Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

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Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

THOMAS T. ANDERSON ET AL. v. REEL
HOSPITALITY, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 47799)
Seeley, Westbrook and Norcott, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs, who had been employed as servers at a restaurant owned
and operated by the defendants, appealed from the trial court’s judgment
granting in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the count
of their complaint alleging violations of the applicable wage regulation (§ 31-
62-E3). They claimed that the court improperly determined that a violation
of the recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3 of the regulations did not,
by law, give rise to a private right of action. Held:
The trial court properly granted in part the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, as this court’s conclusion in Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC
(219 Conn. App. 648) that the requirements set forth in § 31-62-E3 of the
regulations are directory and do not give rise to a private cause of action
was dispositive of the plaintiffs’ appeal.
Argued May 27—officially released July 8, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the defendants’ alleged
violations of minimum wage laws and regulations, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, and transferred to the Com-
plex Litigation Docket; thereafter, the court, Noble, J.,
granted in part the motions for summary judgment filed
by the plaintiffs and the defendants and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Richard E. Hayber, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Allison P. Dearington, with whom were David R.
Golder and Danielle Sturgeon, for the appellees (defen-
dants).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The plaintiffs, Thomas T. Anderson1 and
Rosemarie Taylor, appeal from the summary judgment
1
Thomas T. Anderson, who was formerly known as Thomas T. McDougle,
subsequently obtained a change of name decree from the Hartford Probate
Court and is now known as Cirilla Theodore Anderson.
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rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants,
Reel Hospitality, LLC; Dakota of Rocky Hill, LLC;2 and
David Melincoff. In this certified class action, which
was brought by the plaintiffs, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, and alleged violations of
state minimum wage regulations; see General Statutes
§ 31-60 (b); see also Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31-62-
E1 et seq. (March 8, 2015);3 the court rendered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to
count one of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which
alleged that the defendants had violated § 31-62-E3 of
the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies (regula-
tions) by, inter alia, failing to record on a weekly basis
the amount claimed as a tip credit for each server as
a separate item in the wage record. On appeal, the
plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined,
as a matter of law, that a violation of the recordkeeping
requirements in § 31-62-E3 of the regulations does not
give rise to a private cause of action. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following undisputed factual and procedural his-
tory, as set forth by the court, Noble, J., in its memoran-
dum of decision granting the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in part as to count one of the plain-
tiffs’ amended complaint, or as established by the
record, and construed in the light most favorable to the
2
Dakota of Rocky Hill, LLC, is a subsidiary of Reel Hospitality, LLC.
3
‘‘Pursuant to Connecticut wage laws, an employer may claim a credit
for gratuities received by service employees in the restaurant industry as a
percentage of the minimum fair wage (tip credit) it would otherwise be
required to pay, and the Labor Commissioner . . . acting through the
Department of Labor . . . is tasked with adopting regulations regarding
the tip credit. See General Statutes § 31-60 (b); see also Regs., Conn. State
Agencies § 31-62-E1 et seq. (March 8, 2015).’’ (Footnote omitted.) Nettleton
v. C & L Diners, LLC, 219 Conn. App. 648, 652, 296 A.3d 173 (2023). Unless
otherwise indicated, all citations and references to § 31-62-E1 et seq. of
the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies are to the version of the
regulations updated to March 8, 2015, which were in effect at the time of
the underlying events.
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plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties, is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. ‘‘This action4 was commenced
by the plaintiffs on January 21, 2020,5 and an amended
complaint was filed on February 24, 2020 . . . . In
their [amended] complaint, the plaintiffs allege the fol-
lowing facts. They were servers in a restaurant in Rocky
Hill . . . called Dakota’s Steakhouse (restaurant).6
Taylor worked in the restaurant from October, 2015,
through approximately early 2018. Anderson worked in
the restaurant from August, 2015, through July, 2019.
The job duties of both [of the] plaintiffs as servers
involved serving food and beverages to patrons at tables
and booths in the restaurant area. The plaintiffs allege
that they and other servers performed significant
amounts of nonservice duties without the possibility
for earning tips for such work and were not paid the
minimum wage rate for this nonservice work. [Reel
Hospitality, LLC, and Dakota of Rocky Hill, LLC] . . .
are the owners and operators of the restaurant and the
employers of its employees, including the plaintiffs.
