Birch Groves Assn., Inc. v. Jordon

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Birch Groves Assn., Inc. v. Jordon

BIRCH GROVES ASSOCIATION, INC. v.
KATHLEEN CASEY JORDON
(AC 47213)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant property owner appealed from the trial court’s judgments of
foreclosure by sale rendered for the plaintiff homeowners association in its
action to foreclose water liens on two of the defendant’s properties located
within the community served by the plaintiff. The defendant claimed, inter
alia, that the court abused its discretion by not vacating her default for
failure to plead. Held:

The trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff’s amended complaint,
which was filed after the defendant had been defaulted and which sought
to foreclose on an additional three years’ worth of unpaid water liens, did
not make any substantial changes to the cause of action or interject new
material issues into the case and, therefore, did not extinguish the defen-
dant’s default.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not setting aside the default
for good cause shown pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 17-42) because,
even if the defendant were correct that her delay in pleading did not cause
prejudice to the plaintiff, her motion did not allege any facts demonstrating
that good cause existed to set aside the default that she failed to address
for nearly three years.

This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claim
that the trial court improperly relied on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt in
rendering the foreclosure judgments.

Argued March 17—officially released July 1, 2025

Procedural History

Action to foreclose water liens on certain real prop-
erty owned by the defendant, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Danbury, where the defendant was defaulted for failure
to plead; thereafter, the court, Fox, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motion to set aside the default and rendered
judgments of foreclosure by sale, from which the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
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Christopher G. Winans, for the appellant (defen-
dant).
John J. Bowser, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The defendant, Kathleen Casey Jor-
don, also known as Kathleen C. Jordan, appeals from
the judgments of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, Birch Groves Association, Inc. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) abused
its discretion by not vacating her default for failure to
plead, and (2) erred in rendering judgments on the basis
of the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt when the debt was
disputed by the defendant. We affirm the judgments of
the trial court and remand the case for the purpose of
setting new sale dates.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff is a home-
owners association that provides services, including
the maintenance of the community water system, to
properties within the Birch Groves community in New
Milford. The defendant owns two parcels of real prop-
erty, 7 Juniper Lane and 15 Juniper Lane, which are
each located within that community and, thus, receive
water from the water system maintained by the plaintiff.
In March, 2020, the plaintiff brought this action
against the defendant, alleging that she had failed to
pay the annual water use fee levied against each of her
properties in 2018 and 2019. In a two count complaint,
the plaintiff sought to foreclose several water liens on
the defendant’s properties resulting from the unpaid
fees.1 On October 23, 2020, the plaintiff filed a request
1
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff sought to foreclose water
liens on the 7 Juniper Road property, and, in count two, it sought to foreclose
water liens on the 15 Juniper Road property. The two counts, including the
material allegations against the defendant and the amount of unpaid water
charges with respect to each property, were otherwise identical.
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to amend its complaint. In the proposed amended com-
plaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had again
failed to pay the annual water charge levied against
each property in 2020 and sought to recover those
unpaid fees as well. The defendant did not object.2
Thereafter, on February 16, 2021, the plaintiff filed a
demand for disclosure of defense. On April 1, 2021, the
defendant filed a disclosure of defense, asserting, inter
alia, that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s bills for water are arbitrary
and capricious insofar as the defendant is not a member
of the plaintiff.’’3
The defendant, however, failed to file an answer
either to the original complaint or the amended com-
plaint, and, on April 20, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion
for default for failure to plead. On April 28, 2021, the
plaintiff’s motion was granted, and a default was
entered against the defendant. Despite the protracted
settlement discussions that followed, the parties were
unable to reach an agreement, and, on February 14,
2023, the plaintiff moved for a judgment of foreclosure
by sale.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2023, the court, Shaban,
J., issued a notice to the parties scheduling a hearing
for November 13, 2023, to address the dormancy status
of the case. In advance of that hearing, the plaintiff, on
October 12, 2023, filed another request to amend its
complaint (2023 amendment). Specifically, the plaintiff
sought to foreclose on an additional three years’ worth
of water liens on each property resulting from the defen-
dant’s failure to pay her annual water use fees in 2021,
2
Because the defendant did not object to the proposed amended complaint
within fifteen days, the amendment was deemed to have been filed by the
consent of the defendant. See Practice Book § 10-60 (a) (3).
3
The plaintiff also had filed a motion for default for failure to disclose
defense on March 18, 2021. Following the defendant’s April 1, 2021 disclosure
of defense, the court, Kowalski, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion on April
5, 2021.
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2022, and 2023. The defendant again did not oppose
the plaintiff’s amendment.4 On November 8, 2023, the
defendant filed an answer to the 2023 amendment, in
which she denied the material allegations against her
and asserted as a special defense that the plaintiff’s
water charges had been imposed in an ‘‘arbitrary and
capricious manner.’’5

