State v. William G.

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State v. William G.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM G.*
(AC 46807)
Alvord, Westbrook and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual
assault in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. He
claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury not to
consider the victim’s delayed reporting of the sexual assault when evaluating
her credibility. Held:

The trial court improperly instructed the jury that it should not consider
the victim’s delayed reporting when evaluating her credibility because,
although the court’s instruction was proper at the time that it was given,
the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in State v. Adam P. (351 Conn.
213), which was released while the defendant’s appeal was pending before
this court, reinstated the standard, articulated in State v. Troupe, (237 Conn.
284), that a defendant in a sexual assault case is entitled to an instruction
that ‘‘any delay by the victim in reporting the incident is a matter for the
jury to consider in evaluating the weight of the victim’s testimony.’’

The defendant met his burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s
improper jury instruction regarding the victim’s delayed reporting was harm-
ful and that he was entitled to a new trial because, as the verdict turned
on the victim’s credibility and the defendant’s theory of defense related the
victim’s delayed reporting to her credibility, it was reasonably probable that
the jury was misled into thinking it could not consider the delay in assessing
the victim’s credibility and that it could therefore not consider the defen-
dant’s principal theory of defense.

The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding evidence of certain
uncharged misconduct, as, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Cutler (293 Conn. 303), the trial court was not required to instruct
the jury that, before it may consider such evidence, it must find that the
state proved the uncharged misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
Argued March 11—officially released April 29, 2025

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-
86e.
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State v. William G.

sexual assault in the second degree, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and
tried to the jury before Dayton, J.; verdict and judgment
of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Reversed; new trial.
Erica A. Barber, assistant public defender, with
whom, on the brief, were Kendall Kirk, law student
intern, and Bron Tamulis, law student intern, for the
appellant (defendant).
Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, was Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, William G., appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1) and sexual assault
in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-71 (a) (4). On appeal, the defendant claims that
the court improperly (1) instructed the jury not to con-
sider that the victim delayed reporting the sexual
assault in evaluating her credibility, and (2) denied his
request to instruct the jury that, in evaluating evidence
of uncharged misconduct offered by the state to prove
the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged
crimes, it must first determine whether the state proved
that the defendant had engaged in such conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence. We agree that the court’s
delayed reporting instruction was improper and harm-
ful, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
court.
The following facts, which reasonably could have
been found by the jury, and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. In 2012, the victim’s mother married
the defendant, and he became the victim’s stepfather.
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State v. William G.

The defendant lived with the victim’s mother at her
house in West Haven along with the victim’s sisters, E
and S. The victim lived with her paternal grandparents
at their house in Trumbull, along with her father and
her two brothers. She visited her mother and sisters at
her mother’s house almost every weekend.
Beginning in 2016, when the victim was fourteen
years old, the defendant made comments that made her
uncomfortable. He told her that she should shave her
‘‘privates because women should be shaved’’ and that
she should let him help her shave. He also told her that
he always left the bathroom door unlocked when he
was showering, and he asked her to leave it unlocked
so that they could each enter the bathroom while the
other was showering. Over time, the defendant’s com-
ments became increasingly persistent. He showed the
victim photos of himself, her mother, and another
woman, nude and engaging in sexual acts. Eventually,
the victim stopped visiting her mother and sisters as
often because the defendant’s behavior made her
uncomfortable.
On February 17, 2018, when the victim was sixteen
years old, she visited her sisters at her mother’s house.
She did not plan on staying overnight, but the defendant
said he would take her home the next day. While the
victim was at her mother’s house, the defendant asked
to shave her and showed her inappropriate photos. That
night, the mother slept on the couch while the victim
slept in her mother’s bed with the defendant. When the
victim woke up in the morning, the defendant told her
that she was a heavy sleeper because he had been
‘‘wiggling around’’ and she had not woken up.
On the night of February 18, 2018, the victim got in
the defendant’s vehicle with him so that he could drive
her home. During the drive, the defendant touched the
victim’s legs and lap, and he put her hands on his penis
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State v. William G.

over his clothes. The victim pulled her hands away, but
he put them back on his lap at least three times. When
the defendant’s vehicle approached the road to the vic-
tim’s house, he drove by, turned onto another street,
and continued driving. As he drove, he pulled his pants
down, exposing his penis, and put the victim’s hands
on his penis. Then the defendant turned onto Dayton
Road and pulled into a gravel parking lot by a park. In
the parking lot, the defendant put his hands on the back
of the victim’s head and forced her to perform oral sex
on him. When the victim began crying, the defendant
let her sit up, pulled his pants up, and said, ‘‘you’re not
going to go tell them I raped you, are you?’’ Then the
defendant took the victim home, went in the house, said
hello to her family, shook her father’s hand, and left.
The next day, the victim went to school but skipped
all her classes. At school, she told her cousin that the
defendant assaulted her the night before. The victim
did not, however, tell her cousin any details of the
incident, and she asked her cousin not to tell anyone
because she was embarrassed. The victim thereafter
stopped visiting her mother’s house.
On March 25, 2018, S visited the victim in Trumbull.
While the two worked on a school project in the victim’s
bedroom, the victim became worried that the defendant
was doing the same thing to S that he did to her, so
she told S about the comments the defendant made to
her and the photos he showed her. Then the victim’s
brother R walked by, and the victim called him into her
room and told him about the defendant’s behavior as
well. The victim did not, however, tell S or R that the
defendant forced her to perform oral sex on him on
February 18, 2018. The three of them decided to tell
their grandmother, their father, and their sister E, who
were all present at the house. The victim told her family
members about the defendant’s comments and photos
and the touching that took place in the defendant’s
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State v. William G.