. . . Melincoff is the owner of Reel Hospitality, [LLC],
and Dakota [of Rocky Hill, LLC], manages and controls
both, and is the employer of all servers who work at the
restaurant, including the plaintiffs. In their [amended]
complaint, the plaintiffs sought certification to sue as
representative parties on behalf of a class of servers
4
Prior to commencing the underlying class action in the Superior Court,
the plaintiffs initially had commenced an action against Dakota of Rocky
Hill, LLC, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut,
alleging claims under federal and state minimum wage laws. See McDougle
v. Dakota of Rocky Hill, LLC, Docket No. 3:17-CV-00245 (SRU), 2019 WL
4761446 (D. Conn. September 30, 2019) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification). On January 6, 2020, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’
federal claims without prejudice to the plaintiffs refiling their state law
claims in state court.
5
The record reflects that Reel Hospitality, LLC, and Melincoff were served
with process on January 21, 2020, but that Dakota of Rocky Hill, LLC, was
not served until January 30, 2020.
6
The restaurant is owned and operated by the defendants.
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similarly situated pursuant to Practice Book §§ 9-7 and
9-8.
‘‘In the first count of their [amended] complaint, the
plaintiffs allege [that] the defendants violated [§ 31-62-
E3 (b) and (c) of the regulations]7 by failing to record
on a weekly basis the amount claimed as a tip credit8
for each server ‘as a separate item in the wage record
. . . and by failing to obtain signed weekly tip state-
ments from the servers attesting that [the server] has
received in gratuities the amount claimed as credit for
part of the minimum fair wage.’ . . . This count con-
tains the only claims against Melincoff and Reel Hospi-
tality, [LLC]. In the second count, the plaintiffs allege
that Dakota [of Rocky Hill, LLC] violated [§ 31-62-E4
of the regulations]9 because it assigned nonservice work
to its servers without segregating the time spent on
7
Section 31-62-E3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘Gratuities shall be recognized as constituting a part
of the minimum fair wage when all of the following provisions are complied
with . . . (b) the amount received in gratuities claimed as credit for part
of the minimum fair wage shall be recorded on a weekly basis as a separate
item in the wage record even though payment is made more frequently, and
(c) each employer claiming credit for gratuities as part of the minimum fair
wage paid to any employee shall obtain weekly a statement signed by the
employee attesting that he has received in gratuities the amount claimed
as credit for part of the minimum fair wage. Such statement shall contain
the week ending date of the payroll week for which credit is claimed. . . .’’
8
As discussed in footnote 3 of this opinion, a ‘‘tip credit’’ is ‘‘a credit [an
employer may claim] for gratuities received by service employees in the
restaurant industry as a percentage of the minimum fair wage . . . it would
otherwise be required to pay . . . .’’ Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, 219
Conn. App. 648, 652, 296 A.3d 173 (2023); see also Rodriguez v. Kaiaffa,
LLC, 337 Conn. 248, 259 n.11, 253 A.3d 13 (2020).
9
Section 31-62-E4 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which
was repealed effective September 24, 2020, provides: ‘‘If an employee per-
forms both service and non-service duties, and the time spent on each is
definitely segregated and so recorded, the allowance for gratuities as permit-
ted as part of the minimum fair wage may be applied to the hours worked
in the service category. If an employee performs both service and non-
service duties and the time spent on each cannot be definitely segregated
and so recorded, or is not definitely segregated and so recorded, no allow-
ances for gratuities may be applied as part of the minimum fair wage.’’
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nonservice work from the time spent on service work
and failed to pay its servers the full minimum wage for
all [nonservice] hours worked. The plaintiffs allege that
both violations resulted in their being underpaid
because they did not receive the full minimum wage
for the time they performed nonservice duties. The
defendants filed an answer with special defenses in
which they allege[d] that the plaintiffs’ [amended] com-
plaint fail[ed] to state a cause of action upon which
relief [could] be granted . . . . On April 8, 2021, the
court, Moukawsher, J., certified a class action of servers
who worked in the restaurant.’’ (Citation omitted; foot-
notes added; footnote omitted.)