Following the November 13, 2023 dormancy status
conference, a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for judg-
ment was scheduled for December 18, 2023.6 In advance
of that hearing, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of debt
on November 30, 2023. On December 15, 2023, three
days before the scheduled hearing, the defendant filed
a motion to set aside the default for failure to plead.7

On December 18, 2023, after hearing argument by
both parties, the court, Fox, J., issued an oral ruling
denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the default
and granting the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. On the
same date, the court rendered separate judgments of
foreclosure by sale as to each of the defendant’s proper-
ties.8 In rendering the judgments, the court, relying on
the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt, found that the defendant
owed the plaintiff $4157.32 in unpaid water charges,
plus interest and fees, with respect to each property,
4
See footnote 2 of this opinion.
5
In addition, the defendant (1) claimed a setoff, alleging that she had
‘‘made a payment of $1000,’’ and (2) filed a counterclaim sounding in trespass,
alleging that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff repeatedly flushes and discharges its water
hydrants’’ onto her property without permission.
6
The hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of foreclosure origi-
nally was scheduled for December 4, 2023. On that date, the court issued
notice to the parties that the hearing was continued to December 18, 2023.
7
The defendant also filed on the same date an objection to the plaintiff’s
motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale ‘‘for the reasons noted in [the
defendant’s] motion to set aside default . . . .’’
8
The court indicated at the December 18, 2023 hearing that it was consider-
ing rendering two separate judgments because ‘‘the underlying complaint
involve[d] two pieces of property.’’ Neither party’s counsel objected.
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and set a sale date of April 6, 2024, for both properties.9
This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court abused its
discretion by not vacating the default for failure to
plead. Specifically, the defendant argues that the filing
of the 2023 amendment effectively extinguished the
default pursuant to this court’s decision in Chase Home
Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 178 Conn. App. 727, 176 A.3d
1210 (2017). In the alternative, the defendant argues
that the court abused its discretion in not setting aside
the default for good cause shown.
Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s argu-
ments, we set forth our standard of review and the
legal principles relevant to her claim. ‘‘[T]he effect of
a default is to preclude the defendant from making any
further defense in the case so far as liability is con-
cerned . . . .’’ Practice Book § 17-33 (b). When a party
is in default for failure to plead, ‘‘the judicial authority,
at or after the time it renders the default . . . [also]
may . . . render judgment in foreclosure cases . . .
provided the plaintiff has also made a motion for judg-
ment and provided further that any necessary affidavits
of debt or accounts or statements . . . are submitted
to the judicial authority.’’ Practice Book § 17-33 (b). If
a motion for judgment already has been filed by the
plaintiff at the time the defaulted party files her answer,
as was the case here, ‘‘the default may be set aside only
by the judicial authority.’’10 Practice Book § 17-32 (b).
9
On December 19, 2023, the court issued corrected judgments ‘‘to update
the committee [of sale]’’ because ‘‘[t]he prior committee had a conflict
of interest.’’
10
Conversely, had the defendant filed her answer prior to the plaintiff’s
filing of the motion for judgment, the default would have been set aside
automatically by operation of law. See Practice Book § 17-32 (b). In this case,
however, it is undisputed that the defendant’s answer was filed subsequent
to the plaintiff’s motion for judgment.
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‘‘The abuse of discretion standard of review applies
to a court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a default
. . . . [A] foreclosure action constitutes an equitable
proceeding. . . . In an equitable proceeding, the trial
court may examine all relevant factors to ensure that
complete justice is done. . . . The determination of
what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing
of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial
court. . . . This court must make every reasonable pre-
sumption in favor of the trial court’s decision when
reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion. . . . Our
review of the trial court’s exercise of legal discretion
is limited to the question of whether the trial court
correctly applied the law and could reasonably have
reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance,
LLC v. Scroggin, supra, 178 Conn. App. 739.