vehicle on February 18, 2018. She did not tell them
about the forced oral sex because her family members
were ‘‘freaking out really bad’’ and she got over-
whelmed.
The victim’s family members immediately called the
Trumbull Police Department and reported the defen-
dant for sexual assault and inappropriate conduct. The
police department dispatched Officer Sean McClinch
to the victim’s father’s house to investigate. When
McClinch arrived, he spoke with the victim, her father,
and S. He took a sworn statement from the victim, who
disclosed only those details that she had told her family
members. McClinch called the victim’s mother to dis-
cuss a safety plan for where the victim and her sisters
would stay. He also notified the Department of Children
and Families and the detective bureau for further inves-
tigation.
On March 26, 2018, the victim spoke with Detective
Daniel Wheeler. The next day, on March 27, 2018, she
spoke with a school psychologist. Later that day, Kevin
Sheehy, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted a
recorded forensic interview of the victim, which he
informed her was a very important interview. During
each of these discussions, the victim did not disclose
that the defendant parked in a lot on Dayton Road and
forced her to perform oral sex on him.
On April 4, 2018, the victim told her family for the
first time that the defendant forced her to perform oral
sex on him. She did not, however, tell them that he
parked in the gravel lot of Dayton Road or what he said
to her afterward. The next day, Wheeler visited the
victim at her house to inform her that someone had
told him about the forced oral sex that occurred on
February 18, 2018, and to question her about the inci-
dent. At that time, the victim told Wheeler that the
defendant parked in the gravel lot on Dayton Road,
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State v. William G.

forced her to perform oral sex, and then asked if she
was going to report that he raped her.
On April 6, 2018, Wheeler and other members of the
Trumbull Police Department arrested the defendant.
After waiving his Miranda1 rights, the defendant told
the police that when he drove the victim home on Febru-
ary 18, 2018, he missed the turn onto her road because
it was snowing, and he decided to drive around the
block instead of turning around in the street. He denied
making inappropriate comments to the victim or inap-
propriately touching her, and he denied parking in the
lot on Dayton Road on February 18, 2018. The state
subsequently charged the defendant with sexual assault
in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 and sexual
assault in the third degree in violation of General Stat-
utes § 53a-72a.
During the police investigation into the victim’s alle-
gations, Wheeler conducted a canvass of the area around
the gravel lot on Dayton Road, where the victim alleged
that the defendant had forced her to perform oral sex
on him. Wheeler checked the neighborhood for video
surveillance of the roads and witnesses who saw the
defendant’s vehicle in the area on February 18, 2018,
but he found no video footage or witnesses.
On March 10, 2023, the state filed a substitute infor-
mation charging the defendant with two counts. Count
one charged him with sexual assault in the first degree
in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (1), alleging that he com-
pelled the victim to engage in sexual intercourse, as
defined by General Statutes § 53a-65 (2), by the use of
force. Count two charged the defendant with sexual
assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71
(a) (4), alleging that the defendant engaged in sexual
intercourse with the victim, the victim was less than
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
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State v. William G.

eighteen years of age, and the defendant was the vic-
tim’s guardian or otherwise responsible for the general
supervision of her welfare.
The case was tried to a jury on March 13, 15 and 16,
2023. The state presented the testimony of McClinch,
the victim, Wheeler, and two propensity witnesses, L
and J. J testified that, when she was eleven years old,
she was living in Michigan with her aunt and the defen-
dant, who is her cousin. According to J, when she
‘‘started hitting puberty,’’ the defendant, who was in his
late twenties, began telling J that she should let him
groom her pubic hair. She also indicated that, on one
occasion, the defendant engaged in ‘‘inappropriate
behavior and touching’’ of her friend, L. L testified that,
in 2003, when she was thirteen years old, she was at
J’s house when the defendant, who was twenty-six years
old, kissed her. When L visited J’s home a couple of
weeks later, the defendant asked her to watch a movie
with him. During the movie, the defendant touched L
inappropriately and performed oral sex on her. He put
her hands on his penis and ‘‘wanted to go further,’’ but
L excused herself to go to the bathroom and then went
to J’s room and locked the door. L reported the incident
to the police and subsequently identified the defendant
in a photographic array, but she never heard from the
police again after that.
The state also presented the expert testimony of Dan-
ielle Williams, a forensic interviewer, to explain that
victims of sexual assault may delay reporting because
of, inter alia, shame, embarrassment, or proximity of the
abuser to the victim’s family. With respect to children’s
disclosure of sexual assault, she explained: children
‘‘might deny anything happened’’; they ‘‘might tenta-
tively tell somebody’’; and ‘‘there’s the active stage,
which is where the child is ready to talk about it.’’ She
also described typical grooming behavior by an abuser,
including, inter alia, making inappropriate comments,
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State v. William G.