On November 10, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for summary judgment accompanied by a supporting
memorandum of law and several exhibits, and, on Janu-
ary 6, 2022, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment accompanied by a supporting memorandum
of law and several exhibits. In their motion for summary
judgment, the defendants argued that they were entitled
to summary judgment as to both counts of the amended
complaint and asserted, inter alia, that, because § 31-
62-E3 (b) and (c) of the regulations is directory rather
than mandatory, the regulation does not create a private
cause of action.10 The plaintiffs and the defendants each
filed a memorandum in opposition to the other party’s
motion for summary judgment on January 27, 2022. In
their objection, the plaintiffs argued in relevant part
that no courts have adopted the position that § 31-62-
E3 of the regulations does not create a private cause
of action and that the plaintiffs have a private right of
action to enforce this regulation.
10
The plaintiffs asserted in their motion for summary judgment, which is
not at issue in this appeal, that the defendants had failed to comply with
§§ 31-62-E3 and 31-62-E4 of the regulations and asked the court to render
summary judgment in their favor on their claims brought pursuant to those
regulations.
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The court heard argument on the cross motions for
summary judgment at a remote hearing held on March
28, 2022, and took the matters under advisement. On
July 26, 2022, the court issued a memorandum of deci-
sion granting the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment in part as to count one of the amended complaint
alleging that the defendants had violated § 31-62-E3 (b)
and (c) of the regulations, and granting, in part, the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to count
two of the amended complaint alleging that Dakota of
Rocky Hill, LLC, had violated § 31-62-E4 of the regula-
tions.11 In so doing, the court conducted a detailed legal
analysis to determine whether the requirements in the
pertinent regulation are mandatory or directory and,
after determining that they are directory, concluded, as
a matter of law, that a violation of the requirements in
§ 31-62-E3 of the regulations does not give rise to a
private cause of action. This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs’ sole claim on appeal is that the trial
court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that a
violation of the requirements in § 31-62-E3 of the regula-
tions does not give rise to a private cause of action.
In support of their claim, they assert that (1) General
Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 31-68 (a) (1)12 and § 31-62-E3 of
the regulations establish a private right of enforcement
for violations of the recordkeeping requirements in the
regulation, (2) certain language in Public Act 22-13413
11
The court’s decision rendering summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs as to count two of the amended complaint is not at issue in this appeal.
12
‘‘General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 31-68 (a) (1) provides for a private
cause of action ‘[i]f any employee is paid by his or her employer less than
the minimum fair wage . . . to which he or she is entitled under [the mini-
mum wage statutes] or by virtue of a minimum fair wage order . . . .’ ’’
Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, 219 Conn. App. 648, 664 n.11, 296 A.3d
173 (2023).
13
Public Act 22-134, § 1, amended subsection (d) of § 31-60 by adding
subdivision (4), which provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding any other law or regula-
tion, any claim brought under this subsection, section 31-68 as it relates to
gratuities as part of the minimum wage or section 31-62-E3 of the regulations
of Connecticut state agencies filed after September 24, 2022, shall be adjudi-
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demonstrates an intention of the legislature for § 31-
62-E3 of the regulations to give rise to a private cause
of action, (3) this court, in Nettleton v. C & L Diners,
LLC, 219 Conn. App. 648, 296 A.3d 173 (2023), did not
conclude that § 31-62-E3 of the regulations does not
give rise to a private cause of action, and (4) the trial
court improperly determined that § 31-62-E3 of the reg-
ulations is directory.14 The defendants respond by
asserting, inter alia, that, in Nettleton ‘‘[t]his [c]ourt
analyzed the same issue and the same arguments and
soundly decided that there is no private right of action
under [§ 31-62-E3 of the regulations],’’ and that one
panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of
another panel in the absence of en banc consideration
of the plaintiffs’ appeal. We agree with the defendants
that our resolution of this appeal is controlled by Net-
tleton.
cated, solely, under section 31-60-2 of the regulations of Connecticut state
agencies effective on September 24, 2020, and any amendments thereto.’’
The amendment, thus, now expressly provides for a private right of action.
