id. That precept is consistent with
California law, which consistently has held that ‘‘merits
based arguments have no place in [the] threshold analy-
sis of whether plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from
protected activity’’ under the first prong of the anti-
SLAPP analysis. Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th
719, 733, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier
v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94, 52 P.3d 703, 124 Cal. Rptr.
2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity
requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and
any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele-
vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App.
4th 1283, 1304, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’
denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong
and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP
motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Costa
Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC, 214 Cal. App. 4th
358, 371, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 698 (2013) (‘‘[t]he merits of
[the plaintiff’s] claims should play no part in the first
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis’’); Coretronic Corp. v.
Cozen O’Connor, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1388, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 254 (2011) (‘‘[a]rguments about the merits of
the claims are irrelevant to the first step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis’’); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Pal-
adino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906
(2001) (threshold question of whether anti-SLAPP stat-
ute applies is distinct from question of whether plaintiff
has established probability of success).

In our view, the foregoing authority is well reasoned
and convincing. It also is consonant with the policies
and purposes of Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, as
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articulated in the legislative history before us. Further-
more, our research has not disclosed controlling author-
ity from any jurisdiction that obligates a moving party,
under the first prong of an anti-SLAPP analysis, to admit
the truth of an opposing party’s allegations. To conclude
otherwise would deny parties the protections of § 52-
196a when a complaint contains false allegations about
their conduct. For that reason, we join those jurisdic-
tions that have held that the merits of a complaint—and
the moving party’s corresponding admission or denial
of the allegations therein—have no bearing on the
threshold inquiry under § 52-196a (e) (3) as to whether
the moving party has made ‘‘an initial showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing par-
ty’s complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based on
the moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech,
right to petition the government, or right of association
under the Constitution of the United States or the Con-
stitution of the state in connection with a matter of
public concern . . . .’’

E

Our conclusion today establishes a bright-line rule
that provides clarity to both litigants and the judges of
this state in applying our anti-SLAPP statute. It bears
emphasis that the special motion to dismiss codified in
§ 52-196a is ‘‘a truncated evidentiary procedure enacted
by our legislature in order to . . . provide for a prompt
remedy.’’ Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App.
824; see also General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (1) (requir-
ing court to conduct ‘‘an expedited hearing’’ on special
motion to dismiss); Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn.
947 n.16 (§ 52-196a ‘‘provides an ‘expedited off-ramp’
for a party to avoid further litigation); Priore v. Haig,
supra, 344 Conn. 659 (§ 52-196a ‘‘provides a moving
party with the opportunity to have [a] lawsuit dismissed
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early in the proceeding’’). In our view, a clear demarca-
tion of the respective burdens of the parties is necessary
to effectuate that expeditious intent.
To satisfy its burden under the first prong of § 52-
196a (e) (3), a moving party therefore must demonstrate
that the allegations of the complaint, counterclaim or
cross claim in question are predicated on conduct that
implicates its right to free speech, its right to petition
the government, or its right of association in connection
with a matter of public concern. The focus of that initial
inquiry is on the substance of those allegations, as set
forth in the pleadings and any supplemental affidavits
submitted by the nonmoving party; see General Statutes
§ 52-196a (e) (2); and not on an admission or denial of
those allegations by the moving party. Any denial of
the pertinent allegations by a moving party or indication
that it was not engaged in the exercise of a first amend-
ment right remains relevant to the inquiry under the
second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), which requires a
nonmoving party to establish probable cause that it will
prevail on the merits of its complaint.25
25
Our courts must be ‘‘mindful that anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss are
designed to weed out meritless claims at an early stage of litigation . . .
and that, with respect to the second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), they are
governed by a minimal legal standard.’’ (Citation omitted.) Mulvihill v.
Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 801; see also Elder v. Kauffman, supra,
204 Conn. App. 825 (‘‘[p]roof of probable cause is not as demanding as proof
by a preponderance of the evidence’’); People’s United Bank v. Kudej, 134
Conn. App. 432, 442, 39 A.3d 1139 (2012) (noting ‘‘the very low burden of
proof required in a probable cause hearing’’); cf. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc.
v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘‘the second step of the anti-
SLAPP inquiry is often called the ‘minimal merit’ prong’’); Priore v. Haig,
supra, 344 Conn. 670 (D’Auria, J., concurring) (‘‘the special motion to
dismiss permitted under § 52-196a is easily defeated under a probable cause
standard’’). Moreover, because the procedural mechanism embodied in that
second prong is ‘‘similar to a motion for summary judgment’’; Elder v.