showing a child pornographic photos, and restricting a
child’s privacy.
On March 15, 2023, the court, Dayton, J., discussed
its proposed instructions with the parties outside the
presence of the jury. Specifically, the court noted that
it intended to deliver a delayed reporting instruction
based on instruction 7.2-1 of the Connecticut model
criminal jury instructions.2 Defense counsel orally
objected to the delayed reporting instruction and filed
a written objection with the court. The court, however,
determined that its proposed delayed reporting instruc-
tion was appropriate pursuant to our Supreme Court’s
holding in State v. Daniel W. E., 322 Conn. 593, 142
A.3d 265 (2016).

On March 16, 2023, the prosecutor and defense coun-
sel presented their closing arguments, and the court
charged the jury. Specifically, the court instructed the
jury regarding delayed reporting in accordance with
State v. Daniel W. E., supra, 322 Conn. 593, as follows:
‘‘There was evidence in this case that [the victim]
delayed in making an official report of the alleged sexual
assault. There are many reasons why sexual assault
victims may delay in officially reporting the offense
and to the extent the [victim] delayed in reporting the
2
As noted by our Supreme Court in State v. Adam P., 351 Conn. 213, 330
A.3d 73 (2025), instruction 7.2-1 of the Connecticut model criminal jury
instructions previously provided that where no constancy of accusation
witness testified, but there was a delay in officially reporting the offense,
the trial court should instruct the jury that ‘‘[t]here was evidence in this
case that the complainant delayed in making an official report of the alleged
sexual assault. There are many reasons why sexual assault victims may
delay in officially reporting the offense, and to the extent the complainant
delayed in reporting the alleged offense here, the delay should not be consid-
ered by you in evaluating (his or her) credibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 218 n.1. The instruction was revised on February 26, 2025,
after the verdict in this case, in accordance with our Supreme Court’s holding
in Adam P. See Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 7.2-1, available at
https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited April 16, 2025).
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State v. William G.

alleged offenses here, the delay should not be consid-
ered by you in evaluating her credibility.’’
The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty on
both counts of the substitute information. The court
rendered a judgment of conviction based on the jury’s
verdict and sentenced the defendant to a total effective
term of thirty years of incarceration, execution sus-
pended after fourteen years, two years and nine months
of which was a mandatory minimum, followed by thirty-
five years of probation. This appeal followed.
On February 11, 2025, while the defendant’s appeal
was pending, our Supreme Court issued its decision in
State v. Adam P., 351 Conn. 213, 330 A.3d 73 (2025),
in which the court overruled the modification of the
constancy of accusation doctrine established in Daniel
W. E. and returned to the standards previously articu-
lated in State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917
(1996). See State v. Adam P., supra, 220, 226. On Febru-
ary 25, 2025, prior to oral argument, we ordered, sua
sponte, the parties to file supplemental briefing
addressing the effect of Adam P., if any, on this appeal.
On March 4, 2025, both parties filed supplemental briefs
in accordance with our order.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
instructed the jury regarding the delayed reporting by
the victim. In their supplemental briefs, neither party
disputes that our Supreme Court’s decision in Adam
P. renders the trial court’s delayed reporting instruction
improper. The parties dispute, however, whether the
court’s improper instruction was harmful such that the
defendant is entitled to a new trial. We agree with the
defendant that the court’s instruction was both
improper and harmful error and, accordingly, that a
new trial is warranted.
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State v. William G.

We begin with a brief overview of the constancy of
accusation doctrine as it relates to this appeal. ‘‘Con-
necticut common law allowed the state in a sexual
assault case to offer constancy evidence, which gener-
ally included proof that the victim had disclosed the
sexual assault to third parties prior to making a formal
complaint to authorities. . . . The law permitted the
court to admit this evidence to negate the inference a
fact finder might draw, namely, that a complainant was
fabricating her accusation if she failed to officially
report the alleged sexual abuse promptly after the inci-
dent. . . .
‘‘In Troupe, [our Supreme Court] . . . narrowed the
admissibility of constancy evidence . . . . Specifi-
cally, [it] held that a constancy witness may testify
only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim’s
complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the
details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited
to those necessary to associate the victim’s complaint
with the pending charge, including, for example, the
time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged
perpetrator. . . . Thus, such evidence is admissible
only to corroborate the victim’s testimony and not for
substantive purposes.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Adam P., supra, 351
Conn. 221. Additionally, the court in Troupe held that
‘‘the defendant is entitled to an instruction that any
delay by the victim in reporting the incident is a matter
for the jury to consider in evaluating the weight of the
victim’s testimony.’’ State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn.
305.
Subsequently, in Daniel W. E., our Supreme Court
modified the constancy of accusation doctrine as it
related to the issue of delayed reporting. The court held
that ‘‘the victim in a sexual assault case should continue
to be allowed to testify on direct examination regarding
the facts of the sexual assault and the identity of the
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State v. William G.