A

The defendant first claims that the court abused its
discretion by not setting aside the default because, she
argues, the court incorrectly concluded that the 2023
amendment did not allege new material facts and, there-
fore, had not extinguished the default.

In support of this contention, she relies on Chase
Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, supra, 178 Conn. App.
727, in which this court concluded that the plaintiff’s
filing of an amended complaint effectively extinguished
the defendant’s default for failure to plead to the original
complaint. Id., 745. In Scroggin, the plaintiff com-
menced a foreclosure action against the defendant by
way of a one count complaint in December, 2009. Id.,
730. After the defendant was defaulted for failure to
plead in June, 2010, the plaintiff filed an amended com-
plaint, which contained, inter alia, two additional
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counts directed at the defendant.11 Id., 731–34. Five
years later, on November 24, 2015, the plaintiff moved
for a judgment of strict foreclosure with respect to
the amended complaint. Id., 734. On April 4, 2016, the
defendant filed an answer to the amended complaint
and an objection to the 2015 motion for judgment. Id.
This court in Scroggin noted that ‘‘[t]he [trial] court,
however, indicated that it would not give any effect to
the [answer] filed by the defendant to the . . .
amended [complaint] . . . on the ground that [the fil-
ing was] untimely, having been presented to the court
more than five years following the default. The [trial]
court observed, as well, that in the lengthy period of
time that ensued following the default, the defendant
did not move to set aside that default.’’ Id., 738. Accord-
ingly, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for
judgment of strict foreclosure. Id., 737.
On appeal to this court, ‘‘[t]he defendant argue[d]
that, in fairness to him, the default should have been
extinguished by the filing of the amended complaint
and that the court should have given effect to his answer
. . . .’’ Id., 737–38. This court agreed, concluding that
the amended complaint substantially changed the
pleadings and, therefore, effectively extinguished the
defendant’s default for failure to plead in response to
the original complaint. Id., 743–44. Specifically, ‘‘[t]he
original [one count] complaint, sounding in foreclosure,
invoked the [trial] court’s equitable powers. [In con-
trast] [c]ount five of the amended complaint sounded
in unjust enrichment and count six accused the defen-
dant of engaging in fraudulent conduct. The amended
The amended complaint in Scroggin contained six counts. Count one
11

‘‘generally was consistent with the allegations brought against the defendant
in the original one count complaint,’’ counts two through four were directed
at an additional defendant that was not named as a party in the original
complaint, and counts five and six set forth new claims against the original
defendant. Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, supra, 178 Conn. App.
731–34.
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complaint . . . interjected new material factual allega-
tions and new legal theories on which the plaintiff
relied. . . . [T]hus, the amended complaint materially
altered the nature of the claims against the defendant.’’
Id., 744. ‘‘In light of the changes to the plaintiff’s case
that were reflected in the amended complaint,’’ this
court held that ‘‘it was inequitable for the [trial] court
not to have considered the default entered in 2010 to
have been extinguished. . . . Although it was appro-
priate for the court to have considered the lengthy
period of time that followed the entry of the default, it
nonetheless abused its discretion by failing to consider
the effect of the amended complaint upon that default.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Id., 745.
In the present case, the defendant argued in her
motion to set aside the default that the additional three
years’ worth of water liens that were referenced in the
2023 amendment ‘‘drastically increased the amount of
damages,’’ thereby constituting ‘‘a substantial change’’
from the original complaint and interjecting new mate-
rial issues into the case. The court rejected the defen-
dant’s argument, finding that ‘‘[t]he [2023 amendment]
does not reflect a substantial change to the pleadings
in effect at the time that the default was entered’’ and,
therefore, that ‘‘[t]he [2023] amendment does not inter-
ject material new issues.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)
On appeal, the defendant claims that ‘‘[t]he court’s
interpretation of the amended complaint is simply
wrong and is an abuse of its discretion.’’ In support of
her claim, she essentially reiterates her argument that
the 2023 amendment interjected a ‘‘quantifiably new
material issue’’ into the present case because the
increase in the amount of damages alleged constituted
an ‘‘obvious and substantial change [to] the nature of
the claim’’ against her. We disagree.
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‘‘[I]n determining whether the filing of an amended
complaint following a finding of default effectively
extinguished the default and afforded a defendant an
opportunity to plead in response, the dispositive inquiry
is whether the amendment reflected a substantial
change to the pleadings in effect at the time that the
default was entered. . . . [A] primary consideration in
this inquiry [is] whether the amendment interjected
material new issues in the case.’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, supra, 178
Conn. App. 742. ‘‘If the effect of an amendment of a
complaint . . . is to substantially change the cause of
action originally stated, the defendant is entitled to file
new or amended pleadings and present further evi-
dence. Also, if the amendment interjects material new
issues, the adversary is entitled to reasonable opportu-
nity to meet them by pleading and proof.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 745; see also, e.g., Spilke
v. Wicklow, 138 Conn. App. 251, 270, 53 A.3d 245 (2012)
(filing of four amended complaints did not extinguish
default where, ‘‘[a]lthough the complaints differed in
some respects from the original complaint, the substan-
tive allegations remained the same’’), cert. denied, 307
Conn. 945, 60 A.3d 737 (2013); Willamette Management
Associates, Inc. v. Palczynski, 134 Conn. App. 58, 68,
38 A.3d 1212 (2012) (filing of amended complaint for
sole purpose of ‘‘remedy[ing] a typographical error’’ did
not extinguish default).