Kauffman, supra, 824; ‘‘when disputed issues of fact arise in the context
of a special motion to dismiss, [Connecticut courts must] view the pleadings
and affidavits of the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party’’ in determining whether the nonmoving party has established probable
cause under the second prong of § 52-196a (e) (3). Mulvihill v. Spinnato,
supra, 797, 802.
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In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court improperly construed the first prong of § 52-196a
(e) (3) to require a moving party to admit to engaging
in the conduct alleged in the operative complaint. It,
therefore, improperly denied the special motions to dis-
miss filed by the defendants on that basis.
II
Despite that infirmity, the plaintiff contends that the
court properly denied the special motions to dismiss
under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) because the
conduct alleged in his complaint did not involve a mat-
ter of public concern. That claim requires little discus-
sion.
As part of its initial burden under § 52-196a (e) (3),
a moving party must demonstrate that the allegations
of the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim in ques-
tion are premised on conduct that implicates its first
amendment rights ‘‘in connection with a matter of pub-
lic concern . . . .’’ ‘‘ ‘Matter of public concern’ ’’ is
defined in § 52-196a (a) (1) as ‘‘an issue related to (A)
health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or com-
munity well-being, (C) the government, zoning and
other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public
figure, or (E) an audiovisual work . . . .’’26
26
The proper scope of matters of public concern, as that terminology is
used in § 52-196a, remains an unanswered question, and one that ultimately
must be resolved by either the legislature or the courts of this state. Although
the statute defines ‘‘ ‘[m]atter of public concern’ ’’ in part as ‘‘an issue related
to . . . community well-being’’; see General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (1) (B);
‘‘community well-being’’ is not defined in our anti-SLAPP statute. As we
recently noted, community well-being ‘‘is a nebulous, broadly worded, and
potentially far-reaching term. If the defendant here is correct that a real
estate agent’s conduct is a matter of community concern sufficient to pre-
clude actions regarding defamatory statements, is the same not true for the
conduct of other licensed professionals in the community, such as teachers,
child care providers, or plumbers? Broadly construed, a matter of ‘commu-
nity well-being’ may pertain to the conduct of any business establishment
that is open to the public.’’ Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App.
789 n.14. In his appellate reply brief, Brignole acknowledges that § 52-196a
(a) (1) ‘‘provides a sweepingly broad definition of ‘matter of public concern’ ’’
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In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that Brignole
sent an anonymous letter regarding the plaintiff’s June
10, 2018 arrest to ‘‘various news outlets and persons’’
that bore the headline ‘‘Attorney Beats Wife In Front
of Child’’ and stated in relevant part that the plaintiff
had been arrested and charged with the crimes of
‘‘[a]ssault [in the third] [d]egree ‘with intent to cause
grave physical injury’ and [r]isk of [i]njury to a [m]inor,
a [c]lass C [f]elony. . . .’’ See footnote 6 of this opinion.
In addition, the anonymous letter specified the ‘‘crimi-
nal docket’’ number assigned by the Judicial Branch in
connection with those offenses. As our Supreme Court
has observed, ‘‘[i]t is well established that [t]he commis-
sion of crime [and] prosecutions resulting from it . . .
are without question events of legitimate concern to
the public . . . . Indeed, [p]ublic allegations that
someone is involved in crime generally are speech on
a matter of public concern.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 319
Conn. 394, 415, 125 A.3d 920 (2015); see also Squeglia
v. Squeglia, 234 Conn. 259, 266 n.6, 661 A.2d 1007 (1995)
(‘‘the perpetration of a crime by a parent upon a child
is a matter of public concern’’). Bound by that authority,
we conclude that the conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s
complaint involved a matter of public concern for pur-
poses of § 52-196a (e) (3).27
and argues that the defendant’s arrest for the crime of assault concerns a
matter of community well-being.