person or persons to whom the incident was reported.
. . . Thereafter, if defense counsel challenges the vic-
tim’s credibility by inquiring, for example, on cross-
examination as to any out-of-court complaints or
delayed reporting, the state will be permitted to call
constancy of accusation witnesses subject to the limita-
tions established in Troupe . . . . If defense counsel
does not challenge the victim’s credibility in any fashion
on these points, the trial court shall not permit the
state to introduce constancy testimony but, rather, shall
instruct the jury that there are many reasons why sexual
assault victims may delay in officially reporting the
offense, and, to the extent the victim delayed in
reporting the offense, the delay should not be consid-
ered by the jury in evaluating the victim’s credibility.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Adam P., supra, 351 Conn. 222–23.
Recently, in Adam P., our Supreme Court revisited
the constancy of accusation doctrine as it relates to the
issues of delayed reporting and victim credibility. It
determined that the doctrine, as modified by Daniel W.
E., ‘‘unduly confuses what a jury may and may not
consider when assessing a victim’s credibility in a sex-
ual assault case, and conflicts with aspects of Troupe
that [the court] left untouched.’’ Id., 224. The court,
therefore, overruled the modifications established in
Daniel W. E. and reinstated the constancy of accusation
standards previously articulated in Troupe. Id., 229.
In the present case, the court instructed the jury that
it should not consider the victim’s delayed reporting
when evaluating her credibility, in accordance with the
holding in Daniel W. E. Although the court’s instruction
was proper at the time that it was given, our Supreme
Court, in Adam P., subsequently overruled Daniel W.
E., deciding that the instruction is improper.3 Due to
3
Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘a rule enunciated in a case presump-
tively applies retroactively to pending cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Elias G., 302 Conn. 39, 45, 23 A.3d 718 (2011). Subsequently,
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State v. William G.

this change in the law, we conclude that the court
improperly instructed the jury in this regard. We must
next address whether the improper instruction was
harmful, thereby entitling the defendant to a new trial.
See id., 230. Because this issue ‘‘presents a question of
law,’’ our review is plenary. Id.
‘‘To determine whether the defendant is entitled to
a new trial because of an erroneous jury instruction,
we review the entire charge to determine if, taken as
a whole, the charge adequately guided the jury to a
correct verdict. . . . In appeals not involving a consti-
tutional question [we] must determine whether it is
reasonably probable that the jury [was] misled . . . .
[I]n appeals involving a constitutional question, [how-
ever, the standard is] whether it is reasonably possible
that the jury [was] misled. . . . If the instruction
involves a constitutional violation, the state bears the
burden of demonstrating harmlessness, whereas, if the
instruction does not, the defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating harm. . . . Instructional errors vio-
late due process—and, therefore, are of constitutional
dimension—when they confuse the burden of proof,
the presumption of innocence, or one of the essential
elements of the crime.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 230–31.
In Adam P., the court determined that an instruction
given in accordance with Daniel W. E., although
our Supreme Court explained: ‘‘This court has established the general rule
that judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application
are presumed to apply retroactively . . . to cases that are pending . . . .
We have clarified, however, that [c]omplete retroactive effect is most appro-
priate in cases that announce a new constitutional rule or a new judicial
interpretation of a criminal statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 677 n.6, 224 A.3d 129 (2020).
In the present case, the defendant challenged the trial court’s delayed
reporting instruction before the trial court and on appeal, and the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Adam P. while the case was pending direct
review. As neither party contends that the general rule does not apply in
the present case, we presume that Adam P. applies retroactively.
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State v. William G.

improper, is not an error of constitutional dimension.
See id., 231–32. It reasoned as follows: ‘‘Credibility is
often particularly important in sexual assault cases,
and victims’ delayed reporting may be relevant to their
credibility. In fact, what to make of delay is often a
point of dispute between the parties in sexual abuse
cases, with one side positing that delay is a symptom
of a victim’s trauma, and the other claiming that it is
consistent with a motivation to fabricate accusations.
Even so, neither delay nor credibility is an element of
the charged offenses; nor do they shift the state’s bur-
den of proof to the defendant.’’ Id., 232. Because, pursu-
ant to the court’s holding in Adam P., the instructional
error at issue in this case does not involve a constitu-
tional violation, the defendant bears the burden of dem-
onstrating harm.

