U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Nehring

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U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Nehring

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRUSTEE v.
ALEXANDER T. NEHRING ET AL.
(AC 47145)
Suarez, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant property owner appealed from the judgment of the trial court
denying his sixth motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure. The
defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in determining that the
plaintiff was the holder of the subject note and mortgage. Held:

This court dismissed the appeal as moot because the defendant’s sixth
motion to open the judgment was not accompanied by an affidavit, pursuant
to the rule of practice (§ 61-11 (g)), averring good cause that arose since
the trial court’s previous ruling on the defendant’s most recent motion, and,
thus, no automatic appellate stay arose, the law days passed, and title vested
absolutely in the plaintiff.

Submitted on briefs February 20—officially released April 29, 2025

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a foreclose a mortgage on certain
real property owned by the named defendant, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Danbury, where the named defendant was
defaulted for failure to plead; thereafter, the action was
withdrawn as to the defendant United States of
America, Internal Revenue Service; subsequently, the
court, Mintz, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to open
the judgment and rendered a judgment of strict foreclo-
sure; thereafter, the court, Fox, J., denied the named
defendant’s sixth motion to open the judgment, and
the named defendant appealed to this court. Appeal
dismissed.
Alexander T. Nehring, self-represented, filed a brief
as the appellant (named defendant).
Marissa I. Delinks, filed a brief for the appellee
(plaintiff).
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U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Nehring

Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this protracted foreclosure matter,
the self-represented defendant Alexander T. Nehring1
appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying
his motion to open and to vacate the court’s judgment
of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
U.S. Bank National Association.2 The dispositive issue
in this appeal is whether the defendant filed ‘‘at least
two prior motions to open or other similar motion’’
pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (g),3 such that an
automatic appellate stay did not apply to toll the running
of the law days. We conclude that no automatic stay
1
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (JPMorgan) and the United
States of America, Internal Revenue Service (USA/IRS) also were named as
defendants in the initial filing of the foreclosure action. The complaint
against USA/IRS was withdrawn on October 4, 2018. JPMorgan has not
appealed from the judgment of foreclosure or participated in the present
appeal. Because only Nehring has participated in this appeal, all references
herein to the defendant are to him.
2
The operative complaint named U.S. Bank National Association as
Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of America, National Association, as
Trustee as Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as
Trustee for WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-AR13
Trust as the plaintiff.
3
Practice Book § 61-11 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) . . . Except where
otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry
out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed until the time to
file an appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed before the appeal period has
expired, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of
the cause. If the case goes to judgment on appeal, any stay thereafter shall
be in accordance with [Practice Book §] 71-6 (motions for reconsideration),
[Practice Book §] 84-3 (petitions for certification by the Connecticut
Supreme Court), and [Practice Book §] 71-7 (petitions for certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court).
***
‘‘(g) . . . In any action for foreclosure in which the owner of the equity
has filed, and the court has denied, at least two prior motions to open or
other similar motion, no automatic stay shall arise upon the court’s denial
of any subsequent contested motion by that party, unless the party certifies
under oath, in an affidavit accompanying the motion, that the motion was
filed for good cause arising after the court’s ruling on the party’s most recent
motion. . . .’’
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U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Nehring

applied, and, thus, the law days have passed, divesting
the defendant of his interest in the property, and title
to the property has vested in the plaintiff. Accordingly,
this court cannot provide the defendant any practical
relief, and we, therefore, dismiss this appeal as moot.4
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to this appeal. In May, 2013, the plain-
tiff commenced this action to foreclose on a mortgage
that the defendant had executed in 2006 on property
in Ridgefield as security for a note in the principal
amount of $1,000,000. The plaintiff alleged that it was
the holder of the mortgage note, and that the note was
in default for nonpayment. On October 17, 2014, the
plaintiff filed a motion for default against the defendant
for failure to plead. On October 24, 2014, the clerk
granted the plaintiff’s motion for default. On November
3, 2014, the court, Russo, J., rendered a judgment of
foreclosure by sale against the self-represented defen-
dant and set a sale date of March 28, 2015. On March
13, 2015, the plaintiff filed its first motion to open the
judgment. On March 16, 2015, the court granted the
plaintiff’s first motion to open the judgment and set a
new sale date of May 23, 2015. On May 7, 2015, the
plaintiff filed its second motion to open the judgment.
On May 11, 2015, the court granted the plaintiff’s second
motion to open the judgment and set a new sale date
of July 25, 2015.
On July 22, 2015, the defendant, then represented by
counsel, filed his first motion to open the judgment. In
his first motion to open the judgment, the defendant
alleged that he was ‘‘very close’’ to obtaining the capital
needed to satisfy his debt to the plaintiff and requested
an extension of the sale date. On July 24, 2015, the
The defendant did not appear for oral argument before this court. On
4