‘‘Although we have characterized our general inquiry
in these types of cases as a review of the trial court’s
exercise of discretion . . . [t]he interpretation of
pleadings is always a question [of law] for the court
. . . . Our review of a trial court’s interpretation of
the pleadings therefore is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance,
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LLC v. Scroggin, supra, 178 Conn. App. 743. ‘‘The mod-
ern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to con-
strue pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than
narrowly and technically. . . . Although essential alle-
gations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote
implication . . . the complaint must be read in its
entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading
with reference to the general theory upon which it pro-
ceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
We do not find persuasive the defendant’s assertion
that the 2023 amendment constituted a substantial
change from the allegations set forth in the original
complaint. The only change to the pleadings pursuant to
the 2023 amendment was the inclusion of an additional
three years’ worth of claimed water liens. In seeking
to foreclose on those additional liens, the plaintiff did
not interject new material factual allegations apart from
the years of the liens, and it did not rely on any new
legal theories. The substantive allegations against the
defendant, namely, that she had failed to pay the plain-
tiff’s properly levied water charges, remained the same.
The 2023 amendment merely reflected the fact that
water charges continued to accrue while the litigation
was pending and the defendant failed to pay them.12
Thus, there was no substantial change to the cause of
action in the present case.
Nonetheless, the defendant argues that the quantita-
tive increase in damages reflected by the 2023 amend-
ment constitutes a new material issue under Scroggin.13
12
The defendant concedes that she remained in possession of both Juniper
Road properties and, thus, presumably, continued to receive water from
the community water system, throughout the pendency of the litigation.
13
We note that, in her brief to this court, the defendant claims, inconsis-
tently, that the 2023 amendment ‘‘triple[d] the water charges being claimed’’
and ‘‘quadrupl[ed] . . . the plaintiff’s debt claim.’’ Neither assertion is sup-
ported by the record. In the operative pleadings at the time default was
entered, the plaintiff alleged unpaid water fees in the total amount of
$5178.64. In its 2023 amendment, the plaintiff alleged additional unpaid
water fees in the total amount of $3856.
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We disagree. In Scroggin, the plaintiff sought additional
monetary damages pursuant to the two new claims
against the defendant in its amended complaint; how-
ever, this court’s analysis of whether the amendment
interjected new material issues focused only on the
nature of those claims and the legal theories on which
the plaintiff relied in claiming those additional damages.
See Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, supra, 178
Conn. App. 743–44. Nothing in this court’s analysis indi-
cates that it attached any significance to the difference
in the amount of damages claimed in each complaint.
The defendant does not cite, nor could we find any,
authority to support her contention that an increase in
the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff, in and
of itself, constitutes a new material issue, particularly
when, as here, the allegations giving rise to the addi-
tional damages are substantively identical to those set
forth in the original complaint. Accordingly, we con-
clude that the court correctly determined that the 2023
amendment did not interject new material issues into
the case and, therefore, did not extinguish the defen-
dant’s default.
B
Alternatively, the defendant claims that, even if the
2023 amendment did not extinguish the default, the
court abused its discretion by not setting aside the
default for good cause shown pursuant to Practice Book
§ 17-42.
Practice Book § 17-42 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A
motion to set aside a default where no judgment has
been rendered may be granted by the judicial authority
for good cause shown upon such terms as it may
impose. . . .’’ It is well established that ‘‘[the] determi-
nation of whether to set aside [a] default is within the
discretion of the trial court . . . [and] such a determi-
nation will not be disturbed unless that discretion has
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been abused or where injustice will result.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Raffy’s Café I,
LLC, 173 Conn. App. 193, 203, 163 A.3d 672 (2017). ‘‘In
reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discre-
tion, great weight is given to the trial court’s decision
and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of
its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial court’s
ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it
did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sessa v. Prov-
ince, 98 Conn. App. 564, 566, 910 A.2d 992 (2006), cert.
denied, 281 Conn. 912, 916 A.2d 51 (2007). ‘‘In the exer-
cise of its discretion, the trial court may consider not
only the presence of mistake, accident, inadvertence,
misfortune or other reasonable cause . . . factors
such as [t]he seriousness of the default, its duration,
the reasons for it and the degree of contumacy involved
. . . but also, the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing whether the delay has caused prejudice to the non-
defaulting party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Johnson v. Raffy’s Café I, LLC, supra, 203.
As we previously stated, in her motion to set aside
the default, the defendant took the position that the
default had been effectively extinguished by the filing
of the 2023 amendment. She argued in the alternative,
however, that, if the court were to conclude otherwise,
it nonetheless should set aside the default for good
cause shown. In arguing that good cause existed, the
defendant asserted in her motion only that the plaintiff
was not prejudiced by her delay in pleading because
the plaintiff could have moved for judgment ‘‘in 2021
or 2022 . . . but chose not to.’’ The court, in denying
the defendant’s motion, made no express findings with
respect to the defendant’s alternative argument.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused
its discretion in failing to set aside the default pursuant
to Practice Book § 17-42 because, she argues, ‘‘it should
have been clear’’ to the court that the ‘‘circumstances
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. . . warranted the opening of the default’’ for good
cause shown. In asserting that good cause existed to
set aside the default, the defendant reiterates on appeal
her argument before the trial court that the plaintiff
was not prejudiced by the delay in pleading.14 We are
not persuaded.
14
The defendant also argues in her appellate brief that good cause existed
to set aside the default because ‘‘there [was] no contumacy on the defen-
dant’s part . . . she simply wanted to get the backup for the charges,’’
which we interpret as an argument that she delayed responding to the
plaintiff’s complaint only because she was waiting on documentation to
substantiate the water charges. The defendant’s counsel, however, did not
raise such an argument either in the defendant’s motion to set aside the
default or during oral argument before the trial court. Rather, the defendant’s
counsel appeared to take an entirely different position during argument
before the trial court, as he suggested that the delay was because the
defendant did not feel that the damages sought by the plaintiff prior to the
2023 amendment were worth litigating. Thus, the trial court was not apprised
of the defendant’s position, raised for the first time on appeal, that the
reason for the delay was due to the plaintiff’s alleged failure to provide her
with supporting documentation for its water charges, and the plaintiff was
not given the opportunity to respond to this argument before the trial court.
See Duso v. Groton, 228 Conn. App. 390, 419–20, 325 A.3d 295 (‘‘to permit
a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it
is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—
would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court
and the opposing party’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted,
350 Conn. 933, 327 A.3d 385 (2024). Moreover, apart from the defendant’s
unsupported assertion in her special defense that she made ‘‘numerous
demands’’ for written documentation, the record is devoid of any evidence
demonstrating that she actually made such a request or that she ever indi-
cated to the plaintiff or the court that such documentation was necessary
for her to respond to the pleadings. Because we are in no position to assess
the defendant’s factual assertions when there is no evidence in the record
to support them, we conclude that we cannot address this argument because
of an inadequate record. See Duso v. Groton, supra, 420.
The defendant’s appellate brief also asserts, without further explanation,
that the circumstances establishing good cause included the fact that she
had a pending counterclaim and that new counsel had filed an appearance
one week prior. The defendant, however, offers no legal authority for her
contention that such factors are controlling to a court’s consideration of
whether to set aside a default. Moreover, the defendant fails to engage in
any substantive analysis regarding how those alleged facts established good
cause to set aside the default, which was entered more than two years prior
to the filing of both the defendant’s counterclaim and her new counsel’s
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Although the defendant was defaulted for failure to
plead in April, 2021, she did not take any action to
address that default until December 15, 2023, when she
filed a motion to set it aside, just three days before the