To establish that the improper instruction was harm-
ful, the defendant must demonstrate that it is ‘‘reason-
ably probable—meaning more probable than not—that
the instructional error misled the jury in arriving at its
verdict, therefore requiring reversal. . . . This deter-
mination is necessarily fact intensive, requiring that we
look to the instructions provided, the parties’ theories
of the case, and the larger record, all in their entireties,
to ensure that injustice is not done to either party under
the established rules of law. . . . We evaluate the
harmfulness of a nonconstitutional error on the record
as a whole. . . . An improper instruction is not auto-
matically harmful merely because it adversely affects
a defense. . . . The defendant’s claim of harm requires
that [a reviewing court] conclude that the jury’s verdict
turned on its misunderstanding, based on the Daniel W.
E. instruction, that it could not consider the [victim’s]
delayed reporting of the sexual abuse when assessing
[her] credibility.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 233.
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State v. William G.

The defendant argues that the court’s improper
instruction was harmful because the victim’s ‘‘delayed
reporting was a critical factor in the case,’’ and the
Daniel W. E. instruction ‘‘stripped the defendant of his
principal theory of defense.’’ The defendant contends
that his theory of defense was that the victim had fabri-
cated her allegations of sexual assault and that theory
was supported by the evidence of the victim’s delayed
reporting. We agree that the court’s improper delayed
reporting instruction was harmful.
In Adam P., the court concluded that the defendant
had not demonstrated that the trial court’s improper
Daniel W. E. instruction was harmful and, therefore,
he was not entitled to a new trial. See State v. Adam
P., supra, 351 Conn. 234. In reaching its conclusion, the
court considered ‘‘the record as a whole, including the
jury instructions, the theory of defense, and the strength
of the evidence presented’’ and determined that ‘‘it is
not reasonably probable that the erroneous instruction
misled the jury because it had sufficient tools with
which to judge the victims’ credibility, and neither the
verdict nor the defendant’s theory of the case turned
on delay.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. We are persuaded
that the present case is distinguishable from Adam P.
because the defendant’s theory of the case turned on
the victim’s delay in reporting the sexual assault.
In Adam P., the court determined that ‘‘the victims’
delay in reporting the defendant’s abuse played a rela-
tively unimportant role in the defendant’s theory of the
case.’’ Id., 238. ‘‘[T]he defendant’s principal defense—
that no sexual abuse had occurred and that the victims
had fabricated such accusations—centered on his insuf-
ficient opportunity to sexually abuse the victims and
the absence of physical evidence, categories wholly
separate from any delayed reporting. The defendant’s
reliance on delay in support of his fabrication theory
was minimal, and the jury was able to appreciate his
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State v. William G.

defense even if it arguably believed it was constrained
to disregard delay in assessing the victims’ credibility.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., 236.
Unlike in Adam P., the theory of defense in the pres-
ent case was that the victim fabricated her allegations
of sexual abuse, and the defense relied heavily on evi-
dence of the victim’s delayed reporting to support that
defense. While cross-examining the various witnesses,
defense counsel repeatedly stressed the victim’s delay
in reporting the alleged sexual assault on which both
charges in the substitute information were based. Dur-
ing cross-examination of the victim, in particular,
defense counsel highlighted that she did not mention
the forced oral sex on the following occasions: talking
to her cousin on February 19, 2018; talking to her sisters,
her brother R, her grandmother, and her father on
March 25, 2018; providing a sworn statement to
McClinch on March 25, 2018; being interviewed by
Wheeler on March 26, 2018; talking to her school psy-
chologist on March 27, 2018; and during Sheehy’s foren-
sic interview on March 27, 2018. Defense counsel also
highlighted that, when the victim finally told her family
about the forced oral sex, she did not tell them about
the gravel lot on Dayton Road or that the defendant
asked her whether she was going to report that he
raped her.
Defense counsel’s closing argument further illus-
trates that the defendant’s primary theory of defense
centered on the victim’s delayed reporting because he
spent most of his time relating the delay to her credibil-
ity. He stated: ‘‘[I]t’s so crucial to look at [the victim’s]
testimony and the evidence to show she is not credible.’’
He emphasized that ‘‘[s]he told you about what she
claims happened on the night of February 18, 2018,
but she admitted on cross-examination that she had
numerous opportunities to tell someone that oral sex
occurred; however, she didn’t until almost two months
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State v. William G.

later.’’ He listed thirteen people that she could have
told about the forced oral sex and then stated: ‘‘Either
[the victim] never told . . . anything to each one of
these people, or she only told them that [the defendant]
made comments and that mutual touching happened.
She had a giant support system that she could’ve dis-
closed to but did not. She never mentioned to any of
these people about oral sex, the gravel lot, or the com-
ment allegedly made by [the defendant] before dropping
her off [at] home. Only on April 4, 2018, did she decide
to add to her story and include some of these details.
Please consider this when you’re judging her credibil-
ity . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel also
challenged Williams’ expert testimony concerning typi-
cal reasons for delayed reporting by explaining that
Williams never met the victim and did not know her
background.