February 20, 2025, after the scheduled time for oral argument, the defendant
filed a motion to reschedule the matter, which this court denied. This case
was considered on the briefs and record.
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court, Shaban, J., denied the defendant’s first motion
to open the judgment. The same day, the defendant
filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of
this action. On September 10, 2015, the Bankruptcy
Court issued an order dismissing the defendant’s bank-
ruptcy petition, thus allowing this action to proceed.
On September 30, 2015, the plaintiff filed its third
motion to open the judgment. On March 21, 2016, the
court, Russo, J., granted the plaintiff’s third motion to
open the judgment and set a new sale date of June 25,
2016. On June 22, 2016, following a motion for advice
from the foreclosure committee, the court, Hon. Wil-
liam J. Lavery, judge trial referee, rescheduled the sale
date to July 30, 2016. On July 28, 2016, the defendant
again filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay
of this action. On December 14, 2016, the Bankruptcy
Court issued an order dismissing the defendant’s bank-
ruptcy petition. On February 8, 2017, the plaintiff filed
its fourth motion to open the judgment. On March 6,
2017, the court, Russo, J., granted the plaintiff’s fourth
motion to open the judgment and set a new sale date
of June 17, 2017.
On May 23, 2017, the defendant, in a self-represented
capacity, filed his second motion to open the judgment.
In his second motion to open the judgment, the defen-
dant alleged that he was in the process of converting
the property into a multifamily residence to produce
greater income. On May 30, 2017, the court granted the
defendant’s second motion to open the judgment and
set a new sale date of September 9, 2017.
On August 11, 2017, the defendant filed his third
motion to open the judgment. In his third motion to
open the judgment, the defendant alleged that he was
awaiting a response to an application for loan modifica-
tion and requested an extension of the sale date. On
September 5, 2017, the court denied the defendant’s
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third motion to open the judgment. The same day, the
defendant again filed for bankruptcy, triggering an auto-
matic stay of this action. On January 19, 2018, the Bank-
ruptcy Court issued an order dismissing the defendant’s
bankruptcy petition. On May 29, 2018, the plaintiff filed
its fifth motion to open the judgment. On June 18, 2018,
the court granted the plaintiff’s fifth motion to open
the judgment and set a new sale date of September 29,
2018. On September 27, 2018, following a motion for
advice from the foreclosure committee, the court,
Mintz, J., rescheduled the sale date to January 12, 2019.
On October 4, 2018, the plaintiff filed its sixth motion
to open the judgment, seeking to convert the judgment
of foreclosure by sale to a judgment of strict foreclo-
sure. On October 22, 2018, the court granted the plain-
tiff’s motion to open the judgment, rendered a judgment
of strict foreclosure, and set law days to commence on
January 8, 2019. On January 7, 2019, the defendant again
filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of
this action. On April 4, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court
issued an order dismissing the defendant’s bankruptcy
petition. On September 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed a
motion to reset the law days. On September 30, 2019,
the court, Kowalski, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion
to reset the law days and set new law days to commence
on December 3, 2019.
On November 13, 2019, and, as amended on Decem-
ber 2, 2019, the defendant filed his fourth motion to
open the judgment. In his fourth motion to open the
judgment, the defendant again alleged that he was close
to satisfying his debt to the plaintiff and requested an
extension of the law days. On December 2, 2019, the
court denied the defendant’s fourth motion to open the
judgment but set new law days to commence on January
7, 2020. On December 20, 2019, the defendant filed a
‘‘motion to reargue and reconsider’’ the court’s Decem-
ber 2, 2019 order. On January 6, 2020, the court denied
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U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Nehring

the defendant’s motion. The same day, the defendant
again filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay
of this action. On June 19, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court
issued an order dismissing the defendant’s bankruptcy
petition. On November 10, 2022, the plaintiff filed a
motion to reset the law days. On December 19, 2022,
the court, Shaban, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to
reset the law days and set new law days to commence
on March 21, 2023.

