Sonthonnax v. Xing

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Sonthonnax v. Xing

MEHDI H. SONTHONNAX v. LONGBAO XING
(AC 47205)
Alvord, Suarez and Bear, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving her mar-
riage to the plaintiff and issuing certain financial orders. The defendant
claimed that the financial orders were based on a clearly erroneous factual
finding with respect to the plaintiff’s income. Held:
The trial court’s finding as to the plaintiff’s gross weekly income was without
evidentiary support and thus clearly erroneous, as that finding was based
on the plaintiff’s financial affidavit, which significantly underreported his
gross base income from one of his employers.
Because the trial court expressly considered its erroneous factual finding
as to the plaintiff’s income when issuing its alimony and child support
orders, which were not severable from the court’s property distribution
orders, the judgment was reversed as to all financial orders and the case
was remanded for a new trial on all financial issues, including the court’s
award of attorney’s fees to the defendant’s former counsel.
Argued March 18—officially released May 13, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a
cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Truglia, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and
granting certain other relief, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Reversed in part; new trial.
Janet A. Battey, for the appellant (defendant).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Longbao Xing, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her mar-
riage to the plaintiff, Mehdi H. Sonthonnax.1 On appeal,
1
The plaintiff did not file a brief or otherwise participate in this appeal.
As a result, on January 3, 2025, this court ordered ‘‘that the appeal shall be
considered on the basis of the [defendant’s] brief and the record, as defined
by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument, if not waived by the [defendant]
or the court. Pursuant to Practice Book § 70-4, oral argument by the [plaintiff]
will not be permitted.’’
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the defendant claims that the court improperly based
its financial awards on a clearly erroneous factual find-
ing with respect to the plaintiff’s income. We agree and,
accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial
court and remand the matter for a new trial on all
financial orders.2
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The parties were married in 2005
in France and are the parents of one minor child, who
was born in 2008. The plaintiff initiated the underlying
dissolution proceeding in December, 2020. The matter
was tried to the court, Truglia, J., over three days.3 Both
parties testified and presented documentary evidence.
In its November 9, 2023 memorandum of decision,
the court made factual findings with respect to each
party as follows. The plaintiff is employed by UBS Secu-
rities, LLC (UBS), as a quantitative analyst earning a
base salary of $300,000 annually plus a discretionary
bonus. His bonus in the year prior to the dissolution
of the parties’ marriage was $250,000 and was paid in
cash and stock. The plaintiff also earns $3000 annually
as a part-time adjunct professor. The defendant was
not working outside of the home at the time of the
dissolution, nor had she worked outside the home since
the commencement of the dissolution action. The
defendant is an accomplished martial artist and pre-
viously had worked as a physical education teacher and
martial arts instructor. The defendant claimed at trial
2
The defendant also claims that the court improperly based its property
division orders on a clearly erroneous factual finding with respect to the
parties’ real property. Because we agree with the defendant’s claim that the
court improperly based its financial awards on a clearly erroneous factual
finding with respect to the plaintiff’s income, we need not reach the defen-
dant’s claim with respect to the court’s property division orders. See part
II of this opinion.
3
Although represented by counsel initially, the defendant was self-repre-
sented during the trial, after her counsel was granted permission to withdraw
her appearance.
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that she was vocationally disabled due to a serious
injury to one of her legs. The court found the defendant
not credible as to the extent of her injury and deter-
mined that she is not completely physically or voca-
tionally disabled. The court found that the defendant
has a light duty work capacity.
The court awarded the parties joint custody of the
child, with primary physical custody with the defendant,
and set a parenting schedule. The court ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant child support in the
amount of $428 weekly. With respect to property divi-
sion, the court ordered that ‘‘each party should simply
retain the assets now in his or her name, free and clear
of claims of the other, as a full and final property settle-
ment in this case.’’ The court awarded the defendant
alimony in the amount of $7500 monthly for ten years,
modifiable as to amount but nonmodifiable as to dura-
tion. Finally, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay to
the defendant’s former counsel $32,128.67 in attorney’s
fees. Both parties filed motions to reargue, which were
denied. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant claims on appeal that the court made
a clearly erroneous factual finding with respect to the
plaintiff’s income. Specifically, she argues that the plain-
tiff’s paystubs, which were introduced into evidence at
trial, do not support the income as reported in the
plaintiff’s financial affidavit and as found by the trial
court. We agree.
We first set forth applicable legal principles and our
standard of review. ‘‘In dissolution proceedings, the
court must fashion its financial orders in accordance
with the criteria set forth in [General Statutes] § 46b-
81 (division of marital property), [General Statutes]
§ 46b-82 (alimony) and [General Statutes] § 46b-84
(child support). All three statutory provisions require
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Sonthonnax v. Xing