scheduled hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for judg-
ment. The defendant failed to offer any meaningful
explanation, either before the trial court or on appeal,
regarding her initial failure to plead or why she waited
nearly three years after the default was entered to file
a motion to set it aside. Accordingly, even assuming
the defendant is correct that her delay in pleading did
not cause prejudice to the plaintiff,15 her claim fails
simply because her motion did not allege any facts
demonstrating that good cause existed to set aside the
default that she had failed to address for nearly three
years. See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Weinbaum,
219 Conn. App. 597, 612–13, 295 A.3d 1045 (2023) (court
did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to set
aside default when defendant ‘‘did not provide any
meaningful explanation for her failure to plead on time’’
and therefore failed to demonstrate good cause); Chevy
Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Avidon, 161 Conn. App. 822,
833–34, 129 A.3d 757 (2015) (defendant failed to demon-
strate good cause to open default when defendant’s
appearance. ‘‘[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improp-
erly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis,
rather than mere abstract assertion, is required . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 748, 183 A.3d
611 (2018). Accordingly, we decline to consider these issues in our review
of the defendant’s claim. See, e.g., State v. Hines, 165 Conn. App. 1, 23 n.15,
138 A.3d 994 (declining to review defendant’s argument where he failed to
offer any legal authority to support argument), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 920,
137 A.3d 764 (2016).
15
The plaintiff contends that it was prejudiced by the delay in pleading
in light of ‘‘the time, fees, and costs associated’’ with its ‘‘significant efforts
to craft a global settlement from the time the default entered . . . until the
plaintiff filed its motion for judgment . . . .’’ During oral argument before
this court, however, the plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that, because there
was an annual 18 percent statutory interest rate on the unpaid water liens,
the defendant’s claim that the delay did not prejudice the plaintiff ‘‘admittedly
. . . might be true . . . .’’ See General Statutes § 49-72.
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counsel ‘‘did not provide any explanation for the defen-
dant’s initial failure to plead . . . or give a reason as
to why [he] waited almost seven months to file a motion
to open the default’’); Snowdon v. Grillo, 114 Conn.
App. 131, 141–42, 968 A.2d 984 (2009) (court did not
abuse its discretion in denying motion to set aside
default filed day of hearing in damages, and four months
after default was entered, when ‘‘[t]he only reason for
failing to plead offered by the [defendant] . . . did not
rise to the level of good cause’’); Merritt v. Fagan, 78
Conn. App. 590, 595–96, 828 A.2d 685 (court did not
abuse its discretion in denying motion to set aside
default filed on day of scheduled hearing in damages
and four months after default was entered), cert.
denied, 266 Conn. 916, 833 A.2d 467 (2003).
The defendant has not provided a meaningful expla-
nation for her initial failure to plead or for the lengthy
delay in addressing the default; therefore, she has failed
to demonstrate that good cause existed to set aside the
default. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s
motion to set aside the default.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court improp-
erly relied on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt in rendering
the judgments. The defendant argues that because she
objected to the amount of debt, the court was precluded
from relying on the plaintiff’s affidavit pursuant to Prac-
tice Book § 23-18 (a).
Practice Book § 23-18 (a) provides in relevant part
that, in any foreclosure action, ‘‘where no defense as
to the amount of the . . . debt is interposed, such debt
may be proved by . . . the affidavit of the plaintiff or
other person familiar with the indebtedness . . . .’’
‘‘[Section] 23-18 (a) provides plaintiffs with an efficient
method of meeting their burden to establish the amount
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of the debt if no defense is interposed. Although it
is the defendant’s burden to sufficiently interpose a
defense to the claimed amount of the debt, once a
defense is interposed, the burden remains on the plain-
tiff to prove the amount of the debt. . . . In other
words, once the defendant has sufficiently interposed
a defense as to the amount of the debt, the plaintiff is
required to satisfy its burden under the Connecticut
Code of Evidence, without the benefit of § 23-18 (a).’’
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, 347
Conn. 155, 176, 296 A.3d 157 (2023). ‘‘[A] trial court’s
legal determination of whether . . . § 23-18 (a) applies
is a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 164.