It is apparent to us, on the basis of our review of the
testimony elicited and arguments made at trial, that the
victim’s delay in reporting the defendant’s sexual abuse
was paramount to the defendant’s theory of the case.
Cf. State v. Adam P., supra, 351 Conn. 239 (‘‘[t]he only
explicit mention during closing arguments of delayed
disclosure as related to credibility was brief’’). Because
the court instructed the jury to disregard delay in
assessing the victim’s credibility, it is reasonably proba-
ble that the jury was misled into thinking it could not
consider the defendant’s principal theory of defense.

The state nevertheless maintains that the verdict did
not turn on the victim’s delayed reporting and its poten-
tial effect on her credibility in the eyes of the jurors
because its case was strong. Specifically, the victim
‘‘provided detailed testimony’’; Williams testified about
the typical behaviors of child sexual assault victims,
delayed reporting, and typical grooming behavior; and
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State v. William G.

the testimony of J and L concerning uncharged miscon-
duct were consistent with the victim’s testimony. There-
fore, the state argues, the defendant cannot establish
that the court’s improper instruction was harmful. We
are not persuaded.
The court in Adam P., in reaching its conclusion that
the defendant failed to demonstrate that the Daniel W.
E. instruction was harmful, relied on its determination
that ‘‘[t]he state’s case, even without physical or foren-
sic evidence, was strong.’’ State v. Adam P., supra, 351
Conn. 240. Two victims had testified consistently about
the details of the defendant’s behavior, thereby corrobo-
rating each other’s stories. Id. The state’s expert witness
‘‘bolstered the victims’ credibility’’ by explaining ‘‘the
common triggers for reporting abuse and factors that
might make a disclosure more or less credible,’’ such
as recounting idiosyncratic details. Id., 241–42. Addi-
tionally, three ‘‘detectives corroborated the victims’
timeline of events . . . and detailed how they investi-
gated and assessed the reliability of the victims’ allega-
tions.’’ Id., 241. Moreover, the court stated: ‘‘[T]he jury’s
split verdict in the present case increases [its] confi-
dence that the erroneous instruction was harmless
because what the jury split its verdict on indicates that
it assessed the victims’ credibility. . . . Specifically,
the jury found the defendant not guilty . . . as to inci-
dents involving [one victim] . . . [and] guilty of . . .
an incident in which [another victim] was the sole com-
plainant . . . . The jury came to different conclusions
about the veracity of the victims’ claims, despite their
other similarities . . . . Therefore, we are comfortable
inferring, based on the present record, that the jury
must have made a credibility determination based on
something besides delay [in reaching its verdict].’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 242.
In the present matter, unlike in Adam P., no witnesses
were called to corroborate the victim’s account of what
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State v. William G.

happened on February 18, 2018. The police in the pres-
ent case were unable to corroborate the victim’s time-
line or other details of her statements. They canvassed
the area of the incident for video footage and witnesses,
but they were unable to find any witnesses or videos
of the defendant’s vehicle on the night of February 18,
2018. The only supporting evidence presented by the
state was Williams’ testimony about typical grooming
behavior, J’s testimony that the defendant made com-
ments about shaving her pubic area, and L’s testimony
that the defendant touched her inappropriately in 2003.
Even if J’s testimony tended to corroborate the victim’s
testimony regarding similar statements he allegedly
made to the victim and L’s testimony demonstrated
the defendant’s propensity to sexually abuse children,
neither specifically corroborates the victim’s allega-
tions of forced oral sex on February 18, 2018. Because
the state lacked physical, forensic, and corroborating
evidence, the case turned on the victim’s credibility,
which the defense challenged on the basis of her
delayed reporting of the sexual assault. Unlike in Adam
P., the jury in the present case found the defendant
guilty on all counts and, therefore, there is no split
verdict from which we can infer that the jury assessed
the victim’s credibility on the basis of facts other than
the delay.

Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that sexual
assault cases presenting a ‘‘credibility contest charac-
terized by equivocal evidence . . . is a category of
cases that . . . is far more prone to harmful error.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Favoccia,
306 Conn. 770, 816–17, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012). Because
the verdict turned on the victim’s credibility and the
defendant’s theory of defense related the victim’s
delayed reporting to her credibility, it is reasonably
probable that the jury was misled into thinking it could
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State v. William G.

not consider the delay in assessing the victim’s credibil-
ity. Thus, we conclude that the defendant has met his
burden of demonstrating that the court’s improper
instruction was harmful and, consequently, he is enti-
tled to a new trial.
II
Although our conclusion that the court’s improper
delayed reporting instruction was harmful is dispositive
of this appeal, we also address the defendant’s claim
that the court improperly denied his request to instruct
the jury that, in evaluating evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct offered by the state to prove the defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged crimes, the jury must
first determine whether the state proved that the defen-
dant had engaged in such conduct by a preponderance
of the evidence, as this issue is likely to arise on remand.
See Sullivan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.,
292 Conn. 150, 164, 971 A.2d 676 (2009) (‘‘[b]ecause of
our conclusion that this case must be remanded for a
new trial, it is appropriate for us to give guidance on
issues that are likely to recur on retrial’’).
The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. On March 15, 2023, outside the
presence of the jury, the court noted that L and J would
be testifying about uncharged sexual misconduct and
that it intended to give a limiting instruction before
each testified and during its final jury charge. At that
time, defense counsel requested that the court instruct
the jury that, in evaluating evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct offered by the state to prove the defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged crimes, the jury must
first determine whether the state proved that the defen-
dant had engaged in such conduct by a preponderance
of the evidence. The court noted defense counsel’s
objection but overruled it. Specifically, the court found
that the evidence of prior misconduct was admissible
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State v. William G.