27
The plaintiff also argues that the defendants cannot satisfy their burden
under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to demonstrate that the conduct
in question constitutes speech on a matter of public concern, as opposed
to a matter of purely private significance, because ‘‘the record is absent
any evidence that [anonymous] letters . . . were sent to or received by’’
anyone other than the plaintiff. (Emphasis in original.) He is mistaken. As
we explained in part I of this opinion, the applicable analysis under the first
prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) focuses on the substance of the allegations set
forth in the pleadings. Here, the plaintiff specifically alleged in his complaint
that Brignole sent the anonymous letters ‘‘to various news outlets and per-
sons . . . .’’ For purposes of satisfying the defendants’ initial burden under
§ 52-196a (e) (3), that allegation suffices.
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III
The plaintiff also claims that the defendants waived
their ability to file special motions to dismiss because
they ‘‘failed to obtain the court’s permission to file a
late special motion to dismiss,’’ rendering their motions
untimely. Our review of the court’s memorandum of
decision, considered in light of the existing record, con-
vinces us that the court implicitly granted the defen-
dants’ motions to extend the time to file their special
motions to dismiss.
The plaintiff’s claim requires us to construe the judg-
ment rendered by the court in the present case, as
articulated in its memorandum of decision. ‘‘The con-
struction of a judgment is a question of law with the
determinative factor being the intent of the court as
gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . As a gen-
eral rule, the court should construe [a] judgment as it
would construe any document or written contract in
evidence before it. . . . Effect must be given to that
which is clearly implied as well as to that which is
expressed. . . . If [f]aced with . . . an ambiguity, we
construe the court’s decision to support, rather than to
undermine, its judgment. . . . The judgment should
admit of a consistent construction as a whole. . . . To
determine the meaning of a judgment, we must ascer-
tain the intent of the court from the language used and,
if necessary, the surrounding circumstances.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) White v. FCW Law Offices,
228 Conn. App. 1, 8, 323 A.3d 406, cert. granted, 350
Conn. 928, 326 A.3d 250 (2024).
We begin by noting that our anti-SLAPP statute
requires a party to file a special motion to dismiss within
thirty days of the return date of a complaint. See General
Statutes § 52-196a (c). It further provides that ‘‘[t]he
court, upon a showing of good cause by a party seeking
to file a special motion to dismiss, may extend the time
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to file a special motion to dismiss.’’ General Statutes
§ 52-196a (c). Whether to extend that time period, there-
fore, is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial
court. See, e.g., 7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury,
351 Conn. 169, 182, 329 A.3d 927 (2025) (statute provid-
ing that ‘‘[t]he court may extend the [filing] period for
good cause’’ confers discretion on trial court ‘‘to extend
[the deadline]’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
DeFonce Construction Corp. v. Leslie & Elliot Co., 21
Conn. App. 545, 548, 574 A.2d 1321 (1990) (use of per-
missive ‘‘may’’ in rule authorizing court to extend filing
period ‘‘for good cause shown . . . indicates that the
granting or denial of a motion for extension of time
within which to file [that motion] is a matter of judicial
discretion’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The following additional facts are relevant to the
plaintiff’s claim. The return date on the complaint was
October 15, 2019, which obligated the defendants to
file any special motions to dismiss by November 14,
2019. It is undisputed that they did not do so. At the
same time, it also is undisputed that, on November 12,
2019, the law firm filed a motion for an extension of
up to thirty days to file a responsive pleading; Brignole
filed a similar request seven days later. On November
21, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to Brignole’s
extension request. The next day, Brignole filed a motion
for permission to extend the time to file a special motion
to dismiss in accordance with § 52-196a (c), which was
accompanied by his special motion to dismiss. The
plaintiff filed an objection thereto on November 25,
2019.
The law firm filed a separate special motion to dis-
miss the plaintiff’s complaint on November 27, 2019.
On December 6, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the law firm’s special motion to dismiss, claiming that
it was untimely under § 52-196a (c), as it was filed more
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than thirty days after the return date of the complaint.