On March 13, 2023, the defendant filed his fifth motion
to open, titled ‘‘Emergency Motion to Open, Vacate
Judgment and Request an Evidentiary Hearing Based
Upon Fraud on the Court.’’ In that motion, the defendant
alleged that there was newly discovered evidence that
the assignment by which the plaintiff held the defen-
dant’s mortgage note was obtained through fraud; thus,
the plaintiff was not the rightful holder of the note
and, accordingly, lacked standing to bring its underlying
claim. The defendant further alleged that the plaintiff
brought its claim knowing that it was not the rightful
holder of the note, and, in doing so, engaged in fraud
upon the court, unconscionable conduct, and unfair
trade practices. On March 27, 2023, the court ordered
a hearing on the defendant’s fifth motion to open, to
be held on March 29, 2023, but, on March 20, 2023, the
defendant filed for bankruptcy,5 triggering an automatic
stay of this action. On April 4, 2023, the Bankruptcy
Court issued an order dismissing the defendant’s bank-
ruptcy petition. On July 28, 2023, the plaintiff filed its
seventh motion to open the judgment, seeking to reset
the law days and reenter the judgment of strict foreclo-
sure. On August 3, 2023, the defendant filed an objection
to the plaintiff’s July 28, 2023 motion to open. In his
objection, the defendant reiterated the claims set forth
5
This was the defendant’s sixth bankruptcy petition filed during the pen-
dency of this matter.
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in his fifth motion to open, alleging fraudulent assign-
ment of the mortgage note and an associated lack of
standing to bring the underlying claim.
On September 11, 2023, the court held a hearing on
the plaintiff’s July 28, 2023 motion to open, and the
defendant’s August 3, 2023 objection. At that hearing,
the defendant argued that the assignment of the mort-
gage note was the product of fraud, and, thus, the plain-
tiff lacked standing. The court overruled the defendant’s
objection and granted the plaintiff’s motion to open.
The court found that ‘‘the attempt to try to present
evidence that the judgment is not a valid judgment is
one that the court would not entertain today because it
would, in effect, be a collateral attack on that judgment
that’s already been entered, not once but on multiple
occasions, over many years. . . . [I]t appears, from
looking at the court’s file, [the defendant’s allegation
that the judgment is invalid due to fraudulent assign-
ment of the mortgage note] doesn’t necessar[ily] defeat
the fact that a motion to reset the law days should be
granted here. At least I don’t find a basis for doing so.’’
The court further found that ‘‘[a]ll [of the] plaintiff’s
paperwork [is] in order. . . . The plaintiff is the holder
of the original note and the assignee of the mortgage.’’
In an order dated the same day, the court rendered a
judgment of strict foreclosure and set new law days for
November 14, 2023. The defendant did not appeal from
that order.
On October 11, 2023, and, as amended on October
23, 2023, the defendant filed his sixth motion to open.
In his sixth motion to open, the defendant again alleged
that the assignment of the mortgage note was fraudu-
lent. On November 13, 2023, the court, Fox, J., held a
hearing on the defendant’s sixth motion to open. After
oral argument in connection with this motion, the court
denied the defendant’s sixth motion to open and set
forth the following oral findings: ‘‘[T]he defendant had
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carried the burden of proving the motion, burden to
show good cause pursuant to [General Statutes §] 49-
15 [governing the opening of judgments of strict foreclo-
sure], and clear and unequivocal evidence of fraud. The
court finds the motion fails in both these grounds.’’ The
court set new law days for December 5, 2023. This
appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred
in determining (1) that the plaintiff was the holder of
the subject note and mortgage, and (2) that the defen-
dant failed to prove that the assignment of the mortgage
to the plaintiff was fraudulent. The plaintiff counters
that the matter is moot as the law days have passed.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, because the defen-
dant filed ‘‘at least two prior motions to open or other
similar motion,’’ an automatic appellate stay pursuant
to Practice Book § 61-11 (a) did not apply and, accord-
ingly, title has vested irrevocably in the plaintiff. We
agree with the plaintiff.