because it was ‘‘relevant to the charged crime, not too
remote, similar to the charged offense, committed upon
persons similar to the prosecuting witnesses or witness,
and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect.’’ It thereafter determined that the
jury could consider such evidence without finding that
the defendant engaged in such conduct by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
That same day, the defendant filed a request to charge
the jury with the following instruction: ‘‘The state has
presented evidence of alleged uncharged acts of sexual
misconduct. It is for you to determine whether the state
has proven by a preponderance of the evidence whether
the defendant committed the alleged uncharged sexual
misconduct. If you find that the state has met that
standard, then you may determine the extent, if any,
to which that evidence establishes that the defendant
had a propensity or tendency to engage in criminal
sexual behavior. Bear in mind as you consider this evi-
dence that, at all times, the state has the burden of
proving that the defendant committed each of the ele-
ments of the offense charged in the information. As
to any evidence of uncharged misconduct, the state’s
burden is to prove that conduct by a preponderance of
the evidence.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court, however,
declined to charge the jury that the state must prove
that the defendant engaged in the alleged uncharged
misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
After the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,
the court provided the following instruction concerning
uncharged misconduct: ‘‘You’ll recall that I admitted
the testimony of [L] and [J] for a limited purpose. You
may only consider that testimony as it relates to the
limits for which it was allowed, and you shall not con-
sider such testimony in finding any other facts as to
any other issue. Specifically, the defendant is charged
with criminal sexual behavior; therefore, evidence of
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State v. William G.

the defendant’s commission of another offense or
offenses is admissible and may be considered by you
if it is relevant to prove that the defendant had the
propensity or tendency to engage in the type of crimi-
nal sexual behavior with which he is charged. You may
use such evidence here in the form of the testimony of
[L] and [J] to the extent that you find it should be given
weight only as to the limited purpose for which it was
admitted. However, evidence of a prior offense on its
own is not sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of
the crimes charged in the information. Bear in mind as
you consider this evidence that . . . at all times, the
state has the burden of proving the defendant commit-
ted each of the elements of the offenses charged in the
information. I remind you; the defendant is not on trial
for any act, conduct, or offense that is not charged
in the information.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court had
given the jury substantively the same instruction before
L testified and again before J testified. Before J testified,
the court additionally stated: ‘‘[The defendant] has not
been charged with and is not on trial for anything that
is alleged to have occurred in the past with [J] or with
[L]. So, when it comes time for you to deliberate, you
can give this testimony . . . whatever weight you
deem . . . that it deserves, if any, in making your deci-
sions about the charged offenses.’’
On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court
was required to instruct the jury ‘‘that its consideration
of the evidence is predicated on first finding that the
prior acts actually occurred’’ by a preponderance of the
evidence. (Emphasis omitted.) In support of his claim,
he relies on State v. Cutler, 293 Conn. 303, 977 A.2d
209 (2009), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); State v. Ortiz,
343 Conn. 566, 275 A.3d 578 (2022); and State v. Greer,
213 Conn. App. 757, 279 A.3d 268, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 916, 284 A.3d 299 (2022), cert. denied, U.S.
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State v. William G.

, 143 S. Ct. 1061, 215 L. Ed. 2d 282 (2023). We dis-
agree.
We begin our analysis with the standard of review.
‘‘When reviewing the challenged jury instruction . . .
we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge
to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as
a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by
its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a
court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon
legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort
but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in
such a way that injustice is not done to either party
under the established rules of law. . . . As long as [the
instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues
and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will
not view the instructions as improper.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Greer, supra, 213 Conn.
App. 783–84.
In State v. Cutler, supra, 293 Conn. 303, the defendant
claimed that ‘‘the trial court improperly declined to
instruct the jury to apply a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard as to its consideration of the prior mis-
conduct evidence.’’ Id., 315. Our Supreme Court
rejected the claim, stating that ‘‘[w]here the admission
of prior misconduct evidence depends on the trial
court’s determination that there is sufficient evidence
from which the jury reasonably could conclude that
the prior acts of misconduct occurred and that the
defendant was the actor . . . we see no reason to
impose on trial courts a jury instruction that requires
jurors to consider the properly admissible prior miscon-
duct evidence at a higher standard. . . . Accordingly,
we conclude that it is not necessary that a trial court
instruct the jury that it must find, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that prior acts of misconduct actually
occurred at the hands of the defendant. Instead, a jury
may consider prior misconduct evidence for the proper
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State v. William G.