Curiously, the plaintiff then stated: ‘‘In spite of the fore-
going, should the court deem it appropriate, the plaintiff
wishes to have [the law firm’s] special motion to dismiss
decided on the merits, thereby making the court’s ruling
the law of the case. [The law firm] has waived any
claimed first amendment rights to free speech as it
relates to this matter [by virtue of the nondisparagement
clause of the separation agreement]. . . . [The law
firm’s] motion should be denied on the merits.’’
(Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff thereafter filed an
objection to Brignole’s special motion to dismiss, in
which he similarly claimed that it was untimely and
that Brignole had waived any first amendment rights
by virtue of the nondisparagement clause. The plaintiff
thus argued that Brignole’s special motion to dismiss
should be denied. On January 10, 2020, the defendants
filed separate replies to the plaintiff’s objections to their
respective motions to dismiss, in which they argued
that good cause existed for the court to exercise its
discretion to extend the thirty day deadline pursuant
to § 52-196a (c).
While those various motions for extension, special
motions to dismiss, and objections thereto were pend-
ing, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to file an
amended complaint on December 19, 2019. The court
thereafter deferred consideration of that request, and
the plaintiff on appeal concedes that his September
pleading constitutes the operative complaint in this
case. See footnote 7 of this opinion. On appeal, the
defendants nevertheless submit that the plaintiff’s filing
of that request to amend his complaint further compli-
cated the question of timeliness pursuant to § 52-196a
(c) with respect to their special motions to dismiss.28
28
The defendants’ position, in short, is that the filing of an amended
complaint gives rise to a new thirty day response period pursuant to § 52-
196a (c).
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The court held an expedited hearing on the special
motions to dismiss on January 13, 2020, in accordance
with § 52-196a (e) (1).29 At that time, Brignole’s counsel
engaged in a lengthy discussion of ‘‘the issue of timeli-
ness’’ with the trial court. Noting that Brignole had filed
his special motion to dismiss eight days beyond the
deadline set forth in § 52-196a (c), the court inquired
as to the basis for Brignole’s claim of good cause. In
response, counsel noted that (1) because service of
process was left on a decorative door at Brignole’s home
that is never used, he did not discover the summons
and complaint until October 21, 2019;30 (2) Brignole, an
attorney, was on trial during the time period in question;
and (3) because the anti-SLAPP statute was ‘‘a relatively
new cause of action . . . [Brignole] didn’t realize he
had these rights because he didn’t have enough time
to . . . take a good look at the issue.’’31 In addition,
counsel noted that the plaintiff had recently requested
permission to file an amended complaint and argued
that Brignole should ‘‘be allowed to respond to [that
pleading] with a special motion to dismiss as well.’’ See
footnote 28 of this opinion. Counsel for the law firm
similarly argued with respect to the timeliness issue
that ‘‘the statute allows the court some discretion’’ and
that there was no prejudice to the plaintiff in extending
the time to file special motions to dismiss by approxi-
mately one week.
29
General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The court
shall conduct an expedited hearing on a special motion to dismiss. The
expedited hearing shall be held not later than sixty days after the date of
filing of such special motion to dismiss . . . .’’
30
Brignole’s representation that he first discovered service of process on
‘‘a decorative door that is never used’’ on October 21, 2019, was supported
by a sworn affidavit that he filed with the court.
31
Our anti-SLAPP statute became effective on January 1, 2018. The plaintiff
commenced the present action on September 29, 2019. The first appellate
decision in this state discussing § 52-196a in any manner was decided by
our Supreme Court ten months later in July, 2020. See Lafferty v. Jones,
supra, 336 Conn. 332.
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When the plaintiff raised the timeliness issue in his
argument, the court asked him how he had been preju-
diced by the defendants’ attempt to file their special
motions to dismiss. The plaintiff responded that the
statute did not require him to demonstrate prejudice. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘[A]gain,
just so the record is clear, are you claiming that you
were prejudiced [by the defendants’ tardy filing of their
special motions to dismiss]? . . . [I]f you were preju-
diced . . . you should tell me now.’’ The plaintiff
replied, ‘‘No, I’m not arguing prejudice.’’