To the extent that the plaintiffs’ principal appellate brief can be interpreted
as raising a claim that Public Act 22-134 applies retroactively, we deem any
such claim abandoned in light of the plaintiffs’ express clarification in their
appellate reply brief that they ‘‘never made that argument’’ and, therefore,
that the issue should be ‘‘disregarded by this court.’’ See, e.g., McDonnell
v. Roberts, 224 Conn. App. 388, 398 n.7, 312 A.3d 1103 (2024) (declining to
consider briefed arguments in support of claim that was ‘‘expressly aban-
doned’’ by appellant at oral argument); Ross v. Commissioner of Correction,
217 Conn. App. 286, 289 n.1, 288 A.3d 1055 (same), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
915, 290 A.3d 374 (2023).
14
Although case law concerning whether a statute gives rise to a private
cause of action often involves a claim that such a cause of action is implicit
in a statute; see, e.g., Haworth Country Club, LLC v. United Bank, 226 Conn.
App. 665, 681, 319 A.3d 146 (determination of whether statute implicitly
gives rise to cause of action ‘‘is dependent on a three part test’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 914, 324 A.3d 791 (2024);
the plaintiffs do not claim that § 31-62-E3 of the regulations implicitly gives
rise to a private cause of action. Rather, they claim that the express language
of § 31-68 (a) stating that an employee who is paid ‘‘less than the minimum
fair wage to which he or she is entitled . . . by virtue of a wage order . . .
shall recover in a civil action,’’ ‘‘specifically provides’’ for such a cause of
action by way of the pertinent regulations.
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As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard of
review. ‘‘The general principles governing a trial court’s
decision on a motion for summary judgment are well
established. On appeal, [w]e must decide whether the
trial court erred in determining that there was no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . .
Because the trial court rendered judgment for the
[defendant] as a matter of law, our review is plenary
and we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclu-
sions are legally and logically correct and find support
in the facts that appear in the record. . . . Practice
Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and
any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In decid-
ing a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. . . . A material fact is a fact that will
make a difference in the outcome of the case. . . .
Once the moving party has presented evidence in sup-
port of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing
party must present evidence that demonstrates the exis-
tence of some disputed factual issue. . . . The movant
has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such
issues but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise
sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an
issue of fact does exist. . . . To oppose a motion for
summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must
recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated
in the movant’s affidavits and documents. . . . In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, [i]ssue-find-
ing, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the
procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the
trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of mate-
rial fact, but rather to determine whether any such
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Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

issues exist.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Schimenti Construction Co., LLC v.
Schimenti, 217 Conn. App. 224, 234–35, 288 A.3d
1038 (2023).
Next, we set forth the relevant background regarding
the tip credit regulations, as summarized by this court
in Nettleton: ‘‘ ‘In 1958 . . . the [Department of Labor
(department)] issued a revised wage order for restau-
rant employees that for the first time recognized that
gratuities could count toward the minimum wage under
certain circumstances. . . . The 1958 wage order con-
tained definitions of service and nonservice restaurant
employees . . . that are substantially identical to those
presently contained in § 31-62-E2 (c) and (d) of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. . . . It also
provided that [g]ratuities received by a service
employee may be allowed as part of the minimum fair
wage . . . . [I]n 1980, the legislature replaced the dis-
cretionary phrase [the Labor Commissioner (commis-
sioner)] may recognize, as part of the minimum fair
wage, gratuities . . . for persons employed in the hotel
and restaurant industry . . . General Statutes (Rev. to
1979) § 31-60 (b); with the mandatory language [the
commissioner] shall recognize . . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis in
original.) Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219
Conn. App. 665–66.
‘‘Currently, ‘[§] 31-60 (b) begins by authorizing the
commissioner to adopt such regulations . . . as may
be appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the mini-
mum wage statutes]. It concludes by providing that
[t]he commissioner may provide, in such regulations,
modifications of the minimum fair wage herein estab-
lished . . . for such special cases or classes of cases
as the commissioner finds appropriate to prevent cur-
tailment of employment opportunities, avoid undue
hardship and safeguard the minimum fair wage herein
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established.’ . . . Thus, ‘the statutory language rea-
sonably can be read to delegate to the department the
authority to carve out exceptions to the tip credit in
order to accomplish the remedial purpose of the mini-
mum wage law, which is to require the payment of fair
and just wages.’ . . .
