In re Christopher C.

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In re Christopher C.

IN RE CHRISTOPHER C.*
(AC 47980)
Alvord, Elgo and Cradle, Js.**

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to his minor child and denying his
motions for transfer of guardianship and for out-of-state placement of the
child. The father claimed that the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to disqualify the judicial authority. Held:

This court declined to review the respondent father’s claim that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the father’s motion for disqualification,
as the father, prior to trial, affirmatively waived any conflict and stated that
he consented to the judge presiding over the trial.
Argued February 19—officially released April 14, 2025***

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile Mat-
ters, where the petition was amended to cite in Christo-
pher C. as a respondent; thereafter, the court, Torres,
J., denied the respondent Christopher C.’s motion for
disqualification; subsequently, the case was tried to the
court, Torres, J.; thereafter, the respondent Christopher
C. consented to the termination of his parental rights;
judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights
and denying the respondent Christopher C’s motions
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
*** April 14, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Christopher C.

for transfer of guardianship and for out-of-state place-
ment of the minor child, from which the respondent
Christopher C. appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent Christopher C.).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Matthew Parenti, assistant attorney general, and,
on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The respondent father, Christopher
C.,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court ren-
dered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of
Children and Families, terminating his parental rights
with respect to his minor child, Christopher C., and
denying the respondent’s motions for transfer of guard-
ianship and for out-of-state placement. On appeal, the
respondent claims that the court abused its discretion
in denying the respondent’s oral motion for disqualifica-
tion.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The child was born in August,
2023, and an order of temporary custody was issued a
few days after the child’s birth. On October 19, 2023,
the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to
the custody of the petitioner. On November 8, 2023, the
petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights as to the child.3 The respondent’s pater-
nity of the child was established by the court on January
1
The parental rights of the child’s mother were terminated on December
13, 2023. She has not participated in this appeal. Our references in this
opinion to the respondent are to Christopher C.
2
The attorney for the minor child has filed a statement adopting the
appellate brief of the petitioner.
3
The petition alleged the following grounds for termination: (1) the respon-
dent had abandoned the child; (2) there was no ongoing parent-child relation-
ship with the respondent; and (3) the respondent had failed to achieve a
sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation under General Statutes § 17a-
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In re Christopher C.

11, 2024. The respondent filed, and subsequently
amended, a motion to transfer guardianship to the
child’s paternal grandmother, who at all relevant times
lived in New York. The motion was consolidated for
trial with the termination of parental rights petition.
On April 19, 2024, during the trial management confer-
ence, the respondent’s counsel made an oral motion
asking the court, Torres, J., to recuse herself on the
basis that the court had presided over an action involv-
ing the respondent, his older child, and the same pro-
posed guardian who is the child’s paternal grandmother.
The following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, the
thing that we still have to address is based on [the case
involving the respondent’s older child]. Your Honor pre-
sided on that case, I believe, in December . . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: November.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: November, thank you.
In doing so, Your Honor ruled against the proposed
112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-
717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families
has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless
the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required
if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or
determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2)
termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child
(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to
be neglected, abused or uncared for and has been in the custody of the
commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has
been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to
the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reason-
able time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could
assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . .’’
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In re Christopher C.

guardian in that case, which will be the same exact
proposed guardian in this case . . . in four months or
so, five months later. I guess I need to know from the
court if I could potentially ask, Judge . . . does that
ruling—is that ruling static as to [the respondent’s older
child] or . . . does that ruling implicate that this guard-
ian is not suitable and worthy for any other children
of my client’s?
‘‘The Court: Okay. Interesting. So, I just wanted to
make sure that I understand it. So, what you’re saying
is, when I wrote the decision, did I exclude the proposed
guardian in total and so I’ll say it this way, when I wrote
the decision it was with respect to [the case involving
the respondent’s older child], and the information I
heard in that case led me to write the decision the way
it was written. This case is a different case from my
perspective, and I haven’t heard the witnesses or evi-
dence. Every case is individualized. It all depends on
what is introduced and the evidence that I hear and the
people who are presented. So, there’s no guarantee that
[the petitioner] will sustain its burden of proof. There’s
no guarantee that the transfer of guardianship will be
resolved one way or the other because I need to hear
what’s happening. So, although I have seen, it’s an
exhibit and it may have some relevance as to factual
findings that were made whether it’s, you know, what
dates that things happened, but the decision as to
whether or not this particular guardian is appropriate
depends on the circumstances of this particular case.
The age of the child, communication with the child, the
bond, because everything might be totally different. And
even when we have cases where we have a constellation
of multiple children, when we’re dealing with mom and
dad, we may make decisions that will say child’s—the
first and second child need to remain in care. Child
three and four need to go back because it all depends
on the interaction between the parent and a child. So,
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In re Christopher C.

I can’t answer your question. I can’t say whole cloth
that I would say that person can never be a guardian
because it all depends on so many different factors.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: So, Your Honor, what
you’re communicating to me just if I can pare it back a
little bit is that Your Honor’s decision does not preclude
having that guardian present a case in round two or in
a different matter and having this court reconsider her
status as suitable and worthy.
‘‘The Court: Correct, because [the case involving the
respondent’s older child] was very different and it had
to do a lot with the age of the child and also the relation-
ship that that child had with other people. It may be
complete—I don’t know anything about this particular
case. The folks that this child may be with. There’s so
many different factors that come into play when you’re
talking about placement and family and in [the case
involving the respondent’s older child] that didn’t bear
it out, but it doesn’t mean in another case depending on
the circumstances that it could have a different result.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Okay.
‘‘The Court: So, I don’t know. I don’t know the answer.
There’s no blanket preclusion from my viewpoint.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Well, but I think the
answer you’re giving me is, I can still go forward, and
this court will consider it.
‘‘The Court: Absolutely. It’s an open book, I think.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I think if
I could have just one second. And, Your Honor, I do
have one other thing which, you know, I say this with
all due respect, but my client and I have talked about
the fact that it’s very difficult for him to, you know,
trust the process if same judge, same guardian, four
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In re Christopher C.