At no time thereafter did the court rule on the defen-
dants’ motions for extensions of time. In its memoran-
dum of decision, the court likewise did not address the
timeliness of the defendants’ special motions to dismiss
in any manner. Instead, it considered the merits of those
special motions and concluded that the defendants had
not satisfied their initial burden under the first prong
of § 52-196a (e) (3). The court then denied the special
motions to dismiss.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the defendants
waived their ability to file special motions to dismiss
because they ‘‘failed to obtain the court’s permission
to file a late special motion to dismiss,’’ rendering their
motions untimely. We recognize that the record before
us does not contain any explicit ruling on the defen-
dants’ motions for extensions of time. As the same time,
we are guided by the familiar maxim that the appellate
courts of this state ‘‘do not presume error [on the part
of the trial court]. The burden is on the appellant to
prove harmful error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 132,
74 A.3d 1225 (2013); see also S. C. v. J. C., 227 Conn.
App. 326, 334, 321 A.3d 427 (2024) (‘‘[t]his court does
not presume error on the part of the trial court; error
must be demonstrated by an appellant on the basis of
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Pryor v. Brignole

an adequate record’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). At no time has the plaintiff sought an articulation
from the trial court on whether it determined that good
cause existed to extend the filing period of § 52-196a
(c) or an explicit ruling on the defendants’ extension
motions.
Our review of the court’s memorandum of decision,
considered in light of the existing record, convinces us
that the court implicitly granted the defendants’
motions to extend the time to file their special motions
to dismiss. Although the plaintiff pressed a timeliness
objection in his pleadings and at oral argument, the
court did not conclude that the special motions to dis-
miss were untimely filed without good cause. If it had,
the court would have dismissed, rather than denied,
those motions. Moreover, the transcript of the January
13, 2020 hearing contains ample discussion of the timeli-
ness issue raised by the plaintiff and the defendants’
corresponding claims of good cause pursuant to § 52-
196a (c) and indicates that the court appreciated the
parties’ respective arguments thereon. In its memoran-
dum of decision, the court nonetheless proceeded
directly to a consideration of the merits of the special
motions to dismiss. In light of the admittedly tardy filing
of those special motions, the court could not have done
so in accordance with § 52-196a (c) unless it had deter-
mined that the defendants demonstrated good cause
therefor.
In Connecticut, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, ‘‘we presume that the trial court, in rendering
its judgment . . . undertook the proper analysis of the
law and the facts.’’ S & S Tobacco & Candy Co. v.
Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 313, 322,
617 A.2d 1388 (1992); see also DiBella v. Widlitz, 207
Conn. 194, 203–204, 541 A.2d 91 (1988) (‘‘we presume
that the trial court correctly analyzed the law and the
facts in rendering its judgment’’). Because this court
does not presume error, and mindful that the plaintiff
has not sought an articulation from the trial court on this
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issue, we presume, consistent with the record before
us, that the court implicitly concluded that good cause
justified an extension of the filing period of § 52-196a
(c).
That presumption is particularly warranted under the
specific facts of this case, as the plaintiff expressly
invited the court to address the merits of the special
motions to dismiss. Significantly, after claiming that the
law firm’s special motion was untimely under § 52-196a
(c), the plaintiff stated: ‘‘In spite of the foregoing, should
the court deem it appropriate, the plaintiff wishes to
have [the law firm’s] special motion to dismiss decided
on the merits, thereby making the court’s ruling the law
of the case. [The law firm] has waived any claimed first
amendment rights to free speech as it relates to this
matter [by virtue of the nondisparagement clause of
the separation agreement]. . . . [The law firm’s]
motion should be denied on the merits.’’32 (Emphasis
in original.) In light of that averment by the plaintiff, it
is not surprising that the court reached the merits of
the special motions to dismiss. Having invited the court
to look past the timeliness issue to address the merits
of those special motions, the plaintiff’s procedural chal-
lenge on appeal rings hollow. For all of these reasons,
we reject his claim that the defendants waived their
ability to file special motions to dismiss.
In accordance with the remand we are ordering in this
case, we direct the trial court to address the additional
arguments that the defendants made in support of their
special motions to dismiss and the additional grounds
raised in opposition by the plaintiff.
The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

32
The plaintiff subsequently filed an objection to Brignole’s special motion
to dismiss, in which he likewise argued that it ‘‘should be denied . . . .’’