‘‘We now turn to the regulations that were in effect
when the plaintiff[s] [were] employed by the defen-
dant[s]. Section 31-62-E3 of the regulations provided in
relevant part: ‘Gratuities shall be recognized as consti-
tuting a part of the minimum fair wage when all of the
following provisions are complied with . . . (b) the
amount received in gratuities claimed as credit for part
of the minimum fair wage shall be recorded on a weekly
basis as a separate item in the wage record even though
payment is made more frequently, and (c) each
employer claiming credit for gratuities as part of the
minimum fair wage paid to any employee shall obtain
weekly a statement signed by the employee attesting
that he has received in gratuities the amount claimed
as credit for part of the minimum fair wage. Such state-
ment shall contain the week ending date of the payroll
week for which credit is claimed. Gratuities received
in excess of twenty-three percent of the minimum fair
wage . . . per hour, need not be reported or recorded
for the purpose of this regulation.’ ’’15 (Citations omit-
ted.) Id., 666–67.
15
We note that, after the commencement of this action, the department
‘‘posted . . . amended tip credit regulations, effective September 24, 2020.
See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31-62-E1 et seq. (September 24, 2020).
The department repealed § 31-62-E4 of the regulations and added § 31-62-
E3a of the regulations, which provides that an employer is not required to
segregate a service employee’s time spent performing nonservice duties
unless the employee performs such nonservice duties for more than two
hours or for more than 20 percent of the employee’s shift, whichever is
less. The department also amended § 31-62-E2 of the regulations, defining
‘duties incidental to such service’ as the performance of twenty-three specific
tasks; see Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31-62-E2 (d) (September 24, 2020);
and § 31-62-E3 of the regulations, changing the recordkeeping requirements
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) by replacing the weekly reporting of
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Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

We turn next to an examination of this court’s deci-
sion in Nettleton16 concerning § 31-62-E3 of the regula-
tions. Similar to the present case, the plaintiff in Net-
tleton, who worked as a server at a restaurant operated
by the defendant employer, brought an action based on
violations of, inter alia, the recordkeeping requirements
of § 31-62-E3 of the regulations. See id., 652. One of the
issues raised in that appeal was whether the trial court
properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the claims she brought under § 31-62-E3 of
the regulations. Id., 664. As to that issue, the defendant
employer specifically argued that ‘‘§ 31-62-E3 of the reg-
ulations is directory and, therefore, its noncompliance
[with that provision] does not invalidate the tip credit
and give rise to a private cause of action.’’ Id., 667. In
addressing the issue, this court first noted that, in light
of the language of § 31-68 (a), ‘‘[w]hether the plaintiff
was paid less than the minimum fair wage to which she
was entitled ‘by virtue of’ § 31-62-E3 of the regulations
turns on whether § 31-62-E3’s recordkeeping require-
ments are mandatory or directory. That is, if the
recordkeeping requirements are directory, the defen-
dant’s noncompliance would not invalidate the tip
credit and, therefore, the plaintiff would not have been
paid less than the minimum fair wage to which she was
entitled.’’ Id., 664 n.11.
This court then construed ‘‘the wage statutes and
regulations’’ pursuant to the rules governing statutory
interpretation, for the purpose of determining whether
the recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3 of the
regulations are mandatory or directory. Id., 664–65. In
doing so, this court applied the six factors endorsed by
gratuities with reporting ‘on a daily, weekly, or bi-weekly basis.’ See Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 31-62-E3 (September 24, 2020).’’ (Footnote omitted.)
Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App. 659–60.
16
We observe that the trial court’s decision, which is dated July 26, 2022,
was made prior to, and thus without the benefit of, this court’s decision in
Nettleton, which was released on June 6, 2023.
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our Supreme Court in Electrical Contractors, Inc. v.
Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, 314 Conn. 749,
757, 104 A.3d 713 (2014).17 After applying those factors,
this court concluded that, ‘‘in balancing all the relevant
factors . . . the recordkeeping requirements in § 31-
62-E3 (b) and (c) of the regulations are directory and,
therefore . . . the defendant’s noncompliance with
those requirements does not invalidate the tip credit
and does not give rise to a private cause of action.’’
Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn.
App. 678.

We conclude that this court’s reasoning and decision
in Nettleton is precisely on point and therefore controls
the disposition of this appeal. The plaintiffs argue that
this court’s decision in Nettleton did not hold that viola-
tions of the recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3
of the regulations ‘‘can never form the basis of a private
right of action’’ because the decision was ‘‘limited to
the facts’’ of that case and, pursuant to the separation
of powers doctrine, the ‘‘judiciary simply does not have
17
These six factors are: ‘‘(1) whether the statute expressly invalidates
actions that fail to comply with its requirements or, in the alternative,
whether the statute by its terms imposes a different penalty; (2) whether
the requirement is stated in affirmative terms, unaccompanied by negative
language; (3) whether the requirement at issue relates to a matter of sub-
stance or one of convenience; (4) whether the legislative history, the circum-
stances surrounding the statute’s enactment and amendment, and the full
legislative scheme evince an intent to impose a mandatory requirement; (5)
whether holding the requirement to be mandatory would result in an unjust
windfall for the party seeking to enforce the duty or, in the alternative,
whether holding it to be directory would deprive that party of any legal
recourse; and (6) whether compliance is reasonably within the control of
the party that bears the obligation, or whether the opposing party can stymie
such compliance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nettleton v. C & L
Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App. 668. In the present case, the plaintiffs
claim on appeal that the trial court improperly applied these factors in
reaching its determination that no private right of action exists. In light of
our determination that Nettleton controls our resolution of this appeal, we
need not address this claim.
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Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

that power.’’ On the basis of our review of Nettleton,
18

we are convinced that this court’s conclusion that ‘‘the
recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3 (b) and (c)
of the regulations are directory’’; (emphasis added)
Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App.
678; was not limited to the facts of that case. Indeed, that
conclusion does not contain any qualifying language
indicating that it was limited to the particular circum-
stances of that case, and this court explicitly stated
that ‘‘we agree[d] with the defendant’s claim that the
recordkeeping requirements are directory . . . .’’19 Id.,
678 n.14. Moreover, this court’s determination in Net-
tleton that noncompliance with the recordkeeping
requirements of § 31-62-E3 of the regulations ‘‘does not
give rise to a private cause of action’’; (emphasis
added) id., 678; was predicated on an interpretation of
the regulation and a legal conclusion that such require-
ments are directory. See id., 668–78. That determina-
tion, therefore, was not limited to the facts of Nettleton
in that it was based on a legal analysis of whether
the pertinent regulation is directory or mandatory. See
18
To the extent that the plaintiffs assert that Nettleton did not hold that
§ 31-62-E3 of the regulations does not give rise to a private cause of action,
their assertion has no merit. To the extent that the plaintiffs claim that,
pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary does not have
the power to decide that a regulation does not give rise to a private cause
of action, any such claim is inadequately briefed because the plaintiffs have
failed to cite any relevant legal authority or to provide any legal analysis in
support of this claim. We, therefore, decline to review it. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Dunn v. Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 310–11, 327 A.3d 982 (2024)
(declining to review claim when defendant’s brief contained no meaningful
analysis, no citations to relevant legal principles, and no analysis of how
facts of case related to applicable case law).
19
Although the relevant analysis in Nettleton included some discussion
of the facts, it did so only with respect to two of the six factors that the
court applied in determining that the recordkeeping requirements of § 31-
62-E3 of the regulations are directory. See Nettleton v. C & L Diners, LLC,
supra, 219 Conn. App. 674–78. Our review of Nettleton convinces us that
the resolution of the relevant issue therein was based not on its particular
facts but on whether the recordkeeping requirements of § 31-62-E3 of the
regulations are directory or mandatory. See id., 664 n.11.
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Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289 Conn. 769, 790, 961 A.2d
349 (2008) (recognizing that determination of whether
statutory requirement ‘‘is mandatory or directory . . .
raises a question of statutory interpretation’’); State v.
Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 86, 836 A.2d 224 (2003) (‘‘[t]he
process of statutory interpretation in no way implicates
the fact-finding function of the jury but, rather, presents
a pure question of law’’ (emphasis added)); Starble v.