consideration of the parties’ amount and sources of
income in determining the appropriate division of prop-
erty and size of any child support or alimony award.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mensah v. Mensah,
145 Conn. App. 644, 652, 75 A.3d 92 (2013).
‘‘The standard of review in family matters is well
settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s
orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has
abused its discretion or it is found that it could not
reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts pre-
sented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has
abused its broad discretion in domestic relations mat-
ters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor
of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review
of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the
clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s
findings are binding upon this court unless they are
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the plead-
ings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 651.
In the present case, the court found in its memoran-
dum of decision that the plaintiff ‘‘earns a base salary
of $300,000 per year plus a discretionary bonus. Last
year, he received a gross bonus of $250,000 in cash and
stock. He reports current earnings of $7099 per week,
in base and bonus compensation (Defendant’s Exs. N &
Y). The plaintiff also has a part-time position as an
adjunct professor at New York University, from which
he earns approximately $3000 each year (Defendant’s
Ex. X).’’ In rendering its child support award, the court
again stated that the plaintiff had a gross weekly income
of $7099.
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Following our thorough review of the record, we are
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed with respect to the court’s finding
that the plaintiff earned $7099 per week. In making its
finding as to the plaintiff’s income, the court first stated
that the plaintiff earned a base salary from UBS of
$300,000 per year, which amounts to $5769 weekly.4
That base salary was consistent with paystubs entered
into evidence and the plaintiff’s testimony. However,
the court then found that the plaintiff had a total gross
weekly income of $7099, which purported to include
his base salary and bonus. In making that finding, the
court relied on the income reported on the plaintiff’s
financial affidavit. That affidavit incorrectly reported a
base salary of $4615 weekly from UBS. Because the
plaintiff’s financial affidavit significantly underreported
his gross base income from UBS, the court’s finding as
to the plaintiff’s gross income, made on the basis of the
income reported on the affidavit, is clearly erroneous.
In other words, the court’s finding as to the plaintiff’s
weekly income cannot be reconciled with its finding as
to the plaintiff’s base salary, and, thus, its finding is
without evidentiary support.5 See Ferraro v. Ferraro,
4
Although the plaintiff represented in his financial affidavit that he is paid
biweekly by UBS, the paystubs entered into evidence reflect that he is paid
semimonthly.
5
The defendant additionally claims on appeal that the court abused its
discretion in rendering its child support order when it used its finding that
the defendant possessed a minimum wage earning capacity to calculate the
presumptive support amount. We agree.
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: ‘‘The court imputes a
minimum wage income to the defendant based on the court’s finding that
she has a light duty work capacity. Assuming, therefore, a gross weekly
income of $7099 for the plaintiff and $600 for the defendant, the presumptive
weekly child support amount pursuant to the child support guidelines is
$428, payable by the plaintiff to the defendant.’’
The court erred in calculating the presumptive support amount using the
defendant’s earning capacity rather than her actual earnings, which were
zero. See, e.g., C. D. v. C. D., 218 Conn. App. 818, 850–51, 293 A.3d 86 (2023)
(child support award calculated on basis of earning capacity was improper
where court failed to take mandatory initial step of determining presumptive
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Sonthonnax v. Xing