purpose for which it is admitted if there is evidence
from which the jury reasonably could conclude that the
defendant actually committed the misconduct.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 321–22. The court
then concluded that ‘‘[t]he trial court properly deter-
mined that there was evidence from which the jury
reasonably could conclude that the defendant actually
committed the prior acts of misconduct, and its use of
the word ‘believe’ [in its jury instruction] comports with
the requirement that a jury may consider prior miscon-
duct evidence if there is evidence from which it reason-
ably could conclude that the defendant committed the
acts.’’ Id., 322.
In State v. Ortiz, supra, 343 Conn. 566, the defendant
claimed that the trial court ‘‘improperly declined to . . .
instruct the jury . . . that it could consider evidence
of his involvement in [uncharged misconduct] to the
extent that the jury believed that the defendant was, in
fact, involved in the [uncharged misconduct] and, then,
only to the extent that the jury found that it logically,
rationally and conclusively supported the issue for
which it was being offered—namely, to establish the
defendant’s motive for [committing the charged
offense].’’ (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 590. Relying on Cutler, our Supreme Court
concluded that ‘‘the trial court properly declined the
defendant’s request to include the word ‘conclusively’ in
its instruction on the use of prior misconduct evidence.
Rather, the court properly instructed the jury that, even
if it credited [the witness’] testimony that the defendant
was engaged in [uncharged misconduct] on the night
in question, the jury could consider that evidence only
if it found that it ‘logically and rationally support[ed]
the state’s theory of motive . . . .’ ’’ Id., 603.
In State v. Greer, supra, 213 Conn. App. 757, the
defendant claimed that the trial court, ‘‘in its mid-trial
and final instructions to the jury, improperly failed to
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State v. William G.

provide the jury with a standard of proof to apply in
determining whether the defendant had committed acts
of uncharged misconduct.’’ Id., 776. This court, relying
on Cutler, stated: ‘‘[T]he [trial] court instructed that it
was for the jury ‘to determine’ whether the defendant
engaged in the uncharged misconduct. We discern no
meaningful distinction between the ‘believe’ standard
endorsed in Cutler and the court’s use of the word
‘determine’ in the present case. For that reason, we
are not persuaded that the court’s instructions were
deficient. . . . Accordingly, we find no error in the
court’s instructions to the jury that it must determine
that something occurred rather than believe that it
occurred. Consequently, we conclude that our Supreme
Court’s decision in Cutler controls and, therefore, that
the court properly instructed the jury regarding the
uncharged misconduct evidence.’’ Id., 786.
In the present case, the trial court instructed the
jury that it could consider the state’s prior misconduct
evidence ‘‘if it is relevant’’ and ‘‘to the extent that you
find it should be given weight’’ for the limited purpose
for which it was offered. Pursuant to our Supreme
Court’s decision in Cutler, the court was not required
to instruct the jury that, before it may consider such
evidence, it must find that the state proved the
uncharged misconduct by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. The court, therefore, properly declined to
instruct the jury on the preponderance of the evidence
standard.
The defendant nevertheless argues that the trial court
was required to instruct the jury that it must ‘‘believe’’
or ‘‘determine’’ that the defendant actually engaged in
the uncharged misconduct before it may consider such
evidence. Although our courts have upheld instructions
using those words, no cases have indicated that those
words are required. See State v. Cutler, supra, 293 Conn.
322; State v. Greer, supra, 213 Conn. App. 786. Rather,
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State v. William G.

we are persuaded that the court’s instruction that the
jury may consider the testimony of L and J ‘‘if it is
relevant’’ and ‘‘to the extent that you find it should be
given weight’’ comports with the requirement that a
jury may consider prior misconduct evidence if there
is evidence from which it reasonably could conclude
that the defendant committed the acts. The court’s
charge as a whole instructed the jury that, as the finder
of fact, it was entitled to determine what weight, if any,
should be given to the witnesses’ testimony. Moreover,
the court’s language is consistent with instruction 2.6-
12 of the Connecticut model criminal jury instructions.4
‘‘This court has noted that [w]hile not dispositive of
the adequacy of the [jury] instruction, an instruction’s
uniformity with the model instructions is a relevant and
persuasive factor in our analysis.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Leandry, 161 Conn. App. 379,
396–97, 127 A.3d 1115, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128
A.3d 955 (2015). Consequently, the court properly
instructed the jury regarding the uncharged misconduct
evidence.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
4
Instruction 2.6-12 of the Connecticut model criminal jury instructions
provides: ‘‘When the defendant is charged with criminal sexual behavior,
evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses is
admissible and may be considered if it is relevant to prove that the defendant
had the propensity or a tendency to engage in the type of criminal sexual
behavior with which (he/she) is charged. However, evidence of a prior
offense on its own is not sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of the
crimes charged in the information. Bear in mind as you consider this evidence
that at all times, the state has the burden of proving that the defendant
committed each of the elements of the offense charged in the information.
I remind you that the defendant is not on trial for any act, conduct, or offense
not charged in the information.’’ Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-
12, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited
April 16, 2025).