Inland Wetlands Commission, 183 Conn. App. 280, 286,
192 A.3d 428 (2018) (acknowledging that ‘‘the interpre-
tation of . . . [statutes and] regulations presents a
question of law’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Sosa v. Martin County, 57 F.4th 1297, 1301
(11th Cir.) (‘‘If we treated every factual distinction with
a precedential decision as necessarily material, the doc-
trine of precedent would lose most of its function. . . .
Judges would be freed from the requirement that they
apply the law, so long as they could unearth any factual
discrepancy between binding caselaw and the case they
wanted to decide a different way.’’ (Citation omitted.)),
cert. denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 88, 217 L. Ed. 2d
19 (2023); Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463
F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (‘‘Every case is ‘limited
to its facts,’ if by that phrase one means that the court
based its judgment on the facts presented to it. But
most cases are also decided with reference to some
more general normative principle which extends
beyond the specific circumstances of the case before
the court. Indeed, it is the existence of such broader
norms which distinguishes a decision which is princi-
pled and rational from one which is ad hoc and arbi-
trary.’’).

In summary, the plaintiffs’ sole claim in this appeal
is that the court improperly granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment in part as to count one
of the amended complaint and determined, as a matter
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Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC

of law, that violations of the recordkeeping require-
ments of § 31-62-E3 of the regulations do not give rise
to a private cause of action. A similar claim was raised
in Nettleton, in which this court made a legal determina-
tion that no such private cause of action exists under
the regulations, which are directory. We therefore con-
clude, on the basis of Nettleton, that the trial court
properly determined that the requirements set forth in
§ 31-62-E3 of the regulations are directory and do not
give rise to a private cause of action. See Nettleton v.
C & L Diners, LLC, supra, 219 Conn. App. 678. This
determination is dispositive of the plaintiffs’ appeal.
Because Nettleton is controlling, we need not reach
the other arguments raised by the plaintiffs in support
of their claim regarding § 31-62-E3 of the regulations,
which, in effect, would require us to revisit or to over-
rule Nettleton.20 The plaintiffs did not seek en banc
review of their appeal, and ‘‘it is well established that
one panel of this court cannot overrule the precedent
established by a previous panel’s holding. . . . As we
have often stated, this court’s policy dictates that one
panel should not, on its own, [overrule] the ruling of a
previous panel. [That] may be accomplished only if the
appeal is heard en banc. . . . Prudence, then dictates
that this panel decline to revisit such requests.’’
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Aviles v. Barnhill, 217 Conn. App. 435, 450, 289 A.3d
224 (2023); see In re A. H., 226 Conn. App. 1, 22, 317
A.3d 197 (‘‘[t]he respondent did not seek en banc review
of his appeal; accordingly, we are unable to overturn
our own precedent’’ (footnote omitted)), cert. denied,
20
The plaintiffs do not expressly contend that we should revisit or overrule
Nettleton. Nonetheless, by asking this court to engage in the exact same
legal analysis of § 31-62-E3 of the regulations and to reach a conclusion that
would contradict that of a different panel of this court, the plaintiffs, in
effect, are asking us to revisit or overrule this court’s decision in Nettleton.
For example, in their appellate reply brief, the plaintiffs explicitly argue
that ‘‘Nettleton misapplied the Electrical Contractors, Inc. factors.’’
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349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 784 (2024); State v. White, 215
Conn. App. 273, 305, 283 A.3d 542 (2022) (‘‘[b]ecause
this court is bound to follow the precedent from . . .
other panels of this court, the defendant’s claim that
this court should overrule binding precedent must be
rejected’’), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 918, 291 A.3d 108
(2023). We therefore conclude that the trial court prop-
erly determined, as a matter of law, that a violation of
the recordkeeping requirements in § 31-62-E3 of the
regulations does not give rise to a private cause of
action.21
Accordingly, the court properly granted the defen-
dants’ motion for summary judgment in part as to count
one of the amended complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

21
Because we agree with the defendants that Nettleton controls our resolu-
tion of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to reach any of the alternative
grounds for affirming the trial court’s decision raised by the defendants.