168 Conn. App. 723, 733, 147 A.3d 188 (2016) (court’s
finding as to defendant’s net income was not supported
by evidence and remand for new hearing was required).
II
We now consider the appropriate relief in light of
our conclusion that the court’s factual finding as to the
plaintiff’s income was clearly erroneous. ‘‘Individual
financial orders in a dissolution action are part of the
carefully crafted mosaic that comprises the entire asset
reallocation plan. . . . Under the mosaic doctrine,
financial orders should not be viewed as a collection
of single disconnected occurrences, but rather as a
seamless collection of interdependent elements. Con-
sistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the
mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows
reviewing courts to remand cases for reconsideration
of all financial orders even though the review process
might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distri-
bution or child support awards. . . . Every improper
order, however, does not necessarily merit a reconsider-
ation of all of the trial court’s financial orders. A finan-
cial order is severable when it is not in any way interde-
pendent with other orders and is not improperly based
on a factor that is linked to other factors. . . . In other
words, an order is severable if its impropriety does not
place the correctness of the other orders in question.
. . . Determining whether an order is severable from
the other financial orders in a dissolution case is a
highly fact bound inquiry.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) C. D. v. C. D., 218 Conn. App. 818, 852–53,
293 A.3d 86 (2023).
support amount pursuant to child support guidelines); Barcelo v. Barcelo,
158 Conn. App. 201, 215, 118 A.3d 657 (‘‘[a] party’s earning capacity is
a deviation criterion under the guidelines, and, therefore, a court must
specifically invoke the criterion and specifically explain its justification for
calculating a party’s child support obligation by virtue of the criterion instead
of by virtue of the procedures outlined in the guidelines’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 910, 123 A.3d 882 (2015).
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In the present case, we have determined that the
court made a clearly erroneous factual finding as to the
plaintiff’s income, which was expressly considered by
the court in issuing its alimony order6 and incorporated
into its calculation of the plaintiff’s child support obliga-
tion. Accordingly, the alimony and child support orders
cannot stand. We further conclude that the court’s
errors with respect to those orders are not severable
from the court’s property distribution orders. This is
particularly so given that the plaintiff’s income was the
primary source of support for the family.7 See Onyi-
logwu v. Onyilogwu, 217 Conn. App. 647, 657–58, 289
A.3d 1214 (2023) (‘‘[b]ecause the court’s support orders,
particularly its spousal support or alimony order, are
informed by and reflective of the parties’ incomes and
assets, as affected by the court’s other financial orders,
the entirety of the mosaic must be refashioned when-
ever there is error in the entering of any such interde-
pendent order’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because it is uncertain whether the property distribu-
tion orders will remain intact after reconsidering the
child support and alimony orders in a manner consistent
with this opinion, we conclude that the entirety of the
mosaic must be refashioned. Accordingly, on remand,
the court must reconsider all of the financial orders,
including the award of attorney’s fees.8
6
The court’s rationale for its alimony award centered on the parties’
income: ‘‘[W]hile the defendant is not completely vocationally disabled . . .
the plaintiff has provided most of the financial support for the family for
virtually the entire marriage. . . . [W]hile the defendant may have been
employed at various times during the marriage, the record is not clear as
to amounts she earned, and when. The court also notes the disparity between
what the plaintiff currently earns and the amounts the defendant is likely
to earn if she chooses to return to working outside the home.’’
7
In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that the defendant listed
virtually no assets on her financial affidavit and that the plaintiff showed
minimal assets on his financial affidavit.
8
General Statutes § 46b-62 (a) governs the award of attorney’s fees in
dissolution proceedings and provides that ‘‘the court may order either spouse
. . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with
their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82.’’
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The judgment is reversed only as to the financial
orders, including the award of attorney’s fees, and the
case is remanded for a new trial on all financial issues;
the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

These criteria include ‘‘the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . .
dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount
and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,
employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any,
which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81 . . . .’’ General Stat-
utes § 46b-82 (a).
‘‘In making an award of attorney’s fees under § 46b-82, [t]he court is not
obligated to make express findings on each of [the] statutory criteria. . . .
Courts ordinarily award counsel fees in divorce cases so that a party . . .
may not be deprived of [his or] her rights because of lack of funds. . . .
Where, because of other orders, both parties are financially able to pay their
own counsel fees they should be permitted to do so. . . . An exception to
th[is] rule . . . is that an award of attorney’s fees is justified even where
both parties are financially able to pay their own fees if the failure to make an
award would undermine [the court’s] prior financial orders . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) O’Brien v. O’Brien, 138 Conn. App. 544, 556, 53
A.3d 1039 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 937, 66 A.3d 500 (2013).
Because the ordering of attorney’s fees is dependent on the respective
financial abilities of the parties, the attorney’s fee award in the present case
must also be reconsidered in light of the new mosaic of financial orders
that the court will issue on remand in this case. See id.