It is well established, however, that a mere pro forma
objection to the amount of debt is insufficient to render
Practice Book § 23-18 (a) inapplicable. ‘‘[T]o preclude
the admission of an affidavit of debt pursuant to . . .
§ 23-18 (a) to establish the amount of . . . debt, a
defense to the . . . debt must concern the amount of
the debt. . . . [Our] case law [makes] clear that a
defense challenging the amount of the debt must be
actively made to prevent the application of § 23-18 (a).
. . . A defense is insufficient if it focuses on matters
that are ancillary to the amount of the debt, such as
whether the loan is in default, which is a matter of
liability, or [matters] that attack the credibility of the
affiant or defects in the execution of the affidavit itself.
. . . Additionally, a defense to the amount of the debt
must be based on some articulated legal reason or fact.
. . . A defendant not only must object to the amount
of the debt but must specifically object as to why the
amount of the debt is incorrect: for example, whether
late charges should have been waived or money had
been advanced for taxes.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
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164–65; see also, e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Chai-
nani, 174 Conn. App. 476, 487–88, 166 A.3d 670 (2017)
(claim of insufficient knowledge to admit or deny
amount of debt, and denial that debt was in default,
which went to liability, were not defenses to amount
of debt).

On appeal, the defendant argues that she objected
to the amount of the debt in her disclosure of defense,
special defense, and at the December 18, 2023 hearing.
The defendant’s argument is belied by the record, which
reveals that the defenses she interposed to the debt did
not specifically challenge the amount of the debt.16 The
alleged objections in her disclosure of defense and spe-
cial defense were more analogous to claims of insuffi-
cient knowledge to admit or deny the amount of debt
than specific objections, based on some articulated
legal reason or fact, as to why the amount of the debt
was incorrect. And, although the defendant’s counsel
objected to the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt at the Decem-
ber 18, 2023 hearing, he merely stated that the defendant
‘‘do[es] object to the debt, obviously.’’ The defendant’s
counsel did not elaborate on his objection or explain
why the plaintiff’s affidavit was incorrect, and he did
16
In her disclosure of defense, the defendant asserted, inter alia, that the
‘‘plaintiff’s bills for water are arbitrary and capricious’’ because she was not
a member of the plaintiff and, therefore, ‘‘not privy’’ to how the charges
were calculated. Similarly, in her special defense, the defendant asserted
that the water charges were ‘‘imposed . . . in an arbitrary and capricious
manner’’ on the basis that she ‘‘never received written documentation sup-
porting or substantiating the charges.’’
We note additionally that the defendant’s other disclosed defenses chal-
lenged the plaintiff’s standing to foreclose on the water liens and, in filing
her answer and special defense, the defendant denied all liability with respect
to the unpaid fees. The defendant’s counsel repeatedly represented to the
court at the December 18, 2023 hearing that the defendant’s disclosed
defenses and special defense went to the merits of the case, rather than to
the amount of damages. See, e.g., Busconi v. Dighello, 39 Conn. App. 753,
771–72, 668 A.2d 716 (1995) (defense to liability for debt is not defense to
amount), cert. denied, 236 Conn. 903, 670 A.2d 321 (1996).
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not request an opportunity to be heard further on the
matter.
The defendant, in conclusory fashion, asserts on
appeal that those objections precluded the court from
relying on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt pursuant to
Practice Book § 23-18 (a). The defendant, however, fails
to provide any substantive or legal analysis regarding
whether those objections were sufficient to render § 23-
18 (a) inapplicable under the controlling precedent.17
This court ‘‘repeatedly ha[s] stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief.
. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . For a reviewing court
to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly
and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. State, 230
Conn. App. 524, 530, 330 A.3d 278 (2025). Accordingly,
we conclude that the defendant’s claim is inadequately
briefed, and we therefore decline to review it.
The judgments are affirmed and the case is remanded
for the purpose of setting new sale dates.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
17
In addition, the defendant fails to address, let alone adequately brief,
whether she could properly challenge the amount of the debt by way of her
disclosed defense and special defense, particularly when she was in default
for failure to plead and asserted her special defense in an answer that was
not timely filed. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, supra,
347 Conn. 170 n.5 (acknowledging this court’s holding in Bank of America,
N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App. 486, that defendant may challenge
amount of debt by way of special defense but noting disagreement among
trial courts and expressly declining ‘‘to address the validity of pleading a
special defense related to the amount of mortgage debt owed’’); see also,
e.g., Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Avidon, supra, 161 Conn. App. 836–37
(holding that trial court, in its discretion, may refuse to give effect to defen-
dant’s untimely filed answer and special defenses).