We set forth the standard of review and relevant legal
principles. ‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that
must be determined as a threshold matter because it
implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
. . . Because courts are established to resolve actual
controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled
to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable . . . .
Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual contro-
versy between or among the parties to the dispute . . .
(2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3)
that the matter in controversy [is] capable of being
adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the
determination of the controversy will result in practical
relief to the complainant. . . . A case is considered
moot if [the court] cannot grant the appellant any practi-
cal relief through its disposition of the merits . . . .
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Because mootness implicates this court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, it raises a question of law over which
we exercise plenary review. . . .
‘‘This court ha[s] routinely dismissed appeals by
defendants in foreclosure actions as being moot once
title to the property had vested in the plaintiff. The
dispositive question in those contexts is whether the
law days have run so as to extinguish the defendant’s
equity of redemption and vest title absolutely in the
plaintiff. . . . If the law days have run, no practical
relief [could] follow from a determination of the merits
of [the] case . . . . Accordingly, except in limited cir-
cumstances, it is not within the power of appellate
courts to resuscitate the mortgagor’s right of redemp-
tion or otherwise to disturb the absolute title of the
redeeming encumbrancer.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of
New York Mellon v. Horsey, 227 Conn. App. 94, 104–106,
321 A.3d 441, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 925, 326 A.3d
247 (2024).
Practice Book § 61-11 (a) provides for an automatic
stay of execution in noncriminal matters. It provides
in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept where otherwise pro-
vided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or
carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically
stayed until the time to file an appeal has expired. If
an appeal is filed before the appeal period has expired,
such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determi-
nation of the cause.’’ Practice Book § 61-11 (a). Practice
Book § 61-11 (g), however, provides that, ‘‘[i]n any
action for foreclosure in which the owner of the equity
has filed, and the court has denied, at least two prior
motions to open or other similar motion, no automatic
stay shall arise upon the court’s denial of any subse-
quent contested motion by that party, unless the party
certifies under oath, in an affidavit accompanying the
motion, that the motion was filed for good cause arising
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after the court’s ruling on the party’s most recent
motion. . . .’’ Therefore, ‘‘[t]he application of § 61-11
(g) may result in the dismissal of an appeal because,
[w]hen no automatic appellate stay is in effect, there
is nothing to prevent the law days from passing, render-
ing a pending appeal from a judgment of strict foreclo-
sure moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of
New York Mellon v. Horsey, supra, 227 Conn. App. 107.
In the present case, the defendant had previously
filed six motions to open and one motion to reargue and
reconsider. The defendant’s October 23, 2023 amended
motion was not accompanied by an affidavit averring
good cause that arose since the court’s previous ruling
on the defendant’s most recent motion. See Citigroup
Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Christiansen, 163 Conn.
App. 635, 640, 137 A.3d 76 (2016) (pursuant to Practice
Book § 61-11 (g) there was no automatic stay when
motion was not accompanied by affidavit setting forth
good cause). Accordingly, there was no automatic stay
in effect at the time of the December 5, 2023 law days
and, therefore, title vested absolutely in the plaintiff on
December 5, 2023. See id., 642. Accordingly, we cannot
grant the defendant any practical relief6 and must dis-
miss the appeal as moot.
The appeal is dismissed.
6
‘‘[O]ur Supreme Court and this court have recognized that [courts pos-
sess] inherent powers to provide limited forms of continuing equitable relief
after the passage of the law days in ‘rare and exceptional’ cases . . . . The
category of claims that fall within this class of cases sound in [f]raud,
accident, mistake, and surprise . . . . These are rare exceptions, applicable
only in unusual circumstances.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey, supra, 227 Conn. App. 106
n.8. Although the defendant’s October 23, 2023 amended motion is based
on a claim of fraud, upon a review of the record, we conclude that the
motion does not raise a new allegation of fraud that was not previously
raised in the defendant’s March 13, 2023 motion and August 3, 2023 objection
and previously adjudicated in the court’s September 11, 2023 judgment from
which the defendant did not appeal. Therefore, we conclude that the present
case is not one of those rare and exceptional instances in which this court
shall grant continuing equitable relief.