months later, you know, being able to reach that differ-
ent conclusion. So, I believe that I’m being, that part
of my instruction is to seek to see if we can have a
different judge hear this case and I say that with all
due respect, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: No, I understand. So let me, sorry, I did
look at it. Under [rule] 2.11 [of] the Code of Judicial
Conduct under disqualification and it talks about
whether or not there’s an issue of impartiality, but one
of the important factors to consider is why the person
is impartial and when you’re talking about that it seems
to be more of some sort of personal relationships you
have with it and it typically specifically excludes when
you’re issuing decisions or making rulings. So, in a very
terse way you can say, well if you don’t like my rulings
then you’re asking to be recused, but the canons as well
as the Practice Book specifically exclude that particular
issue and, even when you’re being sued personally by
a person, that does not automatically create a disqualifi-
cation. It has to be whether or not there’s an issue of
impartiality meaning there is some action that’s been
taken subsequent that would cause an impartiality, and
I don’t think ruling on a specific case that is different
from this one would put me in a position that qualifies
for disqualification. So, your request is denied.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: And is that an official—
I mean obviously I didn’t file an official written motion,
Your Honor, but is that the official ruling of the court
on my request?
‘‘The Court: It is.’’
The consolidated trial was held on May 2 and 3 and
June 18, 2024. On the first day of trial, the respondent
executed and signed an affidavit consenting to the ter-
mination of his parental rights.4 In addition, the respon-
dent’s counsel stated: ‘‘We would waive any conflict on
4
In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that ‘‘[d]isposition on
the termination was continued until the final day of trial so that [the respon-
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In re Christopher C.

the dispositional going forward, Your Honor, which I
know is interesting because at one point there was a
request for a potential recusal as part of the history of
this case, but my client understands and he appreciates
Your Honor can make a decision that is impartial.’’
Counsel further stated: ‘‘[N]ow that we’ve consented
and to the extent that there is [a conflict], I’m not sure
if there absolutely is but we would waive any contest
to a conflict as my client does, again, have faith that,
you know, that we are in a situation where we can
have a good presentation of evidence and an impartial
decision maker.’’
On June 18, 2024, following the close of evidence,
the court, Torres, J., issued an oral decision terminating
the respondent’s parental rights as to the child and
appointing the petitioner as the child’s statutory parent.
The court found, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the respondent voluntarily had consented to the
termination of his parental rights and that such termina-
tion was in the child’s best interest. Furthermore, on
the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court
denied the respondent’s motion to transfer guardian-
ship to the paternal grandmother. On July 2, 2024, the
court issued a memorandum of decision denying the
respondent’s motion for out-of-state placement. This
appeal followed.
The respondent’s appeal is limited to the claim that
the court abused its discretion in denying the respon-
dent’s oral motion for disqualification. Specifically, the
respondent contends that the trial judge should have
recused herself because she previously had presided
over a contested hearing to transfer guardianship of his
older child to the paternal grandmother. The petitioner
argues that the respondent expressly waived his dis-
qualification claim. We agree with the petitioner that
dent] could participate in the motion for transfer of guardianship and out-
of-state placement.’’
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the respondent waived this claim and, therefore, decline
to review it.

‘‘Rule 2.11 (a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct pro-
vides in relevant part that [a] judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane, 206
Conn. App. 1, 9, 258 A.3d 1283, cert. denied, 338 Conn.
913, 259 A.3d 654 (2021); see In re Christopher C., 134
Conn. App. 464, 471–72, 39 A.3d 1122 (2012). ‘‘Appellate
review of the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion
for judicial disqualification is subject to the abuse of
discretion standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Lane, supra, 9.

‘‘[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege. . . . It involves
the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding.
. . . For many rights, waiver may be effected by action
of counsel . . . especially decisions pertaining to the
conduct of the trial . . . . In those instances, the
[respondent] is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
agent . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Kylie P., 218 Conn. App. 85,
125–26, 291 A.3d 158, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 926, 295
A.3d 419 (2023). ‘‘When a party affirmatively waives a
claim at trial, we generally do not afford review of
that claim on appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Allen v. Commissioner of Correction, 167
Conn. App. 868, 872, 143 A.3d 1217, cert. denied, 323
Conn. 950, 151 A.3d 846 (2016).

In the present case, before the start of evidence on
the first day of trial, the respondent’s counsel asserted
twice that the respondent waived any conflict and
stated that the respondent ‘‘consented’’ to the trial judge
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In re Christopher C.

presiding over the case.5 Because the respondent affirm-
atively waived the claim that Judge Torres should be
disqualified, we decline to review the respondent’s
claim on appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

5
In his reply brief, the respondent states that he ‘‘does not dispute that
the language used by trial counsel on the first day of trial is sufficient to
meet the [petitioner’s] burden as to waiver . . . .’’
Instead, he contends that ‘‘[t]he failure to properly raise a concern of
judicial bias is distinct from a willingness to proceed after a motion for
recusal has been denied.’’ Although we agree that a willingness to proceed
would not be sufficient to constitute waiver, the present case involves
express waiver of the claim that the respondent is now asserting on appeal.
Also, he raises, without authority in support, the argument that the judge
had a duty sua sponte to recuse herself from the matter. Under the circum-
stances of this case